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ABSTRACT 
Since the early 1990s, Morocco has been undergoing a period of political change 
and refonn. At the same time, Morocco witnessed an increased activity of 
organisations of civil society, which have been able to initiate discourses on human 
rights, women's rights and also Berber rights. As a result, political change has been 
associated with increasing political space that has been accorded to these non-state 
actors. By focusing on the relationship between changing features of the Moroccan 
state on the one hand, and increasing civil society activity on the other, this thesis 
aims to answer the question of whether organisations of civil society have constituted 
a factor in their own right that has contributed to political change in Morocco. 
While the general assumption is that increased civil society activity leads to 
changes towards 'democracy', it is aimed to show that this assumption does not 
always hold. Therefore, the concept of civil society will be coupled with that of the 
public sphere, in order to illustrate how increasing activity in the public sphere has an 
impact on policy makers without, however, forcing rulers to embrace full, Westem-
style democracy. Consequently, far from considering the lack of civil society'S 
'democratic' challenge to the regime as a default, it will be shown that this has been 
one of civil society'S most essential features and one which allowed it to rally for 
rights-oriented policies. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is about civil society and the public sphere, and how both 
concepts apply to Morocco. Both concepts are used in order to explain how 
political change occurs as a result of domestic discourses. The research question 
that this thesis aims to answer is whether new organisations of civil society 
constituted a factor in its own right that had contributed to political change in 
Morocco. 
Political change is defined more broadly than the 'formal' aspect of 
democratisation, which is the narrow focus on the negotiation process between 
the monarchy and opposition parties. Instead, being part of what may be called 
'substantive' democratisation, political change in Morocco is understood as 
citizen's increased participation in public affairs, which results in a redefinition 
of the relationship between the governors and the governed. 
In order to examine the research question, it is important to clarify which 
social groups can be considered new, what is meant by the term 'civil society', 
and which concepts are used in this thesis to understand political change. At the 
same time, the question is connected to a number of hypotheses, which will be 
examined in this case study. The first one is connected to the appearance of these 
new groups. Why did they suddenly appear in Morocco? This needs to be 
analysed in relation to the Moroccan political system, and my first hypothesis is 
that they have appeared as a result of the failures of an 'old' political system to 
accommodate social interests and grievances. The second hypothesis concerns 
their impact on the political system. Which realm of the state and its institutions 
is primarily affected by these groups' activities, and why should the state react? 
It is my hypothesis that these groups are able to initiate discourses, which 
challenge the state's hegemony, i.e. the state's discursive presence in civil 
society; ideologically and institutionally. Reacting to this challenge to its 
hegemony, the state uses a variety of strategies: Accommodation, appropriation, 
and the definition of boundaries beyond which a public discourse and a public 
challenge to the state's hegemony, is prohibited. This happens through the state's 
monopoly over the means of coercion. These strategies require the state's 
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engagement in these discourses that challenge the state's hegemony, with the 
exception of the state's use of coercion and direct censorship. The most central 
hypothesis to be tested is, then, whether this participation of the state in 
discourses is changing the state's hegemony, as well. Therefore, as a catalyst for 
political change, this participation is changing the relationship between state and 
society, as well. 
In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, there have been three 
major approaches t.o civil society. The first approach resembles Western images 
of Arab-Islamic society, and believes that Islamic belief systems and patriarchal 
tribal social organisation obstruct values such as tolerance, civic values, and 
personal freedom. Therefore, 'Arab civil society' is considered to be an 
oxymoron. The rise of Islamic revivalist movements and puritans advocating 
Islamic law is understood as Muslim resistance to modernity. A second view has 
become associated with the concept of corporatism, which was borrowed from 
analyses of Latin America. Corporatist tendencies are processes in which the 
state dominates any kind of economic and civic participation: Centralisation; 
one-party rule; pervasive state security establishments; co-optation of 
independent trade unions and other groups that express their independence vis-a-
vis dominant state structures and regimes in place. The third school of thought 
equates civil society with Western-style formal non-governmental organisations 
(NGO) in the private and voluntary sector. In policy circles as well as among 
scholars concerned with democratic transition, it is assumed that these NGOs 
foster political liberalisation and democratisation 'from the bottom up' or 'from 
the grass-roots level.' 1 NGOs' independence vis-a-vis the regimes, and their 
opposition to them, are the defining characteristics of this civil society. 
I Sheila Carapico: Civil Society in Yemen. The Political Economy of Activism in Ml)dem 
Arabia. (Cambridge: Cambridge Uniwrsity Press, 1998), pp. 4-7. 
I 1 
1.1 Objectives 
By linking civil society to the public sphere, this thesis aims to bridge the gap 
between the latter two approaches and account for a reciprocal dialectic between 
state and civil society. In the following sections, of which the aim is to define 
civil society by linking it to the public sphere, it will be illustrated that these two 
approaches fall into two greater paradigms of civil society, of which the roots 
date back to the late 1ih and early 18th century. I have classified them as 'Civil 
Society as Opposition to the State' and as 'Civil Society as Intermediary between 
State and Society.' 
Second, in order to answer the research question, this Ph.D. thesis aims to 
analyse the development of groups of civil society in relation to the state since 
the mid-1980s. It will examine the pre- and post-independence period, in order to 
provide the background for civil society development since the mid-1980s. The 
use of historical material aims at illustrating the existence of an 'old system,' in 
which state-civil society relations existed. It will then be shown that when some 
organisations changed key-aspects of their political activity, and when they 
changed their relation to the state, this prompted the state to change some of its 
strategies of 'containing' these organisations, as well. 
Third, it is the aim of this thesis to show how political change can be 
conceived of through private citizen's commitment to, and engagement in, the 
public sphere. It will be shown that this engagement in the public sphere has 
been possible due to the existence of 'new' organisations of civil society, and it 
is therefore one outcome of civil society's interaction with the state. 
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1.2 Defining Civil Society 
1.2.1 Civil Society as Opposition to the State 
The use of the concept of civil society in transitional politics has been related 
to the analysis of opposition to authoritarian states. According to Guillenno 
O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter a "resurrection of civil society" is likely to 
occur when an initial political opening has taken place. "Once something has 
happened - once the soft-liners have prevailed over the hard-liners, begun to 
extend guarantees for individuals and some rights of contestation, and started to 
negotiate with selected regime opponents - a generalized mobilization is likely to 
occur.,,2 This is reminiscent of classical liberal social contract theories of civil 
society, as they were fonnulated in Adam Ferguson's Essay on the History of 
Civil Society (1767) and Thomas Paine's Rights of Man (1792). Civil society 
became to be seen as a means of defence against potential abuse by political 
leaders. As such, it was a concept for the description of a new European 
civilisation and it expressed this civilisation's consciousness and self-confidence 
as to its own possibilities, in contrast to the absolutist non-productive and non-
inventory state.3 It was linked to the economy, because civil society'S dynamic 
and possibilities came from within the productive sector. In the 19th century, de 
Tocqueville became one of the most explicit theorists of a civil society, which 
should function as counterweight to the state to ensure the freedom of citizens. 
According to de Tocqueville, in pursuit of equality, citizens empowered the state 
2 Guillenno O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). pp. 48-56. 
3 Paine's anarchistic-liberal model has been very famous. Here "the theme of restricting state 
action is pushed almost to its limits" (John Keane: 'Remembering the Dead. Civil Society and the 
State from Hobbes to Marx and Beyond' in John Keane: Democracy and Civil Society (London 
and New York: Verso, 1988), p. 42. As Foley and Edwards rightly point out, another distinction 
may be made between two branches of this "civil society argument." "Ci\'il Society 1," 
chrystallised by Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America (New York: New American 
Library, 1956) puts special emphasis on the ability of associative life in general and the habits ~f 
association in particular to foster patterns of civility in the actions of citizens in a democratic 
polity. The "Civil Society II" argument was best articulated by Jacek Koran and Adam Michnik. 
It was a strategy of resisting Poland's communist regime in the 1980s, and has also been eVident 
in the recent literature on processes of 'democratisation' in Latin America. O'Donnell and 
Schmitter's quotation, cited above, is an example of this, See i\lichael W. ipiL'y and Bob 
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to undertake the widespread provision of public goods. But in doing so, they 
surrendered a measure of liberty, which would allow "the administrati\'e 
suffocation of civil society" and descent into "relations of political 
dependence. ,,4 
In the MENA regIOn, this theoretical identification of civil society as a 
counterweight to the state has been particularly prominent. Guided by normati ve 
assumptions about 'civility', some authors connected civil society directly with a 
pro-democracy movement. According to Ibrahim for example 
The linkage between civil society and democratization should be 
obvious. Democracy after all is a set of rules and institutions of 
governance through a peaceful management of competing groups 
and/or conflicting interests. Thus the normative component of 
'civil society' is essentially the same as that of 'democracy.,5 
The most influential approach to civil society in the Middle East stems from the 
civil society project organised at New York University from 1991-1994 under 
the programme director Augustus Richard Norton, of which the results were 
published in two edited volumes Civil Society in the Middle East. Norton claims 
that there is no direct link between civil society and democracy: "societies do not 
take two tablets of civil society at bedtime and wake up the next morning 
undergoing democratization.,,6 Nevertheless, he contends that a liberal civil 
society provides both the structural underpinning of representative democracy 
and the terrain on which an organised working class can develop. For him, civil 
society is grounded in free economic markets and the quest of the bourgeoisie for 
political differentiation from the state. It is therefore indirectly the force that is 
pushing for democratic transition.7 He argues against the view that civil society 
Edwards: 'The Paradox of Civil Society' in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No.3, July 1996, p. 
39. 
4 John Keane: Civil Society and the State (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 35-36. 
5 Saad Eddin Ibrahim: 'Civil Society and the prospects of democratization in the Arab world' in 
Brynen, Korany, Noble: Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab world, \'01. I 
Theoretical Perspectives. (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienne Publishers. 1995), p. 29, 
6 Augustus Richard Norton: 'Introduction' in Augustus Richard Norton (ed): Ci\il Society in the 
Middle East, Vol. II, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), p. 6. 
7 Augustus Richard Norton: 'Introduction' in Augustus Richard Norton (ed): Ci\i! Society in the 
Middle East, Vol. I (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), p. 7-8. 
14 
is "deficient, corrupt, aggressive, hostile, infiltrated, co-opted, insignificant, or 
absent,',8 claiming that these are general views of Middle Eastern civil society . 
.; 
As he takes on board Edward Shil's principle of 'civility' and 'tolerance',9 the 
Islamic movement does not fit into his concept and remains excluded. 
Civil Society is more than an admixture of various forms of 
association; it also refers to a quality, civility, without which the 
milieu consists of feuding factions, cliques, and cabals. Civility 
implies tolerance, the willingness of individuals to accept 
disparate political views and social attitudes, to accept 
profoundly important idea that there is no right answer. 1 0 
Other authors have criticised this approach. Beckman, for instance, points out 
that as shorthand for all kinds of associative life, civil society tended to generate 
a circular reasoning with regards to democratisation. 
[I]t promotes a dichotomized view of state-society relations which 
obstructs an understanding of the way in which they mutually 
constitute each other; it tends to downplay the existence of a variety 
of civil societies, their internal contradictions, and the fact that they 
are not necessarily supportive of democratization, in a liberal 
11 
sense. 
Thus, if only the features of associative life that are supportive of a liberal-
democratic project are considered civil society proper, then the hypothesis of a 
link between civil society and democracy becomes in mathematical terms an 
identity-function. Moreover, civil society is then put into the static frame of 
predefined values, which obstructs an analysis of the very same features of state-
society relation. Thus, when analysing civil society, one needs to keep in mind 
that generally speaking non-democratic regimes do also have a stratum of 
supportive elements that constitute a political discourse outside the immediate 
8Ibid. p. 8. 
9See Edward Shils: 'The virtue of Civil Society' in Government and Opposition, Vol. 26. No, 1. 
(Winter 1991), pp. 3-20. 
10 Augustus Richard Norton: 'Introduction' in Augustus Richard Norton (ed): Civil Socil'ty in 
the Middle East, Vol. I (Leiden: E.1. Brill, 1995), p. 11-12. 
11 Bjoern Beckman: 'Explaining Democratization: Notes on the Concept of Civil Society' in 
Elisabeth Oezdalga and Sane Persson (ed): Civil Society, Democracy, and the Muslim "'orld. 
(Istanbul: Swedisth Research Institute in Istanbul, 1997), pp. 1-2. 
reach of the state (i.e. civil society). Here civil society may take patriarchal. 
Islamic, Christian, communist, or fascist forms. As Beckman argues: 
Even if we restrict ourselves to looking at groups in society which 
we think have a particular potential for supporting democracy, we 
need to have an open mind on their contradictory and changing 
nature. They may, at different points in time, either be supporti\'e. 
indifferent, or hostile to the democratic project. For instance, a 
group may oppose military dictatorship but may decide to work 
with factions of the military which are considered more 
sympathetic to its group's interests. Most likely, such a line will be 
contested both within the organization and from outside. So, who is 
to be considered part of civil society and who is not? 12 
For the purpose of this thesis, an identification of civil society in this sense 
would be analytically restrictive. It would focus only on those associations that 
are clearly identified as representing an opposition to the state. It would 
consequently produce an analysis in which these associations, through their 
opposition values, contribute to political change, in so far as they would 
constitute a societal core of democratic values. It would thereby provoke a 
representation of civil society within a harmonious model, analytically changing 
the perspective with which this thesis tries to capture the dynamics of state-civil 
society relations. 
1.2.2 Civil Society as an intermediary between state and society 
Authors who do not adhere to a dichotomising view of state-civil society 
relations take a different view. Hegel was the first of these.13 He sought to 
incorporate associations into the activities of the state in an attempt to prevent 
unconstrained liberalism through a recreation of Plato's republic. In contrast to 
his liberal, mostly Anglo-Saxon, contemporaries, Hegel did not believe in the 
hannonious human condition. Instead, he regarded civil society as inherently 
unstable and conflicting, because of the competitive interplay of pri\'ate interests 
\2 km 'b'd ') Bee an, 1 1 . p. -. 
\3Hegel: Philosophy of Right Translated by T.f\1.Knox. (London: Oxford UniHrslty Press. 
1952). pp. 122-155. 
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and market forces. He argued that "civil society cannot remain 'civil' unless it is 
ordered politically, subjected to 'the higher surveillance of the state,,,I'+ 
Similarly, the leading twentieth century writer on civil society, Antonio 
Gramsci, opposed a dichotomous view of civil society and the state. Indeed, 
connecting civil society within Marxist parameters to the superstructure, 
Gramsci views civil society within the realm of the state. Echoing Hegel's ideas 
of state-civil society relations, Gramsci defines civil society as "the political and 
cultural hegemony, which a social group exercises over the whole of society, as 
the ethical content of the state".15 In his view, civil society is dominating and 
preceding the state. The medium of state-power - domination and coercion _ 
needs to be sustained through hegemony.16 Because of this, Gramsci describes 
civil society as the "powerful system of fortresses and earthworks" situated 
behind the state, giving the state its stability and power. 17 The close inter-
relatedness of civil society and the state finds its theoretical concept in the 
'integral state.' Here Gramsci suggests that "by 'State' should be understood not 
only the apparatus of government, but also the 'private' apparatuses of 
'hegemony' or civil society". 18 In another passage, he contends that the state is 
"the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling 
class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the 
active consent of those over whom it rules." 19 This can be summarised with his 
famous statement that the "State = political society + civil society, in other words 
hegemony protected by the armour of coercion"?O It should be noted, however, 
that in this expression, political society takes the function of the conventional 
understanding of the state, i.e. the institutions of state power. Gramsci does not 
14 Keane: Civil Society and the State (London: Verso, 1988), p. 52. 
15 Gramsci quoted in Norberto Bobbio: 'Gramsci and the Concept of Civil Society'. In: John 
Keane: Civil Society and the State. (London: Verso, 1988), p. 84. 
161 will define the concept of hegemony on page 29. 
17 Antonio Gramsci: Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Edited and translated by Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p. 238. 
18 Ibid. p. 261. 
19 Ibid. p. 244. 
20 Ibid, p. 262 
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claim that civil society is part of the state sphere proper,21 but rather that for a 
proper understanding of state power, hegemony and the institutions of civil 
society have to be taken into account. Gramsci' s discussion of the institutions of 
state power, i.e. the state in the conventional understanding, or what he calls in 
various passages 'political society' supports this view. In his view, all powers are 
also subject to hegemony (and civil society), but in different degrees and in the 
following order: 1. legislature, 2. judiciary, 3. executive. Commenting on the 
judiciary as a special case, he contends that "lapses in the administration of 
justice make an especially disastrous impression on the public: the hegemonic 
apparatus is more sensitive in this sector, to which arbitrary actions on the part of 
the police and political administration may also be referred. ,,22 Here, hegemony 
in civil society means that state power is subject to some form of public scrutiny, 
which as a whole determines the character of the integral state, or the state in 
Gramsci's sense. This means, however, that power in the integral state is divided 
into state power proper, i.e. coercion/domination, and hegemony, and cannot be 
conceived of in a simple descending state towards society (top to down) fashion. 
Applying Gramsci's framework of the state to the Middle East, Ayubi argues 
that due to the lack of any class hegemony, politics in the MENA region has 
been characterised not by an orderly process of aggregating demands, but rather 
of acts of capturing the state and acts of resisting to its attempts at controlling the 
populace through its means of administration and policing. He states his two 
main hypotheses, thus: 
Once in power the ruling caste usually has no intention of giving 
it up, but the techniques of maintaining power vary from case to 
case - although there are two important types. In situations where 
the preservation and enhancement of the privileges of the group 
21 Which John Urry, in his interpretation of Gramsci, seems to suggest. Seeing civil society and 
the state proper as one and the same, implies for him that both spheres ~'ould make ~se of t~e 
same medium, that is coercion and hegemony. From this point of View, he cntlclses this 
conception because civil society does not have the capacity to u~e. coer~i?n as. a regulatmg 
medium. This conclusion is a result of the misconception of concelvmg CIVtl society and ~tate 
proper as one and the same. Instead, as suggested here, civil society has to be seen as part ot the 
'integral state', and not as the state in its common usage. See John Urr)': The ~atomy of 
Capitalist Societies. The Economy, Civil Society and the State. (London: l\ lacnll11an Press. 
1981), pp. 21122. 
2'1 
- Gramsci, 1971. op.cit, p. 246. 
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that captures the state would require preserving the status quo 
(without necessarily rejecting economic growth or artificial 
modernisation), the ruling caste would strive to co-opt other 
groups, in a 'consociational' manner if possible .... In situations 
where the promotion of the interests of the group/fraction that 
captures the state would require changing the status quo via acts 
of social engineering (e.g. developmentalism or so-called 
socialism, etc.), the political techniques would include both 
political co-optation and political isolation.23 
Even if this picture might be adequate for a certain phase in state- and 
nation building in the post-colonial period of many developing countries, such an 
intennediate framework excludes civil society as anything but the servant of 
either state or society, denying it the possibility of constituting an autonomous 
sphere. This is especially true for the concept of neo-patrimonialism, which I 
will discuss later on in this chapter. Hegemony is an important tool for 
understanding state-civil society relations, which I will define on page 29. 
However, if it stands alone it risks analytically diminishing the possibility of 
civil society's autonomous articulation of social, cultural, and ethical values and 
interests, thereby dictating the substance and contents of civil society. This is 
because the presence of hegemony would signify the state's ideological 
penetration of civil society and its absence an isolated dichotomy between state 
and civil society. 
Consequently, how is it possible to analyse organisations of civil society 
and the central question of this thesis, whether they have constituted a factor that 
has caused political change, without analytically limiting the outcome of the 
study? How can an analytical framework account for the possibility that state-
society relations will overcome a period of either confrontation or co-optation to 
develop a mutually accepted framework, in which the state tries to become 
hegemonic by means of representing the main social values and interests? In 
other words, which analytical framework can account for the possibility that 
'new' organisations of civil society can influence decision making processes and 
ultimately the shape and content of the state, H1zilst remaining independent? 
23Nazih N. Ayubi: Over-stating the Arab State (London and New York: I.B. Tauris 1995) p. 25. 
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1.2.3 Civil society as public sphere 
It is understood in this thesis that linking civil society to Habennas's use of 
the public sphere can account for the possibility that organisations of ci\'il 
society influence decision- making processes whilst remaining independent from 
the state. It thereby accounts for the "elusiveness of the state-society boundary" 
which is according to Timothy Mitchell 
not ... a problem of conceptual precision, but ... a clue to the nature of 
the phenomenon. [The boundary] must not be taken as the boundary 
between two discrete entities, but as a line drawn internally within 
the network of institutional mechanisms through which a social and 
political order is maintained. 24 
Habermas defines the public sphere as 
a network of communicating information and points of view 
(i.e., opinions expressing affirmative or negative attitudes); the 
streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and 
synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of 
topically specified public opinions. Like the lifeworld as a 
whole, so, too, the public sphere is reproduced through 
communicative action for which mastery of a natural language 
suffices; it is tailored to the general comprehensibility of 
d .. . 25 every ay communIcatIve practIce. 
As an ideal form, the public sphere is created through linguistic encounters 
and the use of language. Historically and as an institution, it developed in early 
capitalist development out of the intimacy of the household, from which the 
production of goods was taken into the public organisation of capitalist 
production. Because of this intimacy at home in the patriarchal bourgeois family, 
power was curtailed within the public sphere, and in the fonnation of a discourse 
the use of reason became dominant. In the beginning, this took place within 
newly established literary circles, but with the increasing administrative 
interference of the absolutist state into private life, the public sphere became 
24Timothy Mitchell: 'The Limits of the State. Beyond ~tatist approaches and their critic~' in 
American Political Science Review. Vol. 65, No. I. March 1991. p. 78. 
25 Jiirgen Haberma~: Bet\\cen Facts and Nonns. Contribution to a discourse theory of law and 
democracy. Translated by William Rehg (Cambridge Ma~~. MIT Pre~~. 1996). p, 3(10. 
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political. "[B]ut ... even when it turns political [it] aims neither at the utopian 
destruction of the state not at becoming a new state ... but rather at a new form of 
political dualism in which a political public sphere would control the public 
authority of the modem state. ,,26 According to Habermas, this was a reaction to 
the increasing zones of administrative and regulative contact between privati sed 
households and the state, "which provoked the critical judgement of a public 
making use of its reason.,,27 The press was of crucial significance here, as it was 
the means by which the state transformed the privati sed households - society at 
large - into a public zone. 
The importance of the public sphere for civil society and political change 
derives from the following ideas. First of all, the public sphere aims at its own 
institutionalisation rather than at its conversion to new forms of power. 
Critique in this model attempts its own institutionalization 
rather than a conversion into a new form of power that would 
potentially feel itself endangered by critical reason .... The 
modem state, in its originally absolutist form, represents the 
challenge motivating the establishment of a veritable 
countersociety, a society against the state. But this society, 
even when it turns politicaL aims neither at the utopian 
destruction of the state not at becoming a new state, nor even at 
the unification of these aims as in the Reign of Terror, but 
rather at a new form of political dualism in which a political 
public sphere would control the public authority of the modem 
28 
state. 
Second, the public sphere is an expression of the transformation of private 
individuals into public issues. It necessitates the administration's prior 
intervention into everyday life. This dualism can be conceived of as a result of 
the members of the elite beginning to see themselves not only as the object of 
state action but also as being part of what constitutes public concern. Being 
26A. Arato and Jean Cohen: Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
1992), p. 216. 
27 Jiirgen Habermas: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, (Cambridge Mass. f\lIT 
Press. 1989), p. 24. In Morocco, it may be a reaction to corruption, to administrative interference 
in business (anti-corruption campaign), the withholding of passports for women, the use of 
foreign languages on national TV, etc. 
"s . ,.., 16 
- Arato and Cohen, 1992, op.cH., p. - . 
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affected by the regulations of mercantilist policies, consumption regulations, 
dress codes, taxes and duties, and other official interventions into the privatised 
household, this new zone of administrative contact "became 'critical' '" in the 
sense that it provoked the critical judgement of a public making use of its reason. 
The public could take on this challenge all the better as it required merely a 
change of the function of the instrument with whose help the state administration 
had already turned society into a public affair in a specific sense - the press.',29 
The challenge, which the modem state poses to the emerging public sphere, can 
be described as that contlict between administrative power and reason. In 
Habermas's view, the fact that the contlict took the form of mercantilist policies 
versus the capitalist mode of production does not render it a contlict between the 
capitalist mode of production and the state. Rather, due to the widespread 
consequences of state measures, it accelerated the emergence of a critical public 
sphere, producing rational-critical public discourses. Habermas summarises all 
of this in the following way: 
The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the 
sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon 
claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the 
public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over 
the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized 
but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social 
labour. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar 
and without historical precedent: people's use of their 
30 
reason. 
Third, and most importantly, it is the medium through which horizontal 
(within civil society) and vertical (between civil society and the state) 
communication becomes possible, and in which communicative power can 
translate into administrative power, providing the state with the legitimacy on 
which to base its public policies. At the same time, it is the means through which 
the state can exercise its hegemony, which is however one that is constantly 
29 Habennas 1989. op. cit, p. 24. One should recall here Foucault's insistence that power and 
resistance could not be separated. See Michel Foucault: The History of Sexualitv. :\n 
Introduction. (London: Allen Lane, 1979), Chapter One. 
30 Habennas 1989. op.cit. p. 27. Emphasis added. 
challenged and subject to the rules that govern the public sphere, i.e. the use of 
reason and the convincing persuasion of the literate public. 
Explicitly building on Hannah Arendt's famous demarcation of 
power from violence, Habennas describes civil society as the 
prime generator of what he calls 'communicative power', 
according to which deliberation and action in concert are essential 
for understanding the origins of political power, though by no 
means the exercise or use of power. For Arendt, '[p]ower 
corresponds to the human ability not just to act but act in concert. 
Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group 
and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps 
together.' In Habennas's view, Arendt thereby identifies the roots 
of power in uncoerced communication; she grasps the centrality 
of 'the consensus-achieving power of communication aimed at 
mutual understanding' .... Communicative power constitutes a 
'scarce good,' which state administrators rely on, but are unable 
d h . 31 to pro uce on t elr own. 
Despite the fact that Habennas's nonnative political theory is not directly a 
paradigm for the analysis of political systems, it is of crucial importance for this 
thesis because it focuses on the possibility of state - civil society interaction 
within the public sphere. It responds to the question how political change, 
initiated by organisations of civil society, can be both possible and understood. If 
'communicative power' constitutes a 'scarce good' that is needed by state 
administrators, and if it is 'available' through civil society's engagement in the 
public sphere32 and through its initiation of discourses, then the state's 
engagement in this public sphere and its appropriation of these discourses can be 
regarded a possible outcome. The question, as to which shape this may take, 
becomes an empirical matter that this thesis aims to address. Such a model, 
moreover, allows for the possibility for political change for the following reason: 
through the state's engagement in the public sphere, the state subscribes to the 
mode, comprehensibility, with which the public sphere works. In the words of 
Habennas, 
31 William E Scheuennan: 'Between Radicalism and Resignation: democratic theory in 
Habennas's Between Facts and Norms' in Peter Dews (ed): Habennas: A Critical Reader 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), p. 157. 
~, . 
- -Habennas 1996, Op.Clt. p. 367. 
the political influence that the actors gain through public 
communication must ultimately rest on the resonance and indeed the 
approval of a lay public whose composition is egalitarian. The public 
of citizens must be convinced by comprehensible and broadly 
interesting contributions to issues it finds relevant. The public 
audience possesses final authority, because it is constitutive for the 
internal structure and reproduction of the public sphere the on!.v place 
where actors can appear. There can be no public sphere without a 
pUblic.33 
Therefore, as an ideal type, it is this comprehensibility that constitutes the 
'power of the better argument' in this public zone. It is consequently 
characterised by its resistance to direct power relations (governmental and 
economic) and can be called a zone free of power. Despite the possibility of 
dialogue that evolves in this model, the oppressive character of the public sphere 
remains an empirical question, and may have important consequences. "The 
structures of a power-ridden, oppressive public sphere exclude fruitful and 
clarifying discussions. The 'quality' of public opinion insofar as it is measured 
by the procedural properties of its process of generation is an empirical 
"34 
variable. 
1.2.4 Civil society and the public sphere: a working definition 
Resulting from the foregoing discussion, civil society may be defined as the 
sphere of human interaction between the state and the family, in which private 
citizens act on behalf of public issues, through which they constitute and shape 
the ever changing borders of, and discourses within, the public sphere. This 
means that private persons commit themselves to public issues and policies 
(voluntarily), issues by which they had only been indirectly affected. It is a 
sphere of what many authors have named "uncoerced human association,,35 
which is taken to mean the absence of direct vertical power relations, such as 
political (political parties, the state), or economic power.36 For the purpose of 
33 Habennas 1996, op.cit. p. 364. 
34Ibid. p. 362. 
35[or instance Michael Walzer: 'The idea of Ci\'il Society, A Path to Social Reconstruction' in 
Dissent. Vol. 38, No.2, Spring 1991, p. 293. 
36see also Robert Putman: Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italy 
(Princeton: Princeton UniYersity Press, 1993), 167-176. 
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this thesis, this is an ideal type of a 'zone free of power' although certain 
qualifications with regard to Habennas's use of this concept, based on linguistic 
encounters, the use of language and reason, evolving from the patriarchal family 
in Bourgeois society, apply. Nevertheless, Habennas's definition of civil society 
also includes these zones free of power: Civil society's "institutional core 
comprises those non governmental and non-economic connections and voluntary 
associations that anchor the communication structures of the public spheres in 
the society component of the lifeword.,,37 It is not necessarily in opposition to the 
state, which is, for instance, put forward by Bayart, who defines civil society "as 
society in relation with the state ... in so far as it is in confrontation with the 
state.,,38 To include this in the definition would not only impair the analytical 
validity of this study for reasons explained above, but also require a sharp 
division between the constituents of civil society and the state, an assumption of 
doubtful empirical validity. However, through private individual's engagement 
in public issues, they relate to the state and its decision-making capacity as the 
central organ that shapes public life. 
This broad definition needs to be more focused for the purpose of this 
thesis. First of all, infonnal organisations shall be excluded in order to focus only 
on those associations that have an identifiable position in the public sphere. This 
is in line with the general use of the concept of civil society, where most current 
analysts, scholars, and donors agree to define formal organisations between 
private life and the state as the constituent elements of civil society. Second, the 
issue of 'new' associations is related to their structuring according to power 
relations and to their position in the public sphere. As ideal types, it is 
understood that 'new' organisations, in contrast to 'old' ones, are less and less 
structured in relation to dominant modes of power, and therefore more and more 
independent and autonomous. At the same time, 'new' associations have an 
identifiable position in the public sphere, where they participate - in an abstract 
sense - in the public sphere as readers, discussants, promoters of special interests, 
37 Habermas, 1996, op.cit. p. 366 . 
.)8Jean-Francois Bayart: -Civil Society in Africa' in Patrick Chabal (ed): Political Domination in 
Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1986) p. 
11 1. 
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orgamsers of debates and demonstrations, critics, etc. This IS an important 
aspect, as it covers the relation between civil society and the state: those 
associations are not in opposition per se but through their participation in the 
public sphere, they act as catalyst for society's identification of new values that 
have been misrepresented, marginalised, or oppressed by the state. On the other 
hand, those organisations that are not active in the public sphere in this sense, 
and that have no interest in participating in the public sphere, cannot possibly 
shape the political content of the state. They therefore do not represent a unit of 
analysis for this study. Third, 'new' organisations' actions are 'self-limiting' 
concerning their target of action in the sense that Arato and Cohen used the term. 
This means that they are 'single issue' organisations, and do not aim at changing 
the political status quo. According to Arato and Cohen, 
Our presupposition is that the contemporary movements are in 
some significant respects "new." What we have in mind, above 
all, is a self-understanding that abandons revolutionary dreams in 
favor of radical reform that is not necessarily and primarily 
oriented to the state. We shall label as "self-limiting radicalism" 
projects for the defence and democratization of civil society that 
accepts structural differentiation and acknowledge the integrity of 
1·, 1 d . 39 po Ihca an economIc systems. 
Hence, these organisations are considered to be in a meaningful way 'new' 
which does not only relate to their recent appearance. In a country such as 
Morocco, the 'self-limiting radicalism' means that these 'new' groups of civil 
society do not aim to gain state-power per se, nor do they necessarily seek to 
change the exercise of power. Instead, they seek to participate in the public 
sphere in order to cease the exclusive definition of the public sphere by dominant 
power structures. This happens in terms of its contents, its agenda and its 
boundaries. It is the purpose of this thesis to show that the delineation between 
and categorisation of 'old' and 'new' organisations in the public sphere is a valid 
one, from which results important implications for political change. As I will 
discuss below, this alters the state's hegemony in the public sphere, such as the 
state's pretension to be the ultimate provider of the' general good.' 
39 Arato and Cohen. 1992. op.cit. p. 493. 
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1.3 The State 
After having defined civil society and the public sphere, it is important to 
define the other core concept of this thesis: the state. According to Max Weber, 
"a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. ,,40 As a working 
definition, Ayubi states that "the state can be said to be an abstract construct that 
connotes the ensemble of institutions and personnel that possess the exclusive 
right to public power (or to the legitimate use of force) within a certain territorial 
society.,,41 As a legal abstraction, it connotes exclusive authority (sovereignty). 
domestically over a certain territory with its inhabitants, and externally, vis-it-vis 
other states. Internally, the state uses the government and the administrative 
apparatus, to exercise this authority. 
According to Mann,42 a distinction must be made between the 
administrative apparatus and the political elite. The political elite represents a 
dominant social group and carries out its actions by exercising its authority over 
the administrative apparatus. As Desrues and Moyano remark, in consolidated 
liberal democracies, there usually exists a fonnal separation between both 
branches of the state: the administrative apparatus is characterised by its 
pennanence and is subject to bureaucratic procedures guided by Weberian-style 
bureaucratic rationality. The political elite, represented by the government, is 
contingent and subject to the political logic of those who hold power, and its 
continuity depends upon results obtained at the ballot box:B By contrast, in 
Morocco, this clear distinction does not exist. The presence of the monarchical 
system, the makhzen, means that the two branches of state are not clearly 
separated, producing the subordination of rational-legal legitimacy (dominant in 
Western states) to tradition-oriented legitimacy. Accordingly, the elite that 
controls the makhzen system holds 'despotic power,' controlling the 
40Cited in Nazih Ayubi: Over-stating the Arab State. Politics and Society in the Middle East 
iLondon: Tauris & Co, 1995) p. 5. 
I Ibid. p. 30. 
42M. Mann: 'The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins. t-.lechanisms and Results'. in 
European Journal of Sociology. No. 25,1985, pp. 185-213. 
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bureaucratic-administrative and infrastructural power and therefore the state's 
central powers.44 In consequence, there is a close identification between 
'government,' 'state' and the 'regime,' the latter being identical with the 
makhzen, i.e. a form of government. Nevertheless, a certain distinction should be 
kept in mind between the three terms: 
Regimes are more permanent forms of political organization than 
specific governments, but they are typically less permanent than 
the state. The state, by contrast, is a (normally) more permanent 
structure of domination and coordination including a coercive 
apparatus and the means to administer a society and extract 
resources from it.45 
Following Tripp, the neo-patrimonial form of the "state as hierarchy" has 
been the manner in which a certain kind of rule had reproduced itself in the 
Middle East, regardless of the changing personnel of the government itself.46 
This also supports the view in which government personnel and the character of 
the state are viewed as a result of a certain regime type, which is, in Morocco, 
the monarchical system, the makhzen. This resembles Max Weber's concept of 
patrimonial rule, which Weber defined as traditional domination supported by an 
administration and a military force that are purely personal instruments of the 
master.47 
In spite of this, Roger Owen warns that although the term state "carries with 
it multiple associations of thingness, or Leviathaness, encouraging us to think of 
it as a single entity, of it 'penetrating' something called society, of it having 
capacities, of it inhabiting a different area of space from the people it seeks to 
manipulate and control," its "reality ... is much more complex, more fluid and 
43Thierry Desrues and Eduardo Moyano: 'Social Change and Political Transition in Morocco' in 
Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 6, No.1, Spring 2001. p. 28. 
44Ibid. p. 28. 
45 Robert Fishman 'Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy,' 
in World Politics, Vol. 42, no. 3, April 1990. 
46Charles Tripp: 'States, Elites and the 'Management of Change" in Hassan Hakimian and Ziba 
Moshaver: The State and Global Change (Richmond: Surrey, Curzon Press. 2001). p. 220. 
47Max Weber: Economy and Society Vol L (Berkely, Los Angeles: Uni\L>rslly of California 
Press. 1978), p. 231-232. 
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much more difficult to conceptualise.,,48 This gives rise to a framework of state-
civil society relations, which I address in the following subsection. based on the 
notion of hegemony. 
1.4 Hegemony 
In a Gramscian sense, 'hegemony' is the means through which the state 
exercises its domination outside the direct use of coercion. According to Buci-
Glucksmann,49 the notion of hegemony is much larger than Marxist notions of 
'ideology' or the Weberian problematic of mechanisms of legitimacy that 
combine violence with ends of social integration. Closely connected to 
legitimacy, in the case of successful hegemony, a class leads forward the whole 
of society. Its 'attraction' for the allied classes is not passive, but active, which 
means that in the case of 'successful hegemony' allied classes or segments of 
society actively consent to the policies undertaken by the state, and to the nature 
of the state itself. Therefore, hegemony does not depend on simple mechanisms 
of administrative coercion or constraint, and neither on Althusser's notion of 
"mechanisms of ideological imposition,"So nor on legitimisation by symbolic 
violence (Bourdieu)sl. "Rather, from the moment hegemony becomes simply the 
backing for violence, or even worse, is only obtained by violence (the case of 
fascism), this hegemony is in fact no longer assured."s2 
To be precise, the question that the concept of hegemony can help address is 
that of the state's involvement in the public sphere. The public sphere is not in 
48Roger Owen: 'State and Society in the Middle East' (Plenary address to the Twenty-third 
Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association of North America, Toronto, 15-18 
November 1989, cited in Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostinger: 'Introduction' in Tribes and 
State Formation in the Middle East (Berke1y and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
1990), p. 6. 
49 Christine Buci-Glucksmann: Gramsci and the State. Translated by David Fernbach (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1980), p. 56. 
50Louis Althusser: 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus (Notes Towards an Inyestigation)' 
in Louis Althusser: Essays on Ideology (London and New York: Verso, 1984). pp. 1-60. 
Sll, Addi: 'Violence Symbolique et statut du politique dans l'reuHe de Pierre Bourdieu' Revue 
Francaise de Science Politigue. Vol. 51. No.6, December 2001, p. 950. 
52Christine Buci-Glucksmann. 1980, op.cit. p. 56. 
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any way 'neutral, ,53 but the social space where the state discursively lays claim 
to hegemony in an ideological and institutional sense. The state's successful 
hegemony, however, depends on the active 'attraction' of allied segments of 
society and ultimately their participation in the public sphere (whether they are 
social classes or other social groups is of secondary importance), which cannot 
be sustained or produced by the means of coercion. Consequently, 'attraction' is 
a key variable in the state's involvement in the public sphere in order to sustain 
its hegemony. In the absence of such 'attraction,' other social groups of civil 
society might counter the state's claims to hegemony and try to become 
hegemonic themselves, i.e. they try to forge an alliance of groups and/or ideas 
that counters the content of the state and the social ideas/ideology/practices that 
this content involves. This may take two forms: a challenge of the state or a 
challenge of the state's claim to hegemony through social group's participation in 
the public sphere. In Arato and Cohen's sense, the former can be seen as another 
way of formulating 'revolutionary dreams,' the latter can be regarded as the 
empirical basis of the 'self-limiting' character of 'new' social groups of civil 
. 54 
socIety. 
From the foregoing discussion, it follows that civil society and hegemony 
are closely connected, because groups in civil society ultimately provide for the 
state's hegemony. This 'provision' may take various forms: the support of one 
sector vs. the challenge of another sector, of which the result would be a certain 
equilibrium. Another possibility would be a discursive hegemony vs. a 
discursive marginalisation, which would correspond to hegemony of one part of 
civil society and the marginalisation of another part. A third alternative may be a 
complete void or absolute hegemony, corresponding to the complete lack of 
hegemony as in a complete military dictatorship based on coercion alone or the 
complete support of an active civil society, such as in Plato's Republic. 
Whatever its actual historical relationship, a certain congruence between the 
53 An idea that is sometimes connected with Habermas's concept of the public sphere. See Sl'yla 
Benhabib: "Models of public space. Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jiirgen Habennas' 
in Craig Calhoun (ed): Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge. Mass: The M I r Press. 
1992). pp. 69-101, Nancy Fraser: Unruly Practices. Power, Discourse, and Gender in 
Contemporary Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), Chapter Six. 
54Cohen and Arato (1992). op.cit. p. 493. 
'organisational fonn' of civil society and the fonn of hegemony will always be 
maintained. The participation of 'new' groups of civil society in public spheres, 
as zones free of power, or the creation of these zones free of power if public 
spheres had hitherto been structured by direct power relations, consequently 
causes an altering hegemony of the state. 
1.5 The Thesis of Civil Society and the Thesis ofNeo-Patrimonialism 
The hypothesis of civil society, as proposed in this thesis, challenges some 
of the core aspects of the theory of neo-patrimonialism. Max Weber defined 
patrimonial rule as traditional domination supported by an administration and a 
military force that are purely personal instruments of the master. In contrast to 
traditional domination, the master's authority does no longer appear as a pre-
eminent group right, but it turns into his personal right, which he appropriates in 
the same way as he would any ordinary object of possession. 55 By controlling 
the means of coercion, the ruler can broaden the range of his arbitrary power and 
put himself in a position to grant grace and favours at the expense of the 
traditional limitations of patriarchal and gerontocratic structures.56 In Weber's 
thought "[ u ]nder patromonialism, the official has a personal dependence on the 
ruler, whereas in feudalism the relationship is one of fealty.,,57 Bendix suggested 
the following distinction between the two concepts 
Feudalism is domination by the few who are skilled in war; 
patrimonialism is domination by one who requires officials for 
the exercise of his authority. A patrimonial ruler is in some 
measure dependent upon the good will of his subjects .... 
Patrimonialism appeals to the masses against the privileged status 
groups; not the warrior-hero but 'the good king', the 'father of his 
people', are its prevailing ideals .. 58 
55Max Weber: Economy and Society Vol I, (Berkely, Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1978), pp. 231-232. 
56Ibid, p. 232. 
57Bryan Turner: Weber and Islam: A Cricial Study (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1974), p. 78-79. 
58Reinhard Bendix: Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (London: Methuen. 1966), p. 365. 
Emphasis added. 
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For Sharabi, the central feature of his concept of neo-patriarchy, as a social-
political phenomenon, explicitly applied to Middle Eastern society is 
the dominance of the Father (patriarch), the center around which 
the national as well as the natural family are organized. Thus 
between ruler and ruled, between father and child, there exist only 
vertical relations: in both settings the paternal will is the absolute 
will, mediated in both the society and the family by a forced 
consensus based on ritual and coercion. Significantly, the most 
advanced and functional aspect of the neopatriarchal state (in both 
conservative and "progressive" regimes) is its internal security 
apparatus, the mukhabarat. A two-state system prevails in all 
neopatriarchal regimes, a military-bureaucratic structure alongside 
a secret police structure, and the latter dominates everyday life, 
serving as the ultimate regulator of civil and political existence. 
Thus, in social practice, ordinary citizens not only are arbitrarily 
deprived of some of their basic rights, but are the virtual prisoners 
of the state, the objects of its capricious and ever-present violence, 
much as citizens once were under the classical or Ottoman 
sultanate .... [T]he neopatriarchal state, regardless of its legal and 
political forms and structures, is in many ways no more than a 
modem version of the traditional patriarchal sultanate. 59 
Sharabi considers the patronage system, consisting of the distribution of 
favour and protectionism, as the core feature of neopatriarchy. The central 
function that the patronage system is fulfilling, is that of mediation, which 
"secures the protection and material interests of the individual and the groups, 
including the lowest members of the group, strengthens the latter's sense of 
identity and cohesion.,,6o The stability of the system stems from the fact that 
everybody involved in it stands to gain: According to Sharabi, these are the 
supplicant, the bestower of favour, and the go-between as well. "Still, the one 
who stands to gain most is the bestower of favor, the one who has the power and 
the wealth, enabling one to be generous.,,61 Those who seek help from the state 
and its laws discover that the state does not provide an individual with either 
justice or protection. In this system, "[n]eopatriarcal patronage, as it displaces 
legality and renders public institutions superfluous, takes away the individual's 
59Hisham Sharabi: Neopatriarchy. A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Societ\ (New York: 
OUP. 1988), p. 7. 
60Ibid. p. 46. 
61 Ibid. 
claim to autonomous right. ,,62 In this context, Sharabi confirms that "the concept 
of social contract is inconceivable. Society in actuality is only subject to the \\'ill 
of the rich and powerful, a will delimited only by material capacity and 
institutionalized ethical injunction. The law serves not the society but the 
established sociopolitical order; crime is not distinguished from sacrilege or 
rebellion; and punishment is intended not to reform but to restore the sanctity of 
the law and to safeguard existing social relations. ,,63 
Conceiving state-civil society relations in terms of neopatriarchy renders 
impossible the task of accounting for civil society as anything but that of a 
dependent, impotent body of organisations without any autonomy to introduce 
political discourses on whatever subject. Everybody in the system seems to ha\'e 
an interest in preserving the status quo, and institutions are reduced to empty 
secondary shells of primary relations based on primordial links consisting of 
families, tribes, religious orders, etc. The whole system has a clear tendency 
towards immutability, as "in putting conformity above originality and obedience 
before autonomy, it crushes creative talent and encourages only those power that 
help to maintain it.,,64 
Consequently, the argument that the theory of civil society and the public 
sphere contains, and how it is applied in this thesis, runs against the notion of 
neopatriarchy, as it is based on discursive autonomy. This changes the system 
and the status quo, including the privileges of status groups that have gained a 
central position in the system of patronage. In Morocco, as I will show in 
Chapter Three, although this system seemed to be very efficient and effective 
until the mid 1980s, it did not prevent the establishment of an independent public 
sphere. This suggests that there is still some amount of discursive freedom in a 
neo-patrimonial order, and that discursive freedom might even be a part of the 
order itself. This signifies that the neo-patrimonialleader constantly redefines the 
limits of discourses and discursive freedom. This accounts for a certain t1uidity 
of state-society relations and this is understood as a process, in which a plurality 
of social actors participates. 
62 Ibid, 
6 ~ 'd 7" I' I' 
- Ibl ,p, 4 ongma Ita ICS, 
MIbid, 
1.6 Methodology 
In order to analyse social actors' interaction with the state in the empirical 
part of this thesis (Chapters Three to Six), it has been necessary to undertake a 
significant number of personal interviews with representatives of these 
organisations, state-officials, parliamentarians, politicians, state-ministers and 
Royal advisors (forty-seven in total). Moreover, apart from literature research, I 
conducted a significant number of newspaper analysis and surveys. In order to 
do this, I spent six months in Morocco. I applied semi-structured interviews in 
French, which is an official language in Morocco. Therefore, French was fluently 
spoken by all of my interviewees. I noted down my interview partners' responses 
in writing, in order to avoid the use of tape-recording that might have inhibited 
free discussions. 
In order to find a degree of measurement of state-civil society interaction 
(and structures of discourses), three different newspaper-analyses (for human 
rights, Berber right, and women's rights) have been used in Chapter Six. The 
collection of articles has been based on what Moroccans interested in these 
topics, had collected themselves. 
The collection of material (newspaper articles, interviews, and unpublished 
papers) has been subject to the contingencies of research practice. This meant 
that the material that I collected (except for published work) had been subject to 
meeting the right person at the right time, the right newspaper bought and read 
when some relevant information was contained, etc. In the research environment 
that my research question implied, a systematic approach has not been possible. 
The choice of organisations examined resulted from the effort of identifying 
actors that are active in the public sphere, that claim a political role and that are 
recognised in Morocco as playing such a role. The collection of one million 
signatures in 1992, for instance, makes the Association Democrafique de fa 
Femme du Afaroc (ADFM) a political player. The same applies to the ;\faJl~feste 
Berbere of March 2000 and to the Berber movement around the academic 
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Mohamed Chafik. Clearly, this coincides with the French speaking urban elite. 
which is the focus of this thesis. As it has been attempted to identify new 
political actors that are active in the public sphere and that come from civil 
society, it seems clear that, primarily, urban based organisations constitute this 
thesis's research object. 
Similarly, the use of francophone newspapers in the newspaper analyses in 
Chapter Six corresponds to the reading habits of the French-speaking urban elite. 
The sources of the samples chosen vary and I did not control the selection of the 
samples myself. However, the use of uncontrolled samples for the analysis can 
be justified in the following way: those who chose to collect a particular sample 
did so because of their general interest (as journalists, as academics, as 
ministerial officials) and not because they intended to analyse the material from a 
certain perspective. Hence, I did not use newspaper articles that were collected 
by myself because - obviously - my sources are subject to my interest in civil 
society as a participating observer, and therefore using these sources would only 
reflect my interest as a researcher. 
All French quotations used in this thesis have been translated by myself. All 
Arabic words have been transliterated in the same way as these words are 
commonly transliterated in the literature, i.e. simplified versions such as bay'a, 
'ulema and Mohamed have been used throughout this thesis. 
1. 7 Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter Two conducts a literature survey, showing that the main body of 
literature has not been able to show in how far organisations and actors of civil 
society had contributed to political change. It will be argued that this was due to 
the lack of adequate analytical tools, and due to these contributions' relatively 
early publication. 
Chapter Three is concerned with the structure of civil society and the public 
sphere until 1984. It explores the first part of the argument, namely that 
historically, organisations of civil society had been subject to power relations. 
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and that this had inhibited their free activity and success in the public sphere. 
This accounted for a certain articulation between power structures and the public 
sphere. In order to show that this was the case, case studies will be used to 
illustrate civil society'S relations to power structures, and these organisations' 
ensuing failure to act on behalf of their specific interest / purpose. 
The main analysis of the thesis follows in the ensuing three chapters. The 
purpose of Chapter Four, which is concerned with changes that happened 
between 1985 and 1993, is to illustrate that associations of civil society started to 
question their previous link with power structures. The concept of the public 
sphere is used in order to suggest that an increasing autonomy and declining 
articulation with established power relations has been characteristic of this 
period. Section One will illustrate the changes of strategies towards a 'self-
limiting framework' and increasing participation in the public sphere. Section 
Two will illustrate the state's 'positive' responses to this change of strategies. 
Section Three will explore other factors that had changed the state's changing 
attitudes towards these 'new' organisations of civil society. 
Chapter Five, taking up the thread of analysis from Chapter Four, first of all 
discusses the political and economic context in the 1990s. It will then be 
analysed how different sections of civil society have evolved since 1993, in order 
to show the diversity of strategies that have been developed. Using the specific 
case study of social mobilisation during a repressive anti-corruption campaign in 
Section Three, it will be illustrated that this has engendered increased private 
participation in the public sphere, which had the impact of challenging the state's 
hegemony. 
Chapter Six discusses the reactions of the state to this challenge to its 
hegemony. Two sets of reactions will be identified: 'discursive' and 'strategic' 
reactions. Section One discusses the discursive reactions of the state, aiming to 
illustrate the state's interaction with Berber, human rights and women's rights 
discourses. With the help of quantitative data, its aim is to illustrate that the 
reaction of the state depended on a particular discourse's representation and 
features. Section Two will then focus on the state's . strategic , reactions. These 
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will be identified as boundary setting, co-optation and integration. It will be 
argued that all these strategies have allowed for a particular discourse's 
rationality to directly interact with the state, through which political change and 
increased private citizen's participation have become visible for many domestic 
observers. 
The conclusion will relate the summary of the empirical work with the 
theoretical issues that have been discussed in Chapter One. In Section Two, it 
will be argued that the state's changing hegemony is the most important issue 
that has made political change a real existing issue for many domestic Moroccan 
actors, and that this has been the major outcome of civil society's increased 
participation in the public sphere. Furthermore, it will be pointed out that it is the 
state's articulation and interaction with developing public spheres, which, 
depending on a particular discourse that is expressed there, either inhibits or 
furthers the state's hegemony. Section Three finishes with further research 
proposals, and emphasis is put on the need of studying particular, historical 
forms of public spheres. 
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CHAPTER Two: CIVIL SOCIETY IN MOROCCO LITERATURE SL'RVEY 
There have been quite a number of publications that deal with ciyil 
society in Morocco. The earliest contribution dates from 1989. This is Ahmed 
Ghazali's 'Contribution a l'analyse du phemomene associatifau Maroc,.65 It was 
the first acknowledgement of a new phenomenon, that of the mouvement 
associatif, which the author analysed in terms of the Moroccan judicial 
framework, quantitative aspects, and the lack of independence of many of the 
associations to both the state and the political parties of the opposition. He 
observes that the liberty of association - despite the liberal character of the dahir 
(decree) of 195866 - was curtailed in modifications in 1973. This new dahir67 
stipulated that each new association must produce a declaration ('declaration 
prealable') at the Interior Ministry, which in tum must provide the association 
with a 'legal receipt.' Failing to do so would render the activities of an 
association illegal. In practice the 'declaration prealable' (still in practice) meant 
that the authorities could effectively ban associations through the withholding of 
a 'receipt', no association being able to prove that it had filed its declaration. 
Still, between 18,000 and 30,000 associations were already active in the late 
1980s, most of which were in the field of sport and youth.68 
In 1992 Nourredine el Aoufi edited a volume called La Societe Civile au 
Maroc69 in which the Moroccan scholar Abdallah Saaf70 wrote a frequently 
quoted chapter called 'L'hypethese de la societe civile au Maroc.' For Saaf, the 
very structure of Morocco's society prevents the existence of civil society. This is 
because organisations that might make up for civil society are divided. These are 
(1) associations of administrative elites, (2) political parties, labour unions, 
65 Ahmed Ghazali: 'Contribution a l'analyse du phemomene associatif au Maroc'. In Annuaire 
de l'Afrigue du Nord, Vol. 28,1989. pp. 243-260. 
66Royaume du Maroc: 'Dahir du 15 November 1958,' Bulletin Officiel, 27 November 1958. 
67 Royaume du Maroc: 'Dahir du 10 April 1973.' Bulletin Officiel. 11 April 1973. 
68Ghazali, op.cit. p. 249-251. 
69Nourredine el Aoufi (ed ): Signes de Present: La Societe Civile au Maroc. (Rabat: Signes de 
Present. 1992). 
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professional associations, and (3) mystical sects and religious associations. In his 
opinion "the nature of Moroccan society is such that in its globality, it seems to 
rebel against the currents of emancipation and hinders the constitution of spaces 
of freedom in its place. In effect, non-movement and immutability are the main 
features of this social and political universe in Morocco."71 A new dynamic, 
however, had been taken place. External forces, such as the end of the 
dominance of the development state, meant the end of patron-client relationships 
and the distribution state, which are, according to Saaf, the very basis of power 
of the Moroccan state. However, the consequence of this is not the appearance of 
civil society, as this is regarded as a quality beyond the sheer activity of 
.. 72 
assocIatIons. 
Associative life and civil society are not linked for either Ahmed Ghazali 
or Abdallah Saaf. Both authors define civil society as a quality of a society, 
which successfully resists the overarching power of the state. As this does not 
seem to be the case in Morocco, the hypothesis of a 'birth' of civil society is 
dismissed. This is the reason why Saaf, for instance, categorises associations in 
two major groups, in which independent associations' absence from the public 
sphere is the most important feature: 
- cultural associations which are based on the state's centres of 
decision making and which benefit from easy access to information 
and the mass media; 
- and .. cultural associations that are either close to a political party 
or represented by other unsignificant formations [par cette nuee de 
formations aux objectifs divers], which do not represent real 
challenges, because their audience remains limited. This is because 
of their discrete character and their evolution, or the silence which 
embraced the cultural question, which they tried to promote. Most 
of the time, their autonomy is beyond doubt, but they seem like 
conjunctural phenomena, whose significance seems problematic. 73 
70Saaf is himself a politician in the PSD and he was, in a preceding government, the Minister of 
Education. 
71 Abdallah Saaf in Nourredine el Aoufi (ed ): Signes de Present: La Societe Civile au Maroc. 
(Rabat: Signes de Present, 1992). p. 1.t. 
72 Ibid. p. 22. 
73 lbid. p. 23. 
Moreover, both authors are guided by assumptions of external changes 
(the end of the distribution and development state) that have caused certain 
changes in the relationship of state and civil society. Ghazali does not view 
internal dynamics of associations as a factor in its own right, but rather sees in 
their activity the result of state and public sector strategies: 
Their democratising potential of society is largely limited. When 
they are encouraged, it is because they allow to direct voluntary 
activity ... towards secondary or complementary activities of the 
administration. If they are tolerated, it is because their aims are not 
opposed to or do not interfere with those of the public 
administration [pouvoir public]. They are not a moving force of 
any kind of concerted and active will to influence or to seriously 
bend the orientation, the technical decisions or the public policies 
f h . . h f' 74 o t elr respectIve sp eres 0 actIOn. 
The main limitation of both attempts to place Morocco's civil society, the 
mouvement associatif, in the wider civil society debate results from its absence 
of a theoretic framework in which groups of civil society are either the cause or 
the effect of anything else. This can be regarded a consequence of the relatively 
early publication of both texts, which were accordingly unable to focus on those 
groups, which had just started to become active, and whose existence needed 
explanation. 
In 1995, Denoeux and Gateau published an article called 'L'Essor des 
assocations au Maroc: a la recherche de la citoyennete?,75 It is the first analysis 
that takes into account the dynamism of civil society associations of the mid 
1990s, but it focuses on the question of whether Morocco was to experience a 
new citizen's involvement. Hence, even though a certain dynamism certainly 
exists, 
must we conclude ... that these NGOs are about to succeed where 
the other political formations have failed, that is, to serve as an 
emerging vector of real citizenship in Morocco? Is this movement 
really a sign of the Moroccan people's will to mobilise itself and 
74 h 1· . ')52 G aza I. Op.Clt. p.... . 
75 Guillain Denoeux and Lautent Gateau: 'L'Essor des associations au Maroc: it 1a recherche de 1a 
citoyenneh~'?' In Monde Arabe. Maghreb-Mashrek. No. 150. Oct-Dec 1995. 
40 
to face the economic and social challenges, which are confronting 
the country? Is it a sign of important social classes, which demand 
their right to change their status from that of subjects to that of 
. . ?76 
cItIzens. 
The authors remain sceptical. However, as in this study, they note the role 
that the state had started to play in building a discourse around this new 
phenomenon. Already in the early 1990s, the dynamism of NGOs was 
considered by government spokespersons as an additional sign of the country's 
serious commitment to democratisation. The creation of 'free space' that these 
NGOs could occupy illustrated moreover the state's ostensible will to allow 
more autonomy to social groups and their representatives. For the authors, with 
the dynamism of NGOs being supported by the regime, this new phenomenon 
might even be considered a modernisation of the makhzen. The authors analyse 
the different kinds of associations that exist in Morocco (regional, social-
economic, political) and their relation to the state, especially with respect to 
regional associations that had been created in the 1980s by prominent 
personalities from the inner-circles of the palace. For instance, the association 
Grand Atlas in Marrakech was founded by Mohamed Midioui, former head of 
Royal Security and the Interior Minister from 1999-2001. The association 
Sauvegarde, promotion, et developpement de la ville de Essaouira was founded 
by Andre Azoulay, the King's economic and diplomatic advisor. These 
Governmental Non-Governmental Organisations (GNGOs) had partly been 
created in response to donor countries' changing policies of distributing funds to 
NGOs. Partly, they had been created to integrate new urban elites into the 
makhzen. They thereby acted as recruitment agencies for administrative posts. 
According to the Denoeux and Gateau, this was becoming even more important 
due to the increasing urban nature of Moroccan society (since 1990, more than 
50 percent of Moroccans live in towns). Morocco's administrative parties77 had 
apparently failed to mobilise new elites in support of the palace. 
76Ibid.p.19. 
77 Since independence, Morocco has been enjoying a formal multi-party system. In order to 
counter the challenge of the liberation party Istiqlal, the palace quickly responded by creating 
parties that defined their 'mission' as that of supporting the palace .. T~lese ~arties .. cre~ted by 
high-ranking palace personalities. are generally referred to as 'admInistratIOn parties. 
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The actions of the mouvement associatif are described in the different 
areas, and the reactions of the state analysed in terms of banalisation and 
institutional co-optation. In the field of political associations (human rights, 
women's rights, and Berber rights), the regime - according to the authors - had 
tolerated the creation of these movements in order to counter the Islamic 
challenge. It was better to have politically active associations than to ha\'e 
Islamic organisations with extremist orientations. Moreover, in the authors' 
opinion, the image de marque, as seen overseas, had had a decisive impact on the 
regime's tolerant approach towards these political NGOs.78 Domestically, and 
here Deneoux and Gateau share some aspects of their approach with this thesis. 
the creation of advisory councils and human rights ministries had been helping 
the King to change the critical features of the discourse, and to establish the 
monarchy's supremacy. Using as an example the advisory council charged with 
the elaboration of reform proposals concerning the family code,79 Deneoux and 
Gateau suggest that 
this commission was presented to the public as an example of 
concertation and dialogue, partly allowing the Sovereign to 
declare indirectly: "Y ou participated and you gave me your 
recommendation, which represented the compromise that you had 
reached. This has served as the base of the reform that I am 
proposing now. I know that this reform does not answer to all 
your aspirations, but we cannot go beyond this for the time 
. "80 bemg. 
The authors' mam question being whether the mouvement associatif 
corresponds to a rise of citizenship (that is, as defined by both authors in the 
passage quoted above, a sign of the Moroccan people's will to mobilise itself and 
a sign of important social classes, which demand their right to change their status 
from that of subjects to that of citizens), Deneoux and Gateau remain 
pessimistic. The elite character and the feeling among the poor that this is an 
activity that the rich engage in largely for themsel\'es, prevent - in the eyes of the 
78Ibid. p. 30-31. 
79 This happened after \\'omen's rights associations collected 1 million signatures in 1993 in 
favour of changing Morocco's conservative, religiously inspired family code. 
80Ibid. p. 36. 
two authors - the articulation of broad-based participation and thereby the rise of 
a real sense of citizenship. 
Interestingly, analysing the same material as Denoeux and Gateau at the 
same period of time, Sonja Hegasy draws exactly the opposite conclusion. 8 ) She 
analyses the potential of a socio-political opposition from the NGO sector as a 
manifestation of an abstract sense of citizenship. She views, in the NGO sector, 
the establishment of a movement (especially the women's rights organisations) 
that defines itself within a liberal model of tolerance against the totalitarian 
nature of the Islamic movement and the state. For Hegasy, this is the 
establishment of civil society, which corresponds to a harmonious counter-
movement to the ideological claims of the state. In this analysis, however, the 
state is left out of the analysis, as are the political parties. Instead, liberal 
academics and philosphers such as Fatima Memissi and Mohamed Abed al Jabiri 
are analysed for their intellectual contribution to this social movement. With 
handpicked case studies, Sonja Hegasy illustrates the existence of liberal values 
within the NGO sector, but ignores other conflicting and contradicting aspects of 
Morocco's civil society, and the state's involvement in establishing and/or 
changing discourses in the public sphere. This is because Hegasy applies a model 
of civil society that is based on tolerance, accommodation of difference, 
acceptance of others, and its Islamic version that focuses on the possibility of 
ijtihad. By doing so, she overlooks the role of the state in establishing 
discourses, as well as the autonomising tendencies between organisations of civil 
society and political parties. 
The only publication in English is Azzedine Layachi's State, Socien' and 
Democracy in Morocco. The Limits of Associatil'e Life. 82 In his opinion, 
Moroccan associative life is marked by an absence of challenges to the ruler, for 
the culture of neopatrionomialism had imprinted on Moroccan political culture a 
8) Sonja Hegasy: Staat, Offentlichkeit und Zivilgesellschaft in Marokko. (Hamburg: Schritkn des 
Deutschen Orientinstituts, 1996). 
82 Azzedine Layachi: State, Society and Democracy in Morocco. The Limits of Associative Life. 
(Washington DC: Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies. 1998). 
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lack of a notion of citizenship.83 Paradoxically, Layachi defines civil society 
without linking it to a force of democratisation, but links it to it whenever he 
discusses some aspect of it. Thus, he defines civil society as a 
set of social, economic, cultural and political groupings, distinct and 
independent from the state, that perform functions of aggregation 
and articulation of particular interests, and seeks either to influence 
state decisions or to capture the state itself. In the political sphere 
civil society checks state arbitrariness while serving as a buffer 
between state power and private spheres. Finally, civil society is an 
independent process of mobilization of various interests for change 
or for the maintenance of the status quO. 84 
On the other hand, his discussion of "obstacles to political liberalisation 
and democratisation and, thus, to the development of civil society,,85 illustrates 
that he relies on a concept of civil society that is paired with that of a force for 
democratisation. After a discussion of associative life and political parties, he 
concludes that they had not presented a political movement that tried to alter the 
political status quo. In the absence of the latter, it follows for him that despite 
Morocco's experience with political pluralism, this has not given birth to a viable 
and vibrant civil society, capable of limiting state power.86 
Although all three publications give evidence to the 'new' dynamic of 
Morocco's associative life, they remain captives of their own theoretical 
assumptions. For Denoeux and Gateau, next to the question of citizenship, the 
main question is whether the regime's relative tolerance signifies a real political 
opening and thereby a real step towards the country's democratisation, or simply 
a renewal of and a modernisation of the monarchy and its mode of governance, 
the makhzen. 87 The underlying assumption is that it is the regime which defines 
the content and expression of these actors, and instrumentalises groups of civil 
society to fulfil certain, previously defined purposes within an overall strategy 
(pseudo-democratic legitimacy, attraction of international funds for 
83 Ibid. p. 41-42. 
84 Ibid. p. 14-15. 
85 Ibid. p. 42. 
86'd .. IbI . p. VII. 
87 Guillain Denoeux and Lautent Gateau, op.cit. p. 20. 
development, etc.}. Theoretically, political change is off the agenda, because the 
activities of these 'new' actors remain seen within the parameters and as a 
function of regime stability (or a certain modernisation of the makh=en). If 
politically active associations are allowed to assume a new role, this is explained 
in a way that is reminiscent of rational choice theory: 
[T]he regime had the wisdom not to oppose itself to this dynamic. 
This concession is understandable in a country in which, since 
the beginning of the 1990s, urban dwellers have outnumbered the 
rural population. ...For the regime, it is also better that the 
aspirations of a new middle class take the form of associations 
for the defense of human rights or for the promotion of the berber 
culture than that of small radical groups in favor of religious 
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utopIas. 
This perspective ultimately continues to view state-civil society relations 
within a dichotomy model, and does not aim to understand these relations from 
civil society's possible intermediary function. The state's reaction is not put into 
a theoretical framework of hegemony and seems almost arbitrary, of which the a 
posteriori use of rational choice theory gives testimony. 
Layachi's publication is limited by his inability to capture and analyse 
discourses that have been initiated by the actors that he analyses. He, therefore, 
remains analytically restricted in his static model, in which state-civil society 
dynamics and developments are not examined. The main limitation, however. 
consists of indirectly linking civil society with democratisation, which is the 
reason why the author cannot capture independent public spheres and activities 
outside that of directly questioning, and limiting state power. 
Similar theoretical limitations apply to Hegasy.89 The author's units of 
analysis are those liberal-democratic actors that embody "a controlling and 
corrective function vis-a-vis the state,,90 in order to illustrate the existence of a 
88Ibid. p. 31. 
89 Sonja Hegasy~ Staat, Offentlichkeit und Zivilgesellschaft in Marokko. (Hamburg: Schriften des 
Deutschen Orientinstituts. 1996). 
90Ibid. p. 17. 
"counterculture.,,91 As a result of the application of this implicit dichotomy 
model, Hegasy's analysis of change is limited to the social sphere. and the 
dimension of political change is not taken into account. From this problem 
follow other limitations, which this thesis will address. Through the assertion of 
the establishment of a 'democratic counterculture,' in which the establishment of 
a 'counter' public sphere is the most significant feature, Hegasy's study assumes 
that democratic change will somehow automatically follow. "The socio-cultural 
opposition ... has given a counterculture the possibility to assert itself, and it is 
about to transform this counterculture into a factor of power.,,92 The assumption 
of a dichotomy-model, however, prevents a translation of sociaL liberal values 
intok the political realm, especially as this is connected to a loss of power of the 
governing elite. Hence, the unit of analysis of political change needs to be altered 
if a transformation process is described as a possible outcome of state-civil 
society interaction. If a public sphere is understood by definition as that of a 
'counter' public sphere, it analytically restricts the state's access to it. The result 
is its own isolation, which is the reason why Hegasy asks herself whether 
Morocco is an illustration of Marcuse's term of "repressive tolerance," that is the 
toleration of marginal groups and discourses that indirectly legitimate a 
repressive state.93 Consequently, Hegasy's microanalysis of political culture 
needs to be complemented by a larger, systems-theoretical approach, in which 
the public sphere, as a central element of state-civil society interaction is the 
main unit of analysis for political change. It is the purpose of this thesis to 
provide such a larger framework, in order to avoid the limitations - use of 
rational choice theory, unresolved translation from the social to the political, 
instrumentalisation of group's activities - which the application of a dichotomy 
model entails. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. p. 230. 
93 Ibid. p. 19. 
CHAPTER THREE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND PUBLIC SPHERE UNDER THE 
'OLD SYSTEM' (--1574- 1984) 
The objective of this chapter is to show that historically in Morocco, ci\il 
society has been subject to political interests and power relations, which 
inhibited its articulation in a public sphere. This took different fonns under 
different historical circumstances, and depended on traditional ideological 
factors, such as the 'ulema's relationship with the monarchy, as well as on 
factors such as elite conflicts after independence in 1956. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section analyses 
the development of features of Morocco's public sphere in pre-colonial 
Morocco. Here, I will limit my analysis to the role of Islam, in order to illustrate 
how the development of a public sphere was conditioned by historical 
circumstances and political traditions. Although the 'ulema accounted for the 
principal carriers of an independent public sphere, its historical role was much 
more limited. This, I will argue, was essentially because of the absence of a 
general notion of a public, this in itself being a result of the lack of a unified 
Moroccan entity, an administrative apparatus and corresponding educational 
requirements such as literacy. 
In the second section of this chapter, I will analyse the post-independence 
political order. More specifically, I will account for the dependence of civil 
society and the public sphere on the bifurcation of the Moroccan political system 
between loyalists of the Moroccan monarchy and the so-called oppositional 
political parties. This, I will argue, has rendered groups of civil society 
inefficient and dependent, as the power struggle between the two main political 
formations and the internal elite struggles had atomising effects on groups that 
were based on the articulation of single issues and particular interests. In this 
sense, Moroccan-type pluralism was much less plural than it might ha\'e seemed, 
despite the apparent liberal character of the constitutional order. which 
prohibited the existence of a single party system. 
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3.1 Section One: Features of civil society in the pre-colonial Moroccan 
system 
This subsection seeks to explain the development of the Moroccan 
political system within which state-civil society relations existed. Because of the 
difficulty of historically analysing a contemporary phenomenon such as "civil 
society and the public sphere," I will contend myself to an analysis of the central 
question of whether the act of allegiance between ruler and ruled, which is called 
bay'a94 in Moroccan political terminology, had any resemblance with 17th 
century European social contract theories. It should be remembered that 
according to the theory of neo-patriarchy as outlined in Chapter One, social 
contract theories are outside the content of state-society relations as they are 
based on obedience and patronage. Therefore, it will be analysed whether the 
bay'a and the possibility to withdraw this act of allegiance, as occasionally 
happened in Moroccan history, accounted for a system in which the religious 
authorities, the Moroccan 'ulema, controlled the Moroccan monarch - against the 
evidence of neo-patrimonial structures. The underlying question is whether the 
historical evidence suggests that an independent public sphere existed in which 
some parts of Morocco's population, notably the 'ulema, participated. This is to 
examine the central aspect of the thesis, as outlined in Chapter One, that of 
political change based on zones free of power between the population and the 
Moroccan state. In terms of Morocco's historical public sphere, which remains 
the main interest of this chapter, it will be examined whether Morocco's 'ulema, 
as an institution, supported the emergence of a public sphere in Habermas's 
sense, that is a sphere in which the exercise of free will and rationality were the 
dominant modes of operation. This analysis goes beyond an analysis of traditions 
and characteristics of political contestation that were established in Moroccan 
94The hm"a is the act of allegiance that unites the representatives of the people \\'ith the ruler. It 
has ben ~idely used in medieval Islamic countries. and has been seen as an Islamic \ersion ,of a 
contract-type democracy. See for instance Marshall Hodgson: The Venture of Islam. Conscience 
and History in a World Civilization. Vol. II. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
1973), pp. 347-9. 
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political thought and practice, and that still influence modem Islamic thinking in 
Morocc095 but it takes these traditions and characteristics as its starting point. 
3.1.1 The possibility to express dissent in pre-colonial Morocco 
When Morocco gained its independence in 1956, Mohamed Lahbabi 
published a book entitled Le Gouvernement Marocain a I 'Aube du Vingtieme 
Siecle. It examined the political system before the imposition of the French 
protectorate, and argued that the French protectorate had destroyed Morocco's 
political institutions. It had transformed a system in which sovereignty resided in 
the community into an absolute monarchy. The book became a testimony of the 
discussions between conservative and leftist nationalists about the future form of 
the Moroccan monarchy.96 It treats the political system with the vocabulary of 
the Moroccan political system, i.e. the Sultan, its combination with the caliphate, 
and the conditions that the caliphate must fulfil. According to Lahbabi, the three 
essential principles of the Caliphate were (1) that the Caliphate was an 
investiture, (2) that this investiture was based upon the carrying out of a mission, 
and (3) that this mission was carried out through the exercise of defined and 
limited powers. To be a real Caliph, he must be a just ruler and capable of 
ijtihad. 97 Using historic examples, such as Abd'al Aziz's deposition in 1908, 
Lahbabi concludes that in Moroccan political thought, this was established 
tradition. 
Indeed, it seems that there are numerous historical examples that give 
evidence to the possibility that a ruler could be disposed of, which have given 
place to the idea that civil disobedience and the concept of community's 
sovereignty were well established in pre-colonial Morocco. The most prominent 
of these examples is that of al-Yusi's resistance to 17th century ruler, Moulay 
95 See Driss Kettani: 'La seule autorite religiouse, c· est nous' Interyiew with Driss Kettani in 
Maroc Hebdo International, No. 433, 26 October - 1 November 2001. Abdellatif EI Azizi and 
Noureddine louhari: 'Driss Kettani. un alem de pere en fils. L'eternel contestataire' ;\Iaroe 
Hebdo International, No. 433. 26 October - 1 November 2001. 
96 Gellner quoted in C.R.Pennel: 'Tyranny. just rule and Moroccan political thought' in 
Morocco: Occasional Papers No.1, 1994. p. 13 
97Mohammed Lahbabi: Le Gouvernement Marocain a I'Aube du 20eme Sieck (Casablanca: 
Editions Maghrebines, 1975). p. 27-28. 
Isma'il. In general, the position of the 'ulema has been summarised by Pennel as 
follows: 
If the Sultan rules justly, preserves order and the safety of the 
roads, keeps his officers under control so that they' do not 
'tyrannise' the people, raises taxes in a fair way in accordance 
with the shari 'a, and protects the country against attack by outside 
forces, particularly the Christians, then they have a duty to obey 
him. If he does not, and fails so manifestly that justice and order 
are replaced by tyranny, then he can be removed from office. 
Indeed, on occasion it was argued that it was not only the right of 
the pe~rle - led by the 'ulema - to remove him, but their duty to 
do so. 
One example is that of the disposal of Sultan Mohamed al-Maslukh. 
When, in 1575, the Sa'idi Sultan Mohamed al-Maslukh was faced with his 
uncle's army that had entered Morocco with the help of the Ottomans, he fled 
Fes leaving the city open to the invaders. As a result, the 'ulema reversed their 
allegiance to the benefit of his uncle. In a declaration. Mohamed al-Mashlukh 
demanded that they returned their allegiance to him, not because they did not 
have the right to reverse their oath of allegiance (bay'a), but because they had 
had no legal reason to do so in this situation. 
He declared that they were guilty because they violated his ba.v'a 
and broke it, and gave the bay'a to his uncle, without legal cause. 
And he said to them: 'I did not call for the help from the 
Christians until I was deprived of the help of the Muslims,99 
The 'ulema replied, stating first of all that the bay'a was not his, but that 
"the people gave you the reins [of authority] and put the halter in your hands." 
Moreover, the 'ulema referred to Fes as being 'their city', which, as Pennell 
remarks, implies that the 'lilema was as representative of the city and corporal 
life separate from the political authority of the Sultan. Secondly, by leaving the 
city, Mohamed al-Maslukh left it open to 'insolent and corrupt people' who 
attacked the property of the rich: "their harems, wealth, children and the property 
98 C.R.Pennel: 'Tyranny, just rule and Moroccan political thought' in Morocco: Occasional 
Papers No. 1, 1994 p. 22. 
99 quoted in Pennel, ibid. p. 24. He returned to combat his uncle \\ith the aid of Portuguese 
forces, but lost in 'the battle of the three kings.' 
50 
that they had eamed."lOo As a result of the attack on the rich, the poor had 
suffered: "there was no-one left to defend the weak.,,101 Consequently, the failure 
to protect the rich was crucial, because without the wealthy, society could not 
function. By abandoning Fes, Mohamed al-Maslukh was regarded unfit to rule, 
and the 'ulema concluded that "following [the reasoning] of Abu Laila, the 
authority belongs to the man who conquers.,,102 Pointing to a saying of the 
prophet they justified their changing oath of allegiance, explaining "the people, if 
they remain in a state of anarchy, neglected, with no imam over them, should 
agree on an imam and proclaim him and appoint him as the caliph oyer them, to 
deal between themjustly ... ,,103 
This illustrates the existence of an autonomous sphere based on religion, 
in which the power of a ruler could be challenged. In this example this challenge 
occurred when the power of the Sultan was weak. The arguments put forward are 
connected with tyranny and civil strive that the lack of the Sultan's power 
entailed. The 'ulema consisted of the educated and the religiously observant. 
who had a religious following. 
Another prominent example is that of al-Yusi, one of the most famous 
religious dissidents in Moroccan history. AI-Yusi was regarded as a saint with a 
significant following in the mid 1 i h century at the beginning of the Alawi's 
rule. 104 He adhered to the zuwaya al-Dila that posed the main political counter 
force to Moulay Rashid, the founder of the Alawi dynasti on the throne. This 
made him a potential leader of an opposition, because of which he was pursued 
by the Sultan Moulay Isma'il. Addressing himself to Moulay Isma'il he 
contended: 
Both Arab and non-Arab scholars have agreed that tyranny does 
not consolidate power, and it will not stand. Only justice will let 
power stand, and that is true even among the unbelievers. The 
100C.R.Pennel: 'Tyranny, just rule and Moroccan political thought' in Morocco: Occasional 
Pafers No.1. 1994, p. 25 
10 Ibid. 
102Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
1(l4 The present dynasty. 
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kings of the lands of unbelief have survived for hundreds of years 
in kingdoms which are ordered where what they say is listened to, 
at ease from all disorder when they treated their subjects with 
justice, and looked to the proper treatment of their earthly 
possessions. How could a prince who was concerned with this 
world and with religion do any other?l05 
He reinforced his argument by citing Aristotle's warning to Alexander the 
Great, that justice was the basis of good government. For him, being a just ruler 
required implementing Islamic law as the religious scholars interpret it. The 
Sultan must "ask the 'ulema what to take and what to give."l06 Among Muslims, 
rulers were obliged to follow the 'ulema. Moulay Isma'il should follow the 
council of those 'ulema who fear God rather than those who fear the Sultan. l07 
"With respect to both what we have said and what we have not said, do what 
they order and shun what they forbid. This is the path to deliverance if God on 
high so wills.,,108 
AI-Yusi provided an example of someone who challenged the Sultan even 
when his power was strong. Hence, the Sultan was challenged, not on the basis 
of his weakness and civil strive that had given rise to opposition, but on the basis 
of the lack of justice. It must be noted that al-Yusi's story as recorded by 
Geertz l09 was commonplace in Morocco. Rene BruneI remarked with regards to 
a similar folk-tale story of Sid Muhammad bin 'Isa, that he was presented as "a 
defender of the weak and the oppressed" and that "the theme of the struggle of a 
saint against temporal power has always been conducive to the proliferation of 
multiple legends."llo As to its meaning for contemporary Morocco, Munson 
notes that 
I 05 Quoted in PenneL 1994, op.cit. p. 35. 
106 Quoted in Henry Munson: Religion and Power in Morocco (New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press, 1993), p. 30. 
107 . I d' h . . f th A similar remark was pronounced by Kmg Hassan I unng t e opemng sesSIOn 0 e 
CCDH, in May 1990, giving them political space to give 'independent' advice to him. 
108Quoted in Henry Munson, 1993, op.cit. p. 30. 
l09Clifford Geertz: Islam Observed (New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1968). 
110Quoted in Henry Munson, 1993, op.cit. p. 27.Today, the religious challenging of temporal 
authority is still commonplace. The Islamic organisation's Al Adl wal Ihssan spiritual leader 
Abdelsalam Yassine is an example. Others continue to be educated in Morocco's religious 
schools. See Le Journal Hebdomadaire, 25-31 Mai 2002 for an oveniew of new, mostly young. 
Islamic challengers. 
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It is true that most Moroccans in the late twentieth century are 
probably unfamiliar with the epistle to Moulay Islma'il .... But all 
Moroccans are familiar with its message that a ruler must rule 
justly or face divine retribution. Regardless of how many people 
know of al-Yusi's clash with Mulay Isma'il- as depicted in either 
text or folktale - it embodied ideas that have always had. and 
continue to have, a direct impact on the way most Moroccans have 
viewed rulers and those who rebel against them. III 
The last pre-colonial example presented here in order to examine the 
possibility of autonomous action outside the sphere of the Sultan is al-Kattani's 
role in the reversal of the bay 'a of Sultan Abd al-Aziz in 1908. He was another 
historical figure that embodied the myth of the righteous-man-of-God who dared 
to defy an unjust Sultan. He was one of the main figures that tried to give the 
bay'a an explicitly contractual meaning, against the submissive tradition and 
practice. The fact that he was killed shortly afterwards by the Sultan Abd al-
Hafidh should not be taken as a sign of his weakness. but rather as a sign of his 
strength and ability to lead the masses. The historical events that had led to the 
disposal of Abd al-Aziz had been closely connected to the French colonial 
ambitions, which marked a crucial step when the Acts of Algeciras were signed 
in 1906. AI-Kattani (1873-1909) was a venerated Sufi scholar who became from 
1904 to 1909 outspoken against the Sultan's weakness in negotiating with the 
French. He was certainly not a typical representative of the 'ulema, not only 
regarding his activism against the Sultanl12 but also for religious reasons. The 
'ulema tried to have him executed in 1896-7, on grounds of heresy. 
After the occupation of Casablanca and Oujda that followed the signing 
of the Acts of Algeciras, al-Kattani was the only 'a lim , who challenged the 
Sultan's attempts at justifying the French presence in Morocco. However, it was 
the Sultan's brother, Hafidh, who assembled a crowd in Marrakech, far away 
from Fes, on 16 August 1907. He asked the crowd to choose another Sultan who 
would be able to defy the Christian invaders. On being chosen himself and a new 
bay'a issued, the 'ulema of Marrakech was forced to sign it. The conditions 
I 11 Henry Munson, 1993, op.cit. p. 32. 
1 12 As Munson remarks, most other 'ulema were as servile as usual, saying whate\'er the Sultan 
wanted them to say. Munson, ibid. p. 61. 
expressed in the bay 'a included "courage resulting in the protection of the land 
of Islam and holy war against the enemy.,,113 In tum, the Sultan assembled a 
group of Fassi 'ulema in his palace in Rabat, and forced them to issue a jam'a 
condemning the bay 'a of Marrakech, stating that they did not have any reason to 
withdraw their oath of allegiance. In January 1908, a similar scene took place, 
this time however in Fes, with the Fassi 'ulema being coerced by an angry mob. 
The mob consisted of peasants, artisans, and the urban poor. The following 
account from Munson gives important insights into the events ofFes. 
On 15 December 1907, peasants swarmed into Fez refusing to pay 
a market tax imposed by Mulay 'Abd al-'Aziz. Joined by the 
city's poor, the peasants broke open the strongboxes where the tax 
revenues were kept and attacked a number of shops, the French 
post office, and the office of the government's tobacco monopoly. 
The crowds also tried to pillage the Jewish quarter, but its gates 
were shut before they could. After two days of this rioting, 
merchants succeeded in restoring order by means of a makeshift 
militia composed largely porters and slaves. The sultan's army 
was absent, having left Fez in September when Mulay 'Ab al-
'Aziz had decided he would be safer in Rabat, near French troops 
and ships.114 
In January 1908, an agitated crowd of twenty thousand people escorted 
some of Fes's most prominent 'ulema to the al-Qarawiyyin University. They 
demanded the signature of a petition that would declare that 'Abd al-' Aziz was 
no longer fit to rule, transferring the bay 'a to Moulay 'Abd al-Hafidh. This was 
on the grounds that he had been subservient to the French and had failed to 
implement the laws of Islam. As had occurred in Marrakech a few months 
earlier, those who did not want to sign were threatened and coerced. Within 
thirty minutes, the new bay' a was drafted and signed. The distinctive feature, 
and the reason why this bay 'a became prominent among constitutionalists within 
the Nationalist movement, was its contractual nature. I IS The new allegiance to 
113 Ibid. p. 67 
114 Ibid. p. 69170. See also Edmund Burke: Prelude to protectorate in Morocco: Precolonial 
protest and Resistance 1860-1912. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 108. 
115 See especially Allal al-Fassi's political writitings in the 1930s, See John P. Halstead: Rebirth 
of a Nation. The Origins and Rise of Morccan Nationalism. 1912-44 (Cambridge MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1967), p. 55, Mohammed Lahbabi: Le GoU\'emement Marocain a I'Aube du 
20eme siecle. (Casablanca: Editions Maghrebines, 1975), p. 27-28, also AHal al-Fassi: The 
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Abd al-Hafidth was contingent on his acceptance of a number of specific 
conditions. These were the liberation of the territories occupied by France, the 
elimination of all European interference in Moroccan affairs, the duty to consult 
the people with respect to negotiations with foreign powers, the elimination of 
non-Koranic taxes, and the protection of the traditional prerogatives of the 
'ulema. Although the conditional character had always been implied in preceding 
bay 'a, these conditions had never been as explicit. Hence, as Munson observes, 
some 'ulema objected to the bay'a on the grounds that "conditions cannot be 
imposed on kings", thereby recognising the bay 'a's revolutionary aspect in the 
context of Moroccan history. Apparently, it was al-Kattani who had been the 
leading force behind the conditionality of the bay 'a. He declared that "there is no 
benefit to be expected from this revolution if the bay'a of the commander of the 
faithful is not tied to conditions that implement the goals of the 'umma.,,116 
Although Abd al-Hafidh was the person profiting from the new bay'a, he 
became furious when he heard about the conditions that were imposed on him. In 
his opinion, the conditions diluted his power and hindered his ability to govern. 
The frightened 'ulema immediately disavowed the conditions, and blamed them 
on al-Kattani, insisting that he had forced them to accept them. With the new 
Sultan's inability to resist the French forces, the strained relationship between al-
Kattani, the most powerful man in Fes, and the Sultan worsened. In spring 1909, 
al-Kattani left the city of Fes for the Middle Atlas to start a revolt and a holy war 
against the French. He was subsequently captured by the Sultan's soldiers, 
brought to Fes, flogged to death and buried in the middle of the night. 1 17 
3.1.2 Religious dissent 
These three historical examples illustrate the limits of religious dissent 
and the role that the 'ulema played in establishing public spheres. Its role was 
neither purely integrative nor purely oppositional, and it served neither to protect 
individual nor group rights from the monarch's intervention. In two of the three 
examples, the resistance and political force represented by an individual 'alim 
Independence Movement in Arab North Africa Translated by Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh 
(Washington D.C. American Council of Learned Societies. 1954), p. 86. 
116 1 . 7" ~ un son, Op.Clt. p. -. 
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resulted directly from the political trouble that the absence of clear sovereignty 
had brought. The signing of the Acts of Algeciras and the French presence in the 
main Moroccan cities in the early 20th century resembled the abandoning of Fes 
in the 16th century by Mohamed al-Maslukh. Leaving the city or the country 
open to foreign invaders or worse, civil strife (fitna) , were seen as primary 
reasons that legitimated the disposal of a ruler. His primary task was, after all. 
the protection of the Islamic 'umma. Significantly, as in the 16th century 
example, in December 1907, the 'ulema was left alone with civil unrest. The 
Sultan's army had left Fes with the Sultan, who had moved to Rabat to be closer 
to French protection. This gives some important clues regarding the contractual 
aspect of the bay'a: in the first place, the Sultan is charged with the protection of 
the 'umma, and in order to do so, he is given absolute authority. Although there 
clearly existed a contractual aspect, this should be qualified as a contract in the 
sense of Thomas Hobbes rather then John Locke or later French philosophers. As 
Cubertafond remarks, 
The Moroccan contractual perspective is closer to Hobbes's 
political thought than that of Rousseau: a strong central power is 
built and important limitations on one's own political initiatives 
are accepted. This submission is supported in order to reinforce 
the weight of all members of society, notably vis-a-vis foreign 
countries. This aims to avoid one group monopolising all 
resources. Hence, a Leviathan is created in order to avoid the 
jungle and the destruction by rival groups. Then, a contract is 
signed with the King; The bay'a is therefore the delegation of 
power to a person who is overarmed and overequipped. This 
power, however, can be taken back if the Royal delegate fails his 
mission, directly or indirectly. I 18 
Regarding the case of the 1908 bay 'a, the Moroccan bay'a's contractual 
nature needs to be further qualified. It was an angry mob who forced the leading 
'ulema to sign the new bay'a, and it seems that the 'ulema would not have done 
so independently. AI-Kettani, as mentioned above, did not have a large following 
within the 'ulema, and being a Sufi, he was even regarded with religious 
contempt by the orthodox. As a consequence: 
117Ibid. 
118 Bernard Cubertafond: Le System Politigue Marocain. (Paris: I" Harmattan, 1997). p. :'6. 
It is true that the weakened state of the Sultanate in 1907-08 
enabled the Moroccan 'ulema to playa more conspicuous political 
role than they usually did. Still, even in these years, most scholars 
remained pawns manipulated by those who held real power, be it 
the reigning sultan, ... or al-Kattani when he was able to mobilize 
huge crowds of artisans, shopkeepers, and peasants. In this period, 
as in previous centuries, no one denied that approval by the 'ulema 
was a prerequisite of legitimate rule. But nor did those with power 
have any difficulty in forcing the 'ulema to legitimate whatever it 
was they wanted legitimated. 119 
Tozy expresses the same in the following words: 
What is sure is that despite the real weight that the 'ulema 
represented, their power remained limited and one should not 
exaggerate their importance. 120 
On the other hand, religious dissent had cultural roots, which were that of 
the righteous-man-of-God who defies unjust rule. Being able to draw on this 
myth, al-Kattani embodied this figure and was able to put specific conditions 
into the new bay'a, even if he was not able to withstand the pressure when these 
conditions were later abandoned. These pre-colonial developments should 
indicate at least one importance of the structure of the public sphere in state-
society relations in the beginning of the 20th century. This is the importance of a 
religious ideal in challenging the power of the ruler, which is embedded into the 
modes of legitimisation that Morocco traditionally knew. 121 Historical and 
cultural traditions have placed religion and the 'ulema in the heart of social 
contractual relations between state and society, institutionalising to a certain 
degree the public sphere. This was amplified through the 'ulema's access to 
knowledge and written documents, education, religious and philosophical 
119 Munson, 1993, op.cit. p. 75. 
120 Mohamed Tozy: 'Champs et contre-champs politico-religieux au Maroc.' These pour Ie 
Doctorat d'Etat en Science Politique. Universite de Droit, d'Economie et des Sciences d'Aix -
Marseille, 1984, p. 34. 
1 2 1 It may be argued that these modes of legitimacy were embedded in the historical power 
struggles between the monarchical institution and the religious institution of the ':1IH'Qya which 
contested the religious authority of the monarchy in the countryside, what Moroccan and French 
historians have called bled-el-siba. The 'ulema as an intermediate and relatively weak institution, 
based in the cities, was challenged more by the ':lIlraya than by the monarchy, because of the 
particular form ofmaraboutic Islam that the ':lIlnll'aS represented. See i\lary-Jane De~: 'Islam 
and the State in Algeria and Morocco: A dialectical Moder in John Ruby (ed): lslamlsm and 
Secularism in North Africa (New York: St Martin's Press. 1999), 
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reasoning, and, of course, the monarchy's own self-limitation through its claim 
to religious legitimacy.122 The contractual relationship between ruler and ruled. 
however, was articulated with the opposite registry of obedience. This is the 
reason why, paradoxically, Morocco's 'ulema embodied both registries of 
political legitimacy, and would continue to do so in later developments of 20th 
century Moroccan history. It continued to become strong during the protectorate 
within the nationalist movement, as numerous articles on the salafiyra 
movement have shown. 123 
In terms of the development of a public sphere, despite the 'ulema's 
potential and strategic position to exercise certain features of the public sphere, it 
was the existence of power relations that inhibited its role. In other words, the 
'ulema was unable to develop an autonomous sphere, because its close 
association for the legitimacy of the Kingdom made it subject to interference and 
political calculations. This was also due to a lack of differentiation between 
traditional and modem state features, which continues to inform Moroccan 
politics up to today. 
3.2 Section Two: Characteristics of the post-independence order 
Apart from the ambiguous contractual relationship between the ruler and 
the ruled, the second factor that shaped the development of the sphere between 
the political centre and society were the structural and historical developments 
that followed independence and the return of the Sultan from exile in November 
1955. The antagonism between the monarchy and the Nationalist movement on 
the one hand, and between rural and urban elites on the other. resulted in the 
establishment of monarchical power and the duality of exclusion and co-optation 
of the opposition. The evolution of associative activities and the establishment of 
a public sphere accompanied this development, which was also marked by close 
122 For a textual analysis of this, see Mohammed Kably: 'Legitimacy of State Power and Socio-
Religious Variations in Medieval Morocco' in Rahma Bourqia and Susan ~ilson Miller (eds): In 
the Shadow of the Sultan. Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco (Cambndge, MA: Harvard 
Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1999). 
patron-client relationships. As a result, political parties and labour uruons 
became power-bases, and not zones free of power beyond administrative 
manipulation. The same applies to organisations of civil society that started to 
operate. The extreme fragility and fragmentation of the Moroccan political scene, 
that has been commented on by so many observers, continued in associative life. 
Dissent, then, became marginalised through the absence of homogenising 
elements, a consequence of the divide-and-rule phenomenon. 
As I will argue, contemporary developments of civil society need to be 
understood within this situation. After analysing the general features of 
Moroccan political life after independence (neo-patrimonialism, inter-elite 
conflicts, and associations becoming hostage to political parties and state 
interests) I will use three examples (the 1962 plebiscite, early human rights 
activities, and the use of religion by the state) to illustrate that organisations of 
civil society were weakened. This weakening resulted from the fact that they 
absorbed the power struggles that were taking place in the political field (the 
monarchy and those opposition parties issued from the Nationalist movement). 
In the beginning of associative activities, the political association with a party, 
and later that with the state, was the all-encompassing feature of organisations of 
civil society. This was because of the weakness of established patterns of power 
on the one hand, and patterns of patronage on the other. The power vacuum 
resulted from the fact that organisations based on popular mobilisation, the army, 
and the monarchy, all claimed a fair share in the higher ranks of the state. 
Associations, as the example of the 1962 plebiscite illustrates, played a 
significant role in support of a particular political formation. In this situation, the 
monarchy used the same methods, not only with regards to the rural 
aristocracy. 124 Another element of this formation of civil society into a political 
orientation was the fate of the 'ulema within the League of Moroccan' Ulema. 125 
123 See for instance Mohamed EI Mansour:'Salafis and Modernists in the Moroccan Nationalist 
movement' in John Ruby (ed): Islamism and Secularism in North Africa (New York: St Martin's 
Press, 1999). 
1 24Remy Leveau: Le Fellah Marocain. Defenseur du Trone. ~e edition. (Paris: Presse de la 
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1985). 
1 25Mohammed Tozy: 'Champ et contre champ politico-religieux au Maroc'. ThesL' pour Ie 
Doctorat d'Etat en Science Politique. Universite de Droit, d'Economie et des Sciences d'Aix -
Marseille, 1984. 
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Later in the 1980s, regional associations became the subject of the same strategy. 
This means that Morocco's version of etatisme was from the beginning divided 
and bipolar. 
3.2.1 Moroccan Neo-Patrimonialism and thefailure of the multiparty sJ'stem 
The structuring of Morocco's economy and society III relation to the 
monarch has been subject to a good number of pUblications. 126 John Waterbury's 
The Commander of the Faithful analyses Morocco's elite in the early 1960s in 
terms of patron-client relationships with the monarchy. According to Waterbury, 
the entire political elite comprises the field of action for alliance-building 
strategies of the King, who maintains a number of clientele groups of which he is 
the patron. He appoints all high-ranking civil service officials, and approves 
promotions in the armed forces. He may choose to delegate this authority to a 
minister, but according to Waterbury, there is little doubt concerning its origins. 
Consequently the king controls the most desirable administrative 
posts, and he manipulates appointments in the same manner that 
he distributes economic sanctions and rewards: to hold his secular 
clientele in line, attract new recruits, and keep opponents off 
balance. 127 
In a neo-patrimonial and paternalistic manner, "although certain segments 
of the elite identify their interests more closely than others with those of the 
throne, the King consistently tries to promote the notion that all segments of the 
elite constitute a large family, subject to political differences, but essentially 
united in approval of the direct role of the monarchy in politics.,,128 This image 
was reinforced by the security forces that Mohamed V built up following the 
126See for instance: William I Zartman: Morocco: Problems of New Power (New York: Oceana. 
1971), Zartman (ed): Political Elites in Arab North Africa. (London: Longman, 1982), William I 
Zartman (ed): The Political Economy of Morocco. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), Jean 
Leca: 'Reformes institutionnelles et legitimatiojn du pouvoir au Maghreb' in Jean Leca (ed): 
Developpements Politigues au Maghreb. Amenagements institutionnels et proces~us eI~c~oraux 
(Paris: CNRS. 1979), see also Jean Leca and Yves Schemeil: 'Clientelisme et Patnmomahs~e 
dans Ie Monde Arabe' in International Political Science Reyiew, Vol. 4, No, 4, 1983. pp. 45)-
495. 
127 John Waterbury: The Commander of the Faithful. The Moroccan Political Elite. :\ Study of 
Sefmented Politics. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), p. 152. 
12 Ibid. p. 149. 
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spring of 1956. Questioning of the monarch's role and the claiming of popular 
sovereignty, even if anchored in Article 1 of the constitution, led to prison 
sentences. Together with Mohamed Basri, Alternance's Prime Minister 
Abderrahman Youssoufi (1998-2002) became subject to this treatment in the 
winter of 195911960. Hence, the King's authority over the armed forces has been 
critical to his rule. His being the central institution of 'Justice" made him, in the 
words of Waterbury, "dispenser of justice." Political opponents, after having 
been condemned, could always hope to be pardoned by the King in order to be 
re-integrated into the "national family." 129 However, 
If they miss the opportunity, if they persist in error and believe 
that clemency is a door open widely to them at all moments, I 
warn them against the unfortunate consequences of their poor 
intentions and manoeuvres, and I call their attention to the fact that 
Our clemency is equalled only by Our firmness. 130 
Since independence, Morocco has had a formal multiparty system at its 
base, in which divisive elements of Moroccan civil society could strengthen the 
role of the absolute monarch as arbiter, the desired role of the King. The 
institutional basis of power, however, became networks of patronage through the 
distribution of favours, weakening other kinds of decision-making bodies. The 
King is, in the words of Jean-Francois Clement, "the center of a concentric 
cybernetic system," 131 and the following description by Hammoudi contrasts 
these new networks with the dissolution of the institutional autonomy of the 
multi-party system and unionism: 
129 According to Susan E. Waltz "the quality of arbitrariness frequently attached to both reprisals 
and measures of clemency have served to reinforce an object lesson about the King's raw 
powers. Disjointed reprisals and unexpected amnesties throw players offb~lance even ~s they 
underscore the discretionary - and thus enhanced - powers of the monarch. Susan E. \\ altz: 
'Interpreting Political Reform in Morocco' in Rahrna Bourqia and Susan ~ilson Miller (eds): In 
the Shadow of the Sultan. Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco (Cambndge, MA: Harvard 
Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1999), p. 291. 
130 King Hassan, quoted in John Waterbury: The Commander of the Faithful. The Moroccan 
Political Elite. A Study of Segmented Politics. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), p. 150. 
131 Jean-Francois Clement quoted in Bahgat Korany: 'Monarchical Islam with a Democratic 
Veneer: Morocco' in Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble: Political Liberalisatio~ and 
Democratisation in the Arab World. Vol. 2 Comparative Experiences. (Boulder: Lynne Rlenner 
Publishers. 1998), p. 172. 
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The gradual weakening of political parties and unions - through 
repression of those seeking change and the coopting of elites 
devoted to the system - is ... characteristic of this postcolonial 
order. A civilian network emerged, alongside the makhzen and 
the military network. The king acted in such a way as to 
maintain rivalry between the networks and to appear as both 
indispensable mediator and unique source of favors and pebends, 
which were bestowed as rewards for political service. 132 
At the expense of urban associations and parties, traditional links to the rural 
elite were established, and in return for their allegiance, economically and 
politically empowered. This empowerment to ensure allegiance served the 
purpose to establish a new coalition of forces in support of the monarchy, and 
was possible due to a lack of political consciousness among the rural 
I · 133 popu atlOn. 
These notables were relying on economic wealth (land, animals, 
hydraulic resources) and important family connections (Cai"ds, 
Marabouts, Chorfas) in order to exercise control over the rural 
population, to influence their behaviour and to speak in their 
name. This is because the peasantry, as P. Pascon has remarked, 
'does not express itself directly as an organised social class, and 
tolerates that others speak for them, believing that they speak for 
them, simply because they cannot achieve a political identity.' In 
exchange for their support and their contribution to the 
maintenance of social peace in the countryside, these notables 
obtain from the central power a variety of concessions and 
134 
advantages. 
Recovered colonial land was distributed to rural notables and officers, 
landowners freed from tax payments (an aspect that is still in practice), and 
commercial entreprises were run by favoured clients. The early period of public 
sector expansion offered many opportunities for Royal gifts, and exchanged 
active, and hence, potentially threatening, political parties with "mechanisms of 
132 Abdallah Hammoudi: Master and Disciple: The Cultural foundation of Moroccan 
Authoritarianism. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997) p. 33. 
133This would change in later years, due to the rural exodus and new educational opportunities in 
the cities for the semi urbaILrural population. 
134Driss Ben Ali: 'Changement de pacte social et continuite de I' ordre politique au Maroc' in 
Michel Canau (ed): Changement Politigues au Maghreb. (Paris: Centre Natil11lal de la Recherche 
Scientifique, 1991), p. 53. 
balance and arbitration between ... networks.,,135 Along with the bay'a, this 
served the purpose of disempowering the hegemonic organisation of the 
Nationalist movement (organised in the Istiqlal party and the UNFP). However, 
the underlying social demands were not kept at bay. As Leveau notices. the 
Nationalist movement and demands for structural change were at the heart of the 
urban bourgeoisie, being in competition with the rural notables, the latter having 
already profited from the French colonial system. Hence, the period up to the 
dissolution of parliament in 1965 amounted to a reversal of alliances, a strategic 
choice - so it seems - taken by the monarchy in view of the power of the 
Nationalist movement. Rural notables were regarded as the 'security group' - the 
foundation of the Moroccan monarchy - as seen in the 1963 elections and even in 
earlier pro-government rural uprisings against the Nationalists. Their economic 
and political empowerment took several forms, the most important one being the 
proximity of rural interest groups to the government. 136 
3.2.2 Inter-elite conflicts 
An explanation for the monarch's ability to draw on the divisive elements 
of Morocco's political elite will be outlined at this point. The creation of a rural 
counter-movement in order to neutralise the Istiqlal and the organised urban elite 
had already been the strategy of the French administration. This took the form of 
the enrolment of the rural Berber elite into the military academy of Azrou. The 
so-called 'Berber dahir' of 1930 followed the same logic, which divided 
Morocco into two administrative areas in which Islamic law was separated from 
Berber customary law. When the urban elite - organised in the hegemonic Istiqlal 
party - competed in the first phase of Moroccan post-independence for power 
within the "government of national unity," its failure to dominate the monarchy 
resulted from its structural incapacity to undertake rural mobilisation. As 
Hermassi points out (in contrast to Algeria and Tunisia, where the elite was 
heterogeneous and homogenous respectively) in Morocco, from the very 
135 Abdallah Hammoudi. ob.cit. p. 33. 
136 Remy Levau: Le Fellah Marocain. Defenseur du Trone. (Paris: Press de la Fondation 
Nationale de Science Politique, 1985). 
beginning, the bourgeois elite was marginal. 137 Hence, as Gellner noticed, rural 
rebellions that have marked immediate post-independence, were connected to the 
rural elite that feared the dominance of the urban Istiqlal. This is why they 
collapsed quite easily through the intermediaries of the same rural elites that 
were increasingly connected to the monarchy. In fact, at times they did not seem 
to make much sense: "Tribesmen who proclaim themselves supporters of X stage 
a rebellion - while X is in office as Prime Minister. Or again: a Y stages a 
rebellion - which is then suppressed by Y himself, whose supporter the rebels 
claim to be, and in whose very support the rebellion was made.',138 Early rural 
uprisings were closely connected to the system of patronage that administrative 
posts entailed. The 1956 revolt led by Governor Addi Ou Bihi and supported by 
the Minister of Interior, Lyusi, was an attempt to prevent the Istiqlal from 
centralising to its advantage administrative power. 
The extension of the national law and abrogation of the customary 
tribunals, championed by the Istiqlal minister of justice, meant that 
the national party was the sole force capable of making judicial 
appointments. The new judges assumed the legal power as a 
challenge to the local administrative power of the governor and his 
retainers. Furthermore, the Istiqlalis, who had not undertaken rural 
mobilization prior to independence, began to infiltrate the interior, 
the police, the Departments of Education and Public Works. The 
party used its political weight to expel hundreds of local qaids who 
compromised themselves under colonialism .... The final blow 
came when Minister of Interior Lyusi was replaced by Driss 
M'hammedi in May 1956. The clash between the national elite 
and locally based power was not far off. ... After having received 
arms from French officers, Ou Bihi closed down the Istiqlali cells 
and imprisoned almost all the officials in the region, including the 
. h' f d h . d 139 polIce c Ie an t e JU ge. 
The monarchy's alignment with the rural elite became evident following 
governor Ahardane's dismissal and arrest in 1957, for having engaged in partisan 
activity. Ahardane, an important figure within the Liberation Army and close to 
the Royal court shortly after independence, had been the main rival of the leader 
137 Elbaki Hennassi: Leadership and National Development in North Africa (Berkeley and 
London: University of California Press, 1972) p. I·B. 
138 Ernest Gellner, 'Patterns of Rural Rebellion in Morocco: Tribes as i\1inorities' Archives 
Europeennes de Sociologie, Vol. 3, No.2, 1962. p. 297. 
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of the Istiqlal, Ben Barka 140, who had prevented him from accessing to the post 
of Interior Minister. 141 The political conflict was sharpened by the assassination 
of the chief of staff of the Liberation Army in June 1956 (according to rumours. 
at the instigation of Ben Barka.) The Liberation Anny's uprising in Fes _ 
threatening the demolition of the city - ended with the army's surrendering of 
arms to the King. Aherdane had been the main representative of the army and 
became consequently the main intermediary. The King and the then Crown 
Prince Hassan encouraged the foundation of Aherdane's Mouvement Populaire 
(rural with strong Berber background) in November 1957. The rural uprising that 
followed his arrest in his home town Oulmes was, according to his own account, 
sponsored by him personally and had as its objective the recognition of his party. 
Aherdane obtained the desired recognition of his party, and the loyal royalist 
obtained important ministerial portfolios. 142 
These developments resulted in the important bifurcation of the Moroccan 
political system. Its underlying feature was the cultural and political contlict 
between the urban and rural elite. The Istiqlal tried to dominate the political 
system especially through its blocking of a parliamentary bill that would allow 
the freedom of association. This was followed by the counter-formation of a 
rural elite with direct links to the monarchy. This allowed the formation of a neo-
patrimonial political system with governance based on a system of directly 
appointed governors (wali) and religiously formed judges, outside of the official 
political system that consisted of governmental political parties and opposition 
political parties. At the same time, the Istiqlal alienated the army 
by making increasingly frantic attempts t? gain control o~er it, and 
by calling it a stage army of mercena~es. The party l~self thus 
helped consolidate the army's allegIance to the kmg, and 
139 . ' 146 Hennassl, Op.Clt. p. 
140 After having been exiled to France in 1965, Ben Barka was kidnapped and under unclear 
circumstances. 
141 A C . 'N te on the Role of Berbers in the I early Days of Moroccan Independence' in L 
. oram. 0 ") ")70 
Gellner and Charles Micaud: Arabs and Berbers (London: Gerard Duckworth, 197 .... ), p. - . 
142 See Ernerst Gellner: 'Tribalism and Social Change in North Africa' in W.II.Lewls (ed): 
French Speaking Africa: The Search for Identit\' (New York: \\. alker, 19(5) 
exacerbated their sense of Berber identity by seeking to deny its 
. 143 
eXIstence. 
The Mouvement Populaire under Ahardane, although in principle Berber, 
did attract a substantial number of Arab/urban members due to its favoured place 
within the political system, thus losing its character of being purely rural and 
Berber. Gaining strength from the decline of the UNFP and the IstiqlaL it 
became a magnet of power especially due to Ahardane' s close relationship with 
Interior Minister (and military leader) General Oufkir. who organised elections 
and was creating his own personal patron-client relationships. The main goal of 
attaining a place within the party was to become a player in the extensive patron-
client network. This party was without any political programme or ideology: the 
only idea of the party was to support the monarch against the IstiqlaL a task 
facilitated by the Istiqlal's 1959 break-up. The Mouvement Populaire's position 
within the legislative and executive councils allowed its members to profit from 
easy access to rural loans, the distribution of former French land, and from state 
services through the Office National des Irrigations (ONI) and the Office de la 
Mise en Valeur Agricole (OMV A). The distribution of former French land 
fulfilled a special role in the distribution of patronage. Although 600,000 acres 
were directly distributed to rank and file membes of the MP, 'collective lands' 
that belonged collectively to the tribes (15 million acres, of which 2.5 million are 
used in agriculture) were 'managed' by the Ministry of Interior through turning 
h . h· ,144 t em Into a "trustees Ip. 
The basic features of Morocco's neo-patrimonial system ensured that 
personal favours and loyalty were much more important than political ideology 
or political skill in the distribution of administrative and political posts. Apart 
from ideological divisions between conservative and progressive forces within 
the IstiqlaL (AlaI al-Fassi versus Mehdi Ben Barka) the elite was divided 
between rural and urban elements. The fight for political power in the aftermath 
of independence, be it by constitutionalism or by the establishment of a 
multiparty system, absorbed all political activity. As a consequence, newspapers 
l·n 2' ")'72 
- Coram. 197 , Op.Clt. p. ~, . 
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became party-based, as did social organisations (i.e. National Association of 
Istiqlali Women or Association pour fa Protection de fa Famille Marocaine , 
both founded by Zhor Ezzouka in 1963, both still presided oyer by Istiqlali 
B . S . 145) 1" 1 d . ennaru- mIres ,as po lhca power was enved from having a mass 
following. Organisations of this kind were in fact very easily absorbed by 
political interests in their constant need to find the necessary funds on the one 
hand, and the positive image they were able to create for political parties or the 
monarchy on the other. Hence, from the beginning, the system of patronage 
expanded to include associations, be it through their alliance to political parties 
or to the state through being recognised as utilites publiques. 146 
The division of Morocco's politically conscious elite in the aftennath of 
independence made the monarch's domination possible. An instance of this was 
the decline of the Nationalist movement. 147 According to Camau, the monarch's 
institutional dominance was a direct result of the fragmentation of the social 
base. The National movement was not able to produce a defined social project 
that would have resisted tendencies of fragmentation, be they induced or 
intrinsic. 
The emergence of post-colonial political institutions corresponded 
to a movement, which held in itself the negation of dependent 
structures. This movement, however, because of its configuration 
in terms of social stratification, was not able to produce a project, 
which went beyond the aim of nationalising the colonial state. . .. 
These institutions don't produce a 'model' but instead they 
disarticulate this model by an operation, in which the detennining 
factor is not the voluntarism of leaders but the social 
fragmentation. These institutions identify as much the state to the 
nation as the nation has a heterogeneous structure, which tends to 
be an obstacle for the translation of antagonisms in political 
144 Abdaslam Ben Kaddour: 'The Neo-Makhzen and the Berbers' in E. Gellner and Charles 
Micaud: Arabs and Berbers (London: Gerard Duckworth, 1972, p. 266. 
145 One of the two women in the 1998-2002 parliament, member of Istiqlal's Ligllt.' .\/urocaine £II.' 
Droits de /'Homme. 
146 See Ali Benhaddou : Maroc: Les Elites du Royaume. Essai sur I'Organisation du pouvoir au 
Maroc. (Paris, I 'Harmattan. 1997) for state and personality sponsored associations. 
147 The division was. according to Clifford Geertz, Maraboutic \s. Scriptualist. See Chfl()rd 
Geertz: Islam Observed, (Ne\\' I {aven and London: \~ ale U,niversity ~res~. 1 ~68) .. Thl~ . , .. , 
designation overlaps \\'ith other divisions, such as 'LiberatIOn Army \ s. [stlqlal, or ,1:-' ,ma[~ :-'l:d 
here, 'rural' vs, 'urban. ' 
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conflicts. As such, it prevents the representative organisation of 
the nation by the state. In this sense, far from being a proof for the 
inadaptation towards an imitated model, these political structures 
prove to be particularly 'functional' and adapted. '" Be it as it is, 
the political institutions, if they do not reflect the social structures, 
they take them into account. In the Maghreb, they give testimony 
of a social speciality, in which different fields of solidarity 
confront and combine each other, depending on different social 
formations, composite societies, and dependent societies. 148 
The division of Moroccan political parties has been the cornerstone of the 
Moroccan political system and the dominance of the monarch. It had at its base 
the division between the rural and urban elites and population, which was at the 
beginning of the post-colonial period the predominant factor of Moroccan 
politics. The monarchy could play on these divisions, and from a position of 
strength, it could amplify them through its monopoly over the use of coercion. 
The arrest and condemnation of Union National des Forces Populaires leaders in 
1963 for allegedly plotting against the monarchy, is the earliest example. The 
dissolution of parliament in 1965 and the declaration of the state of emergency is 
another. These early developments concerning the fragmentation of the political 
sphere to which responded the monarchy'S monopolisation of power left several 
marks on the development of civil society. I will discuss these in the ensuing 
four subsections. 
3.2.3 The Relationship between Civil Society and Political Parties 
To begin with, a certain critique might be formulated against the distinction 
between political parties and civil society. Political parties can be regarded as 
part and parcel of civil society, first and foremost because they are the real 
'buffer' between the citizens and the state. They guarantee in any democratic 
country (as well as in countries that experience a 'democratic transition' 1.+9) the 
communication between state elites and the population at large. The distinction 
between political parties and civil society, however. can be justified using 
148 Michel Camau: Pouvoirs et Institutions au Maghreb, (Tunis: Ceres Productions. 1978), p. 
200. 
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Putman's distinction between vertical and horizontal power relations, to which I 
referred earlier in Chapter One. ISO In his opinion, associations of civil society are 
characterised by horizontal power relations (between equals, so to speak), 
whereas political parties are characterised by vertical, hierarchical power 
relations. 151 Consequently, when political parties impose their vertical power 
relations on associations of civil society, they inhibit their autonomy and 
transfonn them into mere satellites of their interests. 152 
Until the mid-80s, this was effectively the case in Morocco. Power relations 
inhibited the free expression of associations' interests, as was illustrated by the 
instrumentalisation not only of labour unions, human rights organisations, youth 
organisations, women's rights associations, but also of Islamic organisations (the 
League National des 'Ulema).153 In addition to ideological similarities between 
'democratic' actors of civil society and 'democratic' political parties (which had 
been till 1998 more or less opposition parties), political parties used feminist 
sections and human rights organisations to bolster their own opposition vis-a-vis 
the central government and the monarchy. The same applied to the creation of 
youth organisations such as the Association Marocaine pour I 'Education de la 
Jeunesse (AMEJ) and ToufJoula Chaabia by the Istiqlal (which became later 
UNFP and USFP youth organisations),154 and the student's organisation Union 
National des Etudiants Marocains (UNEM). 
As a result of this close party-association complex, the central feature of 
Morocco's civil society in those three decades following Morocco's 
independence was that associations were very closely tied to the political 
process. The political struggle between the political parties and the monarchy, 
made organisations of civil society fulfil a specific function, that of serving as 
149For a critique of the Transition Paradigm see Thomas Carothers: 'The End of the Transition 
Paradigm' in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13. no. L January 2002. 
ISO See page 24. 
151 Robert Putman: Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 167-75. 
152H b . , of the public sphere and communicative power implies the same idea. a ermas s use 
153See the following three subsections. 
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political parties' presence in the population. In this context, the lack of autonomy 
prevented the clear articulation of any associations' interests or purpose, and 
resulted in the weakening of its associative activities. This was especially the 
case in the politically sensitive sector of human rights, which I will discuss in 
more detail later in this thesis. 155 
From the point of view of political parties, however, this interference into 
associative life was necessary to guarantee the state's absence from civil society, 
that is, to guarantee a certain form of civil society's independence. Larbi 
Messari, high ranking member of the Istiqlal, former Ambassador to Brazil and 
former Minister of Communication (1998-2000), and former active member in 
associations such as UNPM and the Writers' Association, explains the Istiqal's 
point of view: 
In Moroccan political parties, there is a secondary parallel 
organisation that consists of trade unions, school's parents 
associations, associations in education, for the youth etc. The 
militants of political parties have presided over these associations 
(of parents, for instance) in order to talk about the political issues 
that were relevant (for instance: education) ... Apart from that, the 
political parties have always incited the citizens to participate in 
welfare. For this reason, in Morocco there is a well-functioning 
welfare network. The political parties tried to motivate the people 
to become interested in public concerns in order to create and lead 
the citizens. Therefore, very often, organisations appeared thanks 
to the initiative of political parties. It was the democratic parties 
which represented political society and when they fought in the 
extreme situation of the state of emergency [1965-1972] the 
political parties were the vanguards of civil society. Today, the 
political parties fight for power, and civil society, based as it is on 
the volontarism, is not interested in power. This means that today. 
civil society can be separated from political society, but the m'o 
are still part and parcel of the democratic movement ... For 
example, the union of the national press was created by the 
democratic political parties, Youssoufi [USFP], Boucetta [Istiqlal] 
and others in order to defend the interests of public freedom. The 
Union des Ecril'ains was born at the initiative of writers, poets, 
and according to its nature, it should be independent. However, 
Ghallib and I [both IstiqlalisJ, 11'e did a coup d'etat in order to 
defend the independence of this union vis-a-vis the state, In the 
154For a detailed analysis see :\'issa lkken: Les Organisations de Jeunesse au \1awc (Rabat: :\1 
Assass, 1997). 
155The LMDH's actiyities and containment will be explained in the following SUbSl'ctH)11 
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whole Arab world, we were the only case of a l\'riters ' association 
that was independent from the state. 156 
3.2.4 The politicisation of associations and trade unions during the 1962 
referendum 
The referendum for approval of the first Moroccan constitution of 7 
December 1962 marked the role that associations played within the system 
dominated by the monarch and the system of patronage. This event is significant 
in so far as it is the first mass-based event in which the politicisation of 
associations became clear and their relationship to the monarchy the most 
important characteristic. The split between the Istiq lal and the UNFP meant that 
labour unions such as the Union Marocaine des Travailleurs (UMT) and the 
Union Generale des Travailleurs Marocains (UGTM) were forced to adopt the 
attitude of these parties. The positions of the Istiqlal in favour of the constitution 
and the call to boycott the referendum by the UNFP were equally guided by a 
sense of rivalry: The Istiqlal hoped that it could promote itself as quasi-loyal to 
the monarchy, thereby getting rid of its main competitor in the field, the UNFP. 
In contrast to UNFP critics of the constitutional process, the Istiqlal announced 
that it did not consider important how the constitution was elaborated. What 
mattered was what it contained and if this was in line with the aspirations of the 
Moroccan nation. The reason for the controversy was simple: the commission for 
the elaboration of the constitution was not democratically elected as demanded, 
but hand-picked by the monarch. As a consequence, the referendum was the only 
means by which the monarch hoped to legitimise 'democratically' the 
constitutional order, which was written largely by himself. The Istiqlal 
considered (1) Islam (2) territorial integrity (3) the Arabic language and (4) the 
constitutional monarchy the fundamental characteristics of the nation. Its daily 
newspapers AI Alam and La Nation (under the control of the Minister for 
Islamic, Affairs AlIal EI Fassi) were mobilised in support of the Yes-vote. 
During the electoral campaign one month before the vote, in Rabat alone, the 
offices of the UGTM and (,;'nion J4arocaine de /'Agricllltlire (U\lA) were used 
156Larbi f\tessari, member of the IstialaL interview \\'ith the author. 16 "larch 2002, Emphasis 
added. 
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to hold 34 meetings. The dependent character of the UMA was ob\ious when 
considering that it was presided over by former Minister of Agriculture Ahmed 
Nejjai (lstiqlal). Other associations that took actively part in the campaign for the 
constitution were L 'Union Marocaine du Commerce, de l'Industrie et de 
I 'Agriculture, I 'Union Generale des Etudiants Marocains (UGEM), the 
Associations de Parents d 'Eleves, and the Commission Nationale de Sport. 
In rural areas, the Mouvement Populaire assured the success of the 
referendum, through its Association Nationale des Anciens Combattants, which 
counted more than 100,000 members. Aherdane, the president of the MOUl'ement 
Populaire was equally president of this association. Other associations that were 
in favour of the Yes-vote were the Ligue des Ouiemas du Maroc, the Ligue des 
Magistrats, Morocco's first Human Rights organisation the Ligue Marocaine des 
Droits de I 'Homme (lstiqlal) and the Conseil des Communautes Israelites with 
. L 1/' dC' 1':;7 Its press organ a y OlX es ommunautes.-
On the other hand, the vote to boycott the referendum for its lack of 
democratic participation and the dominant role of the monarch was principally 
organised by the political party UNFP, the trade union UMT, and the students' 
union Union Nationale des Etudiants du Maroc (UNEM). The relation between 
the UNFP and the UMT, however, was marked by conflict and competition, as 
Ben Sarka accused the UMT of not being revolutionary enough and of 
compromising with the monarchy. This was essentially because some of the 
local leaders of the UMT had been elected into municipal councils in 1960, and 
had been dealing directly with the monarchical system. In addition, 
The trade unions seemed determined to examine the text without 
prejudice and to leave their militants the freedom of vote. This 
was both to mark their autonomy vis-a-vis the political field and 
because they considered the Royal power as a lasting reality with 
h· h . d I 158 \\' IC It was necessary to ea. 
1-"7 Paul Chambergeat: 'Le Referendum Constitutionnel du 7 Decembre 19h2 au ~laroc.· In 
Annuaire de I'Afrigue du Nord, Vol. 2, 19h2, CNRS. p. 176-7 8. The LMDH is included by 
Chambergeat. even if - according to my sources - it was c(Jnstituted only 10 years later. Therfore. 
this I MDH might be an early di, Ision of the Istiqlal. which carried the same name. 
15S Ibid. p. 180. 
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In the beginning, the politicians of the UNFP were also divided about the 
party's acceptance of the constitution. According to Chambergeat, Ben Barka 
was ready to support the constitution if the party was guaranteed a participation 
in the government. Others, like the fonner chief of the resistance, Fiqh Basri. and 
fonner Minister of Finance in the government Ibrahim, Abderrahim Bouabid. 
declined categorically the constitution for the absence of a constituting assembly. 
When the central committee of the UNFP decided on 15 November to boycott 
the referendum, the UMT decided despite the dissatisfaction of some of its 
leaders "to reject, to denounce, and to fight against the constitution.,,159 The 
associations that were aligned to the UMT such as the Jeunesse Ouvriere 
Marocaine (JOM), L 'Union des Syndicats Agricoles (USA) and the Union 
Progressiste des Femmes Marocaines (UPFM) followed suit. 
What is striking in this fonnation is that the organisation of these 
associations in line with the rationality of the two most important parties went 
hand in hand with an assumption that members were forced to vote in a certain 
manner. Critics of this discipline that were for or against the project contented 
that their members were free to vote as they wished. Similarly, it appears that the 
refusal to be used as an instrument is behind the latent contlict between the 
UNFP and the UMT. As aforementioned, the co-operation of some of the UMT 
members in the municipal councils with the monarchy had been overtly criticised 
by Ben Barka, as this did not fit into the UNFP's revolutionary profile. These 
problems of relative dependence were behind the decision taken by the UMT in 
January 1963 to become fonnally independent from the UNFP. Up to today, 
these fonn the key-issues in the discussions about civil society in Morocco. 
159Ibid. p. 184. 
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3.2.5 The politicisation of Morocco's first human rights organisations, the 
LMDH and the AMDH 
In 1973, the Ligue Marocaine des Droits de I 'Homme was officially 
recognised as an Istiqlali human rights league after the two military coups 
attempts of 1971-72. In its initial phase, it was presided over by Mohamed 
Diouri, former Minister of Equipment, and Abbas Al Fassi, at the time 
Ambassador, and Minister of Employment in the govermment of Alternance 
(1998-2002), all high ranking militants of the Istiqlal. This was during a phase in 
which the monarchy tried to form a new strategic alliance with the opposition, 
being faced with the threat lurking from military coups.160 In one of its first 
pamphlets, the LMDH identified the Interior Minister Outkir as the main threat 
to political freedom and human rights, Outkir being at the same time implicated 
in the second coup attempt. Fifteen years after independence the language is still 
very nationalist: 
Our action was a historical necessity in order to face the dark 
Outkiran order. ... He (Outkir) ruled as an absolute ruler over 
Morocco ... It was a question of dignity .... the Istiqlaliens and all 
active forces of our nation. which had fought colonialism and who 
had sacrified a lot so that Moroccans could live as free citizens in 
a free country, could not tolerate this .... The will of our people 
was ridiculed, and our freedom was tied up. We lived under terror, 
although we had conquered our independence long before. 161 
With the removal of Outkir from the Ministry of Interior, and the climate of 
appeasement that reigned during the constitutional referendum (1974), the 
League Marocaine des Droits de I 'Homme (LMDH) could start to send out 
observer groups to political trials, and to publish reports on unfair trials of UNFP 
activists in May 1972. According to Karem, it exhibited a certain dynamic up to 
160 The first military coup took place on 10 July 1971, when 1500 military cadets tried to kill 
King Hassan II during a Royal party at the Palace in Skhirat. The second followed a year later on 
16 August 1972. when three fighter aircraft tried to shoot down Hassan II's Royal aircraft on hiS 
return from France. 
1 () 1 Interyiew with Director of LMDH Diouri, quoted in Mohammed Karem: . La notion de droits 
de I'Homme au Maghreb. Essai sur une nouyelle culture politique.' These de Doctorat, 
Universite de Droits, d'Economie et de Science Politique d'Aix-Marsaille, 1991. p. 153 15 .... 
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the 1975 Green March, which made the King once again take over domestic 
hegemony through the domination of the nationalist discourse. Consequently. in 
line with the nationalist discourse, human rights were transformed into citizen's 
rights, with the clear tendency to defend first of all the unity and independence of 
La Patrie. The return of the Istiqlal into government in 1977 after 15 years of 
absence had the impact to silence the LMDH's critique. 162 The fact that the 
Istiqlal was a coalition partner, and the LMDH was not independent, diminished 
its capacity to act as a critical force in the 1977 Casablanca trials of 178 leftist 
activists, who were outspoken for the Sahrawi's right to self-determination. The 
same applies to the 1981 bread riots that resulted in the death of 600 protesters 
and more than 100 trials of USFP and CDT members, who had called for the 
163 protests. 
The LMDH being too closely tied to the Istiqlal, those intellectuals close to the 
USFP decided in 1979 to create a second human rights organisation, the 
Association Marocaine des DroUs de I 'Homme (AMDH). The political context 
was that the Istiqlal participated in the government which led to a rupture with its 
USFP ally within the Koutla. l64 As a result, the AMDH's activity was from the 
very beginning tied to the party orientations of the USFP. Hence, the 'necessity' 
to create it was as much a political move as it was a consequence of continuing 
human rights abuses. This being the case, it also became subject to contingencies 
that marked its alliance with the USFP. This became evident during internal 
fights that took place within the USFP at the beginning of the 1980s. The violent 
suppression of the June 1981 demonstrations had the consequence within the 
USFP of splitting the militants into two camps: those who advocated a dialogue 
with the monarchy and those, such as A. Benamor, whose 'radical' tendencies 
made them denounce any opening towards the Royal house. This internal 
conflict hardened with the USFP's participation on 30 November 1983 in 
162 Ibid. p. 157. 
163 See AI reports for the years 1977-1982. 
I64The KOlil/a, was fonned as a 'democratic bloc' following the 1974 constitutional referendum. 
EYer since. it has been an electoral alliance consisting of the Istiqlal, the USFP. and the OADP, 
with occasional participation of the PPS. They fonned the so-called 'fonner opposition.' which 
was opposed to the 'parties of the administration,' technocratic parties created by loyal civil 
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government with Abdelouhad Radi as Minister of Cooperation and the Secretary 
General A. Bouabid as Minister without portfolio. Apparently. this was to 
support the 'national consensus' concerning the West Sahara issue. After a 
period of internal fighting over the control of the AMDH, it was the radical wing 
(Parti d'Avantgarde Democratique et du Socialisme - PADS) that seized control 
in 1984 under Benamor. At the same time, the AMDH became subject to 
suppression, which rendered impossible the continuation of its activities 
throughout the remainder of decade. 165 
3.2.6 The politicisation of religion and the retraditionalisation of Morocco 
The role of religion in Moroccan politics has been analysed in many 
publications. Indeed, one of the dominant characteristics of the Moroccan 
political regime is revealed in the confusion of Islam and monarchy. According 
to Geertz, the two principal registries of legitimacy in Morocco are 'Islamist' and 
'Umma.' The first principle refers to the right to dominate derived from magical 
aspects, the baraka, of an individual, the second to the aptitude to rule judged 
and legitimated by the ruled group. For Geertz, this legitimacy based on Islam is 
therefore 'intrinsic' and 'contractual.' 166 For R. Leveau, Islam became, after 
independence, the principal force of political legitimacy with jurists giving a 
very precise content to the role of the Commander of the Faithful, placing Islam, 
coupled with monarchy, above all other institutions. 167 A slightly different 
perspective is taken by analysts who prefer to talk about tradionalism or the 
traditionalisation of politics. These analysts refer to the use of tradititional 
symbols in the registry of legitimacy, such as the bay 'a that sees the King on top 
of a horse in front of the highest officials of the state. Another prominent 
servants close to Hassan II. This bloc of parties is called 'wifaq.' With the fonner opposition 
parties being appointed in government, the significance of these designations is changing now. 
165 Karem, 1991, op.cit. p. 1621163. Benamour remained president of the AMDH and secretary 
feneral of PADS until 2001. 
66 Geertz: Islam Observed. (New Haven and London: Yale Uniwrsity Press. 1968), pp. 7-+-81. 
167 R. Leveau: 'Islam et Contr61e Politique au l\laroc' in Ernest Gellner and Jean-Claude \'atin 
(eds): Islam et Politigue au Maghreb (Paris. CNRS, 1981), p. 273. 
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example is the obligatory dress code of a white jellaba during the opening of 
parliament. 168 
Regardless of the conceptual difference between religion and tradition that 
has been analysed by these authors, the use of religious symbols and 
connotations in political discourse has supported the hegemony of the monarchy 
in the sphere of religion, which brings Tozy to speak of the political-religious 
field. 169 Of course, the use of religion and religious institutions as a source of 
legitimacy differs from the domination of associations by political parties. The 
difference being that in the beginning, the monarchy did not try to create a 
popular mass support, but focused on the strategic and traditional support of the 
'ulema. In the immediate post-independence period, the nationalists' criticism of 
the subservient role that the 'ulema had played during the French protectorate, 
played into the hands of the monarch, and the foundation of the League of 
Moroccan 'Ulema in 1960 helped the monarchy in finding an institutional base 
for itself. This was despite the fact that, according to Leveau, the creation of the 
League of Moroccan 'Ulema in September 1960 was in the first place a sign of 
the 'ulema' s attempt at becoming independent. 170 
Whenever the 'ulema's criticism of secular practices sharpened, the state 
reacted with the enforcement of religious practices such as fasting during 
Ramadan. 171 Consequently, through the emphasis of religious aspects in 
everyday life, the 'ulema's critique was effectively silenced. As Tozy remarks, 
the 'ulema 's most outstanding feature was its absence in political affairs. l72 The 
1 68lohn Waterbury: 'La It~gitimite du pouvoir au Maghreb: Tradition, Protestation et 
Repression,' in 1. Leca et al (eds): Developpements Politiques au Maghreb. Amenagements 
Institutionnels et Processus Electoraux. (Paris CNRS, 1979), p. 413. 
169 984 . Tozy, 1 , Op.Clt. 
170 According to Leveau, the 'ulema's close relation to the lstiqlal, however, whose leadership 
was closely associated to the scriptualist form of Islam (Allal al-Fassi) served to put the 'ulema 
between the Istiqlal and the monarchy. Remy Leveau:'Islam et Contrale Politique au Maroc' in 
Ernest Gellner and lean-Claude Vatin (eds): Islam et Politigue au Maghreb (Paris, CNRS, 1981), 
p.276. 
17} Ibid. 
} n Mohammed Tozy: Monarchie et Islam Politigue au l\taroc (Paris. Press de la Fondation 
Nationale de Sciences Politiques, 1999), p. 111. 
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King's handling of religious affairs tried to circumvent the 'ulema's critique. 173 
As Leveau describes, 
It seems clear that the monarchy does not want to leave any 
other sector of policial life the possibility to exceed itself on 
the question of Islam. If the 'ulema are worried and if they feel 
threatened by modernisation, Hassan II prefers to slow down 
the progress rather than take their criticism. It should be 
relatively easy for him to find a field of entente with them as 
much as official Islam is still rich enough in Morocco to 
sustain religious buildings and a good number of imams. Even 
if this rich cult was not allowed that kind of expansion which 
Allal EI Fassi had envisioned, these men of religion are 
. f h' "1 d' . 174 conscIOUS 0 t elr pnVI ege sItuatIOn .... 
This was complemented by the establishment of the National Council of 
'Ulema in 1981 that was to be under the King's personal control. With the 
members of the League of Moroccan 'Ulema being appointed by the Council, the 
control that the monarchy could exercise over the religious scholars increased. 
From the perspective of the Moroccan state, increasing control over the 'ulema 
became necessary after the visit of the Shah of Iran in 1979, which sparked 
widespread riots all over Morocco. This embarassed Hassan II's intention to 
illustrate that Moroccan Sunni Islam had nothing in common with radical 
Shi'ism of the Muslim East. Moreover, a farn'a of independent 'ulema against 
the official condemnation of Ayatollah Khomeini followed, increasing the Royal 
embarassment. Consequently, the 'ulema were to become loyal through a more 
clearly defined role, institionalised in the higher spheres of the state. They were, 
in the King's words, to "supervise the religious orthodoxy" 175 without 
becoming the guardians of the shari 'a. They were supposed to be the 
administrators of cult but not the producers of ideology. Neither were they to be 
independent religious activists. This indicated the central problem that the state 
173 HowewL several problems posed themselves, such as Hassan Irs initial lack of religious 
charisma, Allal al-Fassi's religious standing and his initial presidency over the League of 
Moroccan ·Ulema. Other problems included Hassan II 's simultaneous embracing of modernism 
and traditionalism, and the increasing secularisation of Moroccan society. 
174 R. I.eveau 1981, op.cit. p. 276. 
175 Mohammed Tozy. 1983. op.cit. 127. 
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had to tackle: "How to prevent the danger of Political Islam, how to avoid the 
danger of the 'ufema, while transforming them in the auxiliaries of the state." 176 
3.2.7 Consequences in the press 
In this context of political struggle, the Moroccan press became the central 
field, where these struggles were fought over. The monarchy could use its 
monopoly over the administrative apparatus in order to sanction and enforce the 
boundaries of critique in this sphere. Consequently, it had been subject to 
increasing repression. Already immediately after independence, the dahir of 1 
June 1959 gave the Minister of the Interior the right to seize any newspaper that 
had defamed any functionary, public employee or government official. The dahir 
of 28 May 1960 De fa Repression Preventive introduced a new definition of 
what was to be censured: "attacks on the institutional, political, or religious basis 
of the Kingdom." 177 As Bennani and D'Souza comment 
Because of its general and vague character, and because the 
constituting facts for the intervention are not clearly determined, this 
new text would give rise to serious impairments of the freedom of 
press. This is because this text justified suspensions and interdictions 
that were not motivated by legal judgment, and nor submitted to any 
kind of legal control. 178 
The 13 November 1963 saw another limitation of the freedom of press. In the 
case of defamation, journalists had to appear before the court within 48 hours, 
which meant that journalists had only 48 hours to produce a valued defence 
against the charge of defamation. Moreover, the limit of prescription (still for 
defamation) was prolonged from five months to one year. "All these legal 
176 Ibid. 
177 OMDH and Article 19: Liberte de la Presse et de l'Infonnation au Maroc. (Rabat: no 
publisher, 1995). p. 6. This modification came only a few months after the director of the 
newspaper Auahrir was arrested. 
178 Ibid. 
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procedural modifications made legal pursuits for defamation much easier and the 
task of the legal defence much more difficult.,,179 
A third revision took place on 10 April 1973. The dahir, which also reduced 
the liberty of association, increased the punishment for all offences that were 
included in the press code and criminalised all declarations that were suspected 
to "trouble the public order". Moreover, in order to seize a publication, it was no 
longer necessary for the courts or for the Minister of the Interior to prove that a 
journalist wrote something with "bad intentions" (en mauvaise!oi).180 
The Moroccan press has evolved during phases of severe restrictions. Hassan 
II always attempted to portray himself as the country's undisputed leader, 
especially in the Western-Sahara conflict. There are three existing taboos in the 
Moroccan media: criticism of Islam, the monarchy, and territorial integrity. 
These all point to the institutional supremacy of the monarch in Morocco's 
political system, which is as Cubertafond notices, essentially the King's 
system. 181 In this situation, violations of the freedom of press can be regarded a 
necessary side-effect. During the phase of political conflict between the 
monarchy and the political parties issued from the Nationalist movement, 
political questions inevitably challenged decisions taken by the monarchical 
centre. 
At the same time, however, Morocco's press can be regarded as one of the 
freest in North Africa, if not the Arab world. According to the Organisation 
Marocaine des Droits de I 'Homme, 182 there existed 406 different journals and 
newspapers in 1992 and ten years later, they are estimated to number more than 
600. The francophone dailies vary from royalist establishment such as Le Matin 
du Sahara et du Maghreb, nationalists-conservative (L 'Opinion) to socialist and 
179Ibid. These modifications came after the leaders of the UNFP were arrested in July of the 
same year for allegedly plotting against the monarchy. It is also within the context of the 
Moroccan-Algerian war of October 1963. 
180Ibid. These modifications came after the attempted coup d'etat of 16 August 1972 and some 
weeks after the arrest of a number of UNFP personalities who wanted to found the USFP. 
181 Bernard Cubertafond: Le Systeme Politigue Marocain (Paris: Editions L 'Harmattan, 1997), p. 
1~. 
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communist newspapers (Liberation, AI-Bayane). Since the relaxation of the press 
control in the 1990s, some party-independent journals can be added to the list 
(Assahifa, Maroc Hebdo, Maroc Soir, Le Journal, Demain, Le Reporter, etc.). 183 
This freedom, however, was possible only due to one essential feature of the 
press until the mid-1980s: that of particular newspaper's association and 
affiliation with political parties of the 'opposition' parties or the state. This 
meant that newspapers followed an editorial line advocated and decided by the 
political leadership of the political parties, or state officials. They lacked, 
therefore, similar to associations discussed in this chapter, independence from 
where they could have participated in the establishment of an independent public 
sphere. 
3.2.8 The development of Morocco's civil society and public sphere after 
independence: Towards Articulation 
During the formation of the Moroccan political system, the boundaries 
of civil society seemed to be underdeveloped. The system of patronage that 
encapsulated important parts of the population weakened the autonomous 
articulation of interests. Moreover, a unifying element of civil society was 
missing. This was because after independence, particular positions in civil 
society were related to positions of power. As a result, its evaluative function, an 
important aspect of the public sphere, was not developed. This was illustrated by 
the constitutional process of 1963, in which associations were instrumentalised 
for specific political purposes. In the domain of human rights in the 1970s and 
1980s, these associations were also used as power bases and became 
consequently absorbed by political struggles. Hence, there was no critical force 
that challenged the confrontational line between the monarchy and the 
Nationalist movement, neither were there, in this early stage of political 
181 . 31 
-OMDH and Article 19, 1995, Op.Clt. p. . 
183 One may remark here that the relative freedom of press increased proportionally with the 
relatiw importance of TV for the formation of public opinion. In Morocco, TV \vas controlled 
directly by the state and the Ministry of Information, which was - until February 1995 - a 
subsection of the r-..1inistry of Interior. It has now become the Ministry of Communication. 
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development, public spheres not serving as power bases for political incumbents. 
Therefore, the public sphere and political power were articulated. 
Nevertheless, important elements of civil society developed with the 
political system, and became in different periods more and less dependent. The 
period between 1973 and 1975 has been described as an actiYe period for the 
LMDH, because its patron, the Istiqlal party, was not in government. 
Simultaneously, it was given a free hand in the time of appeasement between 
Hassan II and the opposition after the 'Oufkirian' order had been overthrown. 184 
The 'ulema seem to have been enjoying an independent character until Hassan II 
attempted to transform them into 'auxiliaries' of the state. The state, however, 
became more conservative in the process. In 1979, its independence came again 
to the fore, which resulted in more efforts to guarantee their successful 
'nationalisation' . 
Despite these attempts at instrumentalising associations of civil society 
for political purposes, there are clear signs that illustrate particular public 
spheres' resistance against incorporating tendencies of state and political parties. 
The labour union UMT complained from an early stage onwards about the 
influence, which the UNFP was exercising over its organisation. The foundation 
of the League of Moroccan 'Ulema was also meant to be a step towards the 
institutionalisation and independence of religious interests outside the state 
framework, even if - as seen - it was effectively controlled by state institutions 
such as the Ministry of Habous. 
Although the development of civil society was a reaction to 
administrative penetration of society in the early phase of Moroccan political 
development (labour laws, enactment of family code, law on the freedom of 
association, press code, education and universities etc.), the logic used 
corresponded to Morocco's particular political system. Administrative 
penetration of society was not politically neutral (the building of mosques to 
I ~4 General OuiKir, Interior Minister was held responsible for the second military coup. His 
assassination and replacement in 1973 was seen as a sign of change by opposition parties. See 
interview with LMDH director and Istiqali Diouri, quoted in Karem. 1991. op.cit. pp. 153 154. 
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appease the religious sector, the Arabisation campaign to counter the urban 
francophone elite and to placate the conservative nationalists in the Istiqlal) and 
closely connected to power blocs. It involved principal questions concerning the 
organisation of the state and the personnel - political parties or 'independent' 
King's men - and the distribution of the country's newly available riches. With 
basic questions being fought over, administrative penetration can be regarded as 
extremely weak, accounting for what many observers described as 
'traditionalisation.' 185 
3.3 Chapter Three: Summary 
In this chapter, I introduced different aspects that developed in the pre- and 
post-colonial order. I discussed the question of Islam and the' umma before 1912 
as it is presented in the literature. Lahbabi's three principles of the caliphate and 
his understanding of Moroccan history lean towards a conclusion that tied the 
monarchy to the leaders of civil society, that being mainly the 'ulema in pre-
colonial Morocco. An analysis of the role of the 'ulema, however, has revealed 
that the 'ulema acted under pressure, be it popular or monarchical, and were 
more a tool to be used (mainly by the Sultan). Reasons for 'ulema rebellions 
against the Sultan were usually in the realm of civil disorder. If the ruler was not 
able to guarantee the protection of the people from external or internal threats, be 
it through signing of treaties with colonial powers or through the absence of 
armies in times of immediate threat, the 'ulema had the power to withdraw the 
bay'a, i.e. its allegiance. Nevertheless, the myth of the righteous-man-of-god 
who defies an unjust Sultan remained an important feature of what Geertz once 
called the "social history of the imagination" of Moroccan society.186 Hence 
historically, this explains the religious dissent of late 20th century 'ulema and the 
Islamist movement, as it takes its cultural and historical force from this 
"collective self-imagination." At the same time however. claims of religiously-
founded dissent stay ambivalent. The historical circumstances seem much more 
important and specific than the principle of religious dissent. This means that 
even if some contemporary religious scholars base some of their religious 
1 ~5 See Clifford Geertz: Islam observed (New Haven and London: Yale Uni\'t~rsity Press. 19(8). 
\..' , 
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judgements on the imagined historic role of the 'ulema, it would need an 
exceptional situation - connected with real security or national integrity concerns 
- to mobilise a significant number of 'ulema. 187 
This illustrates the lack of an autonomous public sphere, within which the 
'ulema, as actors of civil society, could institutionally initiate political-religious 
discourses that related to public issues. In pre-colonial Morocco, despite the fact 
that 'ulema were literate and used their skills for political purposes (such as the 
writing of new bay'a), the limited participation of ordinary people that were 
affected by public decisions rendered the public sphere deficient. This was 
certainly due to the relatively weak nature of state power in medieval Morocco, 
which had, as Hourani notices, "no permanent roots in the city and '" only a 
small bureaucracy, limited control of the agricultural surplus through taxation, 
and restricted power of coercion; [the state] existed by constant movement, 
political manipulation, and religious prestige.,,188 In this situation, a public 
seemed to exist only in a very limited sense, as ordinary people seemed little 
concerned by public decisions, due to the weak penetration of administrati\'e 
structures, and a lack of clear identification with a target area - geographically 
and socially. To this should be added the limited notion of public in Moroccan 
historical political terminology: 19th century Moroccan histiographers 
considered the 'umma only an informal and unreliable mass that had no face, 
which needed specially designed intercessors that spoke in their name. 189 It 
presented a space of disorder, and not that in European contract theorists 
elaborated idealised civic space of ultimate legitimacy. As a result, it was not the 
'ulema's independence and authority that was the all encompassing feature of the 
public sphere in pre-colonial Morocco, but rather the 'ulema's dependency on 
direct power relationships: AI-Kettani was regarded by mainstream 'ulema as 
186 Ibid, p. 19/20 
187 One may think of the Second Gulf War that had an enormous effect on the domestic position 
of King Hassan II and may include the 2003 Gulf War. 
188 Albert Hourani: 'Conclusion: Tribes and States in Islamic History' in Philip S. Khoury and 
Joseph Kostinger: Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (Oxford: The Uni,er~ity of 
Oxford Pre~~. 1990), p. 306. 
I 89Mohammed Tozy: 'Representation'Intercession: Les enjeux de pou\'oir dans k~ 'champs 
politiques desamorce' au Maroc' in Annuaire de l'Afrigue du Nord, Vol. 2R. 1989, Edition~ du 
CNRS. pp. 158/9. 
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'too powerful,' and his aim to overthrow the political order through the help of 
allied tribes indicates the lack of discursive practices as a means not to gam 
positions of power but for the sake of participating in public discourses. 
In post-colonial Morocco, the material available illustrates the extreme 
fragility of the politically conscious part of the population, and the struggles for 
power between different segments of the population. Certainly, the monarchy 
had a guiding hand in most of these struggles, and could effectively engage in a 
divide and rule strategy. However, the base of these conflicts was historical: 
what is striking among the immediate claimants for power was the lack of 
hegemony of any of them. The Istiqlal's claim to domination and state power 
was counteracted by the formation of alternative centres of power, such as the 
UNFP and the rural Mouvement Populaire led by Aherdane. 
These events and circumstances point to one essential feature of Moroccan 
political life, and the role that political parties played vis-a.-vis associations of 
civil society. Since independence, political parties have been structured m a 
bureaucratic-authoritarian way. It was their oligarchic character that 
distinguished the groups that controlled these political organisations. 190 The 
intra-party fights that took place in the early years of Moroccan independence -
resulting in the multitude of party splits and conflicts - illustrate the incapacity of 
parties to create a consensus. This was transferred to the early activities of 
associations, as their creation in the shadow of political parties transformed them 
into important sources of political mobilisation and ideological contestation in 
the service of particular political parties. As for independent associations such as 
the UNEM or, in the 1980s, the OMDH: all political parties tried to have a 
certain number of their members represented. The control that parties tried to 
exercise over associations resulted from the particular logic in post independence 
Morocco that put them into the position of opposition within the reach of 
political power (in parliament until 1965 and since 1977) but without access. 
)90 See for instance Bernabe Lopez-Garcia: 'Structures des partis. politicisations de la societe ct 
democratie: Splendeur et misere de I'opposition politique au Maroc.' in lean-Claude Yatin (ed): 
Democratie et Democratisation dans Ie Monde Arabe (Cairo, no publisher. 1992). pp. 253-265. 
R. Michels: Les partis politiques. Essay sur les tendances oligarchiques des democraties. (Paris: 
Flammarion. 1971),pp. 137-147 
1,.' -('\) 
Consequently, in the 1960s and 1970s, an absence of societal consensus and 
the politicisation of associations made the Kingdom base itself on static policies 
with considerations of short term stability predominating over the project of 
development. This rendered Morocco, according to Hudson, inherently unstable. 
as the high fragmentation of political culture corresponded to low governmental 
capacities. 191 This points to the articulation of discourses with power politics and 
a low level of state hegemony. With the revival of parliamentary politics after the 
1977 elections and the appointment of the Istiqlal into government, changing 
features appeared (Green March, Hassan II mosque, creation of loyal regional 
associations) without that the complex of political party - civil society changed 
its basic feature. As will be seen in the following chapter, the disentanglement 
started in the late 1980s, and the increasing activity of organisations of civil 
society paradoxically might even be regarded as a result of this complex. 
19\ Michael Hudson: Arab Politics. The Search for Legitimacy. (New Hayen: Yale University 
Press. 1977) p. 399. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PRESSURE FOR PUBLIC SPACE (1985-1993) 
In Chapter Three, I aimed to illustrate the features of an 'old' system in which 
civil society and the public sphere were dependent. Against this background, this 
chapter examines the emergence of a 'new' civil society. when important 
changes happened in the mid 1980s. Individuals and groups of individuals 
recognised the fact that their association to political parties had prevented the 
articulation and promotion of their issues. Consequently, they formed alternative 
associations in order to mobilise for single issues, and became critical in the 
public sphere. This changed the content and the boundaries of the articulated 
public sphere as well. This was most recognisable in the newspaper scene, and 
provided for the increasing political freedom of the mid 1990s. In the early 
phase, the Moroccan state did not consider these new actors as being too 
threatening, and left them the space necessary to commit themselves in agenda 
and boundary setting. In the case of human rights, the state even created the 
forum, where these new organisations could challenge the state's policies, and 
where the representatives of state ministries were direct interlocutors. 
In this chapter, I seek to illustrate the dynamic that these early organisations 
were able to set in motion, which amounted to increasing pressure for public 
space. I will do so by describing the actors and organisations, their strategies, 
and their early successes in indirectly challenging the state's monopoly in 
defining major national issues. This happened essentially through their 
commitment to, and their redefinition of, the public sphere, through which, for 
the first time it seems, features of an autonomous public sphere developed, i.e. 
one in which private persons committed themselves to public issues and policies, 
issues by which they had only been indirectly affected. This happened in three 
principal areas to which I am referring here: Women's rights, human rights, and 
Berber (Amazigh) rights. Their activities had a direct impact on citizens 
concerning their own position vis-a-vis the state, and triggered increasing 
involvement in public issues. I will illustrate this by studying a clash between a 
well-known journalist, Khalid Jamal, and the then Minister of the Interior, Driss 
Basri, in 1993. By challenging state ministers' handling of specific national 
questions, Jamal and others participated in the definition of a new public sphere. 
in which matters of how issues were dealt with preceded questions of who \\'as 
dealing with these issues. 
Special attention will be given to a new milieu of women's rights activists, in 
order to illustrate the development of autonomous public spheres outside the 
direct reach of the state. This challenged the state's position as the guardian of 
'public morality', but through the use of an independent media and even 
Moroccan cinema, the values that this public sphere expressed remained outside 
the direct control of the state. Consequently, the state had to create different 
methods of control and boundary setting. 
Section One will address the main objective of this chapter: to show that 
associations developed new strategies that centred on a rejection of the political 
system's bifurcation, as described in the previous chapter. This allowed them to 
become active and relatively successful, which had important impacts in other 
milieus, such as the Berber milieu, but also the media. Because of this central 
strategy, the state accepted these players and became active in addressing the 
same single issue. It will then be suggested that certain features of political 
change that are referred to by many authors (the early release of political 
pnsoners, more citizen's participation and freedom of press, more 
responsiveness to women's issues) are a result of the state's involvement in the 
same issues. This will be addressed in the second section. The third section 
discusses some of the other domestic and international factors that had played in 
favour of the state's increasing acceptance of these 'new' organisations of civil 
society. 
In this chapter I am concentrating on changes that happened between 1985 
and 1993. I am considering this period as the foundation for those associations 
that became active later on. This is because they were the first organisations to 
experiment with a 'self-limiting' framework. After this period, the state began to 
adjust its responses to these civil society organisations, the result of which was a 
broadened public sphere. 
4.1 Section One: The Appearance of 'new' organisations 
4.1.1 A political question: Civil SOCiety and the protection of human rights 
When Morocco's two human rights groups, the LMDH and the AMDH, were 
unable to operate, when they were subject to political considerations and massive 
repression, human rights activists were forced to rethink their strategies. These 
were based on rebuilding a discourse on human rights that was based on non-
partisan and non-confrontational politics. 
Newspapers generally refused to publish manifestos of those two existing 
human rights groups, for fear of persecution or newspapers' alignment to 
political parties. After 1983, the year of the AMDH's break from the USFP and 
its alignment with the PADS, a USFP splinter group, it entered into a phase of 
enforced inactivity as the government repressed it. 
Its existence was never formally acknowledged by the Moroccan 
authorities, and in May 1983, it was barred from holding a 
general assembly. The radical wing of the USFP, to which most 
AMDH members belonged, was simultaneously under attack, 
and within a week, several of its most active members were 
under arrest. Their imprisonment, and the concurrent ascendance 
of the USFP mainstream, sent the AMDH into reclusion for 
192 
several years. 
While the two human rights associations were inactive during the period from 
1982 to 1987, a small group of USFP activists around the lawyers and university 
teachers Abdelaziz Bennani and Omar Azziman 193 began to discuss the 
possibility of creating another human rights organisation. In the beginning, the 
idea was to found a 'human rights front' with the AMDH and the LMDH. but 
this foundered on the issue of partisan politics. Eventually. a committee of 
192 Susan E. Waltz: Human Rights and Refonn. Changing the Face of North African Politics 
(London and Berkeley: University of California Press. 1995), p. 145. 
193 Azziman became later Minister of Human Rights (1993-1995) and M mister of Justice (1997-
2002). 
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nearly forty people drew up a draft that would become, in 1988. the OMDH's 
charter. This platforme constitutive de l'OlvfDH expressed the necessity for 
defending human rights in Morocco in the following terms: 
Each day, the issue of promoting human rights becomes 
increasingly ... urgent. This issue is not new or modem. It finds 
its roots in the traditions of Moroccan society and in our 
Islamic patrimony. Moreover, the fight for independence led 
by the Moroccan nation, King and People, illustrates the deep 
connection between the liberation of the country and the rights 
of citizens, their individual and collective liberties. 19.+ 
The activities of the OMDH ranged from petitioning for the release of political 
prisoners and for changes in law, to challenging legal decisions. It asked 
questions about political opponents who had disappeared in the previous 30 
years, and enquired into reports of torture and death in prisons. In the first year 
of its existence, it released thirty two declarations and manifestos, and only five 
months after its official foundation in December 1988, thirty five political 
prisoners, most of them held at Kenitra Central Prison since 1977, were released. 
This new activity and its early success on the human rights front had its impact 
on the hitherto dormant human rights groups. Thus, the AMDH held its congress 
in the early months of 1989 without resistance from the authorities and in March 
it issued a press release calling for a general amnesty to liberate political 
detainees and to allow the repatriation of political exiles. 195 Interestingly, 
[S ]uccess made rivalry with the parties predictable. During the 
USFP conference in late March, applause for OMDH observers 
recognized from the podium lasted some 10 - 12 minutes, and 
competition thereafter was inevitable. According to one 
participant, this was a moment of truth for Morocco's political 
parties: human rights were an issue around which Moroccans 
could be mobilized~ by linking social and economic grievances to 
politics, the concept of human rights acquired enormous potential 
1·· I 196 as a po thca weapon. 
19.+ OMDH: A travers ses communiques et declarations. ~lai 1988 - r-.1ars 1991 (Casablanca: 
Editions I\laghrebines. 1991). p. 7. 
19-
:- Waltz, 1995, op.cit. pp. 148-9 
196 Ibid. p. 149. 
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The success and support of the Organisation Marocaine des Droits de 
['Homme in its early years resulted in what many observers called a change of 
climate in Morocco, conducive for the protection of human rights and the rule of 
law. This was evidenced in greater civil and political liberty and a more open 
treatment of human rights issues in the media. In fact, it is possible to speak 
about an explosion of the human rights issue, in which the state apparatus and 
the monarchy have taken an increasingly dominant part. 197 
4.1.2 Association Marocaine des Droits de l'Homme In contrast to 
Organisation Marocaine des Droits de ['Homme 
The two human rights groups, the Organisation Marocaine des Droits de 
['Homme (OMDH) and the Association Marocaine des Droits de ['Homme 
(AMDH) illustrate the state's different handling of human rights groups 
depending on the strategies adopted by a particular group - a challenge to the 
state's hegemony or a challenge to the state's legitimacy - connected with street 
politics that question the state's ability to create law and order. To recap: in 
Morocco a ruler's legitimacy had traditionally been connected with the presence 
of law and order in the street (see Chapter Three). In the Moroccan context, 
street politics therefore challenge the regime's legitimacy, and not its hegemony. 
The AMDH directly challenges the regime's legitimacy by pointing out 
essentially democratic deficits, and by refusing to accept the monarch's 
traditional legitimacy and the centralisation of power in his hands. It repeatedly 
showed this refusal by turning down the monarch's offer to participate in the 
Royal Advisory Council for Human Rights. 
Consequently, the factor that has determined the regime's reaction was first 
of all a group's political stance vis-a-vis the regime. Other factors included its 
relative strength, its perceived effectiveness and popularity. The OMDH's co-
operation with the regime and the AMDH's refusal to do so. as well as the elite 
character of the OMDH's personneL all resulted in ability of the OMDH to work 
without being subject to repression on one hand (the organisation did not offer 
147 . . . I will analyse thiS m Chapter SIX 
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the Moroccan state much occasion to intervene), in contrast to the occasional 
repression that the AMDH experienced on the other. Moreover, the new strategy 
of the OMDH was to stay out of party-based politics, and not to engage in the 
power struggle that entailed sympathies with certain political fonnations. As a 
member of the OMDH's central bureau puts it: 
We have two schools of human rights organisation in Morocco. 
The difference between the OMDH and the AMDH is that the 
AMDH is tempted by politics. They try to do politics with their 
organisation, whereas the OMDH tries to stay out of politics. 
They have another ideology. 198 
Much like the political parties' approach to the political system, the OMDH's 
ideology corresponded to an acceptance of the political status quo whilst keeping 
out of party-based struggles. In contrast, essentially due to the AMDH's radical 
ideology, the AMDH has been vulnerable to radical party's influence (such as 
the PADS). This continued when fonner political detainees from other extreme 
leftist currents joined the AMDH after their release in the early 1990s. Their 
long-time president Abderahman Benamour (until 2001) has been at the same 
time the leader of the Parti d 'A van tgarde Democratique et du Socialisme 
(PADS). The AMDH's working together with the Forum Verite et Justice and 
the Unemployed Graduates Association violates and goes beyond many aspects 
of Morocco's past and present 'national consensus': it calls for public trials of 
violators of human rights, an end to privatisation campaigns, and constitutional 
changes concerning the monarchy'S powers. Moreover, through its co-operation 
with the Unemployed Graduates Association, it calls into question the 
monarchy'S stance and position in the economy and demands increasing public 
sector employment. Their means of campaigning, also, are one of the most 
sensitive, as they are based on popular mobilisation and street politics. It has 44 
sections in Morocco, and is thereby locally present all over the country. One 
militant explains the objectives of the AMDH in the following way: 
We try to protect all rights: political, social, economical, and 
cultural. It depends on the situation. At the moment, 
economical restructuring results in many people becoming 
198 Chouib i\lellouk, interyiew with the author, Rabat, 20 \lay 20()~. 
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economically very vulnerable when they get fired from their 
workplace. But we also want the authorities to tell us the truth 
and we want justice for human rights violations in the past. We 
want the names of people in charge and if possible to try them. 
The King has offered the constitution, to protect the monarchy 
and certain people. He has chosen, with consultation, the Prime 
Minister, there was no democratic process. Article 19 of the 
constitution gives him all powers to do whatever he deems 
necessary. We are continuing the struggle to change the 
. . 199 
const! tutlOn. 
All this demonstrates that in contrast to the approach of the AMDH, that of the 
OMDH was 'single-issue' and 'self-limiting,' as far as the protection of human 
rights allowed this. The OMDH attempted to create discourses (declarations, 
petitions, conferences, etc) rather than popular based pressure (public rallies, 
demonstrations). More than anything else, it was this strategy that allowed them 
to assume a more active role at the end of the 1980s. 
4.1.3 A Social-Cultural Question (1): Women's rights and the Association 
Democratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) 
A comparable case in the socio-cultural arena was the ADFM, which was 
founded by Amina Lmrini in 1985, out of the women's section of the 
Communist Parti du Progres et du Socialisme (PPS). Lrnrini was responsible for 
the women's section and a member of the central committee of the PPS. Until 
today, the ADFM has stayed an association with links to the PPS. However, in 
its own view, it does not allow party politics to influence the association in its 
struggle for the rights of women. The conflict between women's rights and party 
politics in countries like Morocco arises from the controversial character of 
women's rights. These rights contradict the party tactics of presenting as broadly 
based a picture as possible during elections. Rajah EI Habti, a women's rights 
activist, explains this in the following words. 
In a party, the question of women has never been a political 
question, but only a social question. That is why it was 
important for the ADFM to become completely independent 
199Mohamed El Boukili. interyiew with the author. Rabat. 17 January 2001. 
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from the party, in order to develop its strategies independently 
from party strategies, to be able to work more efficiently for its 
cause. For example, when the Family Code, the Moudawana, 
was to be changed, or rather when the changes were proposed 
in 1999-2000, we were criticising the government for not 
acting. The PPS, however, was part of the government thus we 
acted against the interests of the PPS. When the PPS was in the 
opposition, the same happened when we wanted that the 
Moudawana was part of their election programme. But the 
party was against this, for its own strategic, political. and 
ideological reasons. For them, the priority was the economy, 
financial laws, the constitution, or whatsoever. The parties 
want to keep their seats in parliament or in politics in general, 
that's why all women's associations that are directly associated 
t 1·· 1 'k C h' 200 o a po lhca party can t wor lor t elr cause. 
This shows that the organisation of women's interests in political parties leads to 
a dismantling of political structures that, as in Morocco, have not been designed 
to act as real systems of interest accumulation and articulation. In this situation, 
the autonomy of interest-representation (such as women's rights) becomes a 
necessity. As the same militant argues, 
Moreover, within political parties, women are usually weakly 
organised and under-represented. Even in the PPS, you find 
women standing for elections usually in constituencies that are 
not important or that don't have much chance to win, that are 
poor financially and thus poor in opportunities to do anything. 
The leadership, and the majority of constituencies that have a 
. d' db 201 good chance to WIn, are omInate y men. 
As with many other women's associations, the Association Democratique 
des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) is pre-occupied with the need to change 
Moroccan family law - the Moudawana - that is still in large parts governed by 
Islamic Shari'a law. The ADFM rallied against the institutional male tutelage 
that, for instance, required women to have the permission of a male relative or of 
a husband before they were allowed to work. The Royal decree on 13 July 1995 
"d ., 1993 202 changed this after a nahon-wl e campaIgn In . 
200Rajah EI Habti, interview with the author, Rabat, 6 February 2001. 
201 Ibid. 
202 The process will be examined in the later part of this chapter. 
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The ADFM helps women to find employment, it pursues a continuous 
literacy campaign, and it gives legal advice to women in matters subject to civil 
law (family, work, etc.). It also organises petitions, workshops, and seminars 
with topics such as Ie statut juridique de la femme a travers Ie code du statut 
personnel, l'image de la femme dans Ie cinema marocain, and la place de la 
femme dans Ie systeme educatif marocain. It does so because it understands itself 
as an explicitly political association, being primarily concerned with raising 
awareness through educational programmes?03 That means "we don't work 
primarily in direct action with women, direct aid, as we don't want to change or 
help the life of maybe 10 or 20 women, but we do want to change the life of all 
women in Morocco.,,204 Hence, the establishment of legislation based on 
equality between men and women is the main aim of the ADFM. This goes 
beyond the prime focus on civil law, so that the ADFM also had aims such as the 
recognition of sexual harassment as a criminal offence. However, they recognise 
that "if you change the law, you haven't changed the mentality of the people. 
That's why we have a programme of Equality Education.,,205 The ADFM is not 
based on a popular movement in popular areas, and it does not have a huge 
presence on the ground. The reason is that the ADFM's strategy is first of all that 
of intellectually contributing to a broad discussion about women's rights, within 
a wider discussion of human rights. Thus, it is in the first place an intellectual 
organisation lobbying for political change, and not a political organisation 
aiming at mobilising people on behalf of power-oriented politics (for which a 
mass-based organisation might be necessary). On the contrary, it targets the 
media and works as a lobbying force for women's rights and only indirectly for 
more democratic changes in Morocco. In fact, its democratising potential lies 
much less in its ideology or rhetoric, but more in its participation in national 
discourses, which is why it became a recognisable political force, first when in 
1993 it organised a petition for changing the Islamic family code, }"/oudal;t'ana. 
"We work with intermediaries, not directly with the masses. With teachers, the 
203The same applies to women association such as Youssour, or the UAF. 
204Rajah El Habti, interview with the author. Rabat, 6 March 200 I. 
20)lbid. 
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media, political parties, trade unions, and youth organisations. ,,206 This might be 
regarded as its strength, in terms of long-term social and political changes (more 
female participation in politics and more equitable gender relations within the 
family), which are now certainly underway in Morocco. As a socio-cultural 
movement, however, an intellectual movement like the ADFM is losing ground 
to the Islamic movement, especially as they seek to occupy the terrain on which 
the Islamic movement seems to be the strongest: that of social changes that for 
many people seem to be connected with a decrease in public morality. As I will 
illustrate later in this thesis, this was necessary when street politics became the 
means through which political outcomes were decided. 
As the OMDH, this organisation's strategy was based on the rejection of 
political parties' interference and on the absence of 'mass-politics', which might 
have questioned and delegitimised the state's patriarchal organisation. Instead, as 
the OMDH, it focused on the initiation of a discourse through intermediaries, 
such as journalists, schoolteachers, lawyers, etc, avoiding a directly radical 
political message that could have been connected to human rights. As will be 
seen later on in this thesis, this made them, along with the OMDH potential 
interlocutors for the regime, and this despite what women's activist describe as a 
hostile Arab-Islamic cultural framework. 
4.1.4 A Social-Cultural Question (2): Association Marocaine de Lutte contre 
Ie SIDA (ALCS) 
Similar considerations apply to the ALCS. This remarkable association was 
the first association that worked on a theme that has been subject to a virtual 
taboo in North Africa and in the Middle East that of AIDS (French: Sida) and 
sex education. It was founded in 1988 by the medical doctor Hakima Himmich 
in Casablanca, and was the first advisory institution in North Africa to campaign 
for the use of condoms. It offered sex education, and talked about sensitive 
subjects such as homosexuality and prostitution. 
206Ibid. 
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In doing so, the ALes replaced the state: The state being a political, public, 
and an Islamic agent in Morocco and because of the sensiti\'e nature of the 
subject, the state had not been able to work on AIDS in the same neutral way 
(denying for example the existence of sexual relationships outside marriage, not 
to speak of homosexuality, prostitution, and AIDS in general). Hence, although 
since 1986 the state had had a Ministry of Health programme charged \\'ith 
protection against AIDS, the ALes's function was to provide potential victims 
with a social space of administrative freedom (the state's administration being 
for the above reasons biased towards the question) within which they could get 
anonymous advice on the topic. Because of the high illiteracy rate, especially 
among women and the lower classes, the ALes used audio-visual means in its 
sex education campaign to achieve better results (slides. videos, etc.). Since 
1989, it has operated anonymous call centres in Casablanca, Fes, Rabat and other 
major cities. One of its major projects has been a research project among 
prostitutes about their attitudes towards AIDS, and the elaboration of information 
material for them.207 
As Morocco's official language did not allow for the existence of prostitution, 
this project violated public morality, and thus drew criticism from the Islamic 
milieu. The use of condoms and the propagation of safer sex were considered to 
be allowing and supporting immoral sexual relationships outside the tenants of 
Islam, i.e. marriage. Answering this criticism, Hakima Himmich responded to its 
Islamic critics: 
If you could guarantee that all Moroccans do not have sex 
before the marriage and are faithful during the marriage, we 
. I .. 208 
would immediately dISSO ve our aSSOCIatIOn. 
Because of the freedom that it offered to different lifestyles and to differing 
types of people, Hakima Himmich considered ALCS to be part of civil society, 
as it allowed the free expression of difference. even if this was possible only on 
the premises of the association. 
'"'07 '1-1'1"'" 
- Hegasy. 1997, Op.Clt. pp, ) , --, 
208Hamit Bozaslan. i\1onnia Bennani-Chraibi. Remy Lewau (ed): Actcurs et bpaces Politigues 
au Maroc et en Turguie (Berlin: Centre i\tarc Bloch. 1996). p. 93. 
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When you open our door at our headquarters in Casablanca, you 
find yourself immediately projected into a real tower of Babel. 
There is everything: Catholic sisters in strict posture, a young 
homosexual not at ease in his identity who finds at last a free 
space of tolerance, passing by a disappointed political militant 
and a real member of the bourgeoisie. All these identities, so 
different, sometimes contradictory, coexist in mutual respect, 
because they are fed by the same will: to minimise the impact 
of AIDS in our society though listening to the choices and 
realities of individuals. And it is this conception of a civil 
society, a plural civil society, constructed out of the respect for 
others in their difference and diversity, which animates us in 
our action, in our day to day fight against the virus. 209 
This illustrates for Hegasy and her conception of civil society- based on the 
accommodation of difference21 0 - that the ALCS offered a new interpretation of 
society against the official and the Islamic version that had been built up into a 
monolithic stereotype. In the context of this thesis, the ALCS' potential to push 
the controversial topic of AIDS into national notice is a clear sign of the 
changing features of the public sphere. Here, non-state actors define a national 
issue, assert their individual responsibility and expertise, and adapt the discourse 
to a socio-cultural framework that - in contrast to the Western discourse on AIDS 
that has been marked by exclusion - aimed at denying its existence and 
corresponding measures for its 'moral' sensitivity. 
As a sign of this, Himmich started to engage in a number of critical public 
debates and even publicly criticised the then Minister of Health, Abderahim 
Harushi, for refusing to broadcast TV spots on the issue - a novelty in Morocco's 
officially controlled national TV. All this shows how social interests were now 
being channelled into the national context. Consequently, in 1993 Himmich was 
allowed to explain her project on national TV, and in the same year it had even 
gained the status of a uti/ire publique. a status that had hitherto been restricted to 
209Hakima Himmich and Latefa Imane: 'Les ONG au Maroc. pour une societe civile a l"identite 
plurielle. Le cas de I"Association Marocaine de Lutte contre Ie SIDA', in Wolfga.ng He.inz:.La 
Societe Civile dans les Pays du Maghreb. Discours et Realites. (Brussels. FondatlOn Fnednch 
Naumann. 1993), p. 84. 
210See page 43 of this thesis. 
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associations directly created by the Palace.211 This was despite the fact that it 
had been ignored for years by the Moroccan press. Only 8 Mars and Kalima had 
covered the topics of prostitution and AIDS.212 In 1991, Himmich was 
nominated the woman of the year by the journal Premiere Heure. Although the 
Royal press (Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb) ignored her appearance on the 
then private channel 2M, the opposition press talked of a cultural revolution. 
According to the newspaper Casa vite fait 
This programme warmed up our heart, and gave us confidence. 
As a friend said "Hakima Himmich in L 'Homme en question is 
a cultural revolution." Nothing less then that! And it is true, the 
next day in the bookshop we saw a number of people 
impressed and touched. These friends, clients, and benevolent 
volunteers wanted to give her their support, as they suffer like 
Himmich from the evils of our society and want to fight against 
h · . 213 t e mertla. 
The effect that this association has had on the official treatment of AIDS has 
been immense. It has broadened the public discourse about the social problems 
in Moroccan society, so that AIDS and related social problems such as 
prostitution and homosexuality have entered the official discourse and are 
recognised as realities that demand responsible non-discriminating action. The 
side-effect of voluntary action against AIDS has been the creation of difference 
and diversity and with it tolerance as the basis for citizenship: "Being from 
different backgrounds, the volunteers of ALeS have to obey only one Charter, 
one that leaves out all considerations except for the respect of the individual, 
whatever is his political colour, race, or beliefs. And it is this conception of a 
civil society, a plural civil society, constructed out of the respect for others in 
their difference and diversity, which animates us in our action, in our everyday 
fi h . h . ,,2 14 Ig t agamst t e VIruS. 
21 1 See Ghazali, 1991, op.cit. p. 252. 
212 99 . 1~' Hegasy, 1 7, Op.Clt. p. _ ~. 
2I3Quoted in Hegasy, 1997, op.cit. pp. 1521153. 
21.+ Hakima Himmich and Latefa lmane: . Les ONG ay Maroc, pour une societe civile a I' identite 
plurielle. Le cas de I'Association Marocaine de Lutte contre Ie SIDA', in Wolfgang Heinz: La 
99 
The ALCS is another example of a single-issue organisation, which started to 
build up a discourse on a controversial topic such as AIDS, and it had the same 
features as that of the OMDH and the ADFM: It stayed out of the immediate 
'political sphere', had 'self-limiting' features, and concentrated, as the above 
quotation illustrates, on the demands of their particular issue rather then the 
socio-political environment. 
4.1.5 An Identity question: The Berber Issue 
The Berber question has followed a similar logic as that of human rights and 
women's rights. Although all major Berber associations had already existed 
before the time period under consideration, the major event of the 'Charter of 
Agadir' transfonned their fonnerly cultural status into an explicitly political one. 
Administrative intervention into Berber areas and affairs had resulted in 
transfonning 'Berbers' as a cultural-traditional unit into an administrative-
political unit, which followed Moroccan modern nationhood and nation-building. 
This had already started under French colonial rule with the so-called 'Berber 
dahir' (1930), which attempted to divide Morocco in two different 
administrative zones. Reflecting social and legal realities, Berber customary law 
was to be the basis of jurisdiction in rural areas, whereas Islamic Shari 'a law was 
to be the basis of jurisdiction in urban areas.215 After independence, the Arab 
nature of the state became, along with Islam, the major ideological pillar of 
statehood. Next to French, classical Arabic became the official language, taught 
at schools and universities, and broadcasted on national radio and TV. As 
activists see it, this was largely at the expense of Berber culture and language. 
Citing as an example the so-called 'Berber school of Azrou.' militants see that 
the Berber language tamazight stopped being taught at schools shortly after 
Societe Civile dans les Pays du Maghreb. Discours et Realiks. (Bruxelles. Fondation Friedrich 
Naumann, 1993). p. 84. 
215When the Sultan Mohamed V refused to sign the dahir, it became the focus of Nationalists' 
agitation against the French. The French were considered to h.ave tr~nsfo~ed the IsI~~ic 
character of Morocco. See for instance John P. Halstead: RebIrth ot a NatIOn. The Ongms and 
Rise of Moroccan Nationalism (Cambridge i\J:-\.: Harvard Uni\'ersity Press. 1967). pp. 1':-\-\90. 
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independence. Nevertheless, various estimates suggest that at least 50 percent of 
Morocco's population is ethnically and linguistically Berber.216 
The first Berber association was founded in 1967. It called itself 
L 'Association Marocaine pour les Echanges Culturelles, thereby avoiding the 
mentioning of the word 'Berber' or the use of Berber language in its name. It 
was an early sign of a movement to defend the authenticity of the Amazigh 
culture. 1978 saw the creation of the Association Al Intilaqa Attaqajia (Relance 
Culturelle), and the Association Nouvelle Pour la Culture et les Arts Populaire 
(ANCAP), in 1996 renamed Tamaynut. The foundation of these associations was 
considered to be "against pan-Arab policy, because we felt like an arabised 
people.,,217 In 1979 another Berber association joined the three others, the 
Universite d 'Ete d 'Agadir. 
As with human rights and women's rights, the political party system had been 
unable to articulate the Berber issue effectively. In fact, the main political parties 
have never been interested in the Berber question or Berber associations, a fact 
which has given this political movement a certain unity that other movements 
lack. For one Berber militant, the absence of party interest and even a certain 
Arabo-Islamic hostility against Berber language and culture has been the 
principal motive behind their struggle for official recognition. 
The political parties' attitude is the principal question. They have 
never done anything, since independence. In the programmes or 
statutes of the political parties, there is no mentioning of Berber 
culture. Nobody has ever demanded anything connected to the 
Berber language. Not even Aherdane's Mouvement Populaire, 
which had been created by the administration and the Makhzen in 
order to create an equilibrium. Aherdane has always voted for the 
Arabs ..... He always wanted to create a Berber association, but he 
never found the people willing to play his electoral game.218 
~ 16 Pierre Venneren estimates the percentage of Berber speaking Moroccans to be at 50 percent. 
Le Maroc en Transition. (Paris: La Decouverte. 2001), p. 122. David M. Hart estimates that 
Berbers represent 40-45 percent of the Moroccan population: See David M. Hart: . Scratch a, 
Moroccan, find a Berber' in David M. Hart: Tribe and Society in Rural Morocco (London: Frank 
Cass Publishers, 2000), p. 23. 
217lntervicw with Hassan Ashmoush, secretary-general of TamaYllut, Rabat. 1 - April 2002. 
~ 18Ibid. 
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As this expression illustrates, the so-called Berber based party Mouvement 
Populaire - as an explicitly supportive structure for the monarchical system -
never succeeded in representing Berber cultural issues, even though its president, 
Mahjoub Aherdane, pretended to be interested in Berber cultural authenticity.219 
Hence, alienated by its political elite, co-opted and without ideological 
orientation, the unity of the movement expresses itself in a lt'e against them 
consciousness that unites for instance militants of Tamaynut with the 1967 
association AMAREC. The history of one Berber association has a direct impact 
on other Berber associations. The history of anyone association is considered to 
be the history of all associations. This is because history, cultural roots and 
demands are essentially the same, as is their position at the outskirts of the 
political game: 
In each game there are always some people who are afraid to 
lose. A member of the government might lose the elections, a 
political party their social space. There are quite a few parties 
who are afraid that associations will take their role in the 
development of the country. The associations are more active 
than the political parties, which do nothing. The Arabists are 
afraid, especially those who have a mentality that comes from the 
Middle East. And of course the Islamists .... Arab solidarity? The 
Arabs they have all means in order to mobilise the people for the 
Arab cause. We have nothing, and if we want to do something, 
h h ·, 220 we do not get t e aut onsahon. 
In 1991, six associations221 joined forces and signed on 5 August 1991 the 
Charter of Agadir, in which Amazigh demands were for the first time 
formulated. Five other smaller Berber associations subsequently signed the 
charter, which denounced "the systematic marginalisation of the Amazigh 
language and culture,,222 and declared its intention to promote the recognition of 
tamazight as an official language along with Arabic. Moreover, it demanded the 
'19 
- See page 71172, 
220lnteryiew with Hassan Ashmoush, secretary-general of Tamaynllt, Rabat, I' April 2002, 
221 Association Marocain de la Recherche et l'tchange Culturelle, Tamaynllt, L 'Association de 
1 'Unin'rsit(; d 'ElL:, Til/eli. 1 'Association limas, L 'Association Cuitllrelle de SOliS. 
222Quoted in Bruce Maddy Weitzman: 'Contested Identities: Berbers, 'Berberism' and the State 
in North Africa' in The Journal of North African Studies. \'01. 6. No, 3 .. \utumn 2000, p, 31. for 
the full charter see http://www.mondeberbere.com/mouvementJcharte.htm. 
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"integration of the Amazigh language and cultures in various areas of cultural 
and educational... programmes" and the "right to have access to the mass media 
(written, audio, and visual).,,223 It was the first time that Berber associations 
were allowed to become publicly active, and they subsequently started to 
influence the public discourse on identity. The internal political climate had 
already started to tolerate the activities of these groups: 
In the early 1980s there was too much political repression. In 
1981, for instance, Ali Swidqi Azoyiko got arrested, for putting 
forward a re-writing of History and Language. Each attempt and 
all activity was repressed. With foreign pressure and the activities 
of human rights organisations such as the OMDH, Berber 
associations could open the door of activity. Moreover, the 
, . d d h . f . 224 regIme nee e t e Image 0 opemng up. 
The points that are similar with those 'single-issue' organisations in the socio-
cultural and the political realms are that these Berber associations felt badly 
represented by the political party system, but also that the political party system 
attempted to represent these interest but ultimately failed (Mouvement Populaire 
under Aherdane). The system of patronage, which structured the political sphere, 
had a negative impact on the representation of Berber interests in politics. As 
with women's rights and human rights, the articulation of these interests outside 
of the political realm was a consequence of this patronage, and when the human 
rights group OMDH successfully started to create a discourse based on political 
freedom, the Berber associations used the political space that was suddenly 
available to articulate their own demands (the Charter of Agadir), thereby 
shaping the discourse of national identity and Berberism. 
223 Ibid. 
224 Ahmed Arehmoush, interview with the author, Rabat. 17 April 2002. 
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4.1.6 Corresponding Transformations in the Media 
In other sectors of civil society, such as the media, similar strategies (single 
issues, 'self-limitation') were also used as a way of challenging dominant 
discourses. The following three examples, of which two treat women's affairs 
and one is directly concerned with the discourse about citizenship, illustrate that 
the initiation of human rights and women's rights discourses had an effect on 
how the media treated these topics. The first two examples illustrate the 
emergence of a milieu consisting of NGO-activists, whereas the third example 
illustrate how an individual journalist's challenge of the state's hegemony had 
been the result of the administration's prior interference in personal life. 
Together, they give testimony to the changing political discourse that the 'new' 
groups of civil society were able to initiate, and how they thereby challenged the 
state's hegemony. 
One of the most important journals that initiated a certain transformation 
process in the 1980s was the francophone weekly Kalima. Despite being 
forbidden in April 1989 because of some articles on homosexuality, it influenced 
the discussion of women rights, prostitution, and violence against women. 
Focusing on women's affairs, it touched the taboos of Moroccan society and of 
the political system that preferred silent and passive women. It thereby 
established the roots for a discussion about citizenship in Morocco, which started 
in the early 1990s and has not yet stopped (this will be discussed in more detail 
later on). 
Kalima is first of all a place where female words can be freely 
deployed and heard, by women and men. We don't adhere to the 
old ideal of the silent women, which gives only men the right to 
speak. An old silence has drowned, congealed, and denied old 
conflicts avoiding therefore any kind of movement. When only 
, k h' I . ht 225 one person spea s, e IS a ways ng . 
Most journalists that worked for Kalima either had been actin? in the 0:GO 
sector or were to become active in the following wan~ of NGO foundations. 
104 
Nourreddine Ayouch was the publisher of the journal, and he later assisted many 
associations in his advertising agency Shem 's. The journalist in charge of Kalima 
was an anthropologist, Hinde Taarj, who has been working in a small project of 
divorced women (Solidarite Feminine), and who was particularly concerned with 
the fate of single mothers and their children. For her, civil society should be a 
place in which it is possible for a new self to develop, one not forced into 
stringent categories: 
For me, civil society means the idea of the 'place of expression' a 
place in which the self can be affirmed. This is in my eyes the 
new space in traditional societies where the individual has the 
possibility to affirm himself. We see in our Moroccan society the 
emergence of the individual. Until today, the individual has been 
completely drowned in the family group in order to find himself 
in political structures, which reproduced the same culture, the 
same attitudes as those of the family?26 
Kalima had a special importance because it provided space for its readership 
to engage themselves in the topics that it treated. 'Letters to the Editor' invited 
readers to reflect and to discuss the arguments of Kalima, thus the journal 
provided a base within which its readership could formulate a public critique. 
For example, the reports on the professional life of women excited much interest. 
The lawyer Abderrahim Berrada, who had been one of the best-known lawyers 
acting for political prisoners, advised the readership of Kalima on legal issues. 
One reader expressed her admiration for this activity in the following words: 
My greatest respect and my real admiration go to the 'boutique du 
droit'. What Abderrahim Berrada does is really efficient and so 
courageous. At last the law - this mystery - is explained and 
clearly illustrated, so that the people know what it is and 
everybody takes his responsibility. Is not this what democracy is 
227 
all about? 
225Kalima February 1986. Quoted in Hegasy. 1997, op.cit. p. 118. 
226Hinde Taarji: 'Le role des Femme~ dans I'Emergence de la Societe Civile au .\l~roc. In 
Wolfang Heinz (ed): La Societe Civile dan~ !e~ Pays du Maghreb. Discours et ReahtL's. 
(Brussels: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung: 199)). p. 52. 
227 Kalima, Nowmbre 1986, quoted in Hegasy. 1997, op.cit. p. 121. 
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Kalima, as its Arabic speaking counterpart 8 Mars,228 can be regarded as one 
of the first publications that started the discourse on political and social refonns 
that have been on the political agenda since the early 1990s. This did not only 
include human rights and political prisoners, but also included such topics as the 
status of women, thereby indirectly questioning the authoritarian state and its 
foundation, the authoritarian paternalistic family. All this was combined with a 
call for the inclusion of women in society and politics. Kalima called on \\·omen 
to know their rights and to use them in their everyday lives. All this, as Hegasy 
observed, confronts and refutes the monopolisation of history, morality and 
society that is characteristic of the Islamists' discourse. 229 
Other attempts at influencing the public sphere used the cinema to create 
alternative models of society. These also influenced public opinion on such 
culturally sensitive matters as the status of women. The film director Mohamed 
Abderrahman Tazi can be regarded as one of its most important representatives. 
For him, the cinema and TV had paramount power in Morocco, as both media 
could address important questions to women that are of high concern to them. 
Due to the high levels of illiteracy among women, they are denied infonnation or 
ideas from the printed media. 
Weare in the century of pictures. Our Moroccan society, with its 
600/0 illiterates, is no longer illiterate when it comes to images. A 
documentary of thirteen minutes, a clip of two or three minutes, 
diffused over a TV antenna has more impact than any other means 
of communication, knowing that the number of TV viewers can 
. h 10 '11' 230 eaSIly reac mI IOn. 
Tazi produced movies that criticised patriarchal domination structures. His 
movie Badis (1989) took up the stories of two women trying to find a better life 
elsewhere. His first big success came with A fa recherche du mari de ma femme 
(1993) that also became one of the biggest international successes of Moroccan 
nsThis was directed by the president of Union Action Feminine, Latifa Lbabdi. It still appears 
periodically depending on its financial situation. 
2'9 . 158 
- Hegasy, 1997, Op.Clt. p. . 
2.,OTazi, quoted in Fatima Memissi (ed): Camet d'Adrcsscs - )5 Contacts. (Rabat: no publisher. 
1992). p. 17. 
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cinema. In this film Tazi used wit and humour to criticise traditional Islamic law: 
Hadji Ben Moussa repudiates for the third time his younger wife Houda. 
According to shari 'a law, he can only remarry her if she has been married to 
another man in the meantime. Hence, he looks for a man to marry his ex-wife. 
only to get divorced so that he can marry her again. The message of the movie 
can be summarised as follows: 
The spectator realises that a polygamic man is nothing but 
someone without any morals. And that the (unsubmissi\'e) women 
no longer wants to be a product subject to merchandising. 231 
Within a year, more then 500,000 Moroccans saw this film, which was one of the 
first films shot using the Moroccan dialect rather than classical Arabic. 
Newspapers, seminars, and teachers used that film to question Morocco's rigid 
gender-divisions and to illustrate the problems that polygamy creates. It can be 
regarded as an important part of the 1993 attempts of Moroccan feminists to 
change the Moudawana and to abolish polygamy in Morocco. The director 
frequently worked with a group of feminists and academics. and started a 
programme of video clips in 1990 to make the wider public aware of existing 
social contradictions. 
In 1990, within the framework of Femme Maghreb Horizon 2000 
consisting of academics, sociologists, jurists, artists, and 
journalists, we made social video clips. This was aimed at 
entertaining the North African public with the absurdity of certain 
misogynous attitudes that are current in our society It was an 
attempt to educate and change the mentalities, de-dramatising the 
.' h' h nh d 232 subject that IS causmg so muc angUls : rna 00. 
This shows how under pressures of modernisation, a corresponding rationality 
had migrated from the private into the public sphere. It illustrates how decisions 
and motives had been created within power-free zones, outside political party or 
government's zones of influence, just as Habermas has observed in 19th century 
231..1lgerie ..1ctualite, 21 December 1993, quoted in Hegasy. 1997. op.cit. p.126. 
232Mohammed Tazi: Media et Droits de l'Homme. (Rabat: Manuscript. 1994). p. 4. quoted in 
Hegasy. 1997.op.cit.p. 1~4. 
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European public spheres.233 The difference, of course, is that in the Moroccan 
context, the absorption of modem mass media techniques and the replication of 
Western models of communication meant that its development was much 
quicker than it had been in 19th century Europe. 
4.1.6.1 Defensive Challenging 
The preceding subsections illustrated the appearance of self-limited 
associations and their initiation of self-limiting discourses. It has been argued 
that this had been a result of the failure of Morocco's multi-party system to 
accommodate social, cultural, and political interests and values. The following 
third example from the media demonstrates that self-limited criticism of the 
state's hegemony in the public sphere had also been a reaction to the 
administration's intervention, which is why I call this challenge 'defensive'. In 
this example the state's highest representative directly questioned a journalist's 
individuality, i.e. he denied him the rights of citizenship. 
The defensive challenge to the state's hegemony about the acceptance of 
citizenship took the form of a published conflict between one of the best-known 
Moroccan journalists, Khalid Jamal, and the Minister of the Interior, Driss Basri. 
At the time of the conflict, which manifested itself in an open letter that Khalid 
Jamal published in the newspaper L 'Opinion on 12 November 1993, the Minister 
of the Interior, Driss Basri, was regarded in Morocco as the most powerful man 
next to the King. 
The origin of this open letter was a conversation between the Interior Minister 
and the writer J am a!. In this conversation, Driss Basri demanded him to explain 
one of his articles, in which he had criticised '20 years of election fraud' and the 
'illegal establishment of a one party system.' During his conversation, Jamal 
answered to his questioning with reference to the misbehaviour of the 
government that had ignored the rules of free and fair elections, laid down by the 
monarch himself. Thereby, he criticised the Interior Ministry's role in election 
233 liirgen Haberrnas: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, (Cambridge ~l:\. 
lOS 
rigging. The fight over citizenship was epitomised by the question in Moroccan 
dialect Chkoun n'ta?, meaning 'who are you [to criticise ME]?' that Driss Basri 
apparently asked the journalist Khalid Jamal. Jamal had no right to criticise the 
highest representative of the makhzen, and he was thereby reminded of the 
insignificance of his person.234 
In an open letter, Jamal consequently turned this question onto the Interior 
Minister. This can be regarded a spontaneous expression of a sense of citizenship 
in contrast with the notion of subject embodied in the religious and 'this-
worldly' connotations of the makhzen.235 
As an answer to this denial of his right to citizenship, Jamal referred to the 
constitutionally guaranteed, but neglected, rule of law. According to Jamal, the 
principles of the rule of law conferred the ultimate guarantees against tyranny. 
Using the Islamic parable of the 'Good Caliph' he demanded the acceptance of 
the European conception of jus naturalis with the consequent establishment of a 
sense of citizenship. For Jamal this meant primarily that all people in a country 
had as citizens the same rights, which - in his opinion - signified that it is the 
citizens' duty to criticise their government, which consisted - after all - of 
nothing other than a group of responsible co-citizens. 
'Power is example and not force'. Does this constitute a response 
to your eternal question 'Chkoun n'ta'? I spoke to you from 
citizen to citizen. A Minister, even if Minister of State, should be 
first of all a citizen: if not how should he understand his co-
citizens? When Abou Bakr Saddik was proclaimed Caliph, he 
declared to those that had put him on this post: 'I am not better 
then you. If I do well, help me. If I do wrong, correct my 
MIT Press, 1989). 
23.fMohammed Mouqat: 'Le Mouvement des Droits de l'Homme au Maroc. Du ~tahzen a l'Etat 
du Droit' in Annuaire d' Afrique du Nord. 1995. p. 274, 
235 According to Mouqat (Ibid), it goes back to the cultural foundation of the makh::en with its 
distinction bet\\een bled al-makh::en and bled as-siba. in which the resistance to the monarchy' s 
claim to power is part and parcel of the monarchy's o\\,n c,la,im to absolute po\~er, Dwyer. also. 
has noticed that in private interviews."notions of the mdJ\\dual and human freedom. and.,the 
related idea of democracy. were stressed more in my discussions in Morocco than elsewhere K. 
Dwyer: Arab Voices. The Human Rights Debate in the Middle East (London: Routledge 1991). 
p. 110. 
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mistakes'. Minister of State, is this not the rule that should rule 
the relationship between both the governors and governed? 236 
For Jamal, citizenship did not only mean the necessity for a 'Good Caliph' to 
accept his co-citizens, but included also the duty of citizens to counter the 
hegemonic establishment of the state - the monopolisation of public reason - and 
the abuse of power. In this sense, he admits that he has failed the 'mission' that 
citizenship implies. 
I admit that we have, as citizens and as journalists, a lot of 
responsibility for this situation. This is because we have 
accepted the rules that no law had imposed on us, because we 
had not stood straight, forgetting that we had a backbone to 
hold us up and to keep up our head, because we ended up 
ignoring that our country had at its disposal a battery of laws, 
which defend us and our country. This ignorance was wanted, 
encouraged by those who profited from it. The little 
concessions ended up being transformed into big compromises, 
and a little cowardice and scare ended up in submission and 
resignation. The abuse of power nourishes itself from our 
d· d d" 237 scare, our cowar Ice, an our every ay reSIgnatIon. 
These words of Jamal indicate what citizenship meant at the beginning of the 
1990s, in a Morocco that was dominated by the monarchical system of makh::en 
and the Interior Ministry. Under these circumstances, there was no place for an 
autonomous conception of citizenship, and the Interior Minister's attitude defied 
any attempt at introducing such thinking. This situation, however, had not only 
been imposed from above: it had also come from 'below' in that participants in 
the political game, especially journalists, had forgotten that a citizen might have 
to question a government's or a monarchy'S supremacy out of a sense of duty for 
those very institutions. He thereby questioned the hegemony of the state, based 
as it was on a submissive sense of citizenship, and he did this in a self-limiting 
manner. At the same time, he also questioned the state's allied classes 
'attraction' to this definition, when he said that "[t]he little concessions ended up 
236L 'Opinion, 22 November 1993. 
237Ibid. 
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being transfonned into big compromises. ,,238 As he admits in this passage. he 
considered himself as partly belonging to this class. 
Such a concern echoed the constitutional ideas that had nourished Moroccan 
political philosophy and that had marked the ambivalent relationship between the 
monarchy and the Nationalist movement rooted in the pre-colonial period, but 
fonnulates it in a less threatening, and therefore 'acceptable' way. According to a 
Moroccan scholar, 
The authors of the 1908 constitution, or at least those who 
claim to be it shortly afterwards, leaned on this model of 
citizenship, when they demand among others individual liberty, 
the abolition of the castigation, Whipping, and torture, the 
banning of degrading and humiliating acts in prisons, and the 
instauration of representative institutions. This project 
remained in the political consciousness of the national 
movement and played the role of the promotion of a 
emancipative political project.239 
This illustrates that the idea of citizenship as a base for a social project had 
been well rooted in modem Moroccan history, and had been the cornerstone of a 
civil society that created its own rules, in contrast to one based on domination. 
As soon as some political space had been created, and as soon as the public 
sphere opened up its fixed rules, these roots expressed themselves. Defying the 
political or cultural situation imposed on him from above, the author replicated 
the strategies that the earlier NGOs had opted for, and which seemed to promise 
more success and tolerance on the part of the state. 
In this example, Jamai's calling for a sense of citizenship had been a reaction 
to state intervention, and not, as in the preceding examples, a reaction to the 
passivity of the political establishment. It is an example of an increasing self-
limited criticism used by individual actors when confronting the state apparatus. 
238 Ibid. 
239Mohammed Mouqat: 'Le Mouvement des Oroits de I'Homme au Maroc. Ou Makh~l?n a I'Elal 
du Droit' in Annuaire d'Afrigue du Nord, 1995, p. 276. See also Said Bensaid :\I.at~ul: '\Iushm 
o osition Thinkers in the Nineteenth Century' in Charles E. Butterworth and I WIlham z~~man: Between the State and Islam (Cambridge and \\'ashington: Cambridge UnI\cr"lt~ Press 
and Woodrow Wilson Press. ~OOl), pp. 90-10 ... 
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The use of the concept of citizenship illustrates this self-limitation verY well as 
- , 
it is used in marked contrast to earlier demands for constitutional reform and a 
redistribution of power (at the heart of former opposition parties' activities) that 
would challenge the monarchy'S legitimacy. 
4.1. 7 Summary Section One 
In this section, I used the examples of human rights groups, women's rights 
groups, AIDS groups, and Berber groups to illustrate that organisations of civil 
society began to challenge the hegemony of the state, which successfully 
initiated discourses about rights-oriented politics. Moreover, this section 
demonstrated the forms that these discourses took in other parts of civil society, 
notably the media, and it showed that here, similar strategies became 
increasingly employed. It has been the aim of this chapter to show that the 
groups used a self-limiting framework based on the refusal of party based 
politics. Moreover, this section demonstrated that this activity was a result of the 
inability of the 'old' political system - i.e. the bifurcation of the political sphere 
into 'opposition parties' and 'monarchy' - to accommodate interests, grievances, 
and values that had been evolving in the body of society. 
4.2 Section Two: The state's early reaction 
When Moroccan civil society'S activity still followed the framework of party 
politics, the state's reaction followed the same logic through the creation of loyal 
associations. Essentially, this was a replication of its reaction to opposition 
parties' challenge in the 1960s and 1970s, when loyal monarchical figures 
created loyal 'administrative' parties before elections, which were able to gain 
electoral victories through the existence of networks of patronage. Therefore, 
since the 1970s, the state had created its own associations in order to widen its 
presence in society. These were meant to compete with associations affiliated to 
the opposition, and to provide a new mechanism of control and stability during a 
time of severe economic restructuring in Morocco. The big regional 
associations, generously funded by the state and recognised as utililCs publiqut's 
were meant to fonn ne\v elites and to create an activity aimed at bolstering a 
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sense of welfarism between the elite and the disadvantaged masses. According 
to Ghazali, they fulfil an integrative function in that they lead the new elite into 
loyal political parties and into the administration.2-w At the same time these 
associations guaranteed the social contact between the political elite and the 
population at large; furthermore they employed in actiYe collaboration with the 
state financial and human resources, especially in the sectors of deyelopment 
and arts. 
With the appearance of self-limited associations outside the political party 
framework, and with these associations' targeting the hegemony of the state 
through their discourses on individual rights, the state's reaction changed, as 
well. In this section, I analyse the different strategies that the state employed in 
this early phase. The most significant and visible strategy has been the 
multiplication of 'integrating councils' such as the Advisory Council for Human 
Rights (CCDH) and the Cellule Integration de la Femme au Developpement 
(CIFD). Although these 'integrating councils' can be understood as a 
continuation of the 1970s strategy of creating regional associations, it is the aim 
of this section to illustrate that this had further encouraged individuals' and 
groups' participation in the public sphere. This is because the creation of these 
councils, and the state's ensuing direct intervention in the discourse, broadened -
albeit involuntarily - the discourse about human and women's rights rather than 
limiting it. 
In order to show this, three points will be addressed. First, although the 
CCDH had been created by the King in May 1990, it had initiated a dynamic 
through its attempt at including 'new' associations of civil society and answering 
to them.241 Second, in 1998 the main catalyst of political change in favour of the 
protection of human rights was the official acknowledgment of the existence of 
forced disappearances. The CCDH was the organisation, which made this 
official step that was later sanctioned by the King. It is the aim of this section to 
2-W Ahmed Ghazali. op.cit. 1989. pp. 252/253. 
2-l1lt had a special department that dealt with human rights organisation and es~ecially with 
Amnesty International reports. which resulted in . Amendments' to AI reports atter they had been 
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show that the CCDH had been given enough discursive freedom, in order to 
address these questions, even though it had not been designed to achieve what 
Moroccans regarded to be a sensational victory: the liberation of political 
prisoners and the official acknowledgement of the existence of 'forced 
disappearances'. Third, the state's early acceptance of women's groups' 
demands in the creation of the Cellule Integration de la Femme au 
Developpement also had an encouraging effect on women's rights groups. This 
was despite the fact that the aim of the state's action had been - similar to the 
state's dealing with human rights groups - to channel these demands in order to 
neutralise public criticism. 
4.2.1 Attempts at integrating the human right's discourse: The Advisory 
Council for Human Rights (CCDH) 
The members of the CCDH were recruited from five areas of Moroccan 
political life: government ministers (interior, education, justice, since 1994 
human rights), political parties, trade unions, NGOs, the legal and health 
professions, and finally renowned Moroccan personalities in the field of religion 
or higher education (directly appointed by the King). Each organisation was 
represented by one delegate in the council, in which all members had the same 
vote. All organisations proposed three delegates, of whom the King selected one. 
The Council was required to vote unanimously on its suggestions to the King. 
The mandate of the CCDH and the framework within which it worked were 
laid down by a Royal speech on 8 May 1990 on the occasion of its foundation. 
"We have decided to devote this meeting ... to the complementing of the State of 
the rule of law. which will first and foremost put an end to the long palaver 
about human rights, so that we can settle this matter once and for all. .. 242 As to 
the choice of the delegates that had been chosen by him after they were proposed 
critically reviewed by the CCDH. See Amnesty .International : 'Addendum to 'Turning the Page' 
Achievements and Obstacles' (London: unpublIshed document, August 1999). 
242 Royal speech delivered on 8 May 1990, printed in ~ingdo~ of f\loroc~o. Human ~ights 
Advisorv Council: 10 Years in the Service of Human Rights. I he Roy~1 Hw:h In~tructlOn> 
Legislative and Statutory Texts, Advisory Opinions. (Rabat: Impnmene EI ~laanf :\\ .Iadlda. 
2000), p. 14. 
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by the organisations, the King continued "[a]ll these persons, whose names you 
have just heard, have proven their patriotism - thank Allah ... they jealously 
protect their country's reputation, and ... they fear no one but Allah.,,2-n In the 
following guideline as to the principles according to which the Council should 
judge alleged human rights violations regarding political prisoners, a certain 
ambiguity appeared that in the following years should give the council space to 
manoeuvre. 
Weare tired, and all Moroccans are tired, of hearing that there are 
people who are imprisoned for political reasons in Morocco. If 
showing disrespect for Allah - and I ask Allah's forgiveness for 
uttering this - or disrespect for the homeland, for the King, or for 
our beliefs, our country, and our Constitution, is an act that passes 
for a political crime, I say that, to my understanding (and I do not 
wish to influence you), any Muslim who would go round the 
country urging people to embrace any other religion than Islam, 
should have his mental health examined by specialists before even 
expecting to be asked [to] repent. If he should be made to repent, 
and would still go round preaching another religion than Islam, 
the religion of Allah, he would surely be tried; but regardless of 
the verdict in his case, he could not possibly be qualified as a 
political prisoner. 
Should we some day hear or read that a Moroccan has stated that 
such or such a region is no part of Moroccan territory, I should 
consider this a heresy and he could not be tried within the 
framework of the law, so that neither the status of a detainee nor 
that of a political prisoner could apply to his case. 
Likewise, anybody who, through a poster, a newspaper. or a 
speech, should call for a regime other than the constitutional 
monarchy, would be undertaking, in my vieH', not a political act, 
but a destructive act committed against the people's will and 
against the Constitution. Accordingly, I personal~v believe that 
the conscience of this Ad"isory Council shall be at peace if it 
considers that this country's three sacred values are: Allah, the 
Homeland, the King. Henceforth, nobody can say that there are 
political prisoners.244 
It seems clear that with this speech the emphasis was not on finding human 
rights abuses and making sure that the state would take all measures necessary to 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid. p. 15. Emphasis added, 
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make them a thing of the past but rather to react to national and international 
criticism. Nevertheless, a certain element of freedom rested with the CCDH to 
define and compare Morocco's legal protection of human rights relatiye to 
international human rights standards. This meant that it was possible to advise 
the King even if it was against the official policy of denying the existence of 
1·· l' 245 h' fr d po Ihca pnsoners. T IS ee om, however, was restricted in that the voting 
system was based on consensus, which meant in practice that a democratic 
" Id' d " 246 maJonty cou not Impose a eCISlOn. Moreover, the council was to give 
advice to the King only when it was asked to do so by the monarch himself. An 
initiative could only be taken by a 2/3 majority of the Council, which meant in 
practice again the power of a minority to bloc an initiative supported by a 
majority. Abdelazziz Taleb expresses this in the following words: "In the 
beginning, the mandate of the CCDH was pretty clear: "Don't move unless I tell 
you.,,247 The flexibility to initiate proposals can be regarded a safety valve 
through which a two-way dialogue was to be guaranteed. In practice this meant 
from the beginning the formation of an opposition within the Council, that of 
government ministers and government parties on the one hand, and opposition 
parties and human rights organisations on the other hand. Reflecting the social 
discourse on human rights at the time, the latter started to pose questions about 
political prisoners and questions about "forced disappearances" from the day the 
council was formed, and asked for Royal amnesties. In the first recommendation 
from the Council meeting of 12 July 1990, this opposition already became clear: 
Some Council members have raised the question of seeking, in 
favour of persons sentences for crimes concerning State security, 
the Royal pardon on the occasion of the birthday of Your 
Majesty, may Allah glorify him, which is the occasion for the 
celebration of Youth day, a symbol of hope, progress, and 
prosperity~ whereas the other members have opposed the idea 
either because of they see no justification for it or because they 
2~5 See the definition of political prisoners advocated by King Hassan's speech in the passage 
cited above" " 
246 h h ffi . II . Article 19 of the Rules of Procedure from 15 No\"emher 1990 prOVIdes T oug not 0 ICla y. 
for simple majority \"oting . 
2~ 7 Inter\"iew with the author. Rabat, n January 2001 
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find it premature. The decision is up to the sovereign, a decision 
which can only be right and fair. 248 
This passage, though giving evidence to the restricting character of the way 
the CCDH was constituted, gives also evidence - in its first declaration! - to the 
field within which human rights activists could operate. Hence, despite obvious 
restrictions, the council opened up the public sphere for human rights 
organisations, notably the OMDH, so that they could exert influence. As 
Mohamed Seddiqi, the OMDH delegate to the CCDH, recalls: 
With the forced disappearances, this took so much time and we 
had to pose the question in the CCDH again and again. because 
of course, this was one of the most sensitive issues in Moroccan 
politics. But we made clear. and the authorities. the King, and 
the government realised certainly before the appearance of the 
Y oussoufi government and the elections that they had to deal 
with this issue. They couldn't ignore it anymore, it has been too 
publicly debated. We were waiting for an answer, and would ask 
the question again and again. The opening up of the system was 
of course also a problem of the late King Hassan II. His personal 
wish of how to do things impeded the opening up but at the same 
time, made it possible when it had to become possible.249 
This is why the activities of the CCDH had been only sporadic (between 1995 
and 1998 there was no meeting) and although a working group on forced 
disappearances was established in 1995. it was not operational for more than two 
years. This is the object of criticism in the OMDH's Annual Report for 1999. 
Having been designed as an auxiliary instance next to the 
sovereign in this domain, the C onseil Consultatif des DroUs de 
I 'Homme was able to facilitate the translation of the Royal will 
into practice during the first years of its existence, solving the file 
of political prisoners. Nevertheless since the amnesty decreed by 
the King in 1994, its activities have been sporadic and ;~duced. 
The Council itself did not meet during almost three years. _)0 
2.t8 Kingdom of Morocco, Human Rights Ad,isory CounciL 2000, op.cit. p. 5(1. 
2.t9 Mohamed Seddiqi. interview with the author, Rabat, 2.'0212001. 
250 Organisation Marocaine des Droits Humains: 'Rapport sur la Situation des Droits de 
I'Homme au Maroc 1999'. (Rabat, no publisher. 2000), p. -
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This declaration gives evidence to the lack of decision-making power and the 
overarching influence of conservative elements and ministries, as well as the 
lack of power to initiate projects as a response to current human rights problems. 
On the other hand, it illustrates the field of power and the discourse, in which the 
CCDH was operating, as it had publicly been subject to criticism whenever it 
failed to accomplish the reforms that it was expected to undertake. Whenever 
one issue had been resolved, however, Moroccan officials were eager to give the 
CCDH the credit.25I For example, according to a Moroccan scholar, 
The fact that it does not have any decision-making powers does 
not dement its utility, because its role was perceived by 
everybody as an enormous job, endowed with an undeniable 
moral influence. Effectively, Morocco marked with the creation 
of the CCDH its entry into a new era, founded on the scrupulous 
respect of human dignity and the promotion of human rights, all 
this characterised by the consolidation of the rule of law. 252 
The Council's early involvement in the release of political pnsoners 
improved the perception of Morocco's human rights record and the council's 
perceived effectiveness. The first amnesty of 1991 had released 270 prisoners: 
then 424 political prisoners were released in 1994, and a further 28 in 1998. In 
consequence, according to the Council, "the file of political imprisonment was 
closed for good, and not a single political prisoner - according to the 1988 
United Nations definition - can be found in any ... Moroccan prison.,,253 This 
number, however, impressive as it seems, was by no means the original number 
of existing political prisoners according to the Advisory Council for Human 
Rights (CCDH). It had been achieved only after massive intervention of the 
Organisation Marocaine des Droits de I 'Homme. The original number that, 
according to the CCDH, corresponded to the legal UN definition of political 
251 See Prime Minister's speech in Chamber of Representatives in Le '\latin du Sahara el du 
Maghreb, 14 January 2000, Minister of Justice, Omar Azziman, in the For~ign Affaris 
Commission of the French National Assembly on 2 February 2000 Le ,\latm du Sahara ('t dll . 
,\Jag Ii reb. 4 February 2000, or Minister of Human Rights, Mohamed Aujjar. in the UK House of 
Commons Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb. 9 March 2000. 
252 Hamid Rbii. 'Le Conseil consultatif des droits de l'homme peut-il devenir une autorite 
administrative independante' in Revue Marocaine d'Administration Locale et de Oeveloppement, 
no. 37, March-April 2001. p. 22. 
253 Oriss Oahak: Achievement of the Human Rights Advis()f\ Council in brief (Royaume du 
Maroc, (,COH, 2000), p. 5. 
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prisoner amounted to a mere 11. Nevertheless, the CCDH by taking on board a 
broader application of the definition of political prisoner gained both national 
and international credibility and was able to make it appear as a progressiYe 
Royal organisation that the Kingdom had created all on its own. 
4.2.2 Attempts at integrating the women's rights discourse: The Cellule 
Integration de la Femme au Developpement (CIFD) 
The state reacted to the women's movement by creating the Cellule 
Integration de la Femme au Developpement (CIFD) in the first half of the 1990s. 
This association was a sub-section of the Foreign Ministry and was directed by 
Souriya Othmani, a well known figure among women's rights militants. It 
considered itself an NOO and was able to receive substantial international 
funding for its women's projects. It thereby became a Moroccan focus for 
international donor organisations. The UNFP A (United Nations Fund for 
Population Activities) directed most of its activities to the CIFD, and as a result 
only those associations with good contacts with it could profit from the 
UNFP A's financial resources.254 As a result of this, Morocco was the only 
country that during the 1995 United Nations World Women Congress in Beijing 
produced only an official report on the situation of women in Morocco, not an 
alternative report by NOOs. Despite this, according to Hegasy,255 it is difficult to 
interpret that cellule's existence as a blow to the women movement in Morocco. 
On the contrary, Othmani was a very much respected person among NOOs and 
she had certainly advanced the cause of women rights within the government. 
The Moroccan state's early reaction to the organised women's movement 
followed a similar logic as its dealings with the human rights issue. In 1995, the 
state reacted to outside pressure to change the Moroccan family code, the 
Moudawana. This pressure mostly came from women's movement associations. 
2540n a conference in Sale, Hegasy reports the director ofUNFPA, Mustafa Benzine. as say.·ing 
that "we take Mrs. Othmani as our focus and we always ask her when \\e \\'ant to start a project 
with NGOs." Hegasy, 1997, op.cit. p. 215. 
255 Ibid. 
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which had intensified their pressure from the beginning of 1993.256 The 
Association Democratique des Femmes du Maroc may be regarded as a typical 
example. Islamic counter pressure resulted in charges of apostasy against the 
women's rights movement, which the Organisation Marocaine des DroUs de 
I 'Homme clearly condemned. 
The method which is about issuing fatwa pronouncing 
maledictions and sanctions with regard to citizens who express 
their opinion in full freedom and who formulate their demands 
within the framework of the law, not only represents a kind of 
intellectual terrorism which we condemn and which is not to be 
excused, it transgresses the law and is a usurpation of judicial 
257 powers. 
After the collection of one million signatures, the King invited selected 
personalities to discuss a possible reform. The Union Nationale des Femmes 
Marocaines (UNFM) was the only women's organisation present. It was created 
in 1969 by the Princess Lalla Fatima Zohra and was obviously well connected to 
the monarchy. Neither of the most active women's rights associations, the Union 
Action Feminine and the Association Democratique des Femmes Marocaines. 
took part in the discussions. After the consultations, the King decided to transfer 
the issue to a council that consisted of 'ulema, representatives of the Ministry of 
Habous and Islamic Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice. At the same time, the 
King addressed himself to women's rights associations in a publication of the 
Cellule Integration de la Femme au Developpement. Engaging himself in the 
discourse that the women's associations had initiated, he claimed to understand 
the criticism of women, as, for example, unlimited freedom of travel should be 
valid for both men and women. Some passages of the Moudawana were eyen in 
contradiction with the constitution. Polygamy, however, was allowed within 
Islam, and that could not be changed. According to King Hassan II: 
256For a review of the discussion see Mustafa al-Ahnaf: 'Maroc. Le Code du Statut Personnel.' 
In: Monde Arabe Maghreb-Machrek. No. 1-l5. July-September 199-l. No. 1-l5. p'. 3-26. For a . 
discussion of the the opposition to the Gulf crisis see the same author. 'L 'OPPl)SltlOn maghrebme 
face a la crise du Golfe.' In Monde Arabe Maghreb-Machrek No. 130. Od-December 1990. p. 
99-110. 
2570MDH : 'Declaration au sujet de la revendication de moditication des dlSI1Psitions du code de 
statut personnel.' 23 June 1992. 
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Certainly, there are obstacles, which prevent Moroccan women to 
enjoy the full liberty to exercise their rights. When it comes to 
divorce and repudiation, Moroccan women are in the centre of 
concern, as the social security network is absent. ... If she does 
not enjoy the liberty of movement and the possibility to get her 
passport without permission of her husband, ... I consider this 
against the principles of our religion which is the basis of our 
constitution. Our constitution guarantees the liberty to move for 
all our citizens .... In certain questions, such as polygamy, the 
Koran has posed certain conditions.258 
At the same time, the Royal commission was to be the end of the discussion. 
The King received the recommendations of the commission, and in the new 
dahir of 13 July 1995, he changed men's tutelage over women, so that women 
no longer needed the authorisation of their husband, their father, or their son to 
work or to obtain a passport. Even if such results were hardly satisfying for the 
women's movement, the King's speech had laid down a foundation for future 
action that could no longer be ignored. The following statement of Fatima 
Mernissi, a well-known women's rights activist and academic, illustrates how 
the King's direct intervention in the discourse is regarded as a success and as the 
recognition of women's rights as citizens of Morocco: 
The Royal speech reminded that women are citizens and that 
their demands are legitimate. The highest instances, which rule 
this country, see in her participation a guarantee and an 
. d' bl t 259 III lspensa e rump. 
4.2.3 Summary Section Two 
The reactions to both the women's rights discourse and the human rights 
discourse illustrate how the state, through the creation of integrating councils, 
replicated some aspects of the discourse, aiming to neutralise and re-establish 
the state's hegemony in the public sphere. In both cases, the discourse has been 
replicated at the highest level of the state, and in both cases. it has been 
considered as a success for both human and women's rights acti\ists that felt 
258King Hassan in Cellule Integration de la Femme au Dheloppement: I a Femme Marocaine. 
(Rabat, no publisher, 1992), p. 36. . , . . 
259Mernissi in Latifa Akherbach and Rerhaye (eds): Femmes et pohtlgue. (C asablanca: EdIlIOIl' 
Le Fennec. 199::!), p. 8. 
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encouraged. Especially in the case of the CCDH, it has been illustrated that it 
was endowed with a significant degree of discursive freedom by the monarch 
himself, which reflected on the controversial nature of the topic that resisted 
direct state authority. In the case of the women's discourse, however. the state. 
at this early stage, did not really try to integrate the women's movement but 
, 
attempted to deal with the issue from specialised, state-controlled agencies such 
as the CIFD or the commission charged with a reform of the Moudal1'ana. 
Nevertheless, the replication of the discourse changed the state' s position in the 
public sphere, and gave way to further integrating measures in the latter half of 
the 1990s.26o 
4.3 Section Three: Other factors that had contributed to the state gil'ing space to 
associations 
When the Moroccan state started to tolerate the activities of associations, this 
was not only due to them exhibiting certain self-limiting features, but also due to 
a national and international environment that this section aims to address. This is 
to illustrate that domestic activities and pressures for public space, as I have 
described in the previous part of this chapter, did not develop in a political 
vacuum, but in a national and international context that can be described as 
'favourable' for this process. 
4.3.1 International Factors 
Growing tensions between Amnesty International and US-State department 
reports, on one hand, and the Moroccan government, on the other. marked the 
beginning of significant human rights improvements. In order to respond to 
international criticism, the government even set up a "Committee for Dialogue 
with Amnesty International." In 1990, Gilles Perrault's book Votre Ami Ie 
ROi,261 containing a detailed description of human rights abuses. was so 
embarrassing that the King cancelled a trip to France. In the same year. the 
h lIed a Moroccan cultural festival in France. Prillfemps dlt .\Iaroc monarc y cance 
260 I will refer to these measures in Chapter Six. 
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(spring of Morocco) when Amnesty International declared that it would 
transfonn this exhibition of Moroccan culture into a Printemps des Draits de 
I'Homme (spring of human rightS).262 Traditional supporters of the monarchy. 
especially France, began to exercise pressure for the respect of human rights. As 
a result, according to Bouandel, "in Morocco, unlike the governments of Algeria 
and Tunisia, the King took decisive steps toward improving the exercise of 
human rights in order to avoid criticism.,,263 The King publicly recognised this 
external pressure when in his Royal discourse of 8 July 1994 he said that he 
wanted "to tum the page of what is called political prisoners '" in order to end, 
on one hand, the embarrassing domestic situation and the feeling of doubt, and. 
on the other hand, the tendentious critique of ill-disposed persons and foreign 
. ,,264 
enemIes. 
The international dimension was amplified through Morocco's strategy of 
intensifying its relations with Europe and the United States. According to a 
Moroccan scholar, a result of these attempts to improve its relations with the 
West, such as Morocco's application to join the European Community in 1988, 
was a state-led discourse on civil society. "When our government officials travel 
abroad, and when they participate in international organisations, they do not like 
to be questioned about democratic deficits. As a result, they need to give 
democratic credentials, one of which is the existence - or its appearance - of a 
dynamic civil society, independent from the authorities.,,265 
In this situation, a confrontational attitude towards these non-governmental 
actors became difficult to sustain, especially as Western newspaper articles had 
systematically covered the foundation and early activities of Morocco's human 
rights organisations. The French newspaper Le Monde documented the early 
261 Gilles Perrault: Notre Ami Le Roi (Paris: Gallimard, 1990). 
262The official explanation was the Gulf crisis. 
263YoucefBouandel: 'Human Rights in the Maghreb' in Yahia Zoubia (ed): N?rth At~ica in 
Transition. State, Society, and Economic Transformation in the 1990s. (GainsvIlle. UnIversIty 
Press of Florida, 1999). p. 137. 
')64 . . 31 
- Quoted In Denoeux and Gateau, 1995. Op.Clt. p. . 
265Ibid. 
administrative difficulties of the OMDH266 and even launched a media 
campaign to exert pressure on the Moroccan government to tolerate the 
OMDH.267 
4.3.2 Other Domestic Factors 
In order to account for the reasons that had driven the Moroccan state to 
allow increased activity of these public-sphere oriented NGOs, it would be 
misleading to think that the regime encouraged their activity and creation in 
order to simply create a buffer against rising Islamic currents. 268 This might 
apply to state-controlled 'regional associations' encouraged in the early 1980s, 
staffed as they were by leading government officials. In contrast. the foundation 
years and early activities of associations such as the OMDH and the ADFM 
were marked by a conflict for official recognition and public space, from both 
the state and the political parties. 
In the beginning, for them [political parties] women's action was 
only possible within women's sections of political parties. This 
was a problem of political culture. The political elites accepted us 
very slowly, and as a result there is still this suspicion. Hence, the 
fight for the legitimacy of our existence was the first fight of our 
association. This was a fight for civic action, for confidence and 
recognition against the political parties and the state.269 
Consequently, besides mounting internal and external pressure, one of the 
main factors behind the state's move to allow the creation of a freer public 
sphere, i.e. to allow individual associations' activity on issues that are, 
politically, socially, or culturally 'sensitive' for the establishment of the 
266 It had to delay its constitutional assembly three times due to the administration's withholding 
of the "legal receipt" that is compulsory for all associations. It has become the administration' s 
waf' of controlling associative activities in Morocco. 
26 In fifteen months, Le ,Honde published seventeen articles on human rights in Morocco. and in 
December 1988 Le Monde Diplomatique published a long article on the subject. Denoeux and 
Gateau, 1995, op.cit. p. 31. 
::!68 As Bahgat Kourany, for instance, suggests. See Bahgat Kourany: 'f\,hmarchical blam with a 
Democratic Veneer: Morocco' in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble: Political 
Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World. Vol. 2, Comparati\e Perspectin:s 
(Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1998), p. 174 
269Latifa Lbardi. Interview with the author, Rabat, 30 ~lay 2002 . 
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Moroccan state had been the following: They epitomised - to a certain extent _ 
the Moroccan state combination of 'modem' and 'traditional' legitimacy. By 
allowing the creation of public space necessary to challenge the state's 
hegemony, the monarchy's legitimacy based on a combination of modernity and 
tradition became once again reinforced. 270 
This contradicted the hitherto dominant definition of makhzen and state 
control, and can be regarded as a novelty in Moroccan politics. Still in 1991, the 
Moroccan scholar Driss Ben Ali described the state's occuppation of the social-
political sphere in the following words: 
[T]he makhzen wants to occupy the whole surface, which means 
that it does not tolerate any expression except for its own, 
thereby posing itself as an end in itself. It defines itself as a 
guardian of the community's properties and the incarnation of its 
unity. It refuses to accept the tiniest piece of autonomy on its 
political territory. This logic explains why the state shows itself 
vigilant towards the constitution of any zones of power. be they 
social or political. From this follows also the control of 
communication in the economic and social spheres. Clans, social 
and family networks, they are all subject to surveillance. 
Through the use of its excessively centralised administrative 
apparatus, it does not leave any initiative at the local level, and it 
fears to lose its grip of society when leaving parts of authority to 
270See Bahgat Korany: 'Monarchical Islam with a Democratic Veneer: Morocco' in Bahgat 
Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble: Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab 
World. Vol. 2, Comparatin> Experiences (London and Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1998), p.157-158. Abderrahim Lamchichi: Islam et Contestation au Maghreb (Paris, 
L , Harmattan, 1989), p. 169, Abdelatif Agnouche: Histoire Politique du Maroc - Legitimites -
Institutions ( Casablanca: Afrique-Orient, 1987), p. 331. Thierry Desrues and Eduardo Moyano: 
'Social Change and Political Transition in Morocco' in Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 6. No. I, 
Spring 2001. p. 29. Public criticism confirmed that Morocco' s 'pluralism' existed. In 1990, this 
argument was directly used by the Ahmed Alaoui, editor of the official newspaper Le .\fatin du 
Sahara et dll Maghreb, when he writes in the aftermath of a rare opposition party' s motion of 
censure in the parliament: "The debate, with its interventions by the opposition, go\emment and 
majority members, proves that Morocco lives in a democracy. Democracy is the freedom of 
expression and verdict of the Chamber of Representatives. Moreover. the audio-visual medIa 
objectively em'ered the parliamentary debates, just as the opposition press reprodu~ed the 
integral remarks of its representatives. All of this proves if there was need for proof. that 
Moroccan democracv is doing well. So much the better! This public debate is the solemn 
illustration of Hassa~ian democracy." Le "\fatin dll Sahara et £ill ,\!ughreb, 22 f\ lay 1990. qu()ted 
and translated in David M. Medicoff: 'Civic Apathy in the Senice of Stability''> Cultural Politics 
in Monarchist f\lorocco' in The Journal of North African Studies. Vol. 3. ~o. 4 (Winta 199R). p. 
20. 
political forces, which might tum out to be a threat. [qui 
pourraient s'averer irredentistes].271 
4.3.2.1 The consequence of 'defused politics' 
The giving of space to these associations by the state, and its acceptance of 
the creation of a new public sphere, has also been a consequence of what Tozy 
called 'defused politics,' the last factor that I address in this subsection. Tozy 
maintains that though the attribution of 'unchallenging' characteristics to key 
institutions such as representation (which is redefined to signify 'intercession') 
and parliament (which is redefined to signify shu'ra), Moroccan politics had 
been endowed with the absence of any challenge to the monarchy's claim to 
power. 
We call a defused political field all places of controntation 
between the partners of the central power (political parties, trade 
unions, different associations) that cannot, by the nature of their 
activity, lead to an appropriation of power, or be able to change 
the central power's orientation to their proper social project. 272 
This political field encompassed all sectors of the polity, and allowed the 
King to maintain pluralism and modem political institutions, because the key 
variables of the Moroccan political game - representation and parliament - were 
not threatening and overshadowed by submission. In this field, the ideological 
landscape had constantly been reconstituted as 'faithful,' and the representation 
of political actors became a major concern of the central power: The presence of 
all components of public opinion became a goal in itself, as this was the proof 
for the central power's effectiveness and a sign for its diffusion in civil society. 
Tozy cites as an example the fact that invitations to official meetings with the 
. f 1" I . 273 Th f King respected the equal representatIon 0 po ltIca partIes. e appearance 0 
new associations just added another dimension to this, and remained well within 
2710riss Ben Ali: 'Emergence de l'espace socio-politique et strategie de l'etat au Maroc' in Ali 
Sedjari (ed): Etat, Espace, et Pouvoir Local. Retlexion sur Ie Maroc et les Pays en 
De\'eloppement (Rabat: Ed. Guessous. 1991). p. (i·t 
272Mohamed Tozy: 'Representation/Intercession. Les enjeux de pou\'oir dans les 'cham~s 
politiques desamorces' au Maroc' in Annuaire de l':\frigue du Nord. \'01. 28.1989. EditIOns du 
CNRS. p. 165, 
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this 'field of detente.' In fact, they were as much an expression of this through 
their self-limiting character. The main difference to the previous period (Chapter 
Three) is that these associations did not act in this 'field of detente' by default. 
Rather, they chose the 'single issue' -strategy, first of all because of their 
commitment to this issue. The engagement in the public sphere became a 
strategy to achieve their specific socio-political aims, and their challenge to the 
state's hegemony, only a logical consequence. In this situation, it is not 
surprising that the state reacted 'positively' to the appearance of these 
associations, because it remained part and parcel of a coherent phenomenon of 
M . l' 274 oroccan state-socIety re atlOns. 
4.4 Chapter Four: Summary 
In this chapter, I have described changes in associative activities that started 
in the mid 1980s. One important feature had been the new articulation of 
women's rights outside the party system, which started with the Association 
Democratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM), which used to be a section of the 
Parti du Progres et du Socialism (PPS). Being dominated by men, the political 
party hardly ever considered women's rights to be a political issue worthy of 
defence. The party's representation in parliament and the regime's handling of 
'big' national questions had priority, and women's rights issues were merely 
used within the prism of party - monarchy conflicts.275 Consequently, the history 
of associations such as the ADFM or the Union Action Feminine, presided by 
Latifa Lbardi,276 was at first marked by the fight for recognition by the political 
parties (be they 'democratic' or 'administrative'). These new associations were 
successful at changing the national discourse on women's rights and human 
rights. As Memissi, for instance, testifies: 
273 Ibid. p. 166. 
274 ln an interyie\\' (Rabat, 29 May 2002), the King's economic advisor, Andre Azoulay, did not 
sav it directly, but it was implied. 
275The sam~ applies to the question of Berber cultural rights. 
276 Who is a member of the political bureau of the political party Parti Socialist DemoCl'ate 
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We had to wait for the launching of private associations at the end 
of the 1980s to see human rights come into the streets of the Arab 
capitals and to begin to see translations of and commentaries on 
international charters and agreements circulate in Arabic for a few 
dirham. The literate masses pounced on these brochures to read 
about what hurriyyat al-ra'y (freedom of opinion) meant and 
about how the United Nations Charter could protect them against 
torture. It was only through the efforts of intellectuals of the Left 
and university students, agitating for rights of the individuaL that 
bulky translations of Amnesty International documents begun to 
circulate in Arabic. These groups were also instrumental in seeing 
that whole passages from these documents were printed in the 
leftist press when leaders came out of prison or succeeded in 
resuming activity after being tried and fined. 277 
With individual associations taking up their respective Issues, a knock-on 
effect created similar strategies in other areas, which I have identified as the 
Berber milieu and the media. Partly because it fitted into the state's sponsoring 
of 'defused politics', partly because of the existence of international pressure, 
partly because it reconfirmed the state's dual pillar of traditional and modern 
legitimacy, the state accepted these players and their causes, and showed signs of 
being committed to the same issues. This created a climate of political change in 
which formerly permissible behaviour on the part of the state was responded to 
with increasing criticism, which I illustrated with Jamal's criticism of the Interior 
Minister. 278 Instead of suppressing the discourses that these associations 
initiated, the state increasingly attempted to address these issues. It thereby 
commited itself to the production of these discourses, a reaction bound to the 
277Fatima Memissi: Islam and Democracy. Fear of the Modem World, Translated by Mary 10 
Lakeland (Reading MA: Addison Wesley, 1992), pp. 69170 
278 Another example is the following: In 1989, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper L 'Opinion, 
Mohamed Idrissi Ka'itouni. was arrested for publishing a manifesto of two human rights groups. 
the AMDH and the LMDH. The authorities considered the act of publishing this manifesto as 
"stirring up and causing public disorder." Consequently, he was tried and condemned to 2 years 
imprisonment on 9 November 1989. However, more than 300 lawyers nation-wide proposed 
themselves to defend the journalist, and the trial was critically reported by human fights groups. 
It triggered a wave of protest, and three days after the verdict. after a group of Idrissi. (a 
traditional supporting group of the Moroccan monarchy) asked for a Royal amnesty. the Km.g 
pardoned Ka'itouni. Despite the continuing use of. tradit.ional language by the mo~arc~y: thiS 
illustrates how single-issue organisations and their actlYlty became \Ie\\'ed \\Ithm dltlerent 
parameters. for the challenge that they had started to pose was no longer a challenge to the 
monarchy's monopoly of political power. Kaltouni's case. moreover. illus~rates well how. on. the 
one hand, traditional groups (the Idrissi group) had been. conSidered legitimate represL'ntatl\~-: 
(,intercession,' i.e. under the 'old' system), and.h~w o~ly SIX months later - thro~~h the O~tDH s 
.. . . th CCDH 'n~w' groups of CIVil society became to be cOllsldtrLd a-: kh-ltlOl.lte 
partiCipatIOn In e . - ~ .. ' '. '. : .. " . ) l' 1 M 
representatiws (new "IntercessIOn In the new s~stem). SLL fozy. 1989. (r .Clt. p. . 
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political field, domestic and international pressure, and the nature of the 
challenge - rather than threat - that these discourses posed. 
Therefore, one of the main reasons for the early success of these associations 
must be seen in the nature of these associations: their promotion of single issues, 
in which constitutional, power-oriented aspects were not directly addressed, 
allowed them to accept the political situation as a given. Moreoyer. although 
these associations challenged some of the state's pillars of political legitimacy, 
they strengthened the state's combination of enjoying both traditional and 
modern legitimacy. Besides, through the creation of political space for these 
actors, the monarchy could strengthen the consensual nature of the Moroccan 
political game, in which dissent either did not exist, or was channelled in 
appropriate state controlled arenas. Hence, the state's acceptance of this limited 
expression of dissent strengthened the state's position and envisioned role. 
Once the OMDH was created, its immediate success in rallying support from 
important segments of Morocco's political parties illustrated that human rights 
was an issue around which Moroccans could be mobilised .. :279 Accordingly, the 
Advisory Council for Human Rights (CCDH) aimed at fending off ever-
mounting internal and external criticism. Thereby, the CCDH became one of the 
main indicators of a changing political strategy: the effort to create a national 
consensus on the basis of pre-defined monarchical prerogatives. The Royal 
discourse that inaugurated this institution outlined this new model of consensus 
building within pre-defined values. Moroccan human rights organisations 
received for the first time official recognition: Interestingly, less than one and a 
half years after the foundation of a potentially 'subversive' organisation, the 
OMDH, the very same organisation was invited to participate in a Royal 
Advisory Council. Through this participation, the self-limiting character of this 
organisation became even more pronounced: its acceptance of the national 
consensus became the pre-condition for the space of manoeuvre that was 
accorded to it. In the process, it became eyen less challenging then it had already 
been by focusing on single issues outside the sphere of political parties. 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE CONSOLIDATION AND MOBILISATIOi\ OF CIYIL 
SOCIETY UNDER THE 'NEW SYSTEM' (1993-2002) 
This chapter will explain how the public sphere, and civil society \\"ithin it. 
evolved during the 1990s. A new wave of single-issue associations emerged in 
the 1990s, building on the experiences of the 'new' civil society organisations of 
the previous decade. The latter's challenge to the hegemony of the state over the 
public sphere and the new autonomy of civil society groups from political parties 
had paved the way for a proliferation of associations that had shared with those 
in the 1980s their self-limiting strategy and their independence from political 
parties. Equally, previously existing civil society organisations were transformed 
by this new climate. 
The chapter will argue firstly that this process took place during a period of 
economic and political change within Morocco, which in tum had its own 
repercussions for civil society and its relations with the state. On the one hand, 
the balance of power between the monarchy and the political parties was being 
renegotiated (a process, which had been taking place since the 1970s). On the 
other, the country faced a severe economic crisis that raised questions about the 
continuing responsibility of the state to provide employment and social welfare 
to its citizens. 
The second part of the chapter exammes civil society organisations 
themselves, identifying how they responded to the new political and economic 
climate and how they built - in varying ways - upon the experience of their 
predecessors in the 1980s. These responses can be categorised as 1) those 
associations which copied the single-issue, self-limiting strategies of the earlier 
organisations; 2) those which continued to be directly power-seeking; 3) those 
which adopted a more critical and flexible stance and 4) those which broke free 
of previous alliances with the state to assume more independent and political 
postures. 
279Susan E. Waltz: Human Rights and Reform. Changing the Face of North African Pt1litics 
A diverse representation of civil society has been included in this chapter. 
As well as single-issue associations, I have included Islamic organisations. 
human rights organisations, which partly abandoned their single-issue status. a 
private sector representative organisation and the press, since such broad 
coverage provides evidence of the range of strategies adopted across civil 
society. 
In the third section of this chapter, I will examine the case study of a 
scandal about contaminated blood imports, to show that organisations of civil 
society are directly confronting the state and its hegemony in the public sphere. 
Despite the factors that had fostered the continuing autonomisation of 
organisations of civil society and the public sphere in terms of public criticism. I 
seek to illustrate that this process remained a conflict. As I will explain in the 
third section, this conflict needs to be understood as a process of encounters 
involving state officials and associations, in which hegemony is fought over in 
the public sphere. This contrasts with views that focus or presume the adoption 
of 'strategic' thinking of Hassan II or his entourage to explain the state's 
balancing act between authoritarianism and political pluralism.28o 
5.1 Section One: The Political and Economic Context in the 1990s 
5.1.1 The Economic Environment 
As many other countries of the Arab world, Morocco experienced a debt 
crisis that had its roots in the 1970s. There was one major event that sparked off 
Morocco's accelerated debt crisis: the price of Morocco's main export 
commodity. phosphate, tripled from US$ 14 to USS 42 from 1973 to 1974. A 
year later, the price reached S68. As the third largest producer and the world's 
leading exporter of phosphates. the Kingdom expected to benefit economically 
enormously from this unexpected windfall and increase in public revenucs - the 
(London and Berkeley: Uni\'ersity of California Press. 1995), pp. 1489. . , 
)°0 . ' fD . nd 1\laghroul' In' 'KIn" Hassan s strategy of 
_0 Which is the underlymg assumptIOn 0 enoeu.\ a : . ~ . . _ 
political dualism' in Middle East Policy, \'01. \', No.4. January 1998. 
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production and export of phosphate having been controlled by a state-owned 
monopoly, the Office Cherijien des Phosphates. As a consequence, ~10rocco 
happily engaged in an ill-fated economic spending programme. increasing 
salaries of public sector employees and subsidies on essential food items. 
Between 1974 and 1976, government expenditure increased by 100 percent in 
real terms. At the same time, Morocco embarked on a massive public investment 
programme, which increased by 340 percent between 1974 and 1976. 215 new 
public firms were created between 1973 and 1977, and the ratio of government 
expenditures to GDP doubled from about 20 percent in 1973 to around 40 
percent in 1977.
281 
At the same time, it followed a massive recruitment into the 
expanding public sector. Partly for political purposes after the political crisis of 
the early 1970s (two failed military coups), partly to make modernising use of 
public revenues that were suddenly available, large sectors of the middle class 
were employed in the public administration, which increased from 50,000 
employees in 1960 to 500,000 in the early 1980s. 282 
Unfortunately for Morocco, the sudden bonanza was only short-lived. In 
1976, the price for phosphates reached its 1973 level in real terms. However, the 
Moroccan government failed to adjust its investment and expenditure 
accordingly, and it started to finance the growing gap by resorting to borrowing 
abroad. According to Denoeux and Maghroui, several poor agricultural harvests 
and the rising cost of the war in the Western Sahara exacerbated its dependence 
on foreign financing?83 Foreign debt rose from US$ 2.3 billion in 1976 to US$ 
7.9 billion in 1980 and US$ 11.8 billion in 1983?84 In 1983, this corresponded to 
300 percent of export earnings and 84 percent of GDP. 285 In March of that year. 
281Guilain P. Denoeux and Abdeslam Maghroui: 'The Political Economy of Structural 
Adjustment in Morocco' in Layachi: Economic Crisis and Political Changes in No~h Africa 
(London: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p. 56. See al~o Christian M?~iss?n ,and Verom;ue, . _ 
Jeanneret-Amour: 'Adjustement et Depenses Soclaies au Maroc In TIers Monde. 3_. L6. Apnl 
June 1991, p. 253. . 
282Thierry Desrues and Eduardo Moyano: 'Social Change and Political Transition in ~lorocco 
in Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 6, No.1, Spring 2001, p. 32. 
283G '1 . P Denoeux and Abdeslam Maghroui: 'The Political Economy of Structural U1 am . . I" 
Adjustment in Morocco' in Layachi: Economic Crisis and Political Changes In Nort 1 .\ Inc a 
(London: Praeger Publishers. 1998). p. )6. 
2X.fIbid. p. 57. 
285Ibid. 
132 
Morocco's foreign exchange earnings were almost exhausted: the country was 
near bankruptcy and could no longer service its debt or pay for critical imports. 
Negotiations with international creditors and institutions followed and in 
September 1983, Morocco signed its first IMF deal, a loan of USS 200 million 
Special Drawing Rights. The World Bank provided Morocco with USS 600 
million in sector adjustment loans. In the meantime, Morocco's foreign debts had 
been rescheduled.286 
Consequently, privatisation has been one of the key issues that the Kingdom 
of Morocco has embarked on as a part of its Structural Adjustment Policy. First 
of all, it must be noted that the monarchy has always adhered to an ideology that 
emphasised economic liberalisation. Already in 1978, when budget deficits 
worsened and phosphate revenues remained low, the King addressed the issue of 
large public sector employment, and argued that this needed to be reformed. 
Together with decreasing revenues, this explained why the state stopped creating 
public enterprises. According to Denoeux and Maghroui, the King urged that 
work begin on a programme of privatisation, but because of a reluctant 
bureaucracy, his calls for privatisation fell on deaf ears?87 Joffe puts the 
monarchy's ideology of adopting a free economy in the following words: 
[I]n addition to the new orthodoxy in favour of privatisation as 
part of economic restructuring policies, Morocco has always 
sought a liberal, free enterprise market economy. This, alongside 
the issue of democratic political structures, has always formed an 
important part of the rhetoric associated with "Hassanian 
democracy" and, within the limits of Royal control, of 
. . I . 11 288 conshtutlOna prachce as we . 
Morocco's serious engagement in privatisation started in 1988. In terms of 
Morocco's continuing deficit spending, the Dh 4 billion annually (approximately 
286Ibid. p. 58. 
287 Guilain P. Dunoeux and Abdeslam Maghroui: 'The Political Economy of Structural. 
Adjustment in Morocco' in Layachi: Economic Crisis and Political Chan!.!es 111 (\;orth ,\Inca 
(London: Praeger Publishers. 1998). p. 60. 
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us $ 800 million) that the state provided to the 700 public enterprises in 1983 
accounted for 10 percent of budgetary expenditure. Accordingly, 
[i]n any economic restructuring programme, the privatisation of 
the state sector was bound do be a priority. Indeed, on October 
10, 1986, King Hassan, in opening the parliamentary session, 
made clear that this was to be the case and, eighteen months later, 
in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies on April 8, 1988, the king 
announced that legislation was on the way. Eventually, the king 
made clear, all state holdings, except those concerned with the 
"commanding heights of the economy" - the phosphate industry, 
electricity, water and railway system, air transport, and 
telecommunications would be privatised. In December 1989, a 
law (Law 39-89) was passed by the Chamber of Deputies to 
allow the privatisation of 112 companies, including 37 hotels, 
and on October 16, 1990, the enabling legislation (Decree 2-90-
402) was also published.289 
Despite the only limited success of Morocco's privatisation process in the 
1990s - of those 112 companies originally listed for privatisation 38 were being 
dropped, and the programme experienced serious delays290 - the King 
involuntarily initiated an important move in the business community towards 
more economic liberalism. This has been epitomised in King Hassan's 
expression during his speech on the privatisation campaign: 'The goal pursued 
through the coming operations is to give these men their chances, to open the 
d if 'b'Z" h d 'ks,,291 A B h h 292 th oor 0 responsl 1 lUes, c ances, an rzs. S ras as sown e 
privatisation campaign was based on new social-cultural goals, illustrated by the 
publicity that accompanied the privatisation discourse. The privatisation 
discourse illustrates the mutations in the registry of legitimacy in Morocco, 
which resulted in the promotion of a new trilogy: "Nation, State, and Enterprise." 
Commenting on this, Catusse illustrates the consequences for the private sector's 
289Ibid. p. 58. 
290See Tom P. Najem: 'Privatization and the State in Morocco: Nominal Objectives and 
Problematic Realities' in Mediterranean Politics, VI. 6, No. 2. Summer 200 I, pp. 57-58. 
291 Myriam Catusse: 'L 'Entree en Politique des Entrepreneurs au t-.1aroc,' unpublis?ed PhD 
thesis, Universite de Droit, d'Economie, et de Sciences d'Aix-Marsaille, Institut d'Etudes 
Politiques d'Aix-en-Provence, 1999, pp. 1131114, emphasis added. 
292 1. P. Bras: . Les enjeux socio-culturels de la privatisation au Maroc et en TUI1lsie'. in D. 
Guerraoui and X. Richet (eds.). Strategies de privatisations: Comparaison Maghreb-I'urope, 
(Paris: L 'Harmattan. 1995). 
maIn representation, the Conftideration Generale des Entreprises du ,\faroe 
(CGEM) 
Effectively, this is a fundamental moment that entails 
discursively the transfer of collective responsibilities to the 
enterprise and the private sector. The idea of 'economic 
citizenship' is taken on board, which as a result forms the 
CGEM's slogan 'l'entreprise citoyenne,293 
On a more practical level, the economic role of the state has been diminishing 
beyond the privatisation programme. Through an coherent austerity programme, 
implemented by reform-minded technocrats in the 1980s (especially the 
prominent finance minister Mohamed Berrada, but also Moulay Zine Zahidi, 
Hassan Abouyoub, and Hassan Amrani) - government investment declined by 38 
percent between 1983 and 1986.294 Price controls were lifted and import 
liberalisation measures implemented. In 1987 Morocco joined the GAIT, and in 
1995, it signed an association agreement with the European Union, which 
provided for the creation of a free trade area in 2010. Custom duties and import 
restrictions were significantly reduced. The budget deficit declined from 12 
percent of GDP in 1983 to 3 percent in 1997. In the 1983-91 period, exports 
grew by 9.7 percent a year in value and 6.1 percent in volume?95 All of this had 
important ideological consequences concerning what Moroccans expect the state 
to do, which has been nicely summarised by Denoeux and Maghroui: 
The 1980s witnessed in Morocco a progressive reevaluation of 
certain dogma, such as the belief that government is responsible 
for maintaining minimum standards of living or that it has a duty 
to protect national industries against foreign competition. 
Although these beliefs did not disappear totally, they were 
frequently challenged, as new concepts such as "indi\'idual 
initiative," "economic efficiency," "competitiveness," 
"austerity," and "productivity" entered the arena of public 
293 . 113 Myriam Catusse. 1999. Op.Clt. p. . 
294 Guilain P. Denoeux and Abdeslam Maghroui: 'The Political Economy of Structural 
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(London: Praeger Publishers. 1998). p. 58. 
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debate. The country slowly began to question its earlier belief in 
"dirigisme" and "Etat providence. ,,296 
As the two authors correctly point out, this change in attitudes among the 
political elite was accompanied with a greater popular interest in economic 
issues. This was witnessed by the success of publications such as L 'Economist 
and the multiplication of conferences and seminars.297 
5.1.2 The Political Environment 
Politically, the 1990s saw Morocco's most profound and accelerated formal 
political changes since independence, which cumulated in the death of King 
Hassan II and the accession to the throne of his eldest son, Mohamed VI. on 30 
July 1999, and the dismissal of the Interior Minister, Driss Bari, in November 
1999. The most important political events were: the Gulf war, two constitutional 
changes and popular referenda in 1992 and 1996, two legislative elections in 
1993 and 1997, and, finally, the government of alternance consensuelle. These 
events and changes were all inscribed into, and the continuation of, a political 
framework, which Remy Leveau described as 'democracy of limited 
objectives. ,298 That meant that despite Morocco's multiparty system, only loyal 
parties with access to the makhzen and the Ministry of the Interior had access to 
state power. Hence, in this context, the expression 'political changes' needs to be 
qualified: it has been more a rearrangement of the system, resulting from a 
negotiation process between the monarchy and the opposition parties, which had 
resulted in the inclusion of the latter in the circles of Royal patronage, In 
exchange for their almost unconditional acceptance of the status quo. 
Indeed, until the legislative elections held in 1997, opposition 
parties were practically excluded from this circle of opportunity 
as a result of the patrimonialist practices of the Ministry of the 
Interior, which controlled political life through the makhzen, and 
due to the privileged position held by 'legitimist parties', through 
their patronage from the Crown. Thus, a paternalistic culture had 
296Ibid. p. 65. 
297 Ibid. 
298R. Leveau: 'Les hesitations du pouvoir marocain', ,\Iwliere de Voir. Le .\/onde Dip/onlllllljllt', 
Nov. 1994, Paris, pp. 57-59. 
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been continually reinforced. It was a political culture where all 
actors had to accept a one-of-a-kind ideology to avoid being 
excluded from the political arena. 299 
According to O'Donnel et al. seminal work, political liberalisation is a \'iable 
strategy if the political elite believes that the structures of authority will not be 
modified.30o In the beginning of the 1990s, an accentuated legitimacy cnSlS 
made the political establishment, especially Hassan II himself, believe that this 
was the best option available, precisely because no credible alternative to the 
monarch seemed to be at hand. The December 1990 uprising in F es, an 
anticipated referendum on Morocco's territorial claim over the Western Sahara , 
the popular demonstrations during the Gulf War in spring 1991, during which the 
Islamists illustrated their enormous capacity to rally support, all illustrated the 
need for Hassan II to re-establish control over the domestic political sphere. With 
increasing activity expressed in civil society (as illustrated in the previous 
chapter), a project of controlled political liberalisation became a project around 
which the King could rally popular support to recover parts of the state's lost 
legitimacy. The adoption of a strategy of liberalisation of the political system 
started with a constitutional reform in 1992, which should pave the way for 
opposition parties' controlled participation in King Hassan's government. 
Formally, the 1992 constitution provided for the foundation of more 
accountable government: It empowered the Prime Minister to select his ministers 
and placed the cabinet under his authority. Previously, it had been the King alone 
who chose the ministers, who were under his sole authority. In this way, the 
reform gave more leeway to the Prime Minister to formulate and implement the 
country's policy. At the same time, by leaving the Prime Minister and political 
parties the field of 'low politics,' the King strengthened the monarchy'S position 
as that of supreme arbiter "standing above the fray of party politics. And, by 
refraining from becoming embroiled in day-to-day political battles, he can more 
effectively justifY his far more critical role in the following areas: setting the tone 
299Thierry Desrues and Eduardo Moyano: 'Social Change and Political Tramition in \1ofl1ccP' 
in Mediterranean Politics. Vol.6, No. 1. Spring 2001. 
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and general philosophy of government policy; settling issues that are either too 
controversial or too sensitive to be left to others; and deciding matters of "high 
policy" (national security and foreign affairs).,,301 Apart from that, although the 
King no longer selected the ministers, he ultimately appointed them, and 
presided over cabinet meetings. Besides, his advisors, only accountable to him. 
often yield more power then government ministers, and shape the nature and 
directions of the work of ministers.302 Many other safeguards ensured that 
ultimate power remained with he King and that the parliament could not pass any 
laws with which the King disagreed. Consequently. the monarch's sweeping 
t · d 303 A K' . preroga Ives were preserve . s mg Hassan put It: "The fact that I am 
delegating certain powers to the government and Parliament does not mean that I 
am devolving or relinquishing these powers to them.,,304 This became entirely 
clear when Morocco's fourth constitution was approved by a 97.2 percent 
turnout and a 99.97 percent approval despite opposition parties' calling for a 
boycott. 
In a more practical manner, the 1993 elections, which followed the 
referendum on the fourth constitution, reconfirmed that the King was still 
resistant to engage in any power sharing with the opposition parties. This was 
despite the fact that power sharing would still have been limited through the 
constitution, which, as illustrated above, secured ultimate power in favour of the 
monarchy. The first round of the elections raised hopes for the opposition 
parties. Altogether, they won 101 seats out of the 222 seats filled through this 
first round. On the basis of this result, observers expected the opposition parties 
to play an important role in the formation of the next government. These hopes 
were quickly dismissed when the second round of indirect elections In 
September 1993 brought the centre-right party Union Constitutionelle to an 
overwhelming victory. This was regarded as having only been possible on 
account of the Minister of Interior's involvement in election rigging. According 
301 Denoeux and Maghroui: 'King Hassan's strategy of political dualism' in t\liddle East Polic\. 
Vol. Y, No. -l. January 1998, p. 108. 
302Ibid. 
303See ibid, pp. 109-110. 
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to many commentators, this happened in order to counter the success of the left-
wing-nationalist 'democratic' coalition, the Koutla, in the first round of direct 
elections in June 1993.305 
These events pushed Morocco into a deep political crisis. Critical discussions 
between the King and the opposition coalition continued until November. On 6 
November, the King ended the discussions by making clear that there was not 
going to be a re-run of the elections, as there was no authority to do this in the 
constitution. Moreover, he said that he had offered a coalition with the 
opposition, reserving the premiership and the key ministries of interior, foreign 
affairs, and justice within his own prerogatives. The Prime Minister, he 
explained, had to be attributed to a member of the Union Constitutionnelle, 
because it was the largest single party in the new parliament. As the negotiations 
had been fruitless, because neither the Union Constitutionelle nor the Koutla 
parties had been willing to participate, the King appointed four days later a 
technocratic non-party government, headed once again by the veteran Prime 
Minister Karim Lamrani.306 The crisis was deepened by the departure of USFP 
leader Abderrahman Y oussoufi into self-imposed exile, which caused the 
monarchy to propose - one year later - the formation of a coalition government, 
this time headed by a leader of the 'former opposition. ,307 Still, these opposition 
parties declined on the grounds that - next to the continuing appointment of Driss 
Basri as the minister of the interior, held responsible for election rigging - this 
had not been the result of free and fair elections, and therefore void of popular 
legitimacy. Anyway, the opposition parties knew that next to the all-powerful 
Driss Basri, not even the premiership would have guaranteed that the political 
. I 308 parties could exerCIse any rea power. 
304Royal Speech, 20 August 1992. Cited in Denoeux and Maghroui: 'King Hassan's strategy of 
olitical dualism' in Middle East Policy, Vol. V, No.4. January 1998, p. 111. ~05 George Joffe: . Elections and Reform in Morocco' in Richard Gillespie (ed): Mediterreanean 
Politics. Vol I, London, Pinter Publishers. 1994), p. 216. 
306Ibid. p. 216-217. 
307 Royal discourse, 14 October 1994, in Le .\latin dll Sahara t't dll ,\!ag!lIeb. 16 December 1994. 
Constitutional Changes 1996 
The constitutional changes that were introduced in 1996 on the King's initiative 
paved the way for alternance, by rallying and allying the King more closely to 
the 'fonner opposition' around alternance consensuelle, issued - at least in 
theory - from the ballot box (alternance par les urnes). The changes instituted a 
two-chamber system, a lower house and an upper house, where the lower house 
was to be elected through direct elections, and the upper house through electoral 
colleges. The upper house had fonnerly been the one third of the parliament, 
which had been subject to more interference from the Ministry of Interior. and 
that had been, generally speaking, more conservative and monarchist than the 
two thirds that had resulted from direct elections. The constitutional amendments 
were to allow for new elections earlier, "a device to breach the stalemate ... in 
which the mistakes of the past could be overcome. ,,309 It allowed for the 
appearance of a more powerful parliament (i.e. lower house): it was directly 
elected and the strongest political party, issued from the elections, was supposed 
to fonn the government. Consequently, expecting to form a government, the 
'fonner opposition' parties (USFP, Istiqlal and PPS) actively campaigned in 
favour of the constitutional amendments. They thereby supported the monarch's 
legitimacy and role in the political process. Therefore, the constitutional reform, 
much more than any of the other constitutions in the past, strengthened the 
position of the monarchical institution. However, the significant prerogatives of 
the second chamber, such as the power to censure the government, made sure 
that the conservative political current, which was in favour of the monarchy'S 
political prerogatives, would remain a real political check on the so-called 
democratic political parties. According to Denoeux and Maghroui, the second 
chamber could be expected to play the role of "defender of the throne. ,,310 
308Rkia EI-Mossqdeq: 'Les Labyrinthes de l'Alternance au ~1aroc' in Annuaire de ~'~\frigue du 
Nord. 1995 (Paris. CNRS). p. 7'2'2. Also Remy Leveau: 'Morocco at the Crossroads 10 
~terranean Politics. Vol. 2. No.2. Autumn 1997. p. 102. 
309 George Joffe: 'The 1\ toroccan Political System after the Elections.' in Mediterranean Politics, 
Vol. 3, No.3. \vinter 1998. p. 108. 
3100enoeux and Maghroui. op.cit. 1998. p. 114. 
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Alternance par Ie haut 
The appearance of a more powerful parliament and the real perspective to 
form under the direction of a Prime Minister Morocco's government of 
alternance, both made the opposition parties cease their rejection of Driss 
Basri,311 the all powerful Minister of the Interior. They also accepted the 
distribution of votes under the supervision of Basri's Interior Ministry. Because 
of the effective absence of strong conservative currents during the elections of 
the lower house (which were now being 'stored' in the upper house with similar 
competencies as the 'lower house'), the 'former opposition' could save its face 
and appear to have been 'elected by the ballot box' despite remaining effectively 
marginalised as a political current. In the lower house, the Koutla bloc won 102 
seats out of 299 seats (and here the USFP was effectively the 'winning' political 
party with 52 seats). In the new 270-seat upper house, it captured only 44 
seats.312 Through the appointment of the USFP leader Abderrahman Y oussoufi 
as Premier on 4 February 1998, and the face-saving measures that the 
constitutional amendments ensured, the King's third attempt at alternance 
succeeded despite the continuation of Driss Basri as the Interior Minister. In 
addition, the King's largely defined perogatives became institutionalised in the 
so-called ministres de la souverainete. These were ministers, who were directly 
appointed by the sovereign (i.e. King). These were not defined by the 
constitution, and emanated from the King's definition of political practice. They 
were to ensure that he alone ultimately remained in charge of sensitive areas 
related to his claim to be Morocco's religious leader. These were the Ministries 
of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defence, and Religious Affairs. 
All these events that led to the installation of the government of alternance, 
despite their limitations, resulted in a normalisation of the \1oroccan political 
311 George Joffe, 1998, op.cit. p. 110. 
312Ibid. p. Ill. 
regime. The absence of confrontation, as already noticed by Tozy in 1989,313 
became finalised and institutionalised. 
5.1.3 Summary Section One 
As this description of the political and economic environment shows, general 
changes here favoured the emergence of individuals' occupation with political 
issues. The political and economic situation put more emphasis on the 
responsibility that citizens and elected bodies enjoyed concerning public affairs. 
This meant that the public sphere, as a sphere in which individuals of civil 
society act on behalf of public issues, was able to further develop. Taken 
together with earlier success in the 1980s and early 1990s, the climate for 
mobilisation had been viewed by activists as being favourable. In tum, as I will 
illustrate in the following section, they accelerated their interference in the public 
sphere, adopting, however, not always identical and homogenous modes of 
mobilisation. 
313 h d T . ..' Re'presentationJlntercession. l.es enjeux de pouvoir dans ks 'champs Mo arne OZ\. d" . d 
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5.2 Section Two: Consolidation of Civil Society 
5.2.1 The foundation of other single-issue associations 
Similar to the group of associations referred to in the previous chapter, this 
group of associations are identified as being single-issue and self-limiting. 
Examples are taken from the political and the socio-economic realm. 
Alternatives 
In December 1995, a group of middle-class intellectuals and academics founded 
the political association Alternatives. Repeating the experience of women's 
associations, it was created on purpose outside the political party system in order 
to escape the imposition of party discipline. However, also similar to the 
women's groups, it was close to the the Communist party Party du Progres et du 
Socialisme (PPS) and was formed in the Centre de Recherche Aziz Belal in Rabat 
Agdal, (Aziz Belal was a former leader of the Communist party), which 
organised debates and conferences. According to one militant, in this centre 
the discussions and the ideas were very free, so one day some five 
or six people, among them the director of Alternatives, asked 
themselves why they did not found a political association. Such a 
thing didn't exist in Morocco at the time, there were only political 
parties. These five or six people (some were members of Socialist 
parties) started to think about forming a political association, 
reasoning that an association was not strict it didn't ha\'e a party 
discipline or a secretary general, who decided political issues. Its 
members, in the spirit of liberty, were active on a strictly voluntary, 
and benevolent basis .... and that's how they started to work, in 
clubs, cafes, and private homes. The emphasis of their approach 
was that of universality of ideas, and a wish to bring about a form 
of democracy and justice, through which to change contemporary 
1·, 314 Moroccan po ltIcS. 
314Laila Taleb. inter\ie\\' with the author. Rabat. 26 January 2001. 
When the charter for Alternatives was presented in its first general assembly. 
which numbered some 40 people, many people from the older political parties 
came and questioned whether this was not the beginning of a new political party. 
Maybe, we wanted to be competition for them, especially for 
the USFP. So, we had to clarify that this was not the beginning 
of a party, the journalists also thought that this was going to 
happen. This was because Abde1ali Benamour. one of the 
former leaders of the USFP, created the association, so people 
thought that he wanted to have his own party. So we had to 
clarify that this was not going to be our goal and our function. 
We wanted to be an association that advises. helps, and 
influences political parties, on the level of reflection, research, 
and ideas, so that we act as a think tank for them. We want to 
influence the political sphere, in order to change a political 
. . d" 315 posItIon or a eClSIon. 
Alternatives had no difficulties in getting officially recognised, as it was not 
perceived as a populist mass-movement. "We only wanted to talk about politics, 
in the salons, we wanted to think and reflect on what is happening, \ve were not 
an association of unemployed people, with specific demands. ,,316 This also 
seemed to be the reason why the association had been noticed by the 
establishment and why it had not been regarded as threatening. "Alternatives has 
gained a certain significance in the political setting because we have a clean 
image, we are not an association of ex-prisoners who want more money for 
whatsoever. We have an image of an association that wants to reflect on what is 
. . M ,,317 gOIng on In orocco. 
As a result, A Iternati1't;s , critique of the political sphere is couched in 
intellectual references and addressed to the political parties. It avoids sensitive 
issues such as the position of the monarchy and the system of patronage that 
structures the administration in Morocco. Hence, shortly after the accession of 
Mohamed VI, ,llternatil'cs expressed its hope to see a new era coming. which 
amounted to a positive critique of efforts already being undertaken. It did not 
31 :'Ibid. 
31 h Ibid . 
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demand a change in practice but a simple continuation of efforts already being 
visible. 
Since last summer, the rhythm of reforms has seen a 
comprehensiveness, which has surprised more than 
one ... Public liberties (closure of the file concerning the 
disappeared, the return of Serfaty), the nature of the authority 
and its relationship with the citizens, the launching of the big 
reform projects (administration, education) and last but not 
least a new approach in the exercise of Royal power 
(proximity, easing of Royal protocol), these were some signs 
which should theoretically translate into the beginning of a new 
ere. Lastly, the dismissal of Driss Basri the 9 November 1999, 
does this constitute the beginning of the dismanteling of a 
whole system?318 
Alternatives' critique has been directed towards the so-called political class, 
i.e. mainly the political parties of the Koutla, which is seen as an antithesis to the 
dynamism of the new King, who evokes the spirit and the expectations of his 
people. 
The overwhelming majority of the political class has pointed 
out the real tension that exists between the expectations of the 
population, best expressed by a young and dynamic King, and 
the dangerous attentism of decision makers in the political 
sphere. The political parties of the Kouda ... seem hit by a 
. I h 319 preoccupymg et argy. 
As a result of its intellectual approach, Alternati,'es can be seen as working 
towards a restructuring of the multiparty system. Parties with similar ideas 
(conservatives, social-democratic parties) should unite and restructure their own 
internal organisation. By becoming internally democratic, they could act as real 
channels of interest articulation. Hence, Alternatives major political demand 
since 1999 has been to 
318 Alternatin's Lettre d'infonnation et de retle.\ion No.6. Jam'ier 2000, p. 3 
319 Alternatives Lettre d'infonnation et de rdlexion No.6, Janvier 2000. p. :' 
stop this atomisation of the political parties in the sense of a 
recomposition of the actual political field on new. clean, transparent, 
d ffi · b' 320 an e IClent aSlS. 
In order to bring about a change in this direction, Alternatil'es orgamses 
summer schools and conferences on specific topics, to which they in\'ite 
representatives of the political parties and specialists in the field. In its own 
words "it transcends political rhetoric and works for a field of reflection, in 
which figures the problematic of the emergence of a grand movement of progress 
and modernity, passing by a reform of the political party system in Morocco .. ,321 
Relations with the political parties have been marked by tension. not only 
because Alternatives was trying to interfere in what can be regarded as their 
internal affairs (which reflect on the positions of certain people within the 
parties) but also because it was seen as a potential competitor in the political 
field, perhaps even transforming itself into a political party. Hence, all Koutla 
parties (except for the Parti du Progres et du Socialisme) would not allow their 
members to become members of Alternatives, though this directive was not 
always followed. 
Despite these tensions resulting from the particular party logic of Morocco's 
multiparty system, the impact of Alternatives should not be underestimated. It 
can be seen as an expression of the intellectual elite of Morocco that in 1995 was 
faced with continuing authoritarianism and evident friction between the 
monarchy and the political parties. All this at a time when a spillover effect from 
Algeria's civil war was threatening the modernist agenda. In the words of one of 
Alternath'es ' founding members, Azzedin Beniss, it was an 
J20Ibid, 
attempt to open the political system and to initiate a dialogue 
between the democratic parties and the government. to initiate 
a counterbalance against the anti-modernist agenda. Civil 
society, then, became the space. where we could say whatever 
we thought. We thought that the professional politicians 
shouldn't have the monopoly over politics, it needed something 
else. Tre didn 'f want fa become sUlprised like in Algeria. \Ve 
J21Ib'd 6 1 . p. . 
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had to make sure that our door to Europe remained open, and 
we had to save our modernity. Many people have been brought 
up with the values of modernity. Doctors, engineers, 
technicians, academics, they all thought that we had to help 
history to progress, because if not, we will see regression. 
Alternatives was founded on the premise to fight against 
extremism, to keep and save our culture. Hence, the first idea 
was to reconcile the King with the political parties of the left, 
the second the horizontal recomposition and the rationalisation 
'f I" 322 oJ po ltlCS. 
The formation of Alternatives was provoked by a psycho-social atmosphere 
that made it attractive to middle-aged men and women with a liberal-modernist 
vision. Hence, the average age of its 500 members is between 40 and 50 years. It 
comprises large parts of the middle and upper-middle class: entrepreneurs, the 
liberal professions, doctors, pharmacists, journalists, artists, academics and high-
level public sector employees. It first became outspoken during the anti-
corruption campaign - campagne d 'assainissements - in 1996, and acted as a 
mediator in the Gentlemen's agreement, reached between Casablanca's business 
sector and the Ministry of the Interior, when arbitrary government actions 
resulted in the near breakdown of Casablanca's port activities. 
Transparency Maroc 
As in other developing economies, corruption is a huge problem in Morocco. 
From high level civil servant to traffic police, from simple services such as 
obtaining a passport to huge investments in the privatisation business, 
Moroccans pay and receive incredible sums, about which - due to the nature of 
the transactions - no statistics are available. In the face of this problem, a group 
of people influenced by the Berlin-based association Transparency International 
founded Transparency Maroc (TM) on 6 January 1996. In its charter it defined 
its objective clearly as fighting against corruption at all levels of Morocco's 
political organisation, since corruption existed in connection with political. 
juridical, administrative and economic power. 
322 Azzedin Bennis. interview with the author, Rabat, 30 January 200 1. emphaSIS added. 
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Corruption is this intolerable action which results from an 
abuse of political, judicial, administrative and economic power, 
and its misappropriation at the profit of private interests. 
Generally, it consists of the demand of a illegitimate 
remuneration in exchange for an advantage, which can be a 
unlawful advantage or a legitimate right, which is here 
confiscated and rendered inaccessible.323 
As the association's objective conflicts with vested interests in the regime, it 
had difficulties in getting official recognition. Because of this, the organisation 
had to work illegally until 1998. The administration had refused to deliver the 
so-called 'legal receipt.' When a former president of the Organisation 
Marocaine des Droits de l 'Homme (OMDH), Omar Azziman, became Minister 
of Justice, he recognised the association. Subsequently, the responsible governor 
within the Ministry of Interior recognised the association as well. In the period of 
its illegal activity (1995-1998) TM had built around itself a network of other 
NGOs, whose offices they used for public meetings. This was necessary to avoid 
being subject to repression. These 'safe-harbours' were usually the two active 
human rights organisations Association Marocaine de Droits de l 'Homme 
(AMDH) and the OMDH. Whenever TM gave a press conference, it did so at 
these organisations' offices and in combination with these associations' names. 
The first president was Sion Assidon, a factory owner and former political 
prisoner. He was in charge until 2000, when Bashir Rachdi, a company director, 
took over. 
In the organisation, one finds the same people that had worked in earlier 
projects such as Kalima (Nourredine Ayouch), women-associations, and the 
Organisation Marocaine des Droits de l 'Homme (OMDH). Ahmed Ghazali and 
Fatima Mernissi supported the project. Rachid Meknissi Filali, the present 
secretary-general, was also a founding member of the OMDH, and one of those 
members who had left it shortly after its foundation because of doubts about the 
its independence from political parties. 314 Before its foundation, people who had 
J23Charter, quoted in Transparency Maroc: La Corruption au Quotidien (Casablanca: Le Fennec, 
1999), p. 99. 
324This occured in 1993, when Abdelazziz Bennani (USFP) took over the presidency and when 
the US fP dominated the national bureau. Interestingly. in order to gain credibiltiy and to mark 
the OrvlDH's independence, Bennani left the USFP later on. 
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been asked to participate were sceptical because of the sensitive issue that this 
association touched. Moreover, the question of foreign involvement in what was 
regarded an internal affair was viewed critically. After all, it was originally the 
idea of an association that was based in Berlin. The relation between 
Transparency Maroc and Transparency International is expressed by Meknassi-
Filali in the following words, 
We were not so much interested in international transactions, 
which were the first objectives of Transparency International, 
and we wanted to look at what was going on in our country, 
and here government and administrative corrruption is much 
more urgent than any kind of transaction between General 
Motors and BMW. Then, we wanted to take action against 
those involved, whereas Transparency International based its 
work on the principle of indemnity. We wanted to talk about 
things like citizenship, something that was lacking here and 
something that we had to introduce. Transparency International 
did take quite a few things from us, and has changed its 
perspective with us as well. Another reason why we did not 
want to become a section of Transparency International is the 
situation of Moroccan law. As an international organisation, 
we can be subject to much more control than if we are a 
national organisation. Every governor could have asked us for 
a list of members, information about whatever he wanted, and 
could have looked into our offices.325 
Having constituted itself and its objectives, Transparency Maroc (TM) started 
to work in an environment that members describe as favourable. International 
pressure and internal restructuring had resulted in the fact that corruption was an 
issue that many foreign donor organisations wanted to deal with. Consequently 
government officials wanted to be seen to be dealing with it as well. Hence, the 
state introduced a Comite National de Lutte contre la Corruption et la 
Moralisation de la Vie Publique. Here, government ministers, TM, and 
representatives from the World Bank and the United Nations Development 
Programme tried to establish a strategy for the fight against corruption. TM's 
attitude towards this organisation is, however. very critical, 
In the beginning, the objective was to install a system national 
de I'integrite, but the committee did not have any means to do 
325Rachid r-..1eknissi-Filali, lnteryiew with the author, Rabat, 14 June 2001. 
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anything and it, ultimately, had no control over government. 
As a result, it became a place where ministers presented 
themselves in terms of how many people they had detected, 
and what they did with them. It was like in a bank, where each 
department gives its annual report. This was nothing but 
rhetoric. A place of information, but not of global diagnosis. So 
we told them that this did not work, and we told everybody 
else, but of course we leave them as they are and that's it. We 
didn't shut the door completely, but we said that this wasn't 
leading us anywhere. If they want to work, please do so, also 
. h b d· . I 326 WIt us, ut 0 It senous y. 
The fact that the problem is recognised by the regime does not mean that 
corruption can be fought against. The problem is not only that everybody is 
involved, but also that illiteracy and the feeling of subordination to the 
administration hinders the establishment of a consciousness of 'having rights.' 
The development of such an awareness would again transform Moroccan 
'subjects' into 'citizens.' 
Weare in a third world country with an economy that is 
changing rapidly, and because of this, there is a close mafia-
like connection between the economy and politics. Then, of 
course, there is the problem of illiteracy, which translates itself 
into the feeling that people don't have any rights. Reform of 
the system of justice, and introducing a feeling of citizenship -
that's what we still have to accomplish. But the problem is that 
the main politicians don't want to change anything. Problems 
are everywhere, for instance Azziman's position within the 
Comite General des Magis trats , head of this 'self-governing 
body' is the minister. Independence does not exist. Azziman 
himself: is he a government minister, and therefore accountable 
to the government or a 'minister of the sovereignty', and 
therefore accountable to the King? As everybody knows, he is 
the latter, so how can he change things? 80 percent of all 
magistrates are corrupt, and then also the lawyers, who are the 
h b ·b h . 327 guys won e t e magIstrates. 
As a result, despite the recognition and the efforts undertaken, the fight against 
corruption remains one of most the difficult tasks that any association could haye 
taken up. One of its symbolic successes in the political field had been the naming 
~ '"l( 
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of its foundation date, the 6 January, as the National Day Against Corruption. 
Next to the public sponsoring of the Comite National de Lutte contre la 
Corruption et la Moralisation de la Vie Publique, the public discussion of a 
scandal (2000-2002), which brought down the directors of Credit de l'Industrie 
et de I'Hotelier (CIH), illustrated the government's attempt to engage in the 
public discourse and to find public culprits. The Minister of Justice seemed eager 
to bring to justice all those directors involved in the granting of credits based not 
on guarantees but only on personal connection and bribery.328 Many journalists -
some of who have also been foundation members of the TM - have taken up the 
issue despite being often under the pressure of their conservative and party-
affiliated directors.329 
Association Marocaine des Ch6meurs Diplomes (Moroccan Association of 
Unemployed Graduates) 
In terms of street presence the Moroccan Association of Unemployed 
Graduates has become one of the most active associations in Morocco. With 
around 30,000 members, it is also one of the biggest associations that caters for 
the problems of young graduates, who are finding themselves in an economic 
impasse. Since the early 1980s, neither the public nor the private sectors have 
been able to absorb the university graduates produced by the explosion in higher 
education. In comparison with other associations, the unemployed graduates use 
strong language. Usually they are not covered in the national press (if they do not 
get repressed by the security forces such as in Smara on 17 November 2001), and 
have been subject to repeated repression in the past decade. 
We have two main goals: First we want to force the state to 
create jobs, and secondly, we want to establish real democracy. 
328See ,\fa roc Hebda International, 31 May - 6 June 2002, pp. 14-15. The affair has prompted 
the parliament to establish an independent parliamentary commission, which, for the first time in 
Moroccan history, brought the results into the public (despite having had the legal framewt1rk 
since 1992). This prompted the OMDH to positiwly sanction this novelty in Moroccan history. 
OMDH: 'Communique au Sujet de la Commission d'Enquete sur Ie CIH'. Rabat. 27 January 
2001. 
329Nadja Salah director of L Economiste. M. Nanaa. from La Vie Economiqlle. 
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not this kind offa9ade democracy, with the other forces of civil 
. 330 
socIety. 
The Moroccan Association of Unemployed Graduates was founded on 21 
October 1991 from within the UNEM, the Union National des Etudiants 
Marocains, but has not received public recognition until recent times. 
Nevertheless, they receive the sympathies of some trade unions, which offer 
them office space and political support. Hence, when they held their 
constitutional assembly, it was held within the headquarters of the Confederation 
Democratique du Travail (COT, close to the main Socialist party Union Socialist 
des Forces Populaires) in Casablanca; despite the immense police presence at 
that time, the police did not intervene. "At the headquarters of the COT, that 
would have been too tricky,,33l Its leadership's idiom is that of radical leftist 
ideology with a tinge of Marxist-Leninism. Its first president for instance, Omar 
Baaziz, describes himself as Baathist. This, however, should not be taken as the 
organisations 'official' ideology: many Islamist students, sharing the same fate 
as their more secular colleagues, publicly participate in the association's actions. 
Its activities are street-based: masses of unemployed graduates organise sit-ins in 
front of the parliament, demanding negotiations with the Prime Minister, 
Minister of Works, or in the case of repression with the Minister of the Interior. 
As one militant explains, 
The first sit-in in front of the parliament was on 25 March 
1998, after that we met the president of the parliament, 
Abdelwahid Eradi. We handed over a letter, in which we listed 
our demands. On 17 April 1998, we met the Minister of Works 
Khalid Alioua, and on 3 June, we met the Interior Minister 
Driss Basri together with the Minister of Works. On the 26 
October, we organised a march in front of the parliament, 
which was a really big thing, and this was then, unfortunately, 
immensely repressed by the police. Many people were 
detained, but despite of this, we continued our demonstration 
by separating ourselves and marching in different directions in 
smaller groups, everywhere in Rabat. On 4 November, the 
Minister of the Interior invited us for negotiations. We talked 
about the repression, and in an official declaration on the same 
day, he apologised for the tough police intervention. He 
JJO Omar Baaziz, interview with the author. Rabat, 27 January 200 I. 
33l Ibid. 
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basically recognised us, but only indirectly. We arranged a 
meeting with the Ministers of the Interior, Labour. and 
Education on the 1 December 1998. And during these 
negotiations, they agreed to our demands but nothing has 
happened so far. Afterwards, the government launched a 
Conference Nationale pour la Lutte contre Ie Chomage in 
Marrakech, 11-12 December 1998 with the King, who had 
proposed this conference. We decided to participate in this 
conference; such a National Conference had always been our 
idea, although this time, the government had taken the 
initiative. They thought that by ensuring a dialogue, stability 
would come back to Morocco. But this conference was not 
democratic, we didn't participate in the preparation of the 
conference, neither did we participate in the agenda. At the 
conference, there were academics (Moroccan and foreign), 
government functionaries, political parties and trade unions. 
Because we didn't agree to what they were talking about, we 
decided to hold a press conference, in order to express our 
point of views. But we were not given a room to do this, well, 
we did it anyway. We told the press that we were against all 
the resolutions, and the conference didn't have the power to 
legislate anyway. The government only profited from the 
conference, to establish its political will against which we were 
fi h · 332 19 tmg. 
This declaration shows that the association resisted the government's attempt 
to pre-empt its language, when it organised a conference on the issue. This was 
perhaps a result of its succesful attempt to resist being dragged into party 
politics. The association's internal structure had been oriented towards one 
common goal: that of creating employment in the government sector. As Leveau 
and Bennani remarked, 
The young people who are active in the different sections of 
the unemployed graduates ... have a trajectory marked by a 
rejection of ideological cleavages at university, which have 
killed the demands of the students' unions. Their leaders orient 
their action towards the right to work and towards the right to 
organise themselves. This is in a way contradictory with the 
approach of political parties, whose ultimate objective is to 
participate in the exercise of power .... They refuse to let 
themselves pulled into the political field. 333 
JJ2 Ibid. Italics added. 
JJ3Hamit Bozaslan. Monnia Bennani-Chraibi. Remy Leveau (ed): Acteurs et I:spaces Politigues 
au Maroc et en Turguie (Berlin: Centre Marc Bloch. 1996). p. 90. 
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This ability to resist all attempts at its official incorporation seems to result 
from the forceful analysis of their own economic situation: personal, the activists 
are unemployed, and public, official, 'corrupted' policies are responsible for 
their situation, within an increasingly 'globalised economy.' Their point of view 
issued from an analysis that blames International Monetary Fund (IMF)-enforced 
liberalisation policies for unemployment, and accuses the state of wasting public 
money. In addition, mainly due to corruption, many companies do not pay their 
taxes. 
What Credit Agricole [a Moroccan public bank] does is even 
more striking, as we see that money is going into the wrong 
channels. Public money is here financing private sector 
projects, and the profits do not return into public coffers. 35 % 
of Maroc Telecom, sold to French Vivendi, could have been 
sold for 5 billion dollars, but was given for half of this, money 
that is lacking now. The whole thing is that wrong problems 
have been imagined or created, such as Structural Adjustment 
and the Small State. 60 percent of Morocco's population is still 
illiterate, the social security system basically doesn't exist, and 
basic things such as electricity and sanitary systems are non-
existent, not to speak of all the other tasks such as in the 
environment. The state still needs to work. But the state, they 
tell us, doesn't need anyone anymore, the public sector is 
saturated. We should look for work in the private sector. But 
this is not true, there is enough money around, it's just a 
problem of salaries and of the distribution of funds. One 
member of parliament gets 35,000 Dirham per month, and 
there are posts that get up to 300.000 Dirham each month! 680 
public companies exist, but 607 are not controlled financially 
by the authorities. That means that nobody knows what is 
going on there, and how much money they take although they 
have no right to. There are 30,000 functionaries that don't do 
anything, but who get an enormous amount of money, on top 
of their normal income. These are usually family members of 
h dfz " 334 t e gran - unctlOnazres. 
Recent examples of privileges include Hicham EI Guerouj, Morocco's 
athletic champion, who received a substantial amount of land from the monarchy 
in return for his extraordinary performances for Morocco. The association sees 
its existence as a success in the history of Morocco, not just because it is the first 
3J.fOmar Baaziz, interview with the author, Rabat, n January 2001. See also Demain, No, 19. 
~6/05 - 01 '061 ~OO. See also letters to the editor, Demain, No. 20, 2/06 - 9/06/2001. 
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association of its kind in the world, but also because they have managed to talk 
to ministers and to make unemployment a public issue. Moreover, it was seen as 
a signal for the success of the association that in a speech on 10 January 2001 the 
Minister of Labour recognised some of the problems that the Unemployed 
Graduates Association had been seeking to emphasise. 
On 10 January, the Minister of Work made a very important 
declaration concerning the distribution of jobs in the public 
sector. If a post is created in the public sector 95 percent are 
given to people who are willing to pay for them or who have a 
special family connection to the distributor, i.e. government 
official. That's the corruption within Moroccan authorities. The 
government will reduce the salaries, and he talked about these 
ghost jobs [postes phantomesJ and privileges. Created jobs 
must be distributed according to equal criteria. Finally the 
government talks clearly about what whe have been talking 
about all the time. That was the result of our work! Of course, 
we are still afraid that the government will do nothing .... This 
was the first government statement. But of course, it's election 
time in Morocco, let's see what happens.335 
New Local Environment and Development Organisations: Anzat 
Environnement et Developpement 
What most environmental groups have in common in Morocco is their close 
relationship to development within the concept of sustainable development. 336 
Questions of development are treated at the same time as questions of 
environmental protection. Both are regarded as having the same roots as they are 
two sides of the same coin: increasing demographic pressure on the cities is the 
cause for the breakdown of the system of rubbish collections; the high illiteracy 
rate in rural areas causes the lack of public consciousness and the failure of 
governmental awareness campaigns. Hence, socio-economic development goes 
hand in hand with the protection of the environment. Anzat - meaning friendship 
_ is a typical association, the creation of which was provoked by the human 
problems that are only too evident to the inhabitants of the bigger Moroccan 
towns. An::at can be regarded as an ideal-type for local associations, in the sense 
3_~5Inter\'iew held in Rabat, 27/0112001. 
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that communitarians thought of associative activity.337 Friendship, community 
spririt, and sensitivity to local problems are its main driving forces. It is 
constituted by young people, who have known each other since their own 
childhood, and who want to solve local problems in the vicinity of Mrissa in Sale 
in the absence or the incapability of the state. It was founded in 1998 by a group 
of 10 young people and up till now has approximately 50 members. Ali Tazi, 
secretary-general of the association, explained that: 
We founded the association because we believed that it is the 
civil population that needs to take the initiative in the 
development of the country. The state does not have the 
capacity, financially and morally, to do this .... We saw that 
political parties, even if they do have a programme that 
includes environmental questions, do nothing once in power 
and leave the problems as they are. Hence, we wanted to do all 
h· I 338 t IS ourse ves. 
Anzat tries to motivate unemployed graduates to do something voluntarily for 
their neighbourhood, as they see this as a way to integrate those without a job 
into the social network created by the association. It organises round-tables and 
conferences on international environmental standards and their application in 
Morocco, thereby involving political parties, specialists, academics and other 
NGOs. Round-table discussions have focussed on methods of recycling waste, 
and on the impact on the population's health of the lack of social and medical 
infrastructures. Every year Anzat organises a cultural festival In their 
neighbourhood, and combines it with raising public awareness for local 
environmental problems. In 2001, Anzat invited the Minister of Culture and other 
locally elected members of parliament to this festival. It acts as a mobilising 
force against the local factory Liege du Maroc, which is situated in the middle of 
a heavily populated residential area. The local population, including the political 
parties, have been fighting for years for the control of the toxic fumes released 
336This was originally introduced by the Brundtland Report (1987). See Guni Bung Softing: The 
Brundtland Commission's Report - 10 Years (Oslo: Scandinayian Uniyersity Press. 1998). 
337Benjamin Barber: Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New .\!.!e. (Los Angeles and 
London: Uniwrsity of California Press. 1984). 
JJ8 Ali Tazi. interview with the author. Rabat. 26 May 2001. 
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by this factory, which are considered responsible for a higher degree of cancer in 
the area. As Ali Tazi recalls, 
It has been there for a long time, and when it started operating 
this area was in fact not populated, people came later with 
increasing migration into the cities. This is why the owner 
refuses to shut down the factory or to install the necessary filter 
systems, because he says that he has been their longer then the 
people, even if this doesn't really matter for the people born 
and brought up there. Anyway, the problem is that this guy has 
excellent relations to some of the King's advisors, which is 
why he is a very powerful man in Morocco, and no alliance of 
political parties and local groups can force him politically to 
shut down or to change some critical aspects of his factory.339 
Like many other NGOs, Anzat gets project-based funding from international 
NGOs, such as Enda Maghreb. The executive committee members are largely 
unaffiliated to any political party, its executive committee being young and, 
according to Tazi, not interested in politics. Some people, however, do hold 
party-membership which is used when the association wants to publish 
something in a party-based newspapers. Contacts with parties are important for 
the efficient functioning of publicity. As the secretary-general holds party-
membership with the Istiqlal party, the association has worked more closely 
together with the Minister of Labour and the Minister for Planning, both of 
whom are members of the Istiqlal. The explication is the following: 
We did work together with the Minister of Labour, M. Abbas 
EI Fassi, secretary-general of the Istiqlal. This is because he 
supports a lot associations that are beneficial, and gives 
funding to temporary projects. Another governmental 
department is the Minister of Planning, Dr. Aoud Abdelhamid, 
from who we get a lot 0 f information and statistiques about the 
d h · . . h 340 infrastructure an t e mIcro-economICS In t e area. 
Co-operation with the Istiqlal party results automatically as the secretary 
general of An::at is a member of the Istiqlal. This explains a certain suspicion of 
other political parties about the association's actiYities. This illustrates a contlid 
339Ibid. 
340Ibid. 
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to which associations generally are subject. Political parties generally tend to be 
suspicious and fear that an association is taking 'a piece of their cake' when it 
rallies local support for cultural, environmental or political projects.341 
5.2.1.1 Summary: The foundation of self-limiting single-issue associations 
The foundation of new associations that follow the examples of those 
associations that became active in the 1980s proves that the activities of earlier 
single-issue organisations in challenging the state's hegemony had been 
perceived as successful. The state was no longer considered as the agency 
equipped with the necessary human, moral, and economic resources to lead 
Morocco into a project, be it economically or politically. They display in their 
activities what Jamal had earlier referred to when he had confronted the Interior 
Minister, Driss Basri: the people's awareness that it must engage in the public 
sphere and criticise certain policies. It therefore illustrates the increasing size of 
the public as a sphere in which private citizens discuss public issues, from 
directly political questions, corruption, unemployment, and development. In their 
different areas, people who participate in these public spheres though their 
activities are individually concerned by public decisions in their specific domain. 
341 There is a certain similarity with the association .~lternati\'t's. which is. as aforementioned. 
close to the PPS. 
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5.2.2 Power Seeking in the Periphery of 'self-limitation' 
I have included groups of associations in this sub-section, that are not 'self-
limiting' in the sense that they are power-seeking. Morocco's two Islamic 
organisations, although having different approaches to the monarchy, share this 
feature. 
Al-lslah wa at-Tajdid within the Parti du Justice et du Developpement (PJD) 
(former Mouvement Populaire Democratique Constitutionnel, MPDC) 
In contrast to all the other associations treated in this thesis, Al-Islah H'a at-
Tajdid, Morocco's moderate Islamic movement led by Abdellah Benkirane, has 
become an accepted political party. Before the 1997 parliamentary elections, it 
had allied itself to Khatib's party MPDC342 and participated under its banner in 
the elections. It thereby gained official recognition as a political party and 
subsequently supported the Socialist government-coalition (Alternance since 
1998). The association is represented in all parts of Morocco, and has become a 
tolerated Islamic association that, through its alliance with the MPDC, was given 
a political impetus. 
It started its activities as an illegal organisation that was connected to the 
Islamic Youth (Achabibaa al-Islamiya) of Abdelkarim Moti'i, who had been 
implicated in the assassination of Union Socialist des Forces Populaires 
(USFP)-leader Omar Benjelloun in the 1970s. It later distanced itself from these 
radical tendencies and tried to create a wider Islamic platform. When it changed 
its name from al-Jamaa al-Islamiya to al-Islah wa at-Tajdid in 1992, its 
spokesman Mohamed Yatim declared, 
342.\fouvement Poplllaire Democratique Constitutionnel. The MPDC had been a result of many 
splits within the .\folll'ement Poplilaire, originally created by Aherdane immediately after . 
independence, the main political ri\'al of the lstiqlal. For many years, it had been unsuccessful 
during parliament elections. essentially because it did not ha\'e any followers. It \\as regarded as 
an empty shell. \\hich the allslah H'a at-Tajdid \\'as allowed to fill and to give a political content. 
The objective of the moment is to confinn the pacific and legal 
character of the movement in order not to be penalised for 
fonner references. We believed wrongly that the problem 
would be to change the state from above. However. the 
problem in Morocco does not consist in the construction of an 
Islamic state. An Islamic state exists constitutionally and in 
tenns of doctrine. The problem is not that of a laic political 
party which tries to get rid of all religious aspects of the social 
and political life, but to give this religious legitimacy, 
recognised socially and politically, the means to be really 
343 present ... 
As can be seen, the course that al-Islah wa at-Tajdid took, resembled in large 
parts that of the Koutla opposition at that time, and indirectly also that of the 
other self-limiting groups - despite the fact that al-Islah wa at-Tajdid is power-
seeking through its existence as a political party. It recognised the monarchy and 
its perogatives, and found a place within the consensus thereby created. Hence, 
politics became possible because the goal of opposition activity became 
'defused', which meant that the goal of political action had ceased to be the 
central power.344 Even though it was not allowed to fonn a political party, it 
could join - at first as independent candidates - the Mouvement Populaire 
Democratique Constitutionnel, (it changed its name shortly afterwards to Parti 
de Justice et de Developpement, PJD), thereby establishing a political movement 
in fonnal politics. 
The MNPC's retreat in the June 1996 communal election, however, was a 
sign of uneasiness that fell over its leader, Khatib, and the authorities. If the 
lslahists (as they are called) had become too strong in this election, Khatib 
would have lost control over the party. The Islahists reaction surprised the 
political establishment in that they showed significant restrains and did not 
criticise the leadership'S decision not to participate. Instead they put up 
independent candidates. Concerning these communal elections, Tozy pointed out 
the patience of the Islamists and their well organised pedagogic efforts. During 
~43Mohammed Yatim quoted in Mohammed Tozy: 'Refonnes politiques et transition 
democratique' in Monde Arabe Maghreb-Machrek. No. 164, April-June 1999, pp. 7980. 
344See Mohammed Tozy: 'Les enjeux de pouvoir dans les champs politiques "desannocL;s''' in 
Camau (ed): Changements politigues au Maghreb. (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique, 1991). 
160 
the summer, they presented themselves with a moderate image, and at no 
moment did they criticise either Khatib (the party's leader) or the administration. 
Again, according to Tozy, their pragmatism had been nourished by two central 
references in their philosophy and action. First communitarian US and UK 
literature had become part of their articulated ideology. Second, the Islahists 
repeatedly mentioned that they accepted to co-operate with Morocco's socialist 
political parties, which were in the middle of a negotiation process with the 
monarchy. After their modest results in the elections345 both the administration 
and Khatib were more willing to have the Islahists participate in the November 
1997 parliamentary election. Here, again, the Islahists were keen to present a 
moderate image, and observers were surprised both by their professionalism and 
their emphasis on the pre-election campaign. They did not resort to 
discrimination of secular positions and neither did they use mosques in the 
election campaign. In their election programmes, the word shari 'a was not 
evoked, and when candidates played the moral card by criticising corruption, 
they usually based their critique on the history of their adversaries and not on his 
or her impiety.346 Importantly, the PJD declared in 1998 its 'critical support' for 
the socialist government coalition and has played with its 12 parliamentarians a 
leading role in parliamentary politics since alternance. 
Evaluating the Islahists influence on government politics is easy, as it has 
been the main social opposition force against the Plan d'Action for women's 
development in 1999/2000.347 It took a critical stance against government's 
attempts in 2001 to restructure the education system, its emphasis on religious 
themes dominating the public debate. The failure of the Plan d 'Action and its 
mobilisation of popular support against the plan were evidenced in the March 
2000 Casablanca demonstration with more then 300,000 participants. This 
illustrated its capacity to use the street and official channels for political 
objectives. In its presence on the ground it competes with the Abdessalam 
Yassine's Islamic organisation Al Adl )'ral Ihssan. In parliamentary politics it 
aims at establishing itself as a real alternative to the currently hardly noticed 
~4~ . ·d 
. . 100 councillors and three commumty presl ents 
346 . '/83 Mohammed Tozy 1999, Op.Clt. p. iL . 
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wifaq opposition (consisting of fonner Royal 'administration parties'). Its 
questioning of government ministers during Morocco's 'question time' In 
parliament on Wednesdays on populist matters such as Israeli-Moroccan 
commercial relations, or on the de-Islamisation of national education, has 
become the main demonstration of opposition, since the P JD had renounced its 
'critical support' in the aftennath of its own organised protest against the Plan 
d 'Action in 2000. When a working committee of the Socialist Minister of 
Education, Abdallah Saaf, suggested a refonn of the national curriculum putting 
more emphasis on philosophy and arts subjects than on Islamic teachings, Azziz 
Rabah, member of the P JD executive committee, announced 
We consider this a dangerous regression, which threatens our 
society, even if we are not against these subjects. It would be 
dangerous if the government continued in this direction. If this 
is the case, the party would lead a political combat which will 
be harder than that of the plan for the integration of women. It 
would be more serious for us because this is about 
d . 348 e ucatlOn. 
The threat to fight against this plan is certainly everything but convenient for 
a government that tries to introduce reforms that correspond to a modem vision 
of Moroccan needs. The polemic about the Plan d 'Action shows how the state 
falls prey to diverging interests, which is from the Islahists point of view 
convenient, as it gives the Islamists opportunity to demonstrate and to organise 
strength for the coming elections, while at the same time fighting - in a 
hegemonic sense - its main competitor on the ground, Al Adl wal Ihssan. As 
Nadjia Zirari puts it, 
It is not at all impossible that the political combat led by the 
P JD aims at killing two birds with one stone. First of all, the 
P JD tries to appropriate a mobilising theme, the question of 
women, in order to marginalise the democrats concerning a 
pretended 'identity question.' this also serves to compete in the 
field with their brother-enemy Al Adl Wal Ihssan. the 
'extremist' Islamic movement, which refuses to enter the 
political game. It is trying to gain a strong visibility in the field 
347 S ')03')19 fh"h " ee pp. ~ -_ 0 t IS t eSIS, 
qS 
, Ll! Rl!porter, 17-23 May 2001. 
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in order to force the monarch and the other political formations 
to consider them as a major player. 349 
This visibility is not just a visibility in the street, through the mobilisation of 
the people against the suffering of the Iraqi or the Palestinian people. As one 
journalist noticed, its proximity to the people in the popular quarters of Rabat 
and Casablanca resulted in the transformation of party offices in small 
associations for local needs. Apparently, it is also the only party that keeps its 
offices open throughout the year. Their latest move to create an Islamic labour 
union (UNMT) can be regarded as another step towards building an alliance in 
its struggle to re-islamise society. The ultimate goal remains to become a real 
opposition in Moroccan politics, preparing for an eventual alternance and the 
'b'l' . f 350 responsl 1 Ittes 0 government. 
Al Adl wal Ihssan (Justice and Benevolence) 
The association of Abdessalam Yassine is one of the most active and one of 
the most repressed in Morocco, due to the language of opposition to the regime 
employed by its leadership, and due to Sheikh Yassine's Islamic charisma. As 
the King is Amir al-Muminin , he has his proper charisma, baraka, confirmed by 
centuries of tradition, which is not open to challenge. Like Al-Islah wa at-tajdid, 
the association aspires to take part as a proper political player in the political 
game through its transformation into a political party. Their main difference to 
AI-Islah wa at-fajdid is that they have not accepted the new consensus imposed 
by King Hassan II, that of recognising the monarchy without questioning its 
prerogatives. Hence, their activity is still amoral (to borrow Tozy's expression) 
which means that the goal of political action is still the central power. 351 
This explains the history of repression that the movement Al rldl wal Ihssan 
has experienced. It was created in 1987 and despite the fact that it is based on the 
3.+9Najia Zirari: 'Le statut des femmes au Maroc. Un etemel recommencement.· In: Confluences 
Mediterranee. No 33, Spring 2000. 
350Sahria Amrani: 'Les Le90ns de practique politique" in Le Reporter. 17-23 May 2001. 
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principle of non-violence (many times repeated by its leadership) many of its 
members have been involved in violent clashes at universities in the last 20 
years. The success of its charity and Islamic work in the popular quarters of 
Casablanca and Rabat have the same causes as elsewhere in the MENA region. 
Morocco of the 1980s was characterised by the rural exodus and the lack of 
rainfall on the one hand, while on the other hand enforced International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) adjustment programmes weighed heavily on the 
government's ability to provide necessary social services. As a result, whereas 
the majority of the population was illiterate and had no access to medical 
treatment or to other public services (running water, electricity) the state left the 
new arrivals to the principal cities to themselves. The extremely violent protests 
that marked the beginning of the 1980s gave testimony to the lack of integration 
in society of huge parts of the population. Al Adl wal Ihssan occupied the social 
and psychological space that the state was no longer able to fill, largely due to 
the state's lack of human and financial resources, which the motivated Islamic 
charity workers mobilised in abundance. A certain analogy can be drawn with 
environment and development organisations treated above, the only difference 
being that their activity has been embedded into the objective of re-islamising 
society, whereas those local development organisations are more integrated into 
secular society and party membership. 
At the same time, Al Adl waf Ihssan gained intellectual strength through its 
penetration of the universities. The Iranian revolution illustrated the success that 
revolutionary Islam could have as an organised political movement. The 
Islamisation of the universities and the education system was facilitated by the 
policy of arabisation introduced by the Istiqlal party in 1977. Thousands of 
French teachers left the education system to be replaced by unemployed 
graduates from the Islamic faculties, who lacked a scientific background. As a 
result, the influence of the Left weakened at the same pace as that of the 
Islamists and its principal organisation al Adl wal Ihssan increased, so that 
3" I " th h"" b hOI " N d" '-' " " h 
. However. there are signs at t IS IS a out to c ange. ne examp e IS a Ja I assme s. t e 
group's spokeswoman and Sheikh Yassine"s daughter, insistence in September ~OOl that they do 
1101 seek to establish an Islamic republic. 
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Islamic thinking and Al Adl wal Ihssan started to dominate the student's union 
Union National des Etudiants Marocains. 352 
Occasions such as Casablanca's anti-Plan d'Action demonstration in March 
2000 or the Palestine Solidarity demonstration in April 2002 are used to show 
the association's strength and ability to mobilise the masses in its name.353 
According to Tozy, this demonstration of force is possible only due to an 
extremely hierarchical order of active militants that are estimated to number 
5000.354 However, they do not exclusively use the street as their principal scene. 
In 1999, Morocco's beaches were 'occupied' and the association organised 
'morally correct' sun bathing - men and women separated. With participants 
estimated to number 200,000 this massive show of force was banned the 
following year, and riot police used against participants.355 Al Adl wal Ihssan 
(A WI) continues to use the street as public space to voice its political demands 
(its newsletter being most of the time banned) such as support for the people of 
Iraq and Palestine. At the 52nd anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights on 10 December 2000, it demanded the right of association and 
activity. The latter's banning in December 2000 led once again to violence 
between protesters and police, during which some militants of AWl including, 
Nadja Yassine, were arrested. Some A WI students, arrested for participating in 
pro-Palestine demonstrations in November 2000, had already been tried and 
were condemned to four to eight months' imprisonment. Others, including 
Yassine's daughter, still faced trial in 2002. 
352Pierre Vermeren: Le Maroc en Transition. (Paris: La Decouverte, 2001), p. 53. 
353 I I" I .. h th· b'I' It is. however, surely not the on y po lhca orgamsatlOn t at uses ese Issues to mo lise 
popular support. The expressed solidarity with Palestinians in particular is used on many 
occasions (benefit concerts, peformances. dinners. etc) and a certain competition between 
political parties becomes apparent. In May 2002, the P JD's collection of money and organisation 
of a bank-account for the Palestinians was denounced by the USFP for its lack of transparency. 
asking the anti-corruption association Transparency Maroc to follow suit in its denunciation. The 
latter, happy to be an independent body, refused on the grounds that this was not a matter that It 
was concerned with. 
354 Mohamed Tozy: !\'lonarchie et Islam politigue au Maroc. (Paris: Presse de Sciences 
Politique, \999). 
355Interestingly. neither the OMDH nor the AMDH report remarks this use of force. 
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Paradoxically, Al Adl wal Ihssan's refusal to take part in the political game 
has become its principal strategy. It uses a language that disregards the priority 
of the King and continues to broaden its social base. Hence, its refusal to take 
part in the 2002 elections, an option that it still had in the summer of 2001 if it 
had renounced certain aspects of its attitude to the monarchy. has not been a 
matter of fundamental principle but more a strategic choice. In its leadership's 
thinking, the system was not ready for an Islamic take-over, even were they to 
win a future election. According to the weekly Demain356 
They do not want to participate in the 2002 elections. They do 
not want to because they know that if they won them, they 
would be immediately deprived of their victory .... This is 
contradictory, but the Radical Islamists are apparently afraid of 
the ballot box. Afraid of the 2002 results, as they should be, if 
they take place, the fairest elections in recent Moroccan 
history. They are afraid of a conflict that their victory might 
Th 'd h' fl' . 357 cause. .. ey want to avOl t IS con Ict at any pnce. 
Moreover, Demain also reported that even if the Islamists were to enter 
parliament without major disruptions, they regarded it as an institution without 
any powers. Consequently, they preferred to wait until the circumstances 
allowed free elections and real power, something that they thought was sooner or 
later bound to happen. In the meantime, "according to Yassine's Islamists, the 
best strategy would be to work deep in the social body and to wait.,,358 
5.2.2.1 Summary: Power Seeking in the Periphery of 'Self-Limitation' 
Morocco's principal Islamic organisations display features that are 
significantly different from those of the 'self-limiting' associations discussed in 
the previous section of this chapter. They are power-seeking and therefore 
participate in the public sphere not only in order to work for more respect for 
356Many analysists believe that Al Adl,m! Ihssan could win up to 35 °0 if allowed to participate 
in free elections. See for instance Bernabe Lopez Garcia: 'Loi electorale et consensus politique' 
in Demain 303/200 I, also Bernabe Lopez Garcia: Marruecos politico. Cuarenta aiios de proces()s 
electorales (1960-2000). (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas. 2001). 
357 Demain. 17-23 February 2001. See especially Fatiha Layadi: 'AI-Adl face aux echeances 
electroaks de 2002, raisons de la non-participation' in La ~ 'erite, 2 March 2001. 
358Ibid. 
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Islamic values (which remaIns their single issue) but also to increase their 
presence in society in order to create a mass-movement. This means that both 
organisations aim at changing the political status quo, even if the strategies 
adopted differ regarding their relationship with the monarchy. Another major 
difference is that they are 'mass-based' and that they see as one of their principal 
strategies the 'display of force' in the streets. This is a tactic reminiscent of party 
and trade union politics, and falls in Morocco into the category of 'opposition' 
and 'challenge to the state's legitimacy,' based as it is on the existence of law 
and order (see Chapter Three). 
5.2.3 Abandoning Consensus for Confrontation: Responses from Human 
Rights Groups 
New problems and strategies appeared in the centre of the OMDH, originally 
Morocco's first independent human rights organisation that became, during the 
1990s, close to the USFP. 359 In 1999 it found itself in a crisis when its vice-
president resigned from his post and founded the organisation Verite et Justice, 
which focuses on the special and most sensitive human rights issue, that of 
forced disappearances and torture. Since the appointment of Y oussoufi as Prime 
Minister and the death of King Hassan II, some members thought that it would 
be time to take a new initiative and to become more radical. This was to be 
achieved by becoming more popular-based and increasing the membership base 
to include the younger generations (the OMDH's membership structure had been 
very elitist). Opponents to these changes, however, argued that the OMDH was 
not a political party, and should continue to act as an independent organisation 
regardless of the party or King in power. A certain continuity would be the 
organisation's strength in order to increase its independence from political 
currents. Nevertheless, by founding Verite et Justice some leading militants 
thought that the time was opportune to engage in a second mobilisation in favour 
of human rights and political reform. 36o The publication together with the 
AMDH of a list of high officials considered responsible for some of Morocco's 
~C;9 . f: . P I' . 
- - Susan E. Waltz: Human Rights and Reform Challengmg the Face of North A flcan OltlCS 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1995), p. 165. 
360Chouib Mellouk, interview with the author, Rabat, 20 May 2002. 
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worst human rights abuses was certainly a step towards the radicalisation of 
critique. The state reacted promptly, with the AMDH chief along with 35 other 
AMDH and Verite et Justice activists receiving prison sentences up to 4 months 
for their unauthorised public demonstration on 9 December 2000, the 52nd 
anniversary of the UN declaration of human rights. 
The background was the following: In November 2000, the AMDH published 
a list of names, which it regarded responsible for human rights violations that 
had been committed in Morocco's past. It included fonner Minister of the 
Interior, Driss Basri, who had been dismissed only the year before. On 9 
December 2000, 36 members of the AMDH were arrested during an 
unauthorised sit-in that had been organised in front of the parliament. According 
to the militants, the reason for the massive intervention of the security forces had 
been the published list, which threatened the 'national consensus' concerning 
human rights, based on indemnity. Although the human rights group did not get 
the authorisation theoretically required, the system of authorisation has in itself 
become a main point of reference that the militants criticise. As one militant 
comments, 
This was a pacifist sit-in, not a demonstration for which it is 
necessary to get an authorisation, and the constitution gives us 
the right to manifest peacefully, a right that cannot be taken 
b h d .. . 361 away y tea mlll1strahon. 
The trial that took place in May 2001 condemned the 36 militants, including 
the president Benamour, to three months imprisonment and to a fine of 3000 
dirham each. The arbitrary intervention by the administration, the refusal to give 
the AMDH the necessary authorisation, and the severe intervention by the police 
force, was subject to critique in the media. Moreover, the statements by the 
Minister of Justice, Omar Azziman, and the Minister of the Interiour, Ahmed 
Midaoui, concerning the 36 militants in the TV programme Hiwar were widely 
interpreted as evidence of the executive's interference in the system of justice. 
As Benamour puts it in an interview with Le Journal Hebdomadairc, 
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I think that the militants of the AMDH were already juged 
before their trial. The declaration of the Minister of the Interior 
Ahmed Midaoui during the programme 'Hiwar' on 27 
February 2001 and that of his colleague Omar Azziman, the 
day before our trial, shows the intervention of the executive in 
the system of justice. If one holds to the articles 239 and 266 of 
the penal code, which clarifies that the agents of the authority 
cannot, under no circumstances, intervene in a judicial affair 
before the verdict, the two ministers have transgressed the 
I 362 aw. 
The trial and the verdict of the court provoked a series of protests. in which 
the Organisation Marocaine de DraUs de I 'Homme (OMDH) also participated. 
In a declaration to the press, the organisation expressed its concern about this 
situation, which "illustrates a narrow, security-minded approach to the 
administration of public liberties,,363 Its original declaration after these events 
declared that it denounced 
the recourse to brutal force and the contradiction of this recourse 
with all principles concerned with the liberty of expression and 
its expression through pacific and legal means. [The OMDH] 
expresses consequently, with great concern, its strong opposition 
to the decision to ban these manifestations. [The OMDH] notes 
that this is the first blow against human rights activists of such 
scale, which is in contradiction with the Universal Declaration 
for the Protection of Human Rights Activists, whose initiative 
and proposition to the international community has been taken 
364 by Morocco. 
On the 10 December 2000 the AMDH stated (in English) 
Moroccan Authorities celebrated, in their own way, the 52nd 
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights .... 
42 detainees, comprising National MAHR officials and Human 
Rights activists, ... were brought before the Tribunal of 
Premiere Instance .... This trial follow[ ed] a savage repression 
led by various intervention forces ... against the pacifist protest 
sit-in before the parliament... under the slogan "We claim 
unveiling the truth and pursuing those individuals responsible 
361 Le Journal Hebdomadaire, 26 May - 1 June 2001, p. 11. 
,( ') 
- )-Ibid. 
363Le Journal Hebdomadaire. 26 May - 1 June 2001. p. 11. 
-'MOMDH: 'Rapport concernant les E\'enements du 10 decembre 2000.' 
169 
for disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture". The vicinity 
of the Premiere Instance tribunal is under siege of various 
intervention forces [that use] violence and intimidation to 
prevent [family members] and human rights ... activists, as well 
as citizens, from reaching the trial site.365 
The choice of language used above illustrates the uncompromising attitude 
that distinguishes the AMDH. It is this choice of language, which unites the 
AMDH with the Unemployed Graduates Association and to a certain extent with 
the Forum Verite et Justice. This particular association of solidarity has also 
been remarked upon by Leveau and Bennani: 
Apart from the fact that a certain solidarity expresses itself 
when one of 'their members' is taken by the authorities, certain 
footbridges rJlasserelles] exist between them, which do not 
necessarily follow a partisan logic. Therefore, one finds in the 
OMDH members of central bureau of UAF and ADFM, of 
Alternatives, the different Berber associations and of the 
Centre Contre la Violence. The leaders of the Unemployed 
Graduates or the leaders of the association for development 
MADI are at the AMDH. At each manifestation of one 
association, the other organisations are invited to 
.. 366 partl Cl pate. 
The verdict against the AMDH provoked a certain solidarity, encompassing 
the independent press (Le Journal Hebdomadaire, Demain Magazine, Le 
Reporter), as well as Moroccan and international human rights groups. In a self-
defence, an ad-hoc group was formed to support the AMDH. This Comite pour 
Soutenir les Defenseurs des Droits de I 'Homme included among others trade 
unions (Union Marocaine de Travailleurs, Confederation Democratique de 
Travail) and political parties (Union Socialist des Forces Populaires and Parti 
de I'Avantgarde Democratique et du Socialisme). 
These events illustrate a central area of contlict in Morocco's attempt to base 
changes on continuity367: There is widespread scepticism as to the possibilities of 
365public statement of the AMDH. Central Committee, 10 December 2000. 
366 ., 96 Leveau et Bennam. Op.Clt. p. . 
367This is, along with consensus building the base of all Moroccan politics. seen as one 
contribution lean-Noel Ferrie: 'Les Politiques de la i\lorale en Egypt et au ~laroc' in Monde 
Arabe, Maghreb-Mashrek. No. 167, lan-March 2000. 
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change in the current political framework, based as it is on consensus and 
continuity. In fact, not only the association Verite et Justice but also the AMDH 
criticises openly this assumption. Both ask for an open discussion and a putting 
to justice of violators of human rights. Increasing their pressure, they published a 
second and a third list of those regarded responsible for Morocco's worst human 
rights violations during the 'years of lead' provoking further state intervention in 
their attempt to participate in the public sphere in order to break up the silence 
that is surrounding this matter.368 
5.2.3.1 Summary: Abandoning Consensus for Confrontation 
The case of human rights groups illustrates that in a different political 
environment, such as the death of Hassan II in July 1999, older 'self-limiting' 
strategies were questioned. As a result, their intervention in the public sphere 
became more critical, and indirectly their intervention attempted to break-up 
what had been previously described as 'defused politics.' It was this that 
ultimately was at stake, when they demanded an "unveiling [of] the truth and the 
legal pursuit of those responsible for disappearances, arbitrary detention, and 
torture. ,,369 In the Moroccan context, this has been a strategy based on 
confrontation, from where results Verite et Justice's chosen absence from 
integrating councils such as the CCDH. 
5.2.4 The transformation of a 'loyal' organisation: Developments zn the 
Private Sector 
The Confederation Generale des Enterprises du Maroc (CGEM) was founded 
III 1933 as the country's main private sector organisation. It had always been 
considered to be close to the palace and the state. benefiting from the state's 
policy of Moroccanisation in the 1970s and the state's hard stance towards the 
working class mo\'ement, unionism and its leftist political parties. Within 
Morocco's political scene. it was referred to pejoratiH~ly as the 'bosses' 
organisations. Its 1970s leaders M. Amor, D. Qaytouni. and F. Benrahim, heirs 
368 Le Journal Hebdomadaire, 8 - 1.+ December 200 1. 
369 Public Statement. AMDH Central Committee, 10 December 2000 
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of Morocco's traditional Fassi bourgeoisie (originating from the city of Fes). all 
supported the state. They called for the protection of the monarchy during the 
1960s and 1970s, when revolutionary currents became strong in Morocco as 
elsewhere (two attempted military coups in the early 1970s). In a recent elite 
study, Benhaddou reports that 
all of the big bosses of the CGEM used to be statesmen. Both 
Mohamad Amor and Bensalem Guessous were Minister of 
Work and Social Affairs, and Minister of Finance respectively. 
They were nominated ambassadors and later provincial 
governors. ... Driss Qeytouni, successor of the second, was 
director of the Finance Ministry's cabinet and then president of 
the economic commission in parliament. The fourth president. 
Mohamed Smires Bennani, ... was director of the Ministry of 
Health's cabinet, and later director of general affairs within the 
M· . f hI' 370 11l1Stry 0 t e ntenor. 
This close co-existence between the organisation and the state's ministries 
guaranteed the CGEM's support of the state. As one former director explains, 
"the state has a mission, which is to supervise the great equilibria. We need to 
understand and share this. As the private banker that I am, I find the state's 
measures sometimes annoying. But as the state official that I used to be, I do 
accept these measures and find them necessary." Another adds: "in order to get 
out of the crisis, the state needs us, but needs to keep its role. We should 
encourage what it does well: that is to plan and to stay the decision-maker of last 
resort.,,37! 
The political changes in Morocco that touch the regime's relation with social 
forces in civil society have been at the centre of the CGEM's development. Two 
events in 1994/96 marked the rebirth of the organisation. They illustrate the 
personal and the structural features that allow for independent social structures: 
Abderrahim Lahjouji's taking over of the presidency in 1994 marks a leadership 
370 A. Benhaddou: Maroc: Les elites du Royaume. Essai sur l'organisation du pouvoir au Maroc. 
(Paris: r Hannattan, 1997), p. 118 This list can be continued up till today. The present president 
Chami used to be Minister of Public Works in the early 1970s. and worked as the directpr for the 
Office Sherifian de l' Exportation. In the present situation. however, this background works as a 
disadvantage, as his difficulties in winning the 2000 election illustrates. See ieunt' Afi"ique. 20 to 
26 June 2000. 
371 Benhaddou, 1997, op.cit.. p. 121. 
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with a new vision and is considered here the personal ingredient that accounts for 
structural development and differentiation. His conflict with the regime during 
the anti -corruption campaign in 1996, dubbed 'campagne d' assainissement, ,3 7 .2 
accounts for the historical precedence that helps give a social group its own 
internal coherence and definition vis-it-vis the regime. 
Paradoxically, it was the regime's attempt at building an alliance with 
Morocco's entrepreneurs, which - 'from above' - gave to the private sector a new 
role in the development of the country. As mentioned above, the state's attempts 
at restructuring the economic sector had induced a sense of private sector 
responsibility, in replacement of that of the state. 
As mentioned above, before the organisational changes in 1995, the CGEM 
was closely associated with the regime and its directors regarded as the 'state's 
men'. During Lahouji's presidential campaign in 1994, the keyword was 
"restructuring" but interestingly, it was the Royal discourse of the 16 May 1995 
that pulled the trigger for the internal reforms. Here, within the context of a 
planned social partnership that was later to be institutionalised within a tripartite 
formula (the state, the labour unions, and the employers' federation all designed 
to solve problems such as unemployment and economic growth) the CGEM was 
criticised for being unrepresentative. It was asked to transform itself and to 
represent Morocco's small and medium-sized companies.373 The CGEM 
responded to this external impetus by an organisational transformation. It 
increased the number of sector federations (24 at the end of 2001) and created 
commissions, in which all companies, regardless of sector, had a common 
interest (Finance, Commercial Law, ... ). It increased its membership from 400 to 
1800. At the same time, the organisation was centralised and its staff members 
became permanent full-timers. The president, for instance, could no longer run 
his company himself, but had to leave his business to someone else. As a result, 
37'2S .. . amtatlOn campaIgn 
373Rank and file members of the CG EM had expressed their opposition to the policy of 
privatisation at the beginning of the 1990s. This was because of the st~te-centred pOSItion of the 
CGEM, with many companies having profited from the state's protectlOnISm. Changmg the 
composition of the CG EM was to stop this resistance. See Benhaddou, 1997, op.cit. pp. 116-125. 
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the representation of corporate interests became professional, and to guarantee its 
independence, the CGEM financed itself solely from membership fees. 
A New Culture of Economic Contestation 
Within the context of Moroccan culture, Lahjouji represented a new type of 
employer that differed in education and outlook from that older generation 
governed by the classical distinction between 'bourgeoisie' and 'landed 
aristocracy.' Bourgeois then had the meaning Fassi and state-loyal. 37.+ Generally 
perceived economic necessities imposed a reliable system of justice, real 
representation, and political stability. Morocco being in the process of opening 
its economy towards the exterior, US-education and MBAs had become the new 
educational requirements (which inspired Morocco's new American-style elite 
university, The AI-Akhwain University at I frane, as well as a mushrooming of 
private schools offering US and British university-licensed MBA programmes). 
This contrasted with traditional Qurawain education in pre-colonial times,375 and 
studies of Law at the Sorbonne and Engineering at the Ponts et Chaussee in 
earlier post-colonial times of state and nation-building. As a result, the figure of 
Lahjouji was perceived as a model of new contestation and assertation that was 
urgently needed in Morocco, and directly connected to new modes of 
democracy. As one observer put it: 
The real clash is that of the economic Makhzen and these 
defenders of the economic rule of law [i.e. Lahjouji]. It's here 
where democracy is important. Pushed to its extreme, one 
could say that it is Basri against Lajhouji, and not EI Yasghi or 
Boucetta. [former opposition leaders] ... it is the bourgeoisie 
that needs the economic rule of law ... This class has no choice. 
In order to exist and develop, it must finish with the 
kh ' 376 Ma zeman system. 
37.+ The antagonism between rural notables and the bourgeoisie. originating from the city of Fes. 
runs through modem Moroccan history, see Remy Leveau: Le Fellah Marocain: Defenseur du 
Trone, (Paris: FNSP). 1985. . . .., 
.m the Qurawain Uniwrsity in Fes is Morocco's oldest and most prestIgIOus blamlc untverslty. 
376 Quoted in Myriam Catusse: 'L 'Entree en Politique des Entrepreneurs ~u Maro.c'. u~~ubhshed 
PhD thesis. Uni\ersite de Droit, d'Economie, et de Sciences d'Aix-~tarsallle, Instltut d Etudes 
Politiques d'Aix-en-Provence, 1999, p. 313. 
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It was the anti-corruption campaIgn that resulted in a conflict between 
administrative and arbitrary power and its contenders. The former was embodied 
by the inter-ministerial commission consisting of the Interior Minister, Minister 
of Justice, the Minister of Commerce and the Minister of Finance: the latter by 
the CGEM and its president Lahjouji. Here Lahjouji' s 1994 presidential election 
programme could show its significance: "The unchangeable choice for 
liberalism, which implies a definite, progressive disengagement of the state. 
needs a private sector that is structured, organised and strong." He wanted to 
build the organisation to "mobilise all human capacities in order to transform our 
organisation into a real laboratory of ideas, a source of innovation and a force of 
proposition.,,377 According to Nadja Salah, director of L 'Economiste (and later 
founding member of the anti-corruption non-governmental organisation 
Transparency Maroc) his election programme was marked by clarity and 
directness "a l'americaine.,,378 
The CGEM in the anti-corruption campaign 
The anti-corruption drive started with a media campaign launched by the 
Ministry of Finance in August 1995. The ministry hired an advertising agency 
and the slogans published picked up the idea of an infected body that needed to 
be cleansed from a disease. From the idea that "trafficking harms our health," 
came the name that was given to the anti-corruption campatgn campagne 
d 'assainissement (Sanitation Campaign). According to Beatrice Hibou, the 
diminishing legal power of the state during the privatisation process had given 
more latitude to informal networks, relations and arrangements. 379 The 
reaffirmation of the state's control over its borders was targeted against this 
process which included smuggling and drug-trafficking. At the same time, the 
reaffirmation of the state's dominance in political life was targeted against local 
377Myriam Catusse. 1999. op.cit p. 150. 
378 L 'Economiste 23 June 1994. 
379 B II ibou: . Les enjeux de l' ou\'erture au Maroc. Oisidence economique et controle 11l11itique·. 
L C I . d CERI no l'i (Pans' Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches InlernatlOna\cs. 1996). es a uers u .' -. . . -
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corruption within the administration and the political parties.380 As mentioned 
above, the state's action was a response to a 1995 World Bank report that was 
directly presented to the King himself, and which heavily criticised trafficking 
and corruption. During the opening session of the parliament in 1995 the King 
announced that 
I read these reports and find painful their eloquence and 
numbers. The comparisons that are made prevent every person 
with a bit of conscience from falling asleep. 381 
The illegal economy was estimated to represent 40 percent of GNP, and 
informal networks were regarded as weakening the state, depriving it of 50 
percent of its income from customs duties. It de-legitimised the state's control 
over its external borders. The various reports that were published, including the 
World Bank report, openly confirmed that corruption was at the heart of all 
political and economic life in Morocco. The campaign against it endorsed that 
this was not a marginal activity while confirming that most successful and well-
known businessmen were involved. According to Hibou and Tozy, 382 the 
campaign suggested that corruption and illegality did not constitute a 
dysfunctioning, but that it was part and parcel of the political and economic 
system. This means that it was not possible to distinguish between the legal and 
the illegal, the allowed and the prohibited, the public and the private. 
Accordingly, the campaign was not perceived as a fight targeted against specific 
persons in the domain of illegality, against violators of the officially sanctioned 
system of rules, or against corrupters and the corrupted, but rather as a moment 
of extreme uncertainty for all, as an exercise of arbitrary power by the centre. An 
example of this was the decrease in economic activity and the near cessation of 
Casablanca's port activity in the first half of 1996.383 
3S0 This was at a time, when the monarchy was undergoing an extensive negotiation process with 
the main opposition parties, see EI-Mossadeq, op.cit. 1995. 
381 95 Royal Speech, 15 September 19 . 
382 Hibou and Tozy: 'Une lecture d'anthropologie politique de la corruption au Maroc', in Tiers 
u,.,. .... ~" Un1 .11 No 1 (, 1 :'000 D. 38. 
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Hence, the exercise of central power against the economic sector needs to be 
understood not only within the framework of the state's economic and financial 
interests to fight against corruption and trafficking. It must be understood within 
the balance of forces between the state on the one hand and the economic sector 
on the other hand. The former, decreasing its economic role in the economy 
during the process of privatisation, is engaged in a process where the state might 
be considered as the weaker partner. The private sector. being about to 
differentiate itself from the state and the political sector, might consider itself in 
the position to impose its economic rationality and modem outlook onto the 
state. In this context, the authoritarian nature of the sanitation campaign must be 
understood as a reaffirmation of the central power's primacy. as an exercise of 
the state's arbitrary power to rule and intervene in everybody's personal fortune 
and activity. It thereby diminished the border between the private and the public 
through its use of the system of justice to exercise its power - as the wide 
combination of ministries involved in the operation demonstrated. The campaign 
was not concerned with real lawlessness on the ground, and any judicial 
ambition to resolve it: as quickly as it could start from one day to the other could 
it also stop six months later. Furthermore, it was virtually impossible to bring to 
trial the huge number of affairs that were made public. At the height of the 
campaign on 1 7 February 1996, it was the Minister of the Interior Driss Basri 
who announced and thereby threatened its main opponent, the CGEM and its 
president Lahjouji that he had 4500 files ready and could close all of these 
businesses down.384 He thereby responded to Lahjouji's televised opposition on 
12 February 1996, where Lahjouji had accused him of damaging the economy, 
inviting him to come over to his factory to control his affairs. As one participant 
remembers, 
There was this meeting in Casablanca with the Prime Minister, 
the Minister of the Interior and some other ministers that had 
gained so much publicity. They wanted to congratulate each 
other for the good performance of the campaign, and it was the 
occasion of Lahjouji 's unexpected coming out. You know ho\v 
these things work here: it's the Big Show, with teleyision and 
all the rest. Obviously, eyerything was working according to 
plan. And then, sand got into the works ... With Lahjouji. there 
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was a text in which everything was fine, but he departed from 
it many times. And then there were also his gestures. He got 
red in his face out of anger, and he pointed accusingly with his 
index finger at Driss Basri [the Interior Minister]. Twice, the 
support of the audience interrupted his speech. He said that he 
was neither an importer nor an exporter and that he was not 
personally concerned by the campaign, but that those who were 
staging it did harm to the economy of the country. 385 
The King's personal interference in the conflict between economIC and 
political interests marked the process of appeasement and confirmed the 
business-sectors rights in the second half of the campaign. On the anniversary of 
his accession to the throne, Hassan II declared that "we will continue the 
sanitation campaign, but we will do it without excess, with legality and in respect 
fl ,,386 o aw. 
The problem, however, was that the state's reaffirmation of its control over 
the economic sector went beyond the sudden application of norms. It entailed 
the redefintion of the very norms of behaviour while excluding the economic 
participants from negotiations. This explains the feeling of fear among 
businessmen, which in turn fuelled the CGEM's resistance. It resulted in a 
suspicion that the economic system was being destabilised because of the 
arbitrary will of the central government to 're-adjust' the system. Hence, 
according to Hibou and Tozy, Justice did not fulfil its function to apply the law, 
but assumed the function to announce the decisions of the central power. By 
doing so, the courts were merely translating the fact that the central power 
considered that the economic actors had exaggerated in their interpretation of the 
387 
terms of the contract between the state and the economy. 
To adjust the relationship between the economic and the political sector, the 
state had to demonstrate with clarity the reasons for its campaign. It did this by 
publishing estimates of tax evasion, as well as characterising the campaign as 
'sanitary.' These aspects were not critically evaluated during the campaign. 
3X5 Catusse 1999, op.cit. p. 278. 
386 Le Point, 23 March 1996. 
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which claimed a moral purpose, its aim being to 'cleanse' an 'infected' body. 
However, the state had not hitherto been regarded as having the moral integrity, 
or even as being morally legitimated, to pursue the illegal activities of its 
citizens. 
Even if the state is losing money, it has no interest to prevent 
contraband, because this is what allows many people to live. In 
popular areas, people live thanks to small trafficking; ... the 
same people that work in the state profit the most. They are the 
best placed in the system. Especially because the people do no 
longer know what is allowed and forbidden. One does no 
longer know what is legal. This is how they suffocate the 
. . 388 
cItIzen. 
This is why the political character of the campaign was regarded the most 
important aspect of it. '"This is a campaign, a harka,389 of the system [pouvoir] to 
make people fr 'd ,,390 a aI . By targeting internal corruption within the 
administration and within the political parties, the state tried to establish its 
moral authority to conduct a 'popular' anti-corruption campaign. The conflict 
however that developed between the entrepreneurs organised in the CGEM and 
the state put this 'popular' character in question. 
In the face of resistance by the CGEM and the decline in Casablanca's 
economic activity, the sanitation campaign ended in a 'gentlemen's agreement' 
between the central power and the entrepreneurs. The terms of the agreement 
between them deserves special attention as it reflects the ambiguity of the private 
sector's new role and the state's capacity to define it. First of all, the CGEM's 
role in the political process was recognised by the Moroccan state in that its 
president, and some of its leading members, were invited to discuss the matter 
with the King and the Minister of the Interior on 25 March 1996. First steps 
towards reconciliation between the central power and the CGEM were already 
spelled out during a Royal speech on the 3 March 1996. King Hassan described 
the milieu of economic enterprises as honest, and confirmed the necessity to 
388 Quoted in Catuss~ 1999, op.cit. 274 
389The Moroccan term harka referred in precolonial times to the Sultan's military campaign in 
thp ('()\mtrv side in order to establish his authority over more or less independent Berber tribes. 
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constitute the rule of law in the world of business. Here, the concept of the 'rule 
of law' seems to have been deliberately used to accept a fault on the part of the 
state machinery. Simultaneously however, it confirms the right of the state to 
enforce the law in the world of business, i.e. to take all necessary means to 
ensure the end of fiscal evasion and corruption and hence the success of the anti-
corruption campaign. On 25 March, the King received the executi\'e bureau of 
the GCEM and declared in a clearly corporative manner 
Today, we receive you to make you part of our care and 
expectations. Weare part of one and the same team and our 
common objective is to face the social and economic challenge 
t . M 'd" 391 o regain orocco s Igmty. 
What was at stake during the discussions after the showing of resistance was 
the acceptance of the CGEM's presence in the system, the recognition that it had 
a role to play and needed to be consulted. This was conceded in exchange for the 
CGEM's acceptance of the supreme role of the monarchy and its governmental 
bodies. The terms of the agreement signed by the Interior Minister and the 
CGEM were the following: the central power promised the end of the campaign 
and the revision of judges' training to guarantee the independence of the courts. 
Moreover, the Interior Minister announced the introduction of commercial 
courts. This was exchanged for some technical measures to supervise and control 
the import / export business, and the promise of the CGEM to fight corruption in 
its own ranks. 
Despite its essentially technical design, the political nature of the agreement 
should not be overlooked. The English descriptive title given to the agreement, 
'Gentlemen's Agreement' signifies a compromise between two equal but 
distinctive partners, that of the private sector representing the modem outlook of 
Morocco and the supreme representative of the Makhzenian system, the Interior 
Minister. Moreover, it marks a new departure in Morocco' s political and 
economic development. It uses English: the language of the United States. the 
preferred language of business and, in a Moroccan perspecti\'e. the language of 
modernity rather than old-style French. The new recognition of the partial 
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autonomy of the business sector was sanctioned in a tripartite formula, in which 
the King's words of 25 March were given a neo-corporate reality.392 As a result 
economic development, fiscal policies, and the responsibility to create 
employment were no longer considered to be the government's sole 
responsibility or within its sole capacity. The ending of the campaign in this 
Gentlemen's agreement can be seen as providing decisive impetus to the 
increasing differentiation of economic interests and their increasingly 
autonomous political role in Morocco. 
The sanitation campaign was a real action of the Makhzen to 
call to order, to attempt a slow down of this new class. And the 
central power has lost, because it looked for a 'gentlemen's 
agreement.' ... And this by the Minister of the Interior! 393 
Although it is clear that the CGEM had its 'coming-out' with its 
demonstration of dissidence, there are signs that the regime tried to build an 
alliance with this new class. The invitation of the CGEM to take part in 
negotiations with the Interior Minister can be read as an attempt at co-optation or 
alliance building.394 The institutionalisation of tripartite meetings (employers, 
trade unions and the state) and the CGEM's increasing receptions of diplomats 
and foreign commercial delegations also point to the idea of co-operation and 
alliance. As mentioned previously, this alliance was shaped by and through the 
process of privatisation but has at its origin the situation of tolerated economic 
dissidence. The disengaging of the state in terms of economic control that 
marked the process of economic liberalisation has given way to a corresponding 
increase in illegal activity. This was reinforced by a state that profited from a 
status quo in which most enterprises were involved in trafficking or tax-fraud. 
This sphere of illegality that was created can be regarded as reinforcing the 
control of the state over its subjects, and the anti-corruption campaign can be 
regarded as building the necessary base for a co-operation between the state and 
the private sector. It showed that the state had the ability to intervene whene\'cr it 
391 96 Royal Speech. 25 March 19 . 
392 For the theory of Neo-corporatism. see Schmitter. G. and Lehmbruch. P. (eds.) (19R2): 
Patterns of Corporatist Policy Making. (London: Sage. 1982). 
~93. . 333 
. Ouoted m Catusse. 1999. op.CIt p. . 
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felt the necessity to reduce the ambitions of this new rising class. This is 
especially the case because of its distinctiveness from both the old class of loyal 
notables and the Fassi bourgeoisie. 
Despite some apparent similarities with traditional dissidence that had marked 
the Makhzen's relationship with its subject, noted by Hibou,395 the position 
taken by the Lahjouji and the CGEM should not be seen as an ine\'itable 
outcome of Morocco's political design. In fact, the personal involvement of 
someone largely unknown to the political establishment paved the way to a real 
conflict between the traditional power and its legitimate contenders. The 
contestation was legitimate in the sense that it resulted from the dominance of an 
economic rationality - and its organisational support - over the political 
intention of balancing a system that was regarded out of control. This personal 
involvement would result in Lahjouji being described as courageous and "tough 
and stubborn like Justice" by the media.396 The central power could certainly 
take advantage of the dissidence in that it could control how the dissidence 
would stop, guaranteeing the integration of the newcomers. At the same time, 
however, the process gave birth to the development of a corporal identity within 
the CGEM that defines itself - in the tradition of civil society - through its 
financial independence and independent political role. As the following opinion 
expresses, "the fact that we exist independent from the state is already a sign that 
things are different here. This is not Tunisia ... the government and the 
monarchy cannot do whatever they want. They are extremely limited and have to 
find the political solutions to real existing social realities.,,397 
394 . . 2000 4'") Hlbou and Tozy, Op.Clt. ,p.~. 
395 Beatrice Hibou: 'Les enjeux de I'ouverture au Maroc. Disidence economique et 
contrale politique', Les Cahiers du CE~ N~. 15. \Paris: Centre d:Etu?es et de 
Recherches Internationales, 1996). Beatnce Hlbou: Retreat ou redeplOlement de 
I' Etat', Critique International 1, 1998. 
396 La Vie Economiqlle 9 January 1998, in French: "Raid comme la Justice" 
397 Khalid Abaroudi, secretary-general of the CGEM. interview with the author. Casablanca ~h 
June 2001. 
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5.2.4.1 Summary: The transformation of a 'loyal' organisation 
The case of the employer's federation illustrates that the drive towards more 
autonomy even included those organisations, which had formerly been 
considered 'loyal' and close to the monarchy. Clearly, many factors had been at 
work such as the discourse about private sector responsibility, but it is essential 
that in a conflict such as the anti-corruption campaign, an independent, critical 
intervention in the public sphere became the CGEM's strategy at challenging the 
state's hegemony, which threatened the business sector's interests. As a result, 
public sphere intervention has become a viable strategy for the CGEM. The case 
of CGEM, moreover, illustrates how the process of autonomisation worked in a 
conflict situation. Generally, this process can be considered part of the same 
process that women's rights, human rights and Berber's rights groups 
experienced in the 1980s, as I have explained in the previous chapter. This time, 
however, this process applied to a formerly 'state-loyal' group that used to enjoy 
a preferential status. 
5.2.5 The Struggle for Critical Independenc: The Press 
The journals Le Journal and its Arabic counterpart Assahifa, founded by 
Aboubakr Jamal in November 1997, were one of Morocco's first independent 
newsmagazines. As an enfant d 'alternance, as journalists themselves described 
the project when interviewed,398 the two magazines used Western-style 
journalism to cover Morocco's political and social scene. Le Journal did not act 
as a mouthpiece for either the political parties or the monarchy. With alternance 
and the reformation of what the King now called the 'former opposition' Jamal, 
well known to the world of journalism through his father Khalid Jamal, founded 
this newspaper that, in Morocco's political landscape, was indeed a novelty. It 
was clear that, after the initial attempts to introduce new topics such as AIDS and 
prostitution had been successful, a demand for a critical, independent news 
magazine certainly existed. A businessman, Jamal came from the fInancial sedor 
,ne 2001. 
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and not from journalism, so he foresaw this and started Le Journal that coyered 
all the political and the critical issues of politics during alternance: corruption, 
human rights, the Plan d 'Action, and sensational matters such as the Adib 
affair. 399 This approach, however, made it even more necessary to respect the red 
line of publishable discussion: the monarchy, territorial integrity. and religion. 
Well-staffed with 17 permanent journalists, Le Journal became one of the 
most popular newsmagazines in Morocco with a circulation of up to 40,000. 
Taken together with its Arabic counterpart Assahifa (50,000 issues)400 it quickly 
dominated the party-affiliated newspaper scene taking its place next to the 
monarchy'S official newspaper Le Malin du Sahara et du Maghreb that was 
selling on average 100,000 newspapers. 401 
The question of how far the free press is allowed to go has plagued both 
decision-makers and the party affiliated public ever since.402 One typical 
criticism is the following, concerning another 'private' journal, Demain: 
We need a posItIve press that accompanies the democratic 
transition. M. Mrabet transformed Demain in a diffamatory 
journal, which he uses to clear his personal problems with 
others.403 
Censorship, to which both journals had been subject to, is regarded a 
legitimate means in order to "destroy plans of Morocco's enemies which aim at 
harming its vital interests," as one government press release put it. The same 
government press release denounced "profit-seeking [and] the run behind 
399 h' h . See pp. 234-35 of t IS t eSlS 
400Jean_Pierre Tuquoi: 'Le Journal censure au Maroc'. in Le .\/onde. 20 April 2000. 
401 OMDH and Article 19: Liberte de la Presse et de l"infornlation au l\laroc. Limites et 
Perspectiws (Rabat, 1995), p. 26. . _ " 
402 Amongst journalists. this question had alre,ady been extensi.vely ~~scusscd In ~e h~st halt ot. 
the 1990s. Some journalists had even argued tor a legal exclUSIOn ot matenali:--t and In1I11llrai 
oress. See OMDH and Article 19, 1995, Op.CIt. p. 19. 
sensational affairs of renowned personalities,,404 of those In charge of Le 
Journal. 
The problems of Le Journal did not only concern censorship, but more 
importantly, they did relate to the established newspapers. These hardly 
mentioned the seizures of individual numbers, and the Syndicat National de la 
Presse Marocaine did not support the new journal in its fight for greater freedom 
of press. Instead, as Turquoi mentions in Le Monde, they did not seem to be 
convinced at all that Le Journal represented a new genre that merited fraternal 
support. Those who mention the events surrounding Le Journaf05 either took a 
neutral position, or were openly critical of the journals. An Al Bayane editorial of 
the PPS denounced the 'sensationalism' and demanded from journalists an "a 
responsible approach which puts the country's interest on top of the list of 
priorities.,,406 When 2M, Morocco's second TV station, showed the front-page of 
one censured number, three of its directors were dismissed for 'professional 
. k ,407 
mIsta es . 
When Le Journal, Assahifa and Demain were banned in December 2000, the 
ban was actually supported by party-based newspapers. They orchestrated a 
campaign against the journal, stating that when Le Journal published a letter 
which implicated Prime Minister Youssoufi's involvement in the 1971-72 
military coup attempts, it had gone too far. Hence, there was no solidarity 
. . bl' hm d' t I 408 campaign from wIthIn the newspaper-esta IS ent, an no In erna pressure. 
The director and the journalists of Le Journal were never interviewed for their 
point of view, and the ban continued. Le Journal was forced to apply for an 
authorisation of a new journal that they called Le Journal Hebdomadaire (Le 
Journal weekly). A hunger-strike by the director Jamal and international 
-t04Jean Pierre Tuquoi: 'Le Journal censure au Maroc' in Le '\fonde, 20 April 2001. 
-tOS I will discuss these events in more detail in Chapter Six 
406.41 Bayane, 17 April 2000. 
-t07 . 0 Le Monde, 20 Apnl200 . 
-tOXIn fact there was a demonstration in Casablanca, organised by the Syndical Sationaf de fa 
Press£' ,\fl;rocaine. However, it was considered purely symbolic, and it lacked sufficient 
b 'l'. tl'on to be considered credible by Le JOllrnal journalists. For an analYSIS see \lohamed mo lisa , . ')", F b "001 Sassi: 'Pour une lecture positive de la Lettre . Lt' Journal Hebdomadatre. 17 -. l' ruary - . 
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pressure, notably a campaIgn launched by Le Monde, resulted III the 
authorisation of the new journal being given some 6 weeks later. 
5.2.5.1 Summary: The Struggle for Critical Independence 
Party-based interests and ideologies determine the editorial line of 
newspapers and the success of an independent newspaper such as Le Journal 
inevitably faces resistance from within the established newspaper scene. It 
pushed for increasing democratic change, sets new agendas, and tries to 
institutionalise a journalistic philosophy, which consists of checking the national 
political scene. However, what proved to be the main weakness of Morocco's 
media was that any notion of the legitimacy of an independent press had not 
been recognised. In fact, there exists from high-level diplomats down to young 
students a feeling that Morocco's 'private' press needed to learn 'how to 
behave.' The right of a newspaper to criticise decision-makers and the idea that it 
may act as a controlling instance are not accepted: They are regarded as not 
being democratically elected and only interested in increasing profits. Because of 
this absence and most journalists' affiliation to the traditional power blocs, party 
or monarchy based, a unity of a journalistic spirit does not exist either. The 
President of the Syndicat National de la Presse Marocaine (SNPM) is a leading 
member of the Union Socialist des Forces Populaires, and his wife is directly 
related to the Prime Minister. Hence, it is not surprising that when the SNPM 
met on 2/3 June 2001, it was hit hard by internal divisions. The president Younes 
Moujahid was critised for his handling of internal affairs: for a lack of internal 
democracy and the limitation of the freedom of expression. Nevertheless, he got 
re-elected.409 
In spite of this, the press illustrates that the general trend towards abandoning 
former alliances with political power blocs continues and establishes itself. It is a 
direct continuation of those experiences in the media that I have examined in 
Chapter Four, and it is part and parcel of the general process of autonomisation 
that I have identified in organisations of civil society in general. 
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5.3 Section Three: Social mobilisation in favour of Benabderrazik during the 
anti-corruption campaign 
Having described individual parts of civil society, the following example 
illustrates how organisations of civil society and the state interact in the public 
sphere. It is not yet an example of the 'reaction of the state' (which I will 
examine in Chapter Six), but rather a 'reaction of civil society,' as it follows the 
state's arbitary intervention when, during the anti-corruption campaign, a 
pharmacist was imprisoned. Many actors appear and they challenge each other 
on the grounds of public morality and reason, such as the anti-AIDS organisation 
ALCS (described in Chapter Four), the human rights organisation Organisation 
Marcaine des DroUs de I 'Homme (OMDH), various increasingly critical journals 
and newspapers, the Minister of Health and the courts. 
The anti-corruption campaIgn, as analysed above, was not much of a 
repression in any classical sense. No threatening political group was crushed and 
all those condemned and imprisoned were liberated as soon as the campaign was 
over. It was more a reconfirmation of who was really in charge in the country. It 
can be seen as part of the transformation process that several authors have called 
Le Maroc a la recherche d 'un nouvel equilibre. 41 ° As I seek to show here, the 
scandal about HIV contaminated blood imports, which accompanied the anti-
corruption campaign, weakened the moral authority of the established political 
order. Although the state showed its strength through the use of courts for 
political purposes, as a side effect, it lost credibility because it challenged the 
scientific authority of Moroccan and international experts. The scandal, which 
developed out of this situation, is another token of a developing public sphere, 
which evolved in reaction to the state's attempts at the monopolisation of moral 
authority. 
'+09Jamal Chibli: 'Les Journalistes exorcisent leur demons' in .\Iaroc Hebda International. no. 
422,9-15 June 2000. 
410Callies de Salies Bruno: 'Le Maroc a la recherche d'un nouvel equilibre' in Re\ue de Defense 
Nationale. February 1994. Also Remy Leyeau: 'Morocco at the Crossroads' in ~kditerranean 
Politics. Vol. 2. No.2 Autumn 1997. 
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The scandal started with blood that the phannacist Moncef Benabderrazik had 
imported from a Spanish laboratory in 1995. Routinely, as a consequence of the 
anti-corruption campaign, his imports had been seized and checked. Some of his 
blood imports contained an antibody that the Ministry of Health regarded as 
evidence for the blood's contamination with HIV. On 2 January 1996, 
Benabderrazik was charged with violating import-regulations and with the 
possession of contaminated pharmaceutical products. Two personalities of ci\'il 
society then came forward to oppose the Ministry of Health and to defend 
Benabderrazik: Professor Himmich, head of the department of infectious 
diseases at the University-Hospital of Casablanca and her colleague Dr 
Benchemsi, director of the Centre National de Transfusion Sanguine. Himmich, 
was at the same time president of the Association Marocaine de Lutte contre Ie 
Sida (ALCS) and, therefore, well known to the public. Himmich and Benchemsi, 
supported by French, Spanish, and another Moroccan laboratory, publicly 
protested against the decision of the Minister of Health. They were emphatic: the 
imported products were perfectly safe: 
There is no scandal about contaminated blood in Morocco, there 
has never been one. These gammaglobulins anti-D (the 
incriminated products) did contain only antibodies, which 
protect the patient. It is exactly the opposite of a virus ... there is 
. k f ., 411 
no TIS 0 contammatIOn. 
The Minister of Health M Alami, however, refused to take into account the 
results of other laboratories, and criticised the intervention of Himmich and 
Benchemsi. The public, who had been critical of ministerial action since the start 
of the anti-corruption campaign, asked itself "who wants to get rid of 
Benabderrazik?,,412 The ministry showed strength and Benabderrazik was 
condemned in the first and second instance on 5 February and 11 April to 15 
years imprisonment. Because of the expert's repetition that there had never been 
any risk of contamination, the condemnation was viewed as indicating that the 
system of justice was subordinated to the imperatiycs of the anti-corruption 
-lll L 'Opinion, 7 February 1996, 
laisser tomber Benabderrazik" 
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campaign and the views of the Minister of Health.413 The counter-charge of 
Himmich and Benchemsi against the Minister of Health for defamation (Alami 
had called their behaviour 'uncivic' and 'irresponsible'), was dealt with 
separately by the courts and was ultimately put off. 
On the other hand, however, the public statements illustrate the substantial 
weakness of the minister's position. He stated that "as mimimal the risk might 
be, as Minister of Health I cannot take it. As Minister of Health I ban the use of 
these products in order to protect my co-citizens.,,41-t This was combined with 
nationalist anti-Spanish propaganda (common in Morocco), which was 
epitomised by Maroc Hebdo International's headline "Spain palms us off with 
its AIDS."415 His scientific knowledge, however, was sadly limited because he 
opposed the two leading Moroccan experts in the field. Those two claimed 
authority from their appointments to posts that required, in contrast to politics. 
highest scientific accuracy - and they were supported by three other scientific 
institutions. The use of public space was getting a battle between contesters of 
administrative power and the central power itself. As Vairel remarks, 
However, because this is a public context .. .it is also a situation 
in which 'people cannot just affirm or criticise something, they 
also have to justify their affirmations and their criticism.' This is 
what the Minister Alami could not do in a convincing way and 
this is why his intervention against the two professors appeared 
inept, out of place, and therefore unacceptable for many 
. 416 protagomsts. 
As a result, many newspapers openly criticised the Minister's point of view, 
and established a new kind of journalism that had still been underdeveloped in 
Morocco, that of investigations and revelations. La T Tie Economique published a 
413See also Khalid Jamal in Nadia Benabderrazik: L'Affaire Benabderra::ik (Casablanca: Tarik 
Editions. 2002). 
414La /'ie Economique, 9 February 1996, quoted in Frederik Vairel: 'Une histoire sans morale'! 
Remarques it propos du cas Benabderrazik' in t\laghreb-Machrek No 167. January - t\larch 2000. 
p, 5~, 
415 7 June 1996, In French: "L'Espagne Nous Refile Son Sida" Traditionally dose to the Interior 
Ministry. ,\Iaroe Hebdo International later changed its position. 
-l16Frederik Vairel: 'Une histoire sans morale? Remarques it propos du cas Benabderrazik' in 
Monde Arabc: Maghreb-Machrek. No 167. January - March 2000, p,55, 
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senes of investigations during the scandal417 and even newspapers that were 
regarded close to the Interior Ministry such as Maroc Hebda International 
presented Benabderazzik as an innocent victim of political manipulations. "If 
justice without force is powerless, force without justice is tyrannic."'+ 18 
Interestingly, the mobilisation of forces against the Minister of Health appealed 
to univeral principles of moral and professional apolitism. Politics reached 
another level, and also the Organisation Marocaine des DraUs de I 'Homme 
d h d· I d . .. 419 supporte t e two me lca octors In an petItIOn. 
What was now at stake was not anymore the question of blood contamination, 
nor was it a simple question of new forces and the contestation of administrative 
power. Rather, it was a more serious debate about the system of justice and the 
role of the administration within it. The law court that condemned Benabderrazik 
had obviously been influenced by the anti-corruption campaign, that used the 
law courts as the executive organs of the ministries involved (Interior, 
Commerce, Justice).42o When Himmich and Benchemsi sued the Minister of 
Health for defamation, the courts became the centre-point of the challenge posed 
by these new actors to the established holders of power. Even though the courts 
did not condemn the minister, and re-confirmed his position (there was no real 
trial - the courts finished quickly with the charge on 18 June 1996) the judges 
found themselves forced to publish a statement in the official organ Le Matin du 
Sahara et du Maghreb in which they exposed their malaise, and indirectly 
admitted to their subjection to political pressure in the exercise of judicial 
functions. Paradoxically, although they criticised the lawyer of Himmich and 
Benchemsi for complaining about the lack of the court's independence, they 
demanded a more sincere application of the rule of law themselves.421 
.+ 17 Ahmed Benchemsi's articles on 19 April, 26 April, 24 May, 21 June 1996 . 
.+ 18 Maroc Hebdo International, 19-25 January 1996. 
419 La I 'it' Economique, 5 April 1996. 
'+ 20See M. Laurent and G. Denoeux: 'Campagne d'Assainissement au Maroc' in Monde Arabe: 
Maghreb-Machrek, No. 154. 1996, also Guillain Denoe~~: 'Understanding Mt)w(co's 
'Sanitisation Campaign' (December 1995 to May 1996) m The Journal of North Afncan 
Studies, Vol. 3, No.1, Spring 1998. 
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5.3.1 Summary Section Three 
The social mobilisation illustrates how different kinds of rationality. 
emanating on the one hand from civil society (in this case: scientific rationality) 
and on the other from the state (here: political rationality of anti-corruption 
campaign), competed in certain historical circumstances for public resonance. It 
further illustrates that this is a high-degree conflict, of which the outcome is 
unclear and might even be considered risky for those protagonists that take sides 
against the state. Ultimately, it is the developing public sphere that scrutinises 
these conflicts, and takes an interest in them, even if it is not yet possible to 
regard this as being an enforcing power. However, it shows. very much like the 
sudden end of the anti-corruption campaign as explained in the previous section, 
that there are domestic forces at work, which attempt to force their rationality 
onto the state, despite the limitations that may appear. 
5.4 Chapter Five Summary 
In this chapter, I illustrated that the various sectors of civil society reacted 
positively to the successful challenge to the state's hegemony in the 1980s. As I 
illustrated in Section One of this chapter, this happened in a time of political and 
economic change that had the effect of increasing individual's interest in public 
Issues. 
Depending on the particular logic of the public sphere that they were able to 
occupy - general political issues, corruption, economic development matters, 
religious matters, human rights, business matters, and freedom of press - they 
deployed strategies that responded to their particular field of action. A common 
denominator is that they were able to broaden their base and inter\'ene more 
effectively in the public sphere, and that they were granted more freedom to do 
so. The anti-corruption campaign and the case of Benabderrazik in particular 
have shown that the engine for 'change' towards more tolerable public critil'ism 
has been conflict, pursued in the public sphere. The diminishing 'moral' integrity 
.f~ 1 Le .\/otin du Sahara et dll .\lagheb. 18 July 1996. ,\loroe Hebdo lntt'rnativnal '27 July 1996. 
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of the state, be it in local development issues, human rights, corruption. or 
religious affairs, seems to be the most important factor that has, internal to the 
public sphere, pushed the actors to pursue their demands and interests. Through 
the state's pursuit of controversial policies, such as the anti-corruption campaign, 
this lack of moral integrity became even more obvious, and resulted in civil 
society organisations taking up demands such as the fight against corruption 
(Transparency Maroc). The mobilisation of actors of civil society. as much as it 
was a result of earlier mobilisation and success, had also been the result of the 
state's increasing lack of moral integrity. It therefore expresses a certain 
resistance against administrative interference. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE STATE'S DISCURSIVE AND STRATEGIC 
REACTIONS 
The main objective of this chapter is to examine the response of the state, at 
both discursive and strategic levels, to the increasing activity of part of civil 
society as identified in Chapter Five. It would be too simple merely to assert that 
the state started to 'give in' to independent associations' demands, an idea that 
would follow a line of analysis which views civil society and the state in 
opposition terms. In fact, in the first section, I will show that the state's 
discursive reaction depended very much on the representation of civil society's 
articulation of interest, which was, at times, conflicting and which was expressed 
in particular relationships with the state. These corresponded neither to a 
dichotomous nor to an intermediary representation of state-civil society 
relationships. In order to analyse the representation of civil society's interest, I 
am using a newspaper analysis of the Moroccan national press of three important 
national themes: human rights, women's rights, and Berber rights. I aim to show 
that through the participation of organisations of civil society in the public 
sphere, and through conflicts that were expressed here, the state responded 
discursively and practically in ways to mark and further develop its 
'embodiment' of Morocco's national consensus. These took different features 
that I will discuss in the first section, an important one being its increasing 
involvement in the definition of discourses. 
The second section will illustrate the more 'visible' or 'strategic' reactions of 
the state, those of boundary setting, co-optation, and integration. As a working 
definition, the state's boundary setting means the state's definition of a 
discourse's boundaries through the state's monopoly over the use of legitimate 
violence. It is a key-feature of the state's intervention in the public sphere to set 
the limits of tolerable critique. in order to sanction individual's beha\iour in a 
context where certain key-groups' position in the system are perceived as being 
threatened. Co-optation is the state's appointment of key personalities that are 
well-known to the political opposition or in the public sphere thanks to their 
activities in civil society organisations or political parties. It aims at appeasing 
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social groups or organisations that have been expressing criticism of the state, 
without necessarily changing the policy that had been previously pursued. It 
aims at creating the appearance of political movement where stagnation 
dominates. However, the outcome of co-optation is not predefined, and it 
depends on the margin of manoeuvre that is granted to these individuals. 
Integration is the creation of new institutions outside the immediate reach of 
state ministries, in which social organisations, rather than personalities, are 
invited to participate in the formulation of policies. It provides for alternative 
forums of an enlarged public sphere, in which the exchange of state's 
acknowledgement of criticism and suggestions (which grants groups and critics a 
certain legitimacy) are exchanged for the social groups' acceptance of the status 
quo. 
6.1 Section One: The state's discursive responses to political, social, and 
cultural rights advanced by civil society 
6.1.1 The state's responses to the human rights discourse 
Even though it seems exaggerated to speak of a control of the human rights 
discourse, a certain domination of the discourse by the state has become visible. 
In the following paragraphs, I will examine this empirically through an analysis 
of newspaper articles in the francophone national press. 
A certain domination of the human rights discourses started in the early 
1990s with the creation of both the Advisory Council for Human Rights and the 
Ministry of Human Rights. Having built the institutions that could address 
questions of human rights, the state could start to build its prominent position in 
the protection of human rights long before Mohamed VI's accession to the 
throne. In the following analysis of reports on human rights in the francophone 
press, this prominent role of the state and its institutions (Monarchy, Ministry of 
Human Rights, Advisory Council of Human Rights) becomes eyident. At the 
same time, human rights 
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Figure 1: State and Civil Society Participation in the Human Rights Discourse 1994-1999 
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'C ivil society activity' is defined as covering the work of human rights groups, publication of human rights groups' statements, but also articles 
that have as their topic human rights without being written on occasion of state-activity or civil society-activity (for instance human rights in 
Palestine. women and human rights, etc.). In order to illustrate the state's domination, this approach seems justified. 'State-activi ty' is usually the 
organi sation of a conference, the publication of a minister's speech covering human rights, the King's reception of a delegation of Advisory 
ICoul1cil l11 t!mbcrs, ctc. This analysis is based on 115 articles that were published in Le Matin du Sahara e{ du Maghreb, La Vie Economiqlle. 
IA/w()c Ilehdo Int ernational. L 'Opinion, Liheration, Al Bayane from 1994-1999. 
organisations such as the OMDH and the AMDH gained the role of junior 
partners in both the national discourse on abuses in the past and the protection of 
the human rights in the future. 
As can be seen from the Figure 1, the state's participation varied between 75 
percent in 1994 and 90 percent in 1999. Examples of state activities were the 
Minister of Human Rights organising a Journee d'etudes et de reflexion sur "Ies 
medias et les droits de I 'homme" (1994), the Advisory Council for Human 
Rights (CCDH)422 submitting lists of prisoners to the King (1994, L 'Opinion), 
or the King receiving CCDH members (Le Matin du Sahara). 
In its early stage, the formulation of the discourse outside the initiative of the 
state took place in L 'Opinion, the newspaper of the nationalist Istiqlal. A series 
of human rights articles (1996) were written by an academic, Ahmed Belhadj 
Sendague, interested in human rights issues. He used the form of a scientific 
essay and gave his recommendations. In 1995 a political crisis had crippled the 
political elite due the failed attempt of alternance. This can be regarded as 
causing an increased NGO-initiated discourse in the area of human rights. The 
government's plan to build a documentation centre for human rights was subject 
to a critique, as the government's intentions were viewed as a potential threat of 
propaganda. Sendague's article Pour une veritable promotion des Droits de 
I 'Homme au Maroc avec et pour tous reflects this: 
This centre must not be another 'official window' that defends 
the government's position and in order to show its positive 
achievements in this domain, which are, by the way. very 
controversial. One should rather give the centre the necessary 
means to realise its ambitions consistent with the protection and 
the education of human rights at a national, local, and regional 
4')3 level. -
421 Advisory Council of Human Rights 
423 L 'Opinion, 22 January 1995. 
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In 1997 the participation of organisations outside the state diminished to 20 
percent in the francophone press. An article reporting from the annual O\1DH 
meeting combined the positive Royal amnesty of 1994 with the OMDH's 
critique that public liberties had diminished since 1995. (La Vie Economique, 4 
April 1997) 
Basically, nothing new either. And even one confirmation: we 
are getting further and further away from the reform process 
initiated by the Royal amnesty. The annual report of the OMDH 
is depressing. Again, more than in 1995, the year 1996 has seen 
'a real regression in the domain of respecting the physical 
integrity of persons and in the field of public liberties,424 
The year 1998 is celebrated in Morocco as the time when the political climate 
turned to favour political and civil liberties. It was then that the government 
acknowledged for the first time the existence of 'forced disappearances.' It 
pledged to tackle the issue, thereby clearing Morocco's past, and to install a 
scheme of compensation, of which the CCDH was to be in charge. But here also, 
the percentage of NO Os taking part or taking some initiative in the public debate 
did not exceed 25 percent, and one year later, in 1999, this percentage had 
shrunk to less then 10 percent. This is despite the fact that the role of NOOs in 
the development of a 'human rights culture' was seen as crucial by all 
government officials, conferences, and journalists writing on this subject 
6.1.1.1 The Domination of a Discourse 
This analysis shows clearly that the state has taken a leading role in the 
discourse about human rights, from where resulted the state's capacity to define 
the discourse's terms and direction. The state gained the power to exclude 
aspects that did not seem relevant to the modus vivendi desired by the state, such 
as its own responsibility for human rights violations. One aspect that deserves 
special attention is the expressed concern about 'educating', or 'teaching' the 
people a 'human rights culture,' something all human rights organisations are 
happy to participate in, although with a different objective in mind. Teaching 
.Q-l La I'ie Economiqllt!, -l April 1997, original italics. 
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and participating in a culture of human rights confers these associations an 
objective and a role in the political field. It acknowledges the existence and the 
importance of the group concerned, and confirms its position in politics. Since 
1994, with a conference about the role of the media and human rights, the 
question that appeared regularly had been that of teaching a 'human rights 
culture' in schools, in university seminars, and especially at law faculties. 
Although this could be considered a practical and politically neutral step towards 
the future protection of human rights, it implied that the responsibility for human 
rights abuses lay within the society concerned, not within the government. It 
individualised responsibility and ignored the issue of widespread high-level 
corruption and the concentration of power within the Ministry of Interior. This is 
even more surprising given that the most striking feature of human rights abuses 
in Morocco has been its systematic application against journalists and political 
activists, and more recently against public demonstrations.425 
Another feature has been to include social and economic rights, the main 
historic distinctions between the former Western and the Eastern bloc and their 
views of what human rights actually meant (civil and political rights in contrast 
to social, economic rights, as evidenced by ICCPR and ICSER426). In Morocco, 
as in other countries with negative human rights records, the state-controlled 
human rights discourse has always had a social and economic component, and, 
as in any Arab state, human rights were first of all equalled with Palestinian 
human rights. In the beginning of the "explosion" of the discourse on human 
rights (in 1994) however, journalists used Palestinian human rights and 
economic rights as a cover to mow? on to political and civil rights. What became 
evident recently, however, was that officials in charge of human rights used the 
subject to move awayfrom considerations of political and civil rights. Questions 
of political and civil rights are considered cleared in Morocco. Now it was time 
to focus on other issues. This is illustrated in the following statement by 
Abdelaziz Taleb, in charge of co-operation with NGOs in the Ad\'isory Council 
425However. this tactic should be regarded as a central feature of policies concerned with face-
saving. It makes possible the discussion without engaging in direct personal criticism. Attempts 
at opening up the debate, as I will discuss later. are consequently. repressed. .,' 
-l26Intemational Covenant for Civil and Political Rights: InternatIOnal Covenant lor SOCial and 
I conomic Rights. 
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for Human Rights (CCDH). Here he combines aspects of 'educating a human 
rights culture' with aspects of social and economic development. 
However at the moment we all believe that we should include and 
elaborate our mandate to include economic, social and cultural 
rights, not only political and civil. In fact, these problems of 
human rights affect far more people in Morocco than the political 
and civil rights, and as these problems are solved now, we should 
focus our attention on other issues. We have to include problems 
of poverty, education, labour law, such as the right to education. 
Moreover, we have to create a human rights culture. If we have 
this, people behave accordingly, and we don't need human rights 
organisations. With illiteracy being high, people can be 
manipulated by people saying 'hey, I can do this much better.' 
This [the CCDH] is an institution, accountable, nationally and 
internationally. If we have a culture of human rights, we don't 
need NGOs to speak for them. Then the people can speak for 
427 themselves. 
6.1.1.2 The Discourse about Reforming the CCDH 
In proposing a reform of the CCDH, the OMDH suggested a reform of the 
dahir of May 1990, by which the CCDH had been created. The OMDH 
demanded to take into account the Paris principles for National Institutions, 
which the CCDH pretended to be. 
The OMDH has many times asked for a reform of the constituting 
Dahir of the Conseil Consultatif, conforming to the principles 
adopted by the conference of national institutions held in October 
1991 in Paris. These principles were sanctioned by a UN General 
Assembly resolution in December 1993. The processing of these 
principles concerning the independence of the institution, its 
members' competencies and its capacity to initiate important 
human rights questions, necessitates a reform of the Dahir of Mai 
1990. After deliberation of its national council, the OMDH has 
addressed to his Majesty the King Mohamed VI a demand in this 
.. Q8 
sense. 
The Paris principles for National Institutions for the Protection of Human 
Rights concern the activities of National Institutions and for their proper 
427 Abdelazziz Taleb, interview with the author, Rabat, 23 January 2001. 
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working, their complete independence vis-a.-vis the executive, legislative and 
. d' . 429 JU lClary organs of the state. Because of the apparent lack of independence, 
especially due to the right to vote of Ministers in the CCDH, that body gained 
acceptance as a National Institution only with certain reservations: 
but we could convince the UN that we are so active that we well 
deserve to be part of it, and so we hosted the Fifth International 
Meeting of National Institutions and have also chaired the 
International Co-ordinating Committee on Human Rights in the 
United Nations. We have established working groups of 
international human rights standards into national legislation. 430 
The pressure of the Organisation Marocaine des Droits de I 'Homme to 
change the constitution of the CCDH to include the Paris principles, i.e. the 
abolition of the right to vote of government ministers, has created its own 
dynamic within this governmental body, in that members want to work 
according to and be recognised by international standards. The following 
statement by one employee of the CCDH illustrates the dynamic that has been 
created by the King's intention to seek international recognition. 
We come back to the intentional aspect of this issue: The council 
wants to be considered a National Institutions in accordance with 
UN standards. And as Morocco has accepted to work within the 
accepted Human Rights principles, Morocco must have a National 
Institution that is in accordance with UN principles, that is the 
Paris principles. We want to work with international legitimacy 
whether the government likes it or not. It is about whether we 
play according to international rules or not. It is about Morocco's 
. . . ltd d 431 commItment to mternatlOna s an ar s. 
428 OMDH: 'Rapport sur la Situation des Droits de 1 'Homme au Maroc 1999 '. (Rabat, 
un~ublished document, 2000). p. 8. 
42 "If [the representatives of the administration] are included, their mandate during the 
deliberations should only be advisory .... National Institutions should have an infrastructure that 
is adapted to the good functioning of its activities. which means in particular enoug~ f~ancial. 
autonomy. Its funds should have as their objective to have enough personnel and bUlldmg.s at Its 
disposal, in order to guarantee its i.nde~en~e.n~e \:is-a-vis the st~~e and in order not be subJec~ to 
ay kind of financial control that might mhlbl~ Its mdepe~dence. Royaume du ~aroc. C'1I1~ell 
Consultatif des Drotis de l'Homme: Les Institutions NatIOnales pour la PromotIOn ct la 
Protection des Droits de l'Homme. Principes & Cooperations. (Rabat, 2000). pp. -+-+-45. 
-+30 Abdelazziz Taleb, Interview. Rabat, 23 January 200 I. 
431 Ibid. 
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The results of both the internal dynamic within the CCDH and the pressure of 
the OMDH to change the constitution of the CCDH according to the Paris 
principles have resulted in the announcement of coming changes by the King's 
speech of 9 December 2000, and the realisation of these changes in the summer 
of 200l. Ministers ceased to have the right to vote (article 6). The council is 
supposed to submit a report even on questions where it has not been demanded 
by the King himself (article 2).432 Moroccan officials see in the reform another 
sign of the state's will to live up to its human rights commitment, and it may be 
considered as another sign for the Moroccan state's capability to focus on those 
aspects of the human rights discourse that seem less challenging. On the other 
hand, it illustrates the dynamic of a discourse that is capable of imposing its own 
. l' 433 ratlOna 1 ty. 
6.1.1.3 Summary 
The question of human rights has gained a prominence in Moroccan politics 
that seems surprising considering that many civil and political rights such as the 
right of assembly in public places, the liberty of speech, the right to elect a 
government, the right to obtain a fair trial are still restricted. The question of 
human rights has gained a force that could potentially change the entire political 
set-up in Morocco, as it poses questions on such delicate matters as corruption, 
the independence of the judiciary, the legitimacy of police-intervention in 
peaceful meetings, the freedom of speech etc. Continuing day-to-day violations 
of such rights augment this force. The monarchy decided to co-operate with such 
civil society groups as the Organisation Marocaine de Droits de I 'Homme, in 
order to resolve the most urgent human rights issues such as those related to 
political prisoners and forced disappearances. This was combined with a formula 
of power-sharing with the former opposition parties. All of this coincided with 
the repression of other civil society groups such as the Association Alarocainc de 
Droits de I 'Homme and the Unemployed Graduates Association, which had been 
attempting to dominate the 'street scene' At the same time, the state started to 
432 Dahir of 10 April 200 1. 'portant reorganisation du Conseil Consultatif des Oroits dl' 
I'Homme,' published in Le .\latin du Sahara ct dll .\1aghrt!b. 15 April ~OO 1. 
·H3 Interview. Abdelazziz Taleb. Rabat. 3 February 200 1. 
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dominate the public discourse, which enabled it to define the limits and the 
direction of the discussion. As I have illustrated in this subsection, this had the 
effect of focusing on social, cultural, and economic rights, and also to focus on 
issues such as education. This has effectively diverted public attention from 
questions of impunity, the lack of independence of the judiciary. and the almost 
unlimited power of the government, not the courts, to restrict the right to public 
assembly or to suspend the publication of newspapers. 
At the same time, the government's expressed concern for the question gives 
evidence to the effect of the discourse that NGO's were able to initiate. This is in 
line with similar confrontations between the unemployed graduates' association 
and the anti-corruption association Transparency Maroc. In the case of human 
rights, the adoption of the discourse should be considered as a result of the 
OMDH's diplomatic approach and the personalities which undertook the 
contacts; also helpful were its connection with the political party USFP and 
other NGOs notably Alternatives. Its decision to participate in the CCDH and to 
accept the supremacy of the monarch in order to work for institutional changes 
and the defence of human rights resulted from its different, 'non-popular', i.e. 
non-threating position in society. Thus it gave up a position of opposition, which 
had previously been connected with the defence of human rights. 
This subsection's main purpose has been to illustrate the state's discursive 
reaction. It illustrated that the state's dominant engagement in the issue results 
from the consensus that exists in the public sphere concerning 'resolving' the 
issue. Although the modalities have been contested (as illustrated in Chapter 
Five), the issue itself is not contested by any segment of Moroccan society. This 
is why the state was able to assume an uncontested leadership in the discourse, 
as was revealed by the newspaper analysis. 
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6.1.2 The state's discursive response to the women's rights discourse and the 
'Plan d 'Action pour I'Integration de la Femme au Developpement'(1 999-~O{){)) 
If the protection of human rights became an 'official' project during the last 
five years under Hassan II's rule, it is because of its consensual character 
amongst all strata of Moroccan society. In fact, it was only within the state 
institutions themselves that resistance against the project was to be found. The 
theme of women's rights could have been regarded in a similar fashion and 
could have been used as a mobilising force to rally Moroccans behind a 
development project initiated by the state. However, resistance of parts of civil 
society, 'ulema and Islamists in particular, made it potentially unsuitable for the 
Moroccan state's attempt to endow women's rights with an uncontested leading 
role. In fact, the Plan pour l'Integration de la Femme au Developpement (PIFD) 
presents a unique case-study of civil society as Hegel had perceived it some 180 
years ago. Civil society, a sphere between the family and the state, is defined by 
Hegel as ethical life "in its division and appearance".434 If ethical life means 
"the norms of a society's public life,,435 then, as I hope to show in the following 
subsection, ethical life is indeed divided in Moroccan civil society, due to among 
others rapid and unequal socio-economic development, accompanied with two 
competing paradigms of modernity. In this situation, the strategic position of the 
state changes and is indeed the institution that both currents are fighting over, in 
the Gramscian sense. 
6.1.2.1 The beginning o/the PIFD 
In 1995, the PIFD was initiated by a series of ateliers that were organised 
jointly by the World Bank and the Moroccan government. The then official of 
the Ministry of Development and Co-operation, Rabia N asiri. (who has become 
recently the first female advisor of the King) started the project in the aftennath 
of the World Congress on Women in Beijing. The objective was to detine the 
434 Hegel: Philosophy of Right, Paragraph 36. Translated by T.M.Kno:\, (Lond~n: O:\ford 
University Press 1952) p. 36. Di,ision is often not regarded an a~curate. translatlOn of the 
German term Ent::weillng. \\'hich should rather be translated as bIfurcatIOn. However. I do not sec 
a significant difTerence in the use of both tenns. 
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role of women in development, and to make recommendations for the betterment 
of women's social and economic situation especially in rural areas. In Morocco, 
unequal development had caused increasing inequalities between men and 
women. In rural areas, more than 90 percent of women are illiterate compared 
with 60 percent of the male population. On the national level, this level is 67 
percent female illiteracy versus 41 percent male illiteracy. The rate of women 
dying whilst giving birth is 332 per 100,000 births, compared to 174 in Egypt, 
and 74 in Syria.436 At the same time, it is recognised that "women strongly 
participate in all productive sectors of the country,,437 or as one militant put it 
"in reality, men don't work in the Moroccan countryside.,,438 As a world bank 
document describes its objective, 
The present economic and sector study has as its objective to 
prepare a strategy which will contribute to reinforce the 
participation of women in development. It targets the constraints 
that momentarily influence the productivity, income, and the 
social well being of women and it determines the methods and the 
h Id 1·· h . 439 programmes t at cou e lmmate t ese constramts. 
In these World Bank / Moroccan government ateliers, government officials, 
academics, NGOs, and representatives of international institutions were asked to 
exchange their ideas in order to establish a plan for the development of women. 
The structure of these ateliers was based on a preliminary report, which 
attempted to be participative (etude participative). This meant that it had been 
developed in collaboration with the opinions of target groups and grassroots 
organisation. The results of this report were discussed in small working-groups, 
which later presented and discussed their findings in the plenum.44o Special 
435 Charles Taylor: Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 382. 
436Royaume du Maroc, Working Paper: 'Plan d'Integration de la Femme au Developpement' 
(Rabat, no publisher 1999), p. 72. 
4~7 b'd 1 
. I 1 . p. . 
438 Fatima Alaoui, president of Le comitt; des Femmes .\/arocaines pOllr Ie De\'tdoppement, 
Interview with the author, Rabat, 16 January 200 1. 
439 Banque Mondiale, Royame du Maroc: 'Etude Economique et sectorielle. Renforcement de la 
Participation des Femmes au Dewloppement'. Report Number 14153, unpublished document. 3 
l\tav 1995, p. 1. 
4-W' Ehnque Mondiale, Royaume due Maroc: 'Unpublished letter in preparation of the Cinqllii!me 
Atelier Xational,' Rabat ~4-~5 l\tay 1995. 
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attention should be given to ateliers de reflexion that started to work later on in 
February 1998, in which a selected group of civil society organisations 
participated.44I Here these associations worked on a working paper, in which the 
demands of women's rights organisations were listed. The five sessions that 
were organised by the Secretary of State charged with Women, Family and 
Social Affairs resulted in the listing of women's rights groups' demands. These 
included the sensitive issue of changing of the Moudawana, Morocco's family 
code (code statut personnel). Out of 'modem-rational' considerations, changing 
the moudawana resulted from the aforementioned intention to analyse the 
"constraints that momentarily influence the productivity, income, and the social 
well being ofwomen".442 As Rajah EI Habti from the ADFM remarks, 
fighting against illiteracy and poverty of women needed and still 
needs to be the prime objective of development in Morocco. 
Legally, if a girl of the age of 15 or even younger (13 with the 
consent of a judge, 'tutor,' 'cadi ') gets married, how can she 
have a right to education, contribute to national development and 
escape poverty? If she gives birth to a child at the age of 
fourteen, she is even at risk to die for simple medical reasons.443 
Hence, the PIFD's comprehensive programme targeted the needs of women 
In order to improve their practical situations in education and health. This 
focused on areas such as literacy, managing a household (searching for water 
and wood and carrying it in absence of running water and electricity), sex 
education, and increasing medical care in villages. Furthermore, the PIFD 
suggested a reform of the Moudawana to secure the institutional and legal 
preconditions for women to take an active role in economic development. 
Reflecting on the position of women in Morocco, the historic and cultural factors 
that have inhibited their development, and the changes that have been taking 
place since independence, the authors of the Plan d 'Action take a rational and 
widely political stance. 
-l-ll Association Democratique des Femmes dll Maroc (ADFM), Union Action Feminine (UAF). 
442 Banque Mondiale, Royame du Maroc: "Etude Economique et sectorielle. Renforcement de la 
Participation des Femmes au Dew loppement. . Report Number 14153, unpublished document, 3 
May 1995, p. 1. 
If it is recognised that women's conditions have evolved a lot 
since independence, the ambiguity that rests with her statute has 
remained the same. The cultural perception of this statute is 
plural, and oscillates between the attachment to an Arabo-Islamic 
representation, which idealises the feminine condition and the 
demand of a secular, occidental representation. which imposes 
new conditions of life. The conciliation is a source of conflict for 
women. This conciliation is subject to an important debate 
between partisans of modernity / universalism and partisans of 
tradition / and Moroccan specifics. This great debate mobilises, 
since more than 20 years, the women's movement, which 
negotiates this duality, on the basis of a new role of women in 
society, and on the basis of a re-reading of the legal Islamic 
tradition, taking recourse to Ijtihad and to the Maqasids. They 
transport the debate to the public place in Morocco, and also to 
the international sphere ... This cultural duality is fixed by law, 
which in its private space, preserves the spiritual status and 
morals of the muslim FAMILY, and in its public space tends to 
consolidate the material basis of a MODERN STA TE. 444 
What is striking is that whilst analysing the development of the distinction 
private/public in Arabo-Islamic culture, the authors are themselves part of this 
struggle, and try to overcome it in favour of the modernity/universality axis. 
Hence, the recommendations to change the Moudawana focus on universal 
human rights and universal principles that inhibit the economic activity of 
women. 
Beyond the right to development, recognised as a fundamental 
human right, the participation of women is inscribed, in Morocco 
as elsewhere, in the general problematic of human rights 
recognised for women. As a consequence, the participation 
throws up the fundamental question of equality between men and 
445 
women ... 
The Plan d 'Action, presented to the government in March 1999, envisages two 
steps in order to improve the judicial position of women. First, in order to 
-+-+3Rajah El Habti. interview with the author, Rabat, 6 February 2001. 
-+-+-+ Royaume du t\laroc, Working Paper: 'Plan d'lntegration de la Femme au Developpement' 
(Rabat, no publisher 1999), pp. 76/77, italics added. 
-+45 Ibid. p. 70. It is important to note that the adwrsaries .of th.e PIFD do not. believe in the 
universality of these principles. or at least they do not belIeve In .them \\'?en It comes to women 
. h ,I . allv. they may well refer to them \\hen they see their l)\\,n nghts threatened. In the 
ng Is. romc .. . ., . . h d 
. th authors re~er to Koranic texIs when defendmg therr cntlque ot t e J/Oll mmllll. same \\ ay. e ' 
Ibid. p. 90. 
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Improve the short-term situation of women~ the articles of the .\/oudalt'ana 
described in the PIFD should be implemented. These consist of treating the 
urgent questions~ revising the dispositions which. according to the 
practitioners~ lawyers, and judges~ threaten the most the balance 
of families, and around which the consensus does not pose any 
problem. This is the objective of this plan d~action in the short 
t 446 erm. 
The second step concerns the creation of new positiYe law and the changing of 
existing legislation that takes into account the new development in Moroccan 
society. An ad hoc committee~ consisting of specialists of the shari 'a, 
sociologists, jurists, psychologists~ and public health doctors~ should initiate 
these.447 
-l-l6 Ibid. p. 90. 
-l-l7 Ibid. p. 90. 
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Changing the mouawana: The PIFD's Demands 448 
Age of Marriage: Advance the age of marriage from 15 to the age of 18. In 
exceptional circumstances the girl must be asked to explain her reasons for 
marrying at an earlier age, which should need the consent of a judge. 
Obligatory Tutelage for Women: Inhibits the liberty of women to choose a 
partner. 
Repudiation: Potentially destroys the family and the entire social order. From 
the ambivalent situation of women faced with this monopoly. held by the 
husband, follow obvious consequences concerning the safety of the family 
equilibre. The question of repudiation has been central for all, who had been 
interested in the legal condition of women. 
Polygamy: It constitutes a threat to the stability of the family. Even the Koranic 
texts acknowledge that it is a source of injustices against women and the source 
for social and familial transformations. However, each exception to the rule 
should be subject to the consent of a judge and the first wife. 
The second marriage and the keeping of children: There should be no right of 
the ex-husband to take away the children if the wife marries a second time. The 
cultural logic permits to state that a child is better 'adopted' by the second 
husband of his mother, then by the second wife of his father, as the task of child 
rearing rests with women. 
Alimentary Pension: In case of a divorce, the simple food pension needs an 
additional housing pension. 
Equal sharing of acquired wealth: Work performed by the wife to accumulate 
wealth during the marriage needs to be respected when pronouncing a divorce. 
441< Translated from ibid. pp. 90 - 93. 
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6.1.2.2 The polemic for and against the PIFD 
In March 1999, the plan was presented to the Prime Minister Abdelrahman 
Youssoufi. It first gained public criticism in June 1999 when the League of 
Moroccan 'Ulema together with the Minister for Islamic Affairs made a clear 
public statement against the PIFD. 
The question of the Moroccan Muslim women has become the 
subject of merchandising and trade off on the part of those who 
allow themselves to incite our Muslim authentic society, attached 
to its religion, its values, and its authenticity, to depart further 
from the precepts of Islamic law. 449 
In his public statement, the Minister for Islamic Affairs, Abdelkebir Alaoui 
M'Daghri, did not recognise the right of the authors of the plan to change or 
amend a law of the kind of the Moudawana, and saw in the project a threat to 
Islamic civilisation. 
Under no circumstances can magistrates, lawyers, or psychiatrists 
have the educational qualification required for a textual revision 
of a law such as the mouawana. ... [The report is] founded on a 
secular basis [which] in its approach and its content is a feature of 
the war of civilisations, directed against the Islamic renaissance. 
450 
In his view, although the authors of the PIFD have a just cause (the problem 
of development especially in rural areas), and some revisions of the juridical 
texts might be nesessary, "this revision is only allowed to be made by the 
'ulema, specialists of [Islamic] legislation and specialists in its basis and goals, 
and not by anyone else".451 Commenting on the role that associations could play 
in the process of elaborating or revising the code de lafamille, Alaoui M'Oaghri 
states: "these associations have as their members female academics and other 
researchers. They ha\'e all understood that they could playa great role in this 
-l-l9 Al Bayane. ~5 June 1999 
-l:,O Liberation. ~5 June 1999 
-l:' I Liberation. ~5 June 1999 
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debate, on the condition, however, that they participate in a positive way and 
without judgement regarding the main body of the 'ulema.,,452 The press of the 
leftist parties counterattacked the statements of the minister and the 'ulema 453 
immediately. As one article puts it in its headline: "This man is against the 
emancipation of women. That's his right. What is worrisome is that he is a 
.. ,,454 
mlll1ster. 
Whereas conservative forces around the Ministry of Habous and Islamic 
Affairs were countering the realisation of the plan, 'modem' organisations of 
civil society, such as the Association Democratiqu€ des Femmes du Maroc 
(ADFM) put their forces together and created the Reseau d 'appui au plan 
d 'action pour I'integration de la femme au developpement. More than 200 
associations participated in this association, founded on 20 July 1999. As the 
writer Hamina Zin Abidine explains, it was based on the contacts that these 
associations made since they rallied for the first amendments of the Moudawana 
in 1993.455 As the time of its foundation illustrates, all this can be seen as a 
reaction to the statements by the 'ulema and the Minister for Islamic Affairs. 
Although nobody was seeking to create an atmosphere of confrontation, the 
formation of such a force in which Moroccan academic personalities such as 
Fatima Mernissi and Abdellah Hammoudi participated, had a potential for 
polarising the debate between traditionalists and modernists. The following 
statement illustrates this: 
There was no question of creating an atmosphere of confrontation 
between the women's associations and the 'Ulema, but to make 
understood that the question of the place of women in society 
concerns everybody. This is why the idea of the network came 
into being, nourished by the concern to imply a maximum of 
organisations and individuals in order to build a new and modem 
4-'" )- ;\faroc Hebda International, 2 July 1999. 
453 It has to be said that not all 'ulema were unifornlly against the plan. There were currents 
within the league that tended to have a more 'modernist' "iew than others. An example is 
Professor of Islamic law at the Faculty of Islamic Law at Tetouan University, T\lohamed 
Lamrabat. 
454 Liberation, 25 June 1999 
455 Hamina Zin Abidine. inteniew with the author. Rabat. 9 February 2001. Hamina Zin 
Abidine is president of the network and militant of the :\OFT\1. 
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societal project, which fully integrates women in the social. 
cultural, and economic development of the country.456 
The underlying problem that evolved in this dispute was the question of who 
has the right to interprete the Koran and the Shari 'a. Rabea Naciri, one of the 
original initiators of the plan, commenting on the only critique of the 'ulema 
against the Plan d 'Action, that is the statut personnel: "As if the' ulema were the 
only ones that had the right to interprete the holy texts. As if they stood up as a 
conservative, traditional, and omnipotent 'clergy', a notion totally unknown in 
Islam. Another vision exists, that is in line with its time, and it is exactly this 
vision that meets today a growing audience".457 The accession to the throne of 
Mohamed VI seemed to change the balance in favour of the feminists' demands. 
In his first Royal speech on 20 August 1999, the King in his role as the highest 
religious authority of Morocco (Amir al-Muminin), addressed the question of 
women in the following words: 
Although women constitute half of our society, they see their 
interests undermined. The rights, with which our holy religion has 
endowed them, are not taken into account. These are rights, which 
correspond to their noble mission, that gives them justice against 
all worries and violence that they could fall victim to. This is 
depite the fact that they have reached an educational and 
economic level, which allows them to fully compete with men, be 
it in the field of science or work.458 
At this time, however, a third factor appeared that would change the balance 
of power between the two camps completely. Whereas the movement that 
supported the changes of the mouawana had so far only been concerned with the 
established and institutional class of religious authority, i.e. the Minister for 
Islamic Affairs and the 'ulema, the Islamic movement in and outside the 
parliament took issue and demonstrated their force through a mobilisation of 
their supporters. This coincided with municipal elections in Khouribga in 
August 1999. Among the prominent personalities involved were Abdelkrim al-
4"6 
- AI Bayane, ::!2 July 1999 . 
4"7 
- AI Bllyane. 22 July 1999. 
45~ ..ll BayanC', ::!4 August 1999. This address \\as yery much welcomed by supporters of the plan 
and it was seen as a sign of the new King's support. 
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Khatib, secretary-general of the Islamist party Justice et Developpement (P JD). 
Ahmed Raissouni, president of the movement al !slah wa at-Tajdid, Abdelilah 
Benkirane, as well as Abouzaid EI Idrissi and Mustapha Ramid, Islamist 
parliamentarians under the banner of the PJD. 
In November, 1999, the Islamic trend united under the umbrella organisation 
I'Organisme National pour la Protection de la Famille Marocaine. They 
accused the authors and supporters of the PIFD of neo-colonialism, and 
compared the changing of the Moudawana with the crusades. They cited, as 
evidence of this, the fact that it had been financed by the West's main financing 
institution: the World Bank. Hence, it was the duty of all true Muslims to resist 
such a cultural invasion, it could even be responded to by jihad. Indirectly. 
physical threats were addressed against intellectuals and militants of the 
women's movement.459 When the Organisme National pour la Protection de la 
Famille Marocaine held its first meeting, in November 1999 in Rabat, it was the 
leader of the Islamist party PJD, Abdelkrim aI-Khatib, who animated the 
discussion, in collaboration with other established personalities such as Fqih 
Basri (former USFP). The matter united former political enemies such as 
Mahjoubi Aherdan (Mouvement National Populaire) with Abdelkrim aI-Khatib, 
the latter having left the Mouvement Populaire in the 1960s, as a common 
declaration defending their position illustrates.46o As Halima Zin Abidine from 
the Reseau d 'Appui au Plan d'Integration de la femme au developpement recalls 
the reactions, 
the official reaction was that of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs 
and the I 'Organisme national pour la protection de la famille 
marocaine. Inofficially, there has been the reaction of Al Adl wal 
Ihssan, that has been much stronger, even though they accept the 
literacy campaign, they are against all kinds of challenges to the 
Code de la famille. Sex education and contraception are for both a 
big problem, because they think that if you give people advice on 
how to practice contraception, this will lead to adultary. In the 
'ulema, there are those that are more conservative and those that 
are more liberal, although the former is certainly more dominant. 
459Habib Forkani in Liberation. 11 November 1999. also' Habib Forkani a consigne une textc 
awe Fqih Basri,' in La G(eette. 19 November 1999. 
-l6() .\lame Hehda International, 10-16 December 1999. 
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The reaction of the Islamists however, has certainly aggravated. 
There have always been threats, and thank god they have 
remained threats, but the threats have certainly increased.461 
For the Islamist party, the debate about the Plan d'Action had a very positive 
side-effect. When the officially recognised Islamists met on 27/28 November 
1999, at the fourth congress of the Parti de Justice et de Developpement, all 
political parties, USFP, Organisation d'Avantgarde Democratique et du Progres 
(OADP), Union Constitutionelle (UC), Parti d'Istiqlal (PI), etc. sent delegations 
to "wish them success in their work." Hence, the demonstration of force - more 
than 7000 militants came to Rabat - went hand in hand with the acceptance of 
the establishment of the Islamic current. The Organisme de la Protection de la 
Famille Marocaine can be regarded a catalyst in this process, as it combined all 
conservative forces from the USFP, PI to the UC. As one commentator put it, 
By the way, the recent creation of the Comite de Defense de la 
Famille, under the auspices of this political party, illustrated at least 
two things. First of all, the participation of all conservative 
personalities, from all political parties, in the centre of this Comite, 
announces the cristallisation of this current and constitutes an 
intensification of the recomposition of the national political field. 
Moreover, the PJD has shown that it constitutes an actor with which 
one should count. It is directing its first great battle on the field that 
it knows perfectly well, that of the legal condition ofwomen.462 
Whereas conservative and liberal forces of civil society engaged themselves 
in a battle over the Plan d 'Action, it is remarkable that the state, (i.e. the 
government and the monarchical institutions) remained quiet and did not defend 
the plan, even though it was a government initiative. In fact, it seemed that the 
plan, made under the supervision of the Secretary of State charged with Women, 
Family, and Social Affairs, Mohamed SaId Saadi, was personalised to be this 
minister's oeuvre. By the same logic, the Prime Minister announced in January 
2000 - pulling back and disassociating himself from a government initiative -
that he was going to establish an inter-ministerial committee to study the plan. 
The fact that this inter-ministerial commission started work only in late April 
461 Halima Zin Abidine, Interyiew with the author, Rabat, 9 February 2001. 
462 La Vie Economique, 3 December 1999. 
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2000 shows that the government hesitated to play any leading role in an issue, 
that obviously caused too much emotion and friction among conserYatiYe and 
traditional forces. Hence, the government aborted a TV campaign to explain the 
plan to the illiterate majority of the Moroccan people and government officials 
preferred to refer the whole case to the King, in his capacity as arbitrator and 
Amir al-Muminin. On page 215, the analysis of articles appearing in the 
francophone press illustrates the hesitating position of the government. 
As mentioned above, the debate started with the Minister of Islamic 
Affairs criticising the report and asking the 'ulema to write a report on the PIDF 
in June 1999. It should be remembered that although the Minister is part of the 
government, he is directly appointed by the King, which renders him what 
Moroccan's call a ministre de la souvereignete. This is why, after calls for him 
to resign, he replied that he remained minister as long as he had the trust of the 
King. Although the Secretary of State charged with Women, Family and Social 
Affairs SaId Saadi defended 'his' plan in numerous interviews, neither the 
government nor the parties of the coalition defended the plan at the beginning of 
the debate. Only at the end of November did some government parties, notably 
the PPS and the USFP. start to present their public support. The case of the 
Istiqlal is telling. Not only that its official newspaper, I 'Opinion, hardly ever 
mentioned the plan or the conflict, from the beginning it has taken a step back 
from the debate. When its women organisations, Organisation de Femmes 
Istiqlalienne signed a common statement with the Reseau d 'Applui du Plan 
d'Integration de la femme au Developpement for the application of the PIFD, the 
Istiqlal issued a different, more neutral statement arguing for an 'open debate.' 
When the Organisation for the Protection of the Moroccan Family was founded 
in November 1999, members from all parties took part in this organisation, 
uniting in a common front under the leadership of the Islamist Parti du Justice et 
du Del'{!!oppement and its leader Abdelkrim al-Khattabi. 
Despite the fact that, in his first Royal address, Mohamed VI assumed a role 
in favour of the PIFD, he remained behind the scene and only in i\ larch 2000 did 
a conference (entitled more neutrally 'African and Arab Women') took place 
under Royal patronage. This had led participants of the Reseau to ask themselves 
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Figure 2: State and Civil Society Participation in the Discourse 'Plan d'Action de 
l'lntegration de la Femme au Developpement' May 1999 - May 2000 in 0/0 
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'Civil society activity' is defined as covering the work of women's rights groups, the publication of their statements, but also articles that have as 
their topic women's rights in the context of the women's activists' demands. In the context of the PIFD, this includes the activities of the Islamic 
movement if this is articulated outside the parliament and the state. In the context of the PIFD, "state-activity" has usually been the participation 
of a minister in the subject, but also government party's publication of statements concerning the issue. The King's address, for exanlple, is also 
included under the heading "state-activity". The purpose of this categorisation is to illustrate the state's principal absence in the issue and thc 
debatc. despite the PIFD being, in the beginning, a government plan. This analysis is based on 120 articles that were published in Le Ma/in du 
Sahara el ell! Afoghreh, Lihera/ion, Al Bayane, Maroc Hebdo International, Le Quo/idien du Maroc, L 'Economis/e, La Vie Econol?7ique, La 
Gazelle du \faroe. Le Journal and L 'Opinion from May 1999 to May 2000. 
why a government plan had not been defended and supported by the 
government, and why, in fact, civil society groups were defending a go\'ernment 
plan and not the government itself. A reason for this can be found in a 
conference organised by the Parti du Progres et du Socialisme (PPS) youth 
organisation in January 2000 in Rabat on the PIFD. Here, SaId Saadi was gi\'en 
the chance to defend 'his' plan. The PPS could not mobilise a large public, the 
other parties did not send any representatives and also no supporters, hence. the 
room, was dominated young Islamists male and female mixed. As the subtitle of 
an article of the of I 'Economiste put it, "the minister is left alone to defend a 
project that is supposed to be a government project. ,,463 The same article 
describes the atmosphere as follows. 
Young people, obviously students whose exterior signs cut across 
the image of Epinal's bearded Islamists, instantly cause disorder. 
No sign might betray their conviction. They are determined to 
bring to fall the plan for the integration of women. One part of the 
room is made up of young, veiled women. They don't miss the 
opportunity to shout every time they deem necessary. They chant 
their slogans, their arms pointing to the sky, showing their 
determination: 'Idana Chaabia IiI Khotta Saadia' (Popular 
Condemnation of Saadi's Plan) and' Allah Akbar Assifa Innaha 
Nazifa' (literally meaning the storm, that's a bleeding). The 
debate has started badly. Only a few people can speak, most of 
the time they are interrupted by screaming. One woman, holding 
up a spiraL dares to ask the minister to go to one of the night 
clubs, to see the vices and the degree of prostitution. For her, the 
project has the fingerprints of the devi1.464 
As Figure 2 indicates, at the beginning the government position was marked 
mostly by a dialectical tension between SaId Saadi and the Minister for Habous 
without a clear government statement marking its position. In what followed, the 
creation of the reseau and the mobilisation of Islamists dominated the debate 
until the end of the year, with no clear government intention becoming clear or 
even visible. Only in December and January did government acti\'ity show itselt~ 
at first with party statements, then with go\'ernment statements against the 
mobilisation of Islamists in the mosques. i.e. the utilisation of sacred places fix 
463 L 'Economiste. 26 January 200 1. In French: "Ie ministre est line a !ui-meme pour defendre 
un projet pourtant gouwmementa!" 
464 L 'Economiste, ~o January 2001. 
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political purposes. This was an issue demanded by the women's organisations to 
confront the growing mobilisation against the plan which was taking place the 
mosques. Later on, the government took part with Prime Minister Youssoufi's 
announcement of the creation of an inter-ministerial committee. This committe 
was to consist of all groups involved, and was to give new recommendations 
regarding the PIFO.465 
The slow reaction of the government towards an unpopular plan that had 
strong support in the organised women's movement illustrates the dilemma of a 
government that is facing a strong, well organised and extremely divided civil 
society. The state, trying to represent and overcome the conflicting interests 
found itself in the middle of a battle, in which parts of its machinery represent 
the two diverging interests themselves, which puts each of them in arms against 
the other. Here, the conflict was animated by the Minister for Habous and 
Islamic Affairs, and later by conservative forces within all parties, (i.e. Lhabib 
Forkani, USFP). In this situation, the neutrality of the state is not a given factor, 
and the state reacts but slowly, changing its features as they are fought over by 
social forces that have their political outlets in Parliament. Thus, the plan to 
change the Moudawana is now shelved466, and instead of an overall plan to 
increase the economic capacity of women in Morocco, the different sections of 
the plan, i.e. literacy, reproductive health, are treated separately in the different 
government ministries, with no sign of real activity in sight. But a government 
reshuffle in October 2000 put a former, female militant at the head of the newly 
created Ministry for Women and the Family, which did illustrate a certain 
commitment towards the cause. This poses special problems for developing 
polities, or political systems that aspire to a more democratic representation, as 
such a situation is inevitably connected with a re-organisation of interests in 
government. The Parti de Justice et de Deve!oppement congress being one sign 
of it, and the reception of PJO leader Abdelkrim al-Khattabi by the Prime 
Minister Youssoufi in February 2000 another. It seems clear that the Koutla 
parties did not want to treat the Jvfoudmt'ana in their election campaign, 
..J.65 It has ne\"er been created. Instead, a Royal commission, announced in April 2000. formed in 
A~ril 2001, started to operate, without any results (time of writing: f\larch 2003) . 
..j. 6 Time of writing: March 2003. 
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something the PJD, playing its trump of public morality, would be more than 
happy to do. On the other hand, the Reseau working towards a change of the 
Moudawana before the elections, wanted to see these changes realised and 
threatened to withdraw its support for those parties that did not act. 
Weare still working hard to see changes before the next 
elections. We try to tell the government that if they want the vote 
of women in this country, then they need to change the 
conditions for them. We will vote for the party that acts.467 
The problem for the women's organisations, however, is to reach into those 
sectors of society where the problems of illiteracy and poverty are the most 
urgent, in order to create a credible counterforce to those that already seem to 
have the network and the support-system in the more heavily populated areas. 
This is quickly understood by the politial leaders of the force against PIFD, as 
the following statement by Abdelkrim aI-Khatib and Mahjoubi Aherdan 
illustrates: 
Everything has been made as if the plan concerned nobody except 
for women living in expensive neighbourhoods, who, by the way, 
have no need whatsoever for an action plan for their development. 
Morocco is much bigger and if the objective is to get official 
acknowledgement of a certain way of life, with the rights that 
come with it, then we see here a plan that has been made for a 
certain category of woman and not for all Moroccan women. 
There are arabophone women and tamazight women, there are 
urban women and rural women, we have intellectual women and 
illiterate women, women from bidonvilles and from residential 
h h · h h' . 468 areas, eac one aVlng er own proper c aractenstlcs. 
The intellectual force of women's rights groups' arguments seems weaker 
than the simple popular Islamic message based on public morality, especially 
when it comes to spreading the message in a target group that is largely illiterate. 
However, features of Moroccan society are constantly changing: two examples 
are the highest divorce rate in the Maghreb (20 %), and an increasing NGO 
activity targeting gender-specific problems of women such as domestic \iolence. 
467 Halima Zin Abidine, President of Reseall d 'ApPlii au Plan d 'Int;gration de la Femme all 
Developpement. Interview with the author, Rabat, 9 February 2001. 
468 ,\foroe Hebdo International. 10-16 Decemb~r 1999, 
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divorce, single motherhood, male tutelage, prostitution in the popular areas of 
Casablanca.469 These changes will ultimately increase the pressure for legal 
changes despite the structural disadvantages that the women's rights movement 
is experiencing at the moment. 
6.1.2.3 Summary 
The development around the PIFD has been an essential mobilising force of 
two important socio-political currents, which claim a fair stake in the state's 
socio-cultural orientation. In the latter half of the 1990s, the women's rights 
paradigm has been able to reach - institutionally - the highest level of the state. 
At the same time, however, the state has never explicitly adopted the discourse 
of women's rights, which became more than obvious during the PIFD campaign 
as I have illustrated in this subsection. Therefore, the opposing sectors of civil 
society were seeking political umbrella organisations, but were largely left alone 
to campaign for a project that touches cultural sensitivity. In this situation, the 
state's absence from the public sphere is the most remarkable feature, especially 
because it seems extremely difficult to redefine the content of the women's 
rights message in a way to make it conform with a proactive religiously defined 
state. Therefore, in the absence of a consensus in the public sphere, the state 
could not act as a unifying force to embody a consensus, and its reaction is 
marked by inertia. 
6.1.3 The state's responses to the Berber rights discourse 
The Berber right discourse illustrates features that are similar to both the 
women's rights discourse and the human rights discourse. It shares with the 
women's rights discourse a certain volatility of actors of civil society. and a lack 
of a homogenising element that could possibly transform the discourse into a 
state-led project. On the other hand, there are clear state attempts at redefining 
the political content of the discourse, in order to liberate it of potentially 
'destructive' elements. The purpose of this subsection is again to illustrate how 
469 E.g. Centre d 'Ecolltt'. Bayti, Solidarite F(;minine all founded in the 1990~ 
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the state's reaction has been conditioned by the discourse's articulation in the 
public sphere. 
Amazighity gained a significant international dimension, since the Berber 
culture - as the original inhabitans of North Africa (Tamazgha) - is equally found 
in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, parts of Egypt, Mali, Niger, and the Canary Islands. 
From 27-31 August 1997 the Congres Mondial Amazigh (CMA) held its first 
meeting in Tafira / Canary Islands - no other government would have given the 
organisation the authorisation to hold a meeting. The world congress - being an 
expreSSIOn of the fact that the very nature of the culture transgressed all 
boundaries - reconfirmed the sentiment shared by many Berbers that they 
constituted a greater nation. On the 22 January 1998, the central organ of the 
CMA declared in Paris: 
Tafira is and remains a great moment in Amazigh history. It has 
been the first congress of all Imazighen, the establishment of a 
strong ambition, of a dream, that to unite all children of 
Tamazigha [name of geographical entity of North African 
Berbers] .... Not everything was adopted unanimously. But we 
consider this normal considering that geographical distances and 
centuries separate us since the night of times [la nuit des temps} 
without counting the enemies of the Amazigh people and their 
work to systematically destroy everything that deals with 
tamazight... Let's be determined to VI'ork that the Congres 
Amazigh becomes a powerful factor to unite the Amazigh people, 
to resist state and partisan interests, to render it an efficient 
instrument for the defence of our interests, of the fundamental 
. h if h A . h . 470 rzg ts 0 t e mazzg natzon. 
6.1.3.1 Amazighity in Morocco: A discursive rapprochement 
On 1 May 1994, seven members of the Tilleli (Freedom) association were 
arrested in Goulmima (south-east Morocco), when they displayed banners in 
tamazight, asking for the official recognition of the language.471 SeYenteen days 
later, four of them were released, the other three sentenced to prison tenns (two 
for two years and the third one to one year) and fined 10,000 dirhams (S 1,000) 
-l70Quoted in T({inagh No. 13, March 1998. p. 73. emphasis added. 
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each. They were convicted of posing a "threat to the sanctity of the State".-+72 
Shortly afterwards, after widespread publicity, more than 400 attorneys 
volunteered to defend the teachers in their appeal on 29 June 1994. Only four 
days after their appeal they were all released. 
The increasing activity of the Berber movement, growing awareness among 
Moroccans concerning the right to publicly challenge the state's authoritarian 
measures, along with the state's augmenting expansion of civil space, resulted in 
the King's moving towards certain discursive changes. On the 33rd anniversary 
of the King's accession to the throne, the 20 August 1994, the King declared that 
Morocco's "dialects" were "one of the components of the authenticity of our 
history." Surely "we have to hold to the language of the Koran but not at the 
expense of our authenticity and dialects especially since there is not one of us 
who cannot be sure that there is in his dynasty, blood or body a small or large 
amount of cells which came from an origin which speaks one of Morocco's 
dialects,,473 Although Arabic remained the "Langue Mere du pays,,474 he issued 
a decree authorising the necessary changes in the national curriculum that 
permitted the teaching of Berber dialects at schools. Earlier in the year, Prime 
Minister Abdellatif Fillali declared that the government intended to introduce 
news bulletins in the three Moroccan dialects. What became apparent was that 
linguistically, national authenticity was coupled with the existence of dialects, 
which left the question of Amazigh culture and its authenticy coupled with its 
language Tamazigh out of the equation. 
Nevertheless, in 2002, eight years after King Hassan's authorisation to teach 
"dialects" in schools, it had not been put into practice and seemed to be off the 
agenda. The forceful repression of the Berber movement in neighbouring Algeria 
in spring 2001, however, along with the fact that Moroccan Berbers were 
prevented from supporting the Kabylians, has put the unsatisfactory Amazigh 
471 Apparently, they shouted slogans against the teaching of Hebrew at Moroccan Universities 
when that of tama~ight was banned_ Courier International, No. 550_ 17-::!2 Mai 200l. 
472US State Department: Morocco Human Rights Practices for the Year 1994, (Februar 1995)_ 
473Quoted in Weitzman, 2000, op_cit. p_ 32_ 
474Quoted in LeJolirnal, 22-28 July 2000. 
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question back on the agenda. The discursive rapprochement, as the following 
Berber manifesto illustrates, has been unsuccessful. 
6.1.3.2 The Manifeste Berbere 
Half a year after Mohamed VI's accession to the throne in August 1999, one 
of the most prominent militant of the Amazigh cause, the academic Mohamed 
Chafik, wrote a 23 pages long manifeste berbere. 229 militants, including one of 
Morocco's best known human rights activists, Driss Benzekri, (Forum Verite et 
Justice) signed this manifesto on 1 March 2000. After its publication in the press, 
it was sent to the Royal cabinet. This can be considered a reaction to the lack of 
progress concerning the realisation of both the Charter of Agadir and King 
Hassan' promise made six years earlier in 1994, which "did not have the smallest 
effect and, up till now, remains a dead letter.,,475 By the end of the 1990s a 
remarkable increase in the number of Berber associations was to be seen: from 
around six in 1990 to almost 200 in 2000. They had organised themselves in the 
Congres Mondial Amazigh (CMA) pushing for political reforms concerning the 
recognition of tamazight as an official language and a rewriting of Moroccan 
history to include Berber history. The first sentence of the manifesto declares a 
certain optimism that has marked the coming to power of Mohamed VI. 
Thanks be to God, Morocco is about to get out of a situation 
against which it has been fighting since independence . 
. . . Thanks to the will of the majority of the people, and the 
will of a young King, nourishing great intentions, soon we 
enter into the third millennium by its great door, at the same 
speed as those who have prepared themselves. Resolutely 
and without false shame, we have started to repair our 
mistakes. Time has come for enthusiasm, and action, 
through a general mobilisation processing the dormant 
. f d . I . 476 energIes 0 our eepest natIOna conSCIOusness. 
This manifesto repeats, explains, and summarises nine principal demands of 
the Amazigh movement. It starts with an official constitutional recognition and a 
compulsory teaching of tamazight, demands the provision of Berber-Arabic 
475 Mohamed Chaftk: 'Le Manifeste Berbere', (2000). p. 13. 
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interpreters in administrative and public institutions such as hospitals and the law 
courts, and goes on to ask for the establishment of an exclusively Berber 
speaking Moroccan TV station. 
Millions of TV spectators ... do not understand anything of what 
they hear, the language of the news, the official speeches, the 
interviews and the commentaries, the round table discussions 
etc, which are all in a classical Arabic or in a dialect which tries 
to be classical Arabic in its turns and vocabularies. The language 
of films is usually Egyptian or French. These millions of 
Moroccans cannot but have a feeling of frustration, one of 
cultural exile, or of furious resignation; anyone in their place 
would be reduced to this kind of frustration. Then it is legitimate 
to ask... if they are at home, in the country of their ancestors, or 
are they in a country, which is subjected and colonised? 477 
The manifesto had the effect of rallying the support of almost 200 Berber 
associations. On 12 May 2000, 150 militants met in Bouznika to discuss the 
strategies at their disposal to realise the demands formulated by Chafik. 
Although the manifesto was ignored by the majority of the national press,478 the 
subsequent meeting in Bouznika gave rise to speculations about the possible 
creation of a political party. Some Amazigh militants had evoked the idea, 
notably the Moroccan president of the Congres Mondial Amazigh, Rachid 
R h 479 a a. 
For the militants, the meeting was a success, and another step towards the 
organisation of a political force. The creation of a political party was dismissed: 
it was considered by Chafik to be an invention of the media.48o The militants 
created a commission that was charged with the creation of a general assembly 
of Amazigh forces. The debate about the possible creation of a political party, 
however, became the principal objective of a subsequent discourse between 
476Ib 'd 1 1 . p ...... 
477Ibid. p. 20. 
478 According to AgraH' Amazigh, 30 May 2000, only three national journals published the 
manifesto. 
479See for instance Rachid Raha:'Pourquoi les imazighen du Maroc devront s'organiser 
politiquement?' in La G(/~ette dll .\faroe, No. 190,22 November 2000. 
480 Li/J(;ration. 17 May 2000. 
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Arabists and Amazighs. It was marked by an idenfication of a 'Berber threar-+s I 
that went hand in hand with a 'politicisation'of the issue and the idea of a 
'Berber Fundamentalism'. 482 Similar to the national debate about the PIFD 
Figure 3 on page 225 illustrates the state's absence in a debate that is marked by 
a polemic between Amazighs and Arabists. 
6.i. 3. 3 Morocco in the 2000s: The reconfirmation of Berber Rights? 
The Kabylia uprising in neighbouring Algeria in spring 2001 had a profound 
effect on the balance of forces in Morocco. It met a well-organised associative 
structure, which struggled with those political forces that wanted to stop the 
creation of a Berber political party. This was the main concern of the established 
holders of power. Had the Berber movement developed into a mass movement, 
the power base of established political parties would have been threatened. 
Hence, since 2001 the demonstration of solidarity of Moroccan Berbers had been 
strictly banned.483 This gave rise to demands of the creation of a Berber political 
party, as, without one, the free expression of Berber demands within civil society 
and associations was seen to be impossible. As Ahmed Benchemsi in Jeune 
Afrique I 'intelligent put it, "As the manifesto puts it, it is certain that the cultural 
associations do no longer manage to channel and ease off Berber frustration. 
Therefore, it is time to become politically active, which risks to upset the central 
power.',484 A visit of the Congres Mondial Amazigh to the European parliament 
in Strasbourg on 12 June 2001 ended with the parliamentarians confirming their 
support to the Amazigh cause. On 15 June 2001, the 15 Head of States of the 
European Union demanded a political initiative to solve the Berber question in 
Kabylia, including widespread political and economic reforms. 
481 Al Bayane, 5 May 2000, Abdellatif Mansour in .\faroc Hebdo International 13-19 July 2001. 
4S2 Abdellatif Mansour in Maroc Hebdo International No. 42 23/06/2000, Le Journal 
Hebdomadaire 30 June - 6 July 2001, La Ga::.ctte du .\1aroc 15 April 2002. 
4S3The only exception being that of the traditional 1 May demonstrations all over the country. 
The police forcefully dispersed the subsequent sit-in in front of the Algerian embassy in 200 I 
and the handing over of a letter to the ambassador. 
4S4Jeune Afrique I'Intelligent, 8 June 2001. 
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Figure 3: State and Civil Society Participation in the Berber Discourse 2001-2002 in 0/0 
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Because of the state's clear absence from the discourse, I have subdivided non-state activity into five major groups: ' Arabic / Berber polemic ' 
means that the author is a militant and argues directly for or against the recognition of Berber rights. A 'journalistic review' of the issue is defined 
as covering the work or the politics of the Berber issue, without being written on the occasion of new Berber activity. Under the heading 
'as~ociative activity' I have included all articles that were written to inform on any new development, in which any Berber association had 
participated, - such as the Manifeste Berbere. ' State-involvement' has usually been participation of a minister on the subject. The King's 
initiative to found the Institute for Amazigh Culture, for example, is also included under the heading . state-involvement. ' The purpose of this 
categorisation is to illustrate the state' s principal absence in the issue and the debate, and the divisiveness of the issue among Moroccans. The 
chart cOvers the peri od between June 2001 and June 2002 and it is based on the analysis of 43 articles published in Le Journal Hehdomadaire. 
L L .\\enfiel. \/aro(; ffehdo International. I 'Economiste. La Gazette du Maroc, Le Reporter. Demain, Liberation. Le Quotidien dZl 11 /0/"0(;. La JFie 
/:'c 017 0 J7] iq /f e. and A / Ba),ul1e .. 
In the meantime, in June 2001 the second follow-up meeting in Bouznika of 
Moroccan Berber associations failed to get the authorisation required. With 
neighbouring Algeria falling deeper into civil strive, the political dimension of 
the Berber question was regarded as too sensitive by the Moroccan authorities. 
Moreover, the possible creation of a Berber political party at a time when 
Morocco was trying to prevent the foundation of any new political parties (for 
instance the liberal party of entrepreneurs Forces Citoyennes) ensured major 
political resistance. Berber militants were charged with spreading hostile and 
intolerant anti-Arab and even anti-Islamic ideas (sponsored by Zionism and 
foreign countries!), and with representing nobody but themselves. In addition, 
they were reminded that associations and political parties based on ethnicity or 
regions were outlawed by the constitution.485 Berberism was associated with 
Islamic extremism, and it was stressed that Mohamed Chafik, the main 
intellectual figure behind the Berber movement, was a friend of Abdessalam 
Yassine, the spritual leader of Al Adl wal Ihssan, Morocco's main Islamic 
movement. This created a major political impasse, as the rhetoric became 
increasingly violent, the Algerian example threatening, and Morocco's Amazigh 
movement increasingly powerful, organised, self-confident (remembering past 
promises from the late King Hassan II), and intellectually mature. The Moroccan 
state reacted in a way that it could do best: the banning of its public 
. 486 
expreSSIOn. 
4S5 For example ,\/aroc Hebdo International, No. 42. 23 June 2000, .\/aroc Hebdo International 
13-19 July 2001 pp. 6-8, Al Bayane, 5 May 2000. 
486 Rabat. 1 May 2001 ,Bouznika, 22-24 June 2001. Casablanca 4 July 2001. Goulmin 28-
29August 2001 
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6.1.3.4 The beginning of domination: "Amazigh Speech: His Majesty the 
King seizes control over the issue. ,,487 
On 30 July 2001, however, the issue took a surprising tum. On the second 
anniversary of his accession to the throne, Mohamed VI announced the creation 
of the Institut Royal de la Culture Amazigh (IRCA) that he qualified was part 
and parcel of his Nouveau Concept de I 'Autorite. In his speech, he stressed that 
Moroccan identity is "plural because it was built on diverse influences: 
Amazigh, Arab, Saharan, African, and Andalusian." To give more impetus to the 
culture and its scientific exploration, the IRCA was supposed to give "a new 
impulse to this culture, which constitutes national wealth, in order to give it the 
means to preserve itself, to develop, and to blossom and flourish ... Therefore, 
We have given substance to the cultural dimension of the new concept of 
authority, which We attempt to put into practice.,,488 The press immediately 
remarked on the unique quality of a Royal speech that stressed the Berber origins 
before Arabic culture as a source of Moroccan identity. L 'Economiste ran the 
headline: "Amazigh Speech: HM the King seizes control over the issue. ,,489 
Other Royal comments were to follow. In an interview with the French 
newspaper Le Figaro, the King Mohamed VI situated the Berber demands within 
the plural national identity that is Moroccan: 
The Berber demands are not the same as those of the Kabylians. 
Here in Morocco, the Amazigh rather than Berber sensibility is 
integrating. The identity 'I am Moroccan' comes before 'I am 
Berber' or 'Arab.' There are Moroccans who are Berber. others are 
Arab, African, or Andalusian descendants. My father was of Arab 
descent, whereas my mother was Berber. This reality expresses the 
. 490 Moroccan gemus. 
On 31 October in an interview with the newspaper Paris Match the King 
contended that "I am myself half Berber. this would be to deny one part of my 
.. PO This is how the independent weekly L 'Economiste, 1 August 200 l.put it. 
488Quoted in L 'Ecol1omiste, 1 August 2001. 
489Ibid. 
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culture and of my genes. I don't speak Amazigh, helas, because I was brought up 
in an education system in which it \\'as not taught. but I would like to be able to 
take the time to learn it.,,491 On 17 October 2001. the King had already issued the 
decree, which gave the Institut Royal de la Culture Amazigh its legal status. On 2 
January 2002 he nominated the leading intellectual figure of the Amazigh 
movement, Mohamed Chafik, author of the manifeste berbere. as director of this 
institute. The four other members of the conseil administrat(t are \lohamed 
Rochdi Chraibi. director of the Royal cabinet. Hassan Aourid, the King's 
personal Berber schoolfriend and Royal spokesperson, \;lohamed Meziane 
Beltkih, Royal councillor, and Abel-Wahab Benmanssour, official historian of 
the court.492 As the human rights institution CCDH, this institute is financed by 
the King's personal budget, that of the Royal court. 493 
6.1.3.5 Summan' 
Concerning Morocco's political strategy at dealing with the Berber question. 
the above events are symbols of significant changes. First of all, it is reminiscent 
of the strategy dealing with the human rights question in the early 1990s. A 
Royal Institute is formed (although it is not an Advisory Council) to deal 'in all 
objectivity' with the profound matters. beyond the present demands of Berber 
activists and its Arabic partisan counterparts. The Royal Institute is to be 
composed of the '"representatives of the different components of La Sation, ,,494 
which means political parties, labour unions, religious and economic 
representatives and those of associative life. Questions of official recognition of 
tamazight and political changes that allow for Amazigh culture to flourish in 
Morocco are qualified by stipulating that the Institute's first objective is the "the 
recognition of the integral unity of our shared history .. 495 
490 Ie Figaro. 4 September 2001. also quoted in It! .\fonde Amazigh, No.6. 6-15 September 
2001. 
491Quoted in Le'\fondeAmazigh, No. 14-15.31 January 2002. 
492 Ie ,\londe Ama~igh. No. 14.5 January 2002, 
493 I 'Essentiel. February 2002. 
494, . I F b "002 I E'senlle. e ruary _ . 
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At the same time, the discourse itself illustrates features that weaken the state's 
possibility to engage in the discourse, should the institute aim at radically 
changing the status quo. Before this happens, the volatile discourse suggests that 
the institute will first of all engage in a redefinition, in order to create the 
consensus needed for a further engagement in, and commitment to, the issue. 
This leads to the last point to be made concerning the question why the state 
reacts discursively, but not yet institutionally. Stated otherwise, why is it that the 
state creates the discourse about the protecting Berber rights, without actually 
creating and implementing the legal and political measures at its disposal. As this 
analysis indicates, it seems that the answer is that the differences among groups 
of Morocco's civil society are too strong, and that a strong government position 
would only exacerbate the divisions. 
6.1.4 Summary Section One 
Table One: Discursive Representation and State Intervention 
Rights Consensus in the Redefinition Possible Discursive Institutional 
Movement Public Sphere Intervention Intervention 
Human Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rights 
Women's No No No No 
Rights 
Berber's No Yes Yes No (if 
Rights consensus) 
This table summanses the state's position and interaction in a particular 
discourse, depending on a discourse's particular articulation in the public sphere. 
It illustrates the central finding of this section: that the state's interaction in the 
public sphere is marked by the way in which a discourse is represented. It needs 
to be stressed that it is not possible that this be directed or controlled hy the 
495 1bid. Emphasis added. 
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no 
Moroccan state. Instead, it depends on the multitude of interactions between 
individuals, who work on or who are interested in the issue. 
F or the purpose of this thesis, this section has illustrated the forms that 
interaction between state and civil society may take depending on the particular 
structure of a discourse. In Morocco, the strategies of domination and adoption 
that I have identified are only possible if the base of the discourse is not 
fragmented, or if a consensus exists. This stresses the fact that the public sphere 
is increasingly autonomous, and not structured according to clearly defined 
principles that may be controlled by the state, which is just one of the actors in 
this sphere. However, a process of redefinition might have the effect of creating 
a consensus that has been absent before. Although it seems unlikely that this can 
be successful, the King's direct engagement in the Berber's rights discourse may 
have exactly this effect. 
6.2 Section Two: The state's 'visible' and 'strategic' responses to new actors: 
boundary setting, co-optation, and integration 
6.2.1 Boundary setting 
On 9 December 2000, the occasion of the 52nd anniversary of the universal 
declaration of human rights, the Association Marocaine de Droits de I 'Homme 
(AMDH) organised a demonstration in Rabat for the protection of human rights. 
Like the demonstration of the Islamic organisation Al Adl wal Ihssan in 
Casablanca, it was not accorded the required authorisation. Like the 
demonstration in Casablanca, the dispersal of the demonstration and the trial of 
36 militants followed suit. Within the 36 militants arrested were the president A. 
Benamour, secretary-general of the radical-leftist Parti de I 'Avantgarde 
Democratique et du Socialisme. In January 2001, the AMDH came to fear its 
own dissolution, but continued to function despite police harassment. On 17 rvlay 
2001, the 36 militants were each condemned to 3 months imprisonment and a 
3000 Dirham fine (300 Dollars). They were found guilty of "participating at the 
organisation of a banned manifestation and the public, non-armed gathering that 
:no 
could have threatened the public order.,,496 The trial was described by a 
Moroccan journal as 'Kafka-esque', during which "all defence questions were 
refused, no fonnal requirements fulfilled, and the right of the accused eyen to 
speak denied.,,497 One week after the violent repression of the AMDH 
demonstration, the francophone weekly Le Journal and its Arabic counterpart 
Assahifa were banned by the Prime Minister, Abderrahman Y oussoufi. This was 
due to the publication of a letter by the fonner communist radical Fqih Basri, 
which implied the USFP's participation in the military coups of the early 
1970s.498 
These two incidents and attacks on the freedom of expression and public 
assembly were related. A few weeks earlier, the magazine Le Journal had 
published an Association Marocaine de DroUs de I 'Homme (AMDH) list of high 
ranking officials close to the regime that were considered by the AMDH as 
having perpetrated crimes against humanity during so-called 'years of lead.' The 
list of names included the highest ranking military officers such as Hosni 
Benslimane, chief of the police force, and Hamidou Laanigri, chief of the DST 
(Direction de la Securite du Territoire, Moroccan intelligence service), both high 
representatives of the makhzen. Since 1999, the AMDH and the Moroccan NGO 
Verite et Justice had been rallying in order to bring to justice the perpetrators of 
the worst violations of human rights, especially those responsible for torture and 
death in prison. As many of those were still holding positions of power in the 
anny and civil service, the regime - and many others - had not recognised the 
AMDH's and Verite et Justice's demands, and had consequently tried to limit the 
scope of their activity. The dissolution of the AMDH was first proposed in the 
government council after the publication of this list, fearing the opening of a 
Pandora's Box by the activities of this association.499 
496 Lf' Journal Hebdomadaire. 26 May - 1 June 200 1, p. 10 . 
.+97 Ibid., p. 10. 
498 This came after, in April 1999, Le Journal had one number censured for an inter. iew with 
Polisario leader Mohammed Abdelaziz El Marrakchi . 
.+99 Lf' Journal Hebdomadaire. 26 May - 1 June 200 1, p. 10. 
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At the centre of the government's activity aimed at restricting the activities of 
the association, as well as that of journals that tend to touch the three sacred 
elements of Morocco (King, God, and Nation i.e. army), appeared the press, 
which faced the restrictive press code around article 77 of the dahir of 18 
November 1958. The dahir gives the Prime Minister the right to ban the 
publication of a newspaper and the Interior Minister the right to censure 
individual numbers. The lack of independence of the courts illustrated itself once 
again in the withholding of the legal receipt to the former director of Le Journal, 
Jamal. He applied for a new authorisation after Le Journal and Assahifa had 
been banned. The appearance of these two journals under a different name, 
notably Le Journal Hebdomadaire and Assahifa al-Ousboya was only achieved 
after Le Monde staged a media campaign in support of their director, Jamal. Part 
of this international campaign was his invitation to the 34th congress of the 
International Federation of Human Rights in January 2001. Taking place in 
Casablanca, Morocco's entire human rights nomenclature was present, including 
the Minister of Human Rights, Mohamed Aujjar, from the so-called 
administration's party Rassemblement National des Independants (RNI). The 
standing ovations for this young Moroccan journalist ensured that the political 
elite did not miss the point. A few days later, the Moroccan regime showed its 
flexible and undogmatic nature of dealing with political pressure: the two 
journals were given the necessary legal receipt and allowed to reappear under a 
different name. 
After the reappearance of Le Journal and Assahifa under a different name, the 
Foreign Minister, M Benaissa, sued the journal for defamation. In one of its 
articles Le Journal reported on dubious financial transactions, through which the 
Royal acquisition of US property via the former Moroccan Ambassador to the 
United States was achieved at a price many times above market value - which 
was obviously to the advantage of the former Ambassador and now Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Benalssa. For his comments on this affair, the director of Le 
Journal was condemned by the Casablanca Tribunal of Hay-Hassani Ai·n Chock 
to pay a fine of 2 million dirhams, approximately 200,000 US dollars. A member 
of the security force is reported as saying '"Don't worry, Le Journal will not die. 
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We will leave its head just out of the water.,,500 In June 2001, Prime Minister 
Y oussoufi told a group of German journalists with respect to the fate of Le 
Journal that the Moroccan press needed to learn how to behave, and in France he 
proclaimed, "the interdiction of Le Journal had good effects. Look how wise 
they have become. ,,50 1 
Other attacks on the freedom of press were directed against the director of the 
Rabat bureau of the Agence France Presse (AFP), Claude Juvenal. After having 
sent the same manifesto of the Association Marocaine de Droits de I 'Homme 
that had been responsible for the closure of Le Journal, to France, he was 
expelled from Morocco. According to the authorities, 
this journalist has lost the ethic and the deontology of the profession 
by taking initiatives hostile to Morocco and its institutions. His 
reports ... were hardly ever motivated by concerns of information but 
inspired by the will to talk badly and to provoke confusion, 
ambiguity, and conflict within the national community. However, 
... , the bureau of the AFP at Rabat continues to work normally and 
Morocco remains more than ever attached to the freedom of press 
and to the guarantees that apply to this liberty if it is inscribed into 
a de-ontological framework and ethic of this profession as it is 
realised, conceived and respected in the entire world. 502 
Already in 1999, Claude Juvenal of AFP had got into trouble with the 
authorities. He had published an article that quoted a source in the Palace as 
saying that Algerian Islamic militants had been crossing the badly controlled 
southern border between Morocco and Algeria during one of their attacks in the 
summer of 1999.503 Taken up by the Algerian media, such news was 
embarrassing. When Juvenal was declared persona non grata the Royal 
newspaper Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb criticised him 
since for many years he has not stopped to doubt, to criticise, 
and especially to denaturalise - characteristically with bad 
500 lean-Pierre Tuquoi: Le Dernier Roi, Crepuscule d'une Dynastie. (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 
200l),p.268. 
50 I Ibid. See also Youssoufi's interview with the Spanish newspaper El Pais, reprinted in Le 
Afande. 21 December 2000. 
502 Le Malin du Sahara el du Maghreb. 5 November 2001, italics added. 
503 Le .\lande, 7 November 2000,3 September 1999. 
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intentions - all initiatives of reform undertaken by Morocco. 
504 
As can be seen from these cases, limitations of the freedom of expression are 
intimately linked to publicly criticising the army. The Kingdom is continuing to 
protect the sacredness of this institution by all means, and has kept a strict line of 
interpretation. When it comes to sensitive issues the freedom of expression has 
remained restricted, and the 'red lines' of permissible behaviour, badly defined 
and up to interpretation, are not up for discussion. This is justified in terms of 
'nobody is above the law' and in the following example sanctioned with prison 
sentences. 
On 30 November 1999, the military officer Mohamed Adib talked to the 
French press about corruption and ill-treatment in the Moroccan army. As a 
result, he was later condemned to five years imprisonment by a military court. 
Captain Adib was an officer in the Moroccan army when he noticed networks of 
corruption that dealt with the reselling of 120 tons of army gasoline in 
Errachidia. In October 1998 he addressed a letter to the Supreme Commander of 
the Royal Armed Forces, Crown Prince Mohamed, in which he denounced the 
corruption that he had witnessed. The Crown Prince opened an inquiry into the 
affair, which resulted in the condemnation of Adib' s superiors to 18 months 
imprisonment. Although Adib was not implicated in any way in this affair, he 
became subject to harassment, transfers from one military base to the other, and 
various disciplinary sanctions. All this led him to file an official complaint at the 
administrative tribunal, a civil jurisdiction. The court accepted its responsibility. 
but never dealt with the issue. His recourse to a civil court, however, had the 
negative effect of increasing the harassment to which he was exposed. This is 
why Adib spoke about his experience with a French journalist from Le Monde on 
30 November 1999. Five days later he was arrested and interrogated by military 
at a senior level: by the Sahara Commanding Officer General Bennani and by the 
director of the Direction de fa Securite dll Territoire, Hamidou Laanigri. Captain 
Adib was subsequently held for 60 days under military arrest. On the 17 
February 2000, after his military trial (from which the public media was 
5(l.t. -Le .\,falln dll Sahara e/ dll Jfaghreb, .) November 200 1. 
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completely excluded), he was sentenced to five years imprisonment, which was 
later reduced to two and a half years, for "violations of military instructions" and 
"insulting the army." Among the judges was one of his superiors against whom 
Adib had previously filed a complaint. According to Avocats Sans Frontieres 
(ASF): 
[Captain Adib] did not benefit from a fair trial. The trial 
ridiculed the presumption of innocence and the matter of 
impartiality and independence of the court was more than 
questionable. The court, rejecting all demands of the defence, 
avoided systematically that the debate broadened to include 
the liberty of expression within the army.505 
What is surprising is that Moroccan human rights associations, having 
become very active in recent years, did not mention in their statements and 
reports the trial and the lack of liberty of expression within the army. The only 
criticism is coming from the international human rights organisation Federation 
International des Droits de I'Homme and the Belgian association Avocats Sans 
Fro n tieres . 
6.2.2 Co-optation 
The Moroccan state has continued its strategy of co-opting key-members of 
the political opposition in order to weaken the potential for organised opposition. 
Rabea Naciri, for many years an activist for women's rights, was in charge of the 
organisation of the ateliers de reflexion within the ministry of co-operation. Her 
activities in the Association Democratique des Femmes Marocaines and the 
Maghreb Egalite - Collectif 1995 had given her credibility with many actors of 
civil society. Nevertheless, her approach to political change concerning the status 
of women illustrates that 'the state's logic' had influenced her thinking, even if 
street -action continues to inform her thought. 
What happened after the demonstrations and the polemic, 
however, is that many women took over our demands and went 
505 Quoted in Le Journal Hebdomadaire, 24 February - 3 March 2001. see also 
http://www.asf.be. 
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into their villages to spread the logic of our demands. For the 
women that is now Minister of Women affairs: there are many 
problems, as she is under the tutelage of a man. The Moudawana 
changes in 1993 were done during the vacations, for the new 
King, he has problems during the period of transition, he 
couldn't dare to put forward a tough line. For the Prime Minister, 
however, there are the considerations of elections. But with the 
literacy campaign is working well. 506 
The same applies to Omar Azziman, former president of the Organisation 
Marocaine de DraUs de I 'Homme, who became in November 1993 the first 
Minister of Human Rights. Between 1997 and 1998 he was the Minister of 
Justice, one of the appointments that are reserved to the King. Again this seems 
to be a classical case of co-optation. Socially respected persons who form 
alternative discourses and are holders of discursive power are allowed to 
approach the decision making centre. The result is the stabilisation of the system 
against the pressure for change that comes from the social forces that these 
individuals represent. The creation of a ministry that occupies the same terrain as 
the social groups that are promoting the case might as well be interpreted as 
taking the political case away from social actors. In order to win the ensuing 
competition between institutions and civil society, credible people are needed to 
run the institution that is supposed to take away the case from civil society. As 
he himself explains his reasons for accepting the post, 
When I was asked to become the first Minister of Human Rights, 
I hesitated a lot. There were two possibilities: either this was a 
serious proposition, or this was just a means for co-opting actors 
of civil society. I took my decision thinking that there is a 50 
percent possibility that the first possibility was the right one, and 
because this possibility existed, I had to accept. During my time 
at the Ministry of Human Rights, I think that we did good work, 
and we made some significant advances regarding the questions 
of torture and forced disappearances. Because of the progress 
that we did in the field of human rights, I think that I was asked 
to take over the Ministry of Justice, in order to continue with the 
reforms. Here, again, I asked myself the same question as before, 
and decided that my expertise was needed. I do not consider 
myself as a minister, but rather as someone in charge of a reform 
507 programme. 
506Rabea Naciri. interyiew with the author, Rabat, 19 February 200l. 
507 Omar Azziman. Interview with the author, Rabat, 9 April 2002 
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The institutionalisation of human rights as a subject in schools was made 
possible by Omar Azziman, and it was under Mohamed Aujjar, Minister of 
Human Rights, and also former member of the OMDH, that the documentation 
centre for human rights was established.508 In 1994, the Ministry of Human 
Rights and the German Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation organised a conference on 
civil society in North Africa. In Morocco, this activity has resulted in a positive 
evaluation of state-civil society co-operation in the area of human rights. 
Especially the Organisation Marocaine des Droits de I 'Homme has increased its 
co-operation with the ministry: although being very anxious about its 
independence, in interviews this partnership - especially since the government of 
alternance - is described as positive. 
6.2.3 Integration 
The last institutional reaction of the state concerns 'integration.' Apart from 
the CCDH, which has been extensively covered elsewhere in this thesis, the 
women's rights issue provides another example of this strategy. A general 
comparison of the 1993 pressure and the pressure represented by the PIFD 
illustrates this changing strategy. As a state official of the Ministry charged with 
Women's Affairs recalls: 
In 1994, [after the 1993 collection of 1 million signatures] the 
department charged with women's affairs was created and was 
supposed to establish a national report on the situation of women. 
After the conference in Beijing, this developed into a strategy for 
the integration of women, which was finalised on 8 March 1997. 
When we presented the report it was criticised because there was 
no transparency whatsoever about how the plan came into being. 
In February 1998 it was decided that a plan should be developed 
that should include the government departments concerned, the 
women associations of the political parties, the human rights 
associations, representatives of local development schemes, and 
academics. By consensus, it should develop a plan on a national 
level on the four themes that are considered urgent in Morocco: 
education, reproductive health, economic situation of women, and 
the judicial and political situation of women. 
508In Rabat AgdaL only 400 meters away from the OMDH's office. 
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Shaha Reeza from the World Bank asked four academics to 
organise four ateliers in the fields that were considered urgent: 
education, reproductive health, economy and jUdicial/political 
status. Rabea Naciri coordinated the four sectors, which were 
organised according to a participative method. Each expert 
contacted the government department concerned and N GOs to 
work as participating partners. Accordingly, given the input of 
the social actors concerned, the governmental plan d 'action was 
the product of all national components' concertation .. The atliers 
de reflexion guaranteed this participative element. Each expert 
organised such an atelier de reflexion in order to inform and to 
get more information about the measures proposed. On 19 March 
we presented the proj ect to the vice president of the World Bank, 
and shortly afterwards, a ministerial commission presided by the 
Prime Minister was constituted for the integration of women in 
development. The Minister of Habous was part of this, and he had 
the right to ask questions and to say whatever he wanted. 
Everybody recognised the independence of women, the 'ulema, 
the Islamic movement, everybody agreed to the plan.509 
What appears is that, in an attempt of creating a national consensus, 
organisations of civil society have become one of the primary foci of the 
administration. The fact that the department charged with the situation of women 
(later transformed into a ministry charged with questions of family, children, and 
the handicapped) was created in 1994 indicates that the state was responding to 
pressures from the women's movement. The collection of one million signatures 
the year before had had an effect. Interestingly, as the initial plan had been 
refused by NGOs in 1997 for its lack of transparency, an open plan was 
introduced in which the most important NGOs were asked to participate. This 
participative method, although certainly influenced by the World Bank, was 
accepted by the government, which formed the ministerial commission to put 
into practice the Plan d 'Action. The keywords that appear are participation, 
concertation, partnership, and consensus. Continuing this strategy despite the 
social resistance to the Plan d 'Action aspects of the plan are being put into 
practice in the north of Morocco in collaboration between the Ministry, the 
United Nations Development Programme, and women associations such as the 
Association Democratique des Femmes Marocaines, the .lssociation 
Planification Familiale, and the Association Jlarocaine des Droits de lafemme. 
509Fatima Zine, interview with the author. Rabat. 27 February 200 1. emphasis added. 
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In 2000, the strong reaction to the Plan d 'Action caused a similar tactic. 
Under the pressure of mobilised social and political forces, the state resorted to 
the creation of a Royal commission, charged with the critical aspects of the 
reform of the Moudawana. 510 Interestingly, prior to this attempt at integration 
had been the state's attempt at integrating the women's rights discourse. There 
was no collection of signatures that pressed for demands or initiated the state's 
action. Instead, women NGOs had been invited to put forward their demands in 
ateliers de rejlexion, so as to create a social base for new policies. This initiated 
a reform process from within the state. The problems that the state encountered 
resulted from the use of the theme of women's rights by highly policised 
segments of Moroccan society, from within the state and from within society. 
The state's response, therefore, had been characterised by inertia. The delegation 
of the affair once again to a Royal commission illustrates how the choice of 
action has been severely limited. The state, therefore, has been pushed to form 
another integrating institution, this time, however, in order to postpone a 
decision on this central political issue. 
A similar strategy of integration took place in the private sector, significantly 
after the CGEM gained significant independence and autonomy from the state. 
Since 1996, the state has engaged in reformulating the economic relations 
between workers and employers, thereby confirming the increasing significance 
of the private sector in the economy. This redefinition took the form of tripartite 
consultations. The main trade unions (CDT and UGTM), under the auspices of 
the state, were to discuss with CGEM the problems of minimum wages and 
layoffs. This was a search for solutions through dialogue, which avoided any 
attempts to resolve these economic questions through industrial action. In 
Morocco, industrial action had had a violent history.511 This also resembled in 
large parts a neo-corporatist strategy, which Lehmbruch and Schmitter had 
510 In 2003, the results are still not known. 
511 The last major strike, that transformed itself quickly into rioting. rocked the city of iangiers 
in June 1996. two months before the signing of the tripartite agreement. For a history see A 
Memouni: Le Syndicalisme ouvrier au Maroc, (Rabat: Edition Maghrebines. 1979). 
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analysed in North-Western Europe.512 It aimed at establishing a social dialogue 
in replacement of open class conflict. 
In the Moroccan context, this neo-corporate strategy needs to be understood 
as resulting from the neo-liberal restructuring of the economy, with a consequent 
decrease in the public sector's activity. According to a 2000 World Bank report, 
private sector investment accounted for almost 70 percent of overall investment 
in the economy.513 Considering the structure of urban unemployment, which 
reaches highest levels among university graduates514 and taking into account the 
increasing force of the Unemployed Graduates Association, the monarchy could 
successfully shift the responsibility for creating employment onto the private 
sector representation. By doing so the state would assume the role of a mediator 
in Morocco's conflictual class relationships. Prior to this, the state's attempt to 
create a national consensus in order to defuse the explosive quality of the 
employment question had been manifested by the creation of the Conseil 
National de la Jeunesse et de I'Avenir (1991), and the Conseil ConsultatiJ du 
Suivi du Dialogue Social (1994).515 
On 1 August 1996, the 'social dialogue' was officially born. It was signed by 
the Confederation Generale des Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM), by the 
represenatives of the two trade unions Confederation Democratique du Travail 
and the Union Generale des Travailleurs Marocains, and by the Interior 
Minister. It is another example of the restructuring of the Moroccan state's 
position vis-a-vis civil society. As Catusse remarks, far from transforming itself 
into a minimum state, the Moroccan state does not stop to control the modalities 
and the competences of each protagonists, conforming to the monarchy'S 
traditional self-imagined role as arbiter between different conflicting forces, of 
512 P.c. Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch : Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making (London: Sage. 
1982). 
513 The World Bank : World Bank Atlas 2000 (Washington, The World Bank, 2000). p. 51. 
514See Royaume du Maroc, Ministere Charge de la Prevision Economique et du Plan: Population 
& Developpement au Maroc (Rabat. Centre d'etudes et de recherche demographiques. 1998). 
515Whose activities. ho\,,:ewr. have been se\'erely limited. 
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which the monarchy had all too often been the origin.516 In the case of this 
triparte agreement, however, it must be noted that the Moroccan state does not 
appear as an arbiter in a situation of social conflict but rather as a partner in a 
consensual situation of economic development. Semantically, conflicts are 
changed into concertation. The vice president of the employer's federation for 
instance expressed his satisfaction with the agreement because it would avoid 
future conflicts: 
The tripartite accord constitutes a real and important advance in 
the processing of the social pact. ... It is undeniably an event 
without precedence in the social history of Morocco, because 
from now on one can say that negotiation and concerted action are 
the rule, and confrontation remains the exception.517 
The CGEM achieved its national recognition as an autonomous political 
player. This was, as explained before, the result of its opposition to the anti-
corruption campaign. At the same time, however, the employer's federation as 
well as the trade unions were mobilised by the state to fill a new function in the 
creation of national consensus. The King's action defined the framework, in 
which the two partners were to find a non-conflictual approach, each defending 
their own interests. In fact, they were invited to find a common interest, 
supplanting the idea that their interests were, in one way or the other, opposing 
each other. 
This consensual approach to politics has been the monarchy'S mam 
originality. The response of the employer's federation to this consensuaL non-
conflicting approach beyond class conflict has been the introduction of the 
slogan 'entreprise citoyenne.' This meant that companies held certain social and 
economic responsibilities vis-a-vis society. This partnership for the development 
of Morocco's economy has been founded on the premise that the Moroccan 
economy was to open up towards the exterior, and that all partners involved had 
an interest in negotiating and regulating their stakes in the process. Few advances 
516Myriam Catusse: 'La recomposition des relations professionnelles au Maroc' in I\londe .\rabe 
Maghreb-Mashrek. Oct-Dec 1998. p. 21. 
517 La Vie Economique. 9 August 1996. 
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have been made in terms of real changes,518 due in large part to the CGEM's 
opposition to increasing worker's rights on the grounds of flexibility.519 
Nevertheless, a certain 'pacification' of worker-employers relations has 
appeared, which stands in marked contrast to the violent clashes that trade unions 
and their members had experienced with the Moroccan regime from the 1970s to 
the 1990s. Even if this pacification is connected to a "sphere of public non-
d " " C 520 . h eClSlOn, as atusse puts It, t e close relationship of state, employer's 
federation, and trade unions has become another sign of the state's progressi\'e 
involvement in the establishment of symbolic dialogues. 
We find here a process of 'society's pacification,' the 
management of social conflicts, which is getting progressively, 
under the auspices and encouragement of the state, towards a 
'sphere of public non-decision' where employers and employees 
are sent to face-to-face negotiations, all this within a framework 
marked by institutional construction and participation. 521 
6.2.4 Summary Section Two 
The three strategic ways of reacting to civil society'S increasing activity in the 
public sphere all seem to create increasing space for individual's political 
activity. Even the state's attempt at setting the boundary of permissible 
behaviour defines the amount of freedom, within which public critique becomes 
possible. For instance, it has become possible to indirectly criticise the 
monarchy'S role to guarantee the Islamic character of the state.522 Through the 
definition of boundaries and public engagement in defending them,523 the state 
defines the rules and gives them a meaning, which is consequently adhered to by 
the public itself. Essentially, it can be argued that the state's responses reflect the 
518 Legislation of working conditions (code du travail), reform of the social security system 
(caisse national de securite sociale) 
519For other reasons see Catusse, 1998, op.cit. p. 33 
520 98' 34 '3'i Catusse, 19 , Op.Clt. p. _ . 
521 Ibid. 
5220riss Kettani: 'La seule autorite religiouse, c'est nous' Interview with Driss Kettani in .\/aroc 
Hebda International. No. 433,26 October - 1 November 2001. 
523 See the King's interview in Le Figaro, 4 September ~OO 1. 
242 
conflicts that do already exist in society. The state can restrict the freedom of 
expression precisely because the freedom of expression is not considered a value 
in itself. The recent lack of support for journalists and human rights activists, 
when they were subject to boundary setting measures, illustrates this. This 
contrasted with earlier signs of popular support for Berber militants and 
journalists, when they had been sanctioned despite having displayed only limited 
criticism. This gives an important measurement concerning one of the central 
aspects of this thesis, that of the continuing existence of power relations. These, 
it seems, still prevent the existence of a full public sphere in Habermas's sense, 
and grants the state the possibility to use this method of control. 
Co-optation and integration, however, gIve nse to a particular discourse's 
influence on the state level. In fact, through engaging in these issues through 
integrating and co-opting measures - not to speak of direct adoption of 
discourses - the state gives these ideas access to the legal and administrative 
means necessary to realise certain demands. This is the element of political 
change that becomes visible for many activists and observers, but it is limited 
through their strategic and self-limited character: central features of the state are 
not supposed to change, and are not subject to public scrutiny, challenges, or 
even discussion. Bearing in mind the question of changing the Moudawana, but 
also the institutionalisation of social dialogue between the CGEM and the labour 
unions, it needs to be remembered that this access does not guarantee the actual 
implementation of a particular reform programme. In the case of human rights, 
however, a certain movement was made possible within the areas that were 
defined by the state. Social actors recognition of this progress highlighted the 
state's capacity to successfully adopt the language of human rights. 
6.3 Chaper Six Summary: Discourse and Political Change 
Despite all the limitations, these reactions of the state illustrate the power of 
the public sphere over the formulation of public policy. 
(1) The introduction of 'human rights and citizenship' as lessons in schools; 
(2) The open and public conflict around the Plan d'Integration de la Femme 
au Developpement; 
(3) The relative success of the human rights issue; 
(4) The initiative of Mohamed VI in the creation of an Institute for Berber 
Affairs. 
All these cases serve as examples in which public pressure III certain 
historical circumstances, combined with power that Habermas has called the 
'power of the better argument', has touched the highest level of the state. In all 
four cases, the state has reacted in ways to defuse and thereby change the power 
of this 'rationality,' but by doing so, the state accepted the logic with which the 
particular discourse had been operating. 
(1) This meant that citizenship, even if it includes the duty to follow the 
laws, also includes the right to free expression and self-respect. 
(2) It also meant that changing the Family Code, Moudawana, had clear 
advocates in the government, and will continue to occupy the 
Moroccan state. 
(3) This further meant that the principle of indemnification and the 
acknowledgement of the state's responsibility in human rights 
violations,524 even if not originally intended by the creation of the 
CCDH, were outcomes of discussions that had been marked by face-
to-face talks. The CCDH, even though it was regulated in a way to be 
loyal, was not supposed to be a mouthpiece of the government, from 
which resulted the absence of direct power relationships (despite the 
Minister of Interior's place in the council). 
(4) The creation of a Berber Institute acknowledges the fact that in 
Moroccan socio-economic development, Amazighity had been 
neglected. The teaching of tamazight at schools, the foundation of a 
Berber TV channel, and slowly the constitutional recognition of 
tamazight as an official language (although this might be called a 
'national ' language), all of this might well be the outcome of the 
politics of Berberism in Morocco in the near future. In a way, with 
the increasing semantical recognition by the Moroccan monarch 
himself of the Berber identity, the authorities become bound by a 
logic that derives from these Royal discourses and interviews. 
However, the state's input in the public sphere caused the appearance of a 
peculiar feature whenever the state considered the repression of contenders to its 
authority. This central feature is the idea that 'nobody is beyond the law,' which 
has become the Moroccan state's interpretation of the Rule of Law. The banning 
of the Berber public assembly in Boutezikna was so justified525 as were the legal 
actions against Captain Adib526 and the newspapers Le Journal and Demain,527 
or the violent dispersion of unauthorised public demonstrations. The question of 
limiting public liberties is viewed through a different prism, in which the law 
needs to be respected. This interpretation assumes - to a certain extent - an 
uncritical public, which accepts the paternalistic connotation of the rules of 
society, 'ethical life' as defined by the state. Even the King has used this 
argument in his threats to the newspaper scene. It is remarkable that even the 
former president of the OMDH, Omar Azziman, confirmed the importance and 
validity of the law in the reform process. Those citizens, journalists, Berber 
activists, and military officers that are law-abiding and 'reponsible' have become 
new ideal-types that have resulted from the state's interference in the public 
sphere. 
524 On the 20 August 1999. Mohamed VI himself acknowledged the existence of forced 
disappearances, something that Hassan II had never admitted. 
525 Andre Azoulay, Economic and Diplomatic Adyisor to the King, interview with the author. 
Rabat, 30 May 2002. 
5~6 Omar Azziman, Minister of Justice, interview with the author, Rabat, 9 April ]002. 
5~7 Ibid. 
These new techniques of power are beyond direct repreSSIOn, and they 
contribute to the system's stability. It is considered here the new basis of the 
state's hegemony. In the new press code (March 2002), the sanctity of monarchy, 
army, and territorial integrity was maintained. It was even introduced and 
defended by Omar Azziman. At the same time, the effective authorisation of 
associations has undergone a reform. The 'receipt' of the declaration prealable 
has to be sent to the association at the very latest two months after the 
submission of the declaration. A preliminary receipt is supposed to be given to 
the association directly upon submission. The problem in Morocco, however, 
being the actual application of laws, it remains to be seen if this will in fact 
change the behaviour of the tenants of power in the administration. 
Together, these features account for what Mohamed VI called in his Royal 
discourse of 12 October 1999 the New Concept of Authority. He has not ceased 
to mention this new concept in his Royal speeches528 and he has given it 
different meanings at different times (relationship administration - citizens, 
reform of the election code, Berber culture, the responsibility of regional 
governors, walis, for investment). This new concept was originally based on '"the 
protection of public services, local affairs, individual and collective liberties, on 
the preservation of security and stability, the management of local concerns and 
the maintenance of social peace."S29 Within the authorities the King wished to 
find that "the responsibility of administrative offices will no longer be assumed. 
[To be responsible, the administration] must stay open to citizens, and [officials] 
must be in contact with them. Citizens' problems must be treated on the ground, 
and citizens must participate in the search for appropriate solutions."s3o This was 
interpreted by the Moroccan intellectual elite as signifying increasing political 
opening, accessibility of the administration, legality and rule of law, and finally 
partnership.531 The OMDH, however, remarks on 26 February 2000 
."i28See speeches on 12 October 1999; 29 October 1999; 30 July 200 1: 12 October 2001: 17 
October 2001; 19 January 2002. 
"2<) Royal Speech, 12 October 1999. 
530 Ibid. 
531 See for instance Azzedine Bennis: 'A propos du nouveau concept de I'autorite' in Altematil't's 
No.6, January 2000. 
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During the last months of the year, no concrete measure was 
taken to put into practice the Royal speech of 12 October. The 
OMDH has emphasised a number of violations, which again 
resulted from a repressive conception of authority. It has 
demanded the public authorities an exercise of power that is 
compatible with the respect of fundamental rights and liberties. It 
has proposed to the principal officials in the Minister of the 
Interior to hold a meeting to start a dialogue concerning this 
subject. On the 31 December the organisation has not received 
532 
any response. 
The independent press has been asking itself many times, what this new 
concept was meant to signify,533 but interestingly, the replacement of the 
Minister of the Interior, Ahmed Midaoui, in September 2001 was interpreted as 
resulting from his reluctance to embrace the full significance of this new 
philosophy.534 Shortly afterwards, the violent repression of a manifestation of 
unemployed graduates in Smara, on the 17 November 2001, continued to cast 
doubts over the state's willingness to embrace a new definition of authority as 
the monarch's speeches want Moroccans to believe.535 
Nevertheless, it was gIven a certain meamng In the Prime Minister's 
administrative circular from 5 November 1999 on the application of legislation 
relating to public liberties and associations of civil society. The four principal 
orientations that this circular recommended were: 
It considers associations, regardless of their nature, a necessary 
partner of the state. 
It advises Ministers and Secretaries of State to adopt a positive 
attitude concerning association's demands to use public halls. 
It reminds that internal activities of associations, trade unions, 
political parties, as well as cultural activities in the area of arts, 
sports, or welfare are not subject to a preceding declaration. 
5320MDH: 'Rapport sur la Situation des Droits de l'Homme au Maroc, 1999', (Rabat: 
~~fublished document 2000) p. 34. . . .,' , 
- For instance Le Journal Hebdomadmre, 16-22 June 2001, also OMOH. Oi\1DH. Ou en est la 
mise en oeuvre du nouveau concept de l'autorite,' Rabat, 26 February 2000. 
534L 'Economiste, 20 September 2001. 
5350MDH : 'Rapport de l'OMDH sur les evenements survenus it Smara Ie 17 novembre 2001.' 
(Rabat: unpublished Document. January 2002). 
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It emphasises the posItIve attitude that the administration 
should adopt concerning declarations that are concerned with 
h . fbi' l'b . 536 t e exerCIse 0 pu IC I ertIes. 
This illustrates that the New Concept of Authority is given the significance of 
a state-civil society partnership, in which the margins of public liberties, despite 
all the restrictions discussed above, are slowly increasing. It finds its limits in the 
perceived threat of anarchy, which is considered to lurk everywhere. Mohamed 
VI's definition of freedom illustrates this: 
But what is freedom? For me, it is the respect of others and the 
respect of the law. Freedom is not anarchy. Critique must be 
constructive, and must not be denunciation. Freedom of press 
does not mean to write whatever one wishes about whomever. 
One must write with respect to the facts, even if they are less 
exciting than the fantasies of those, who choose to criticise for the 
sake of criticising. But in Morocco, as elsewhere, the stubborn 
facts impose their own sanctions on those who want to ignore 
th 537 em. 
536Cited in OMDH: 'Rapport sur la Situation des Droits de \'Homme au Maroc, 1999,' (Rabat: 
un¥ublished document, 2000) p. 14. 
53 Interview in Le Figaro, 4 September .2001. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION - CIVIL SOCIETY, 
HEGEMONY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN MOROCCO 
After having referred to the empirical changes that happened in the civil 
society - state relationship in terms of Morocco's public sphere, it is the 
objective of this chapter to relate this development with the argument that I have 
formulated in the beginning of Chapter One. First of all, in the first section, I will 
briefly summarise the findings of each individual chapter in order to provide the 
basis for the conclusion of this thesis. 
In the second section, I will conclude by referring to the theoretical issues of 
Chapter One. First, I will elaborate on the effects that power relations have on a 
developing public sphere and suggest a certain convergence between these power 
relations and the public sphere's fragmentation. I do this in order to illustrate the 
importance of linking the public sphere to the issue of the state's hegemony, and 
in order to account for the interrelation of state and civil society. In a second 
step, I will show that it is not appropriate to view state-civil society relations in 
Morocco within dichotomy or integrative models. Instead, it will be argued, that 
it is the structuring of the public sphere, which shapes the possibility of 'new' 
groups of civil society to commit themselves to national issues. This structuring 
is considered to condition the possibility of the state to increase its hegemony. 
Therefore, the original research question whether 'new' groups of civil society 
constitute a factor of political change, will be answered with reference to the 
changing hegemony of the state, which is, indeed, the outcome of these groups' 
participation in agenda setting discourses. 
The third section of this chapter will discuss further research suggestions that 
result from the outcome of this study. 
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7.1 Section One: Chapter Summaries 
This thesis set out to illustrate how an active civil society and a political 
public sphere can challenge the state's hegemony. In the first chapter. I 
established the theoretical concepts on which I am basing this thesis, notably the 
concepts of 'civil society as opposition to the state' and/or 'civil society as an 
intermediary'. It was argued that understanding civil society in terms of public 
sphere provides an alternative to these more common understandings of civil 
society. In theoretical terms, I considered the public sphere as being a focus area 
from which to analyse both the state's and civil society'S role and involvement in 
discourses. It has been argued that this allowed a means of measurement of 
organisations of civil society in playing a supportive role in political change. 
Furthermore, it was argued that 'new' organisations of civil society, 
characterised by less and less structuring according to dominant modes of power 
(political parties, monarchy), became a new type of organisation of civil society. 
which subsequently have been the focus of this thesis. 
In Chapter Two, the literature survey illustrated that research on civil society 
in Morocco had so far reproduced a dichotomy view, which hindered, in my 
opinion, an understanding of state and civil society as being connected by a 
developing public sphere. It has been argued that this was essentially due to 
research having been conducted very early and in response to a developing civil 
society. which reflected an increasing research interest in this topic as well as a 
corresponding early activity of those 'new' organisations of civil society. 
Through the use of various historical examples in Chapter Three, it was 
subsequently shown that in pre- and post-colonial Morocco, groups of civil 
society were structured by dominant modes of power, and that the public sphere 
was deficient in that it could not articulate and transform social demands into 
public issues. The examples of religious challengers to the ruler of Morocco 
illustrated that it was the discourse of the 'righteous-man-of-god who defies an 
unjust Sultan,' which posed certain limitations on traditional Moroccan rulers. 
but that the 'ulema as an institution. essentially because of the absence of a 
notion of a public, was unable to provide for the basis for a public sphere. It has 
been argued that the political developments after independence also illustrated 
the inability of organisations of civil society to resist power relations, which 
were structured through inter-elite conflicts and neo-patrimonial rule. It was then 
suggested that the public sphere was not clearly developed either, as power 
relations were omnipresent and shaped particular organisations' activities. 
Chapter Four examined the changes that happened in the strategies of 'new' 
organisations of civil society in the mid-1980s until 1993. These organisations 
started to challenge old ties to power relations. It has been argued that the main 
novelty was that they focused on certain single-issues that left directly political 
questions outside of their activity. Furthermore, Chapter Four illustrated that it 
was this central feature that allowed these 'new' organisations of civil society to 
start shaping public discourses in the public sphere, despite their individual 
issues being 'classified' as politically, socially, or culturally 'sensitive'. It has 
been pointed out that this created a milieu of private citizens committed to public 
issues, which increased the public sphere's autonomy from power structures. As 
this had the effect of weakening the state's hegemony, it has been argued that the 
state sought to re-establish its hegemony through interacting in the discourse. 
Chapter Five examined more the recent developments of this civil society -
state interaction in the 1990s. It has been illustrated that various groups of civil 
society reacted towards the initial engagement in the public sphere as had been 
examined in Chapter Four. However, it has been pointed out that they displayed 
features specific to their particular field of action, and I identified a variety of 
strategies from 'self-limitation', 'increasing criticism', 'power-seeking' or 
'transformation' that these other sectors employed. Moreover, it was illustrated 
that one of the engines for mobilisation or autonomisation had been public 
conflicts, which had been pursued by these 'new' organisations of civil society. 
It has also been pointed out that this was accompanied by a diminishing 'moral' 
integrity of the state. This had the effect of these organisations' being able to 
more effectively intervene in the public sphere, which was increasingly 
accompanied by journalists pushing for more public freedom and critical 
journalism. At the same time. howcycr. the state's hegemony had increasingly 
been put into question through this participation: First, these discourses 
illustrated the existence of social groups that felt misrepresented and 
marginalized by the state. Second, the lack of 'attraction' of classes allied to the 
state was articulated. Third, in the public sphere, the existence of 'self-limited' 
discourses (compared with the former absence of them) questioned the ability of 
the state to provide political solutions to real-existing social realities. 
Focusing on the reactions of the state to the latest wave of increasing 
independence in the public sphere, Chapter Six examined the state's consequent 
direct engagement in the public sphere, as well as three distinctive strategies: 
boundary setting, integration and co-optation. It has been argued that the state's 
engagement in the public sphere, and its attempts at redefining critical parts of 
discourses, had been shaped and conditioned by one central factor: a discourse 
being homogeneous or conflictinglheterogeneous. It has also been illustrated that 
the state's engagement in the definition or integration of discourses had resulted 
in the state's adoption of some of the key-issues that had been involved. These 
were, for example, the question of 'political prisoners and disappearances' in the 
human rights discourse, changing the Family Code, MOlldawana, in the women's 
rights discourse, as well as the status of the Berber language tamazigh. Although 
the exact meaning of the latter two issues has not been resolved yet, the creation 
of advisory councils that deal with these issues points out that key-issues are 
continuously dealt with at the highest sphere of the state. The new King's 
introduction of a New Concept of Authority epitomised this cautious reaction of 
the state to the increasing importance of the public sphere, and its attempts, 
through a state-led discourse about a new role of the administration, to attract 
this new class of citizens to the Moroccan state. 
7.2 Section Two: Theoretical Considerations and Conclusion 
7.2.1 The preponderance of power relations in the structure of the public 
sphere and the public sphere's fragmentation 
The analysis of 'new' groups of civil society has illustrated that their action 
was embedded into the general political framework of appeasement between the 
opposition political parties and the monarchy. The development of this space 
between the state and society showed that a close association to existing power 
structures gave way to increasing independence, which started in the mid-1980s. 
This independence reinforced their 'neutral' and 'limited' character, and their 
successes in rallying public support for civil rights issues. This can be called a 
phase of disentanglement between prevailing power structures and groups of 
civil society. In what follows I suggest the utility of viewing this crucial instance 
of the development of civil society as indigenous to the interconnectedness of 
political power with groups of civil society. 
First of all, the effect of power structures on 'single issue' organisations 
needs to be explained. From the case studies analysed, it follows that 
associations' critical engagement in public issues had been inhibited, in so far as 
the 'political logic' of a certain political structure dominated the 'logic' of a 
particular single issue. Berber, human rights, and women's rights had not been 
represented and protected because they had been used in the political conflict 
between contestors of state legitimacy and the political elite. To a certain extent, 
the religious issue is an exception. Here, the most remarkable feature was the 
monopolisation of the religious discourse by the state, and not so much the 
'political logic' of political formations. This did not impair on the religious 
dimension of public life, but it had the effect of amplifying existing contradiction 
between a modem state form and a traditional religious discourse. Hence, 
although it aimed at representing religious interests, it had triggered altemati\"c. 
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independent associations, whose objective had been to remain independent from 
. . I' 538 eXIstmg power re atlOns. 
At a more theoretical level, political intervention took a form reminiscent of 
Habermas's description of state intervention in the capitalist economy. In order 
to maintain social and political stability, i.e. the maintenance of the status quo, 
politics took on a 'negative character' and was oriented towards the avoidance of 
risks and the eradication of dangers to the system: "not, in other words, towards 
the realization of practical goals but towards the solution of technical 
hi ,,539 A .. 'fi h .c: pro ems ssocIatlOns ust pus lor greater autonomy reflected their 
attempt to overcome the sphere of 'technical problems' (which are women's 
illiteracy, constitutional rearrangements, international declarations, rural 
development, public enforcement of fasting during Ramadan) and their search 
for the realisation of practical goals. This has been the reason why some authors 
have seen Morocco as an example where identity politics started to playa major 
role. 540 It is, however, more than identity that is at stake, but the drawing of 
demarcation lines between different kinds of politics. To borrow Habermas's 
terminology, the influence of 'administrative power' and 'instrumental reason' 
had 'colonised' the free expression of private interests in the public sphere and 
"the realm of symbolic interaction.,,541 In line with Habermas's 'optimism', 
however, the disentanglement is a reflection of knowledge, self-reflection, and 
an "emancipatory cognitive interest, which aims at the pursuit of reflection. ,,542 
It therefore allows for the creation and invention of alternative organisational 
forms. 
5381n this respect, contrary to Armando Salvatore contention that the image of 'Islam in 
movement' represented the antithesis of the persuasive strength of a public discourse that appeals 
to citizens' rationality and judgement, the Islamic movement shared features with Habermas 
model of public sphere as "the epitome of Western political modernity." See Armando Salvatore: 
Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997), p. xv. 
539 Jiirgen Habermas: Towards a Rational Society, trans I. by 1. Shapiro, (London: Heinemann, 
1971), pp. 102-3 
5.+0Bruce Maddy Weitzman: 'Contested Identities: Berbers, 'Berberism' and the State in North 
Africa' in The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 6, No.3, Autumn 200l. 
5.+ 1 David Held: Introduction to Critical Theory. Horkheimer to Habermas. (Cambridge and 
Oxford: Polity Press. 1990), p. 265. 
5.+2Jiirgen Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests. (London: Heinemann, 1971) pp. 19~-
198. 
Certainly, this is one aspect of 'modernising' features, which Morocco's 
society illustrates in abundance. The rise of 'the political' and the state's and the 
political parties' intervention in organisations of civil society ha\'e been part and 
parcel of this project of modernity, as has been the increasing accumulation of 
knowledge and self-reflection on the part of non-state actors. As the 
development of disentanglement illustrates, the one-sided nature of power, 
therefore, changed and since the early 1990s, it is possible to view power within 
the parameters of 'administrative power' and 'communicative power.' As 
illustrated in Chapter One of this thesis, this is the heart of Habennas' sIegal 
theory of state-civil society interaction. 
In the conclusion to the state's engagement in the public sphere (Chapter 
Six), I mentioned that the state's successful definition of boundaries, and some 
parts of the public spheres' open approval of these measures, illustrated the 
continuing existence of power relations. It is an indication of the lack of unity, 
and therefore the lack of 'communicative reason' that might be expressed here. It 
constitutes the basis for the state's strength concerning so-called 'sensitive' 
matters. This being the case, it needs to be taken into account that particular 
discourses, far from being expressions of a common 'people's will', have 
polarising tendencies, and are not universally agreed upon. They depend on the 
structural differences that exist in societies, which are greater in countries of 
rapid and unequal socio-economic and cultural development than elsewhere. In 
this context, 'communicative power' understood as a 'scarce good,' which is 
needed by state administrators, and which is only available through civil 
society's engagement in the public sphere,543 poses a special problem for the 
state, as it does not exist in a 'pure' and 'easily identifiable' fonn. It is, in itselt~ 
subject to struggles and challenges, and the state engages in them, though it is 
holding the means to realise the political goals of contestants. Therefore, the 
continuation of the existence of power relations needs to be understood as a 
result of one particular feature of the public sphere, which is the division of 
certain discourses. The unit of analysis needs to be changed from the nation-state 
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to the particular subplots, where discourses and communicative rationality. are 
constituted. With the central administrative power, however. remaining within 
the boundaries of the nation-state and, as Tripp illustrates, the state as an 
'imagined community' continues to be stronger than ever, the apparent division 
fd ' . b d . 544 o Iscourses IS oun to contmue. 
Therefore, the case of Morocco illustrates the importance of linking 
hegemony to the public sphere. The active attraction of allied segments of 
society with the state and its policies (and the marginalisation of other segments) 
has at its basis those discursive divisions that I have identified above. What is 
important, however, is to understand that the public sphere and its divisions are 
constantly evolving and not subject to direct state control. Because of the linkage 
between hegemony and the expressions in the public sphere, changes that happen 
through new actors' becoming active and engaging in agenda setting discourses, 
had important repercussions on the state's hegemony. In the examples discussed 
in the previous two chapters, there had always been allied segments of society, 
whose positions seemed to be threatened (culturally, economically. or politically) 
by these new non-state actors. This illustrates that the state's hegemony is 
threatened through the simple activity of new groups and consequently. these 
activities were considered as 'sensitive' (Berber and women's rights), 
'subversive' (human rights and Islamic groups) or 'disloyal' (business groups). 
However, as the 'allied' classes are also subject to changes, the state's handling 
of these issues changes as well. 
In a next step, the state may engage in the discourse without necessarily 
changing its contents. This needs explanation, and it is suggested here that this, 
again, needs to be understood as an attempt to bolster the state's hegemony in 
civil society. Habermas's argument, despite overlooking contradictory features, 
gives two reasons why this happens: First of all, the state takes on board the 
'communicative rationality' expressed in the public sphere in order to increase 
5-B Jiirgen Habennas: Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discours Theory of Law and 
Democracy. Translated by William Rehg (Cambridge l\tA, The l\tIT Press. 1996). Chapter 8. 
544Charles Tripp: 'States, Elites and the 'Management of Change" in Hassan Hakimian and Ziba 
Moshaver: The State and Global Change (Richmond: Surrey, Curzon Press, ~OO 1)_ 
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its legitimacy vis-a.-vis this particular clientele. Applied to Morocco, this means 
that the state takes on board the rationality expressed through women's rights, 
human rights and even Berber rights, in order to relegitimise in these areas or 
compensate for a loss of legitimacy elsewhere (unemployment, urban unrest, 
traditionalism). All of this expressed itself in a political situation that was 
marked by major uncertainties (alternance, economic crisis, succession) and by 
the new expression of these civil rights. One could say that 'communicative 
rationality,' became a new possible resource for increasing or consolidating the 
state's legitimacy. Second, and following the first step, when the state engaged in 
and committed itself to the public sphere, it had to abide to the rules that were 
established through linguistic encounters. These are, according to Habermas, the 
principles of free and egalitarian values, which determine the power of particular 
arguments in a public situation. Hence, instead of changing the discourse or 
giving it a patrimonial, authoritarian meaning, the state is opening itself to the 
logic of particular discourses, without reacting by forcefully determining its 
contents. Applied to Morocco, I have illustrated that the problem had been the 
absence of an identifiable discourse, and therefore the absence of a well 
expressed 'communicative rationality.' Nevertheless, in cases where unanimity 
existed (human rights), the state's engagement in discourses was unable to 
change the 'sensitive' areas (e.g. in the CCDH, the CCDH's reform to conform 
to the Paris principles for National Institutions). It is only when the unanimity is 
'broken' (that is human rights groups disagreement over actions and attitudes to 
adopt) that the state's potential at defining the contents reappear. On the other 
hand, in areas where unanimity was far from being established, the definition of 
discourses has either been impossible or delayed. In the case of women's rights, 
the state found itself in a difficult situation, as it aimed at engaging in the 
discourse, thereby increasing the 'allied classes' attraction to the state, whilst 
alienating already 'allied classes' within the state itself. This illustrates the nature 
of hegemony in Morocco, which is based on a complicated combination of 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic classes that may partly correspond to 
f ' d" l' d d 't ,545 universal models 0 tra ltIona Ism an mo eml y. 
545Entelis increases the cultural strands to four: monarchical. modernist. militarist. and 
messianic. See John P. Entelis: Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan politics (Boulder: 
West\it'w Press. 1989). Chapter One. 
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7.2.2 The representation of Morocco's civil society: Dichotomy vs. 
Integrative Models 
This analysis of civil society has illustrated that although 'new' groups of 
civil society have oppositional characteristics, apart from a few exceptions they 
are by no means 'in opposition' to the state. In fact, as most of them, though not 
all of them, display 'self-limiting' features, it is no longer the relation to the state 
which characterises their action or which motivates their commitment but rather 
their commitment to the issue itself. At the same time, paradoxically, some of the 
groups display opposition characters, whereas others tend more towards 
integration. This means that as a general model, the empirical material available 
suggests that neither dichotomy nor integrative models, are suitable for a valid 
representation of Morocco's civil society. In consequence, as general models, 
both need to be discarded. 
As I attempted to show, the importance of the public sphere is that it is less a 
relational concept between the state and civil society, and much more based on 
discursive interaction, which might take many different forms. The advantage is 
that a certain opposition and critique is one feature of this discursive interaction, 
however, it is not its sole feature. The contention that civil society is related to 
democratisation becomes a matter worthy of empirical investigation. A focus on 
the public sphere allows external observers to view the lack of real democratic 
challenges not as a lack of civil society's activity, but rather as a special feature 
of its activity. In fact, it was exactly the lack of opposition to the state that had 
been noted as one of the main features of civil society (see Chapter Four). 
Consequently, the lack of 'democratic opposition' stemmed from the non-system 
challenging aspects of these groups' demands. Without wanting to take one 
central feature of civil society as the very reason for its playing a system-
stabilising factor in a political situation still regarded as 'transitional,' its 
potential to push for transitions, which I still contend, needs to be explained 
using different parameters. In other words, the force for political change cannot 
be explained from features that civil society displays, but rather from 
autonomous rules that exist in developing public spheres, which these actors help 
establish. 
7.2.3 The New Rules a/the Public Sphere and the State's Hegemon:v 
The case studies illustrated the establishment of these new rules in the public 
sphere. The first one refers to the logic of change, which has been fonnulated by 
associations such as Alternatives, displayed by the actions of the anti-corruption 
association Transparency Maroc, and demanded by the CGEM in its demands 
for the 'economic rule of law.' As long as these demands, political as they are, 
are directed at others outside the centralisation of power around the monarchy, 
the centre is reinforced and allows the criticism, improving its modern and 
democratic image at the same time. When key actors in the state decided to 
change alliance-building groups, the state at times even committed itself to 
'partnership building measures.' This became a possible option because 
discourses were connected to organised groups of civil society. In Morocco, the 
state created working groups for employer-worker conflicts, human rights, 
unemployment, corruption, women's rights and Berber rights. At this point, 
however, the discourse and its existence in the public sphere were recognised. 
Consequently, it became less and less possible to suppress the discourse, because 
this would have caused widespread resistance against the state. At this point, 
civil society and the public sphere were already politicised enough to resist direct 
interference. The protest movements against the state's arrest of Berber militants 
in 1994 and Idriss Kaitouni in 1989 serve as examples. As I said before, a 
demarcation line between 'communicative power' and 'administrative power' 
developed, and activities in the public spheres, similar to Habennas's theoretical 
framework,546 aimed at defending the public sphere's values, based as they are, 
on equal participation and liberty. Consequently, with less direct intervention in 
the public sphere becoming possible, the demands for changes achieved, as a 
discourse, a life in its own right. As mentioned before, the state could only 
engage in the modalities of the changes, not in the question of whether changes 
5461iirgen Habennas: Bet\n~en Facts and Nonns. Contributions to a Discours Theory of Law and 
Democracy Translated by William Rehg (Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press. 1996), p. ro. Arato 
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were necessary or not. At this point, the hegemony of the state undergoes a 
crucial change. The successful adoption of new socio-political values challenges 
the basis of older policies, and questions the relevance of older discourses. 
7.2.4 The state's new basis of hegemony 
In this situation, the Moroccan state looked for a new discursive basis for its 
hegemony. Human rights, citizenship, and King Mohamed VI's invention of a 
New Concept of Authority are all signs of a new discursive basis, beyond King 
Hassan II's use of religion and his classic policies in favour of rural notables. As 
illustrated, in the search for a new basis for the state's hegemony the state 
attempted to commit itself to women's rights, but had to withdraw its support 
and change its approach due to well expressed and well organised resistance. 
Nevertheless, women's groups still seem to be high on the priority list of Royal 
preoccupation, and therefore the target group of discursive appeasement, as the 
recent introduction of a quota system for female parliamentary deputies 
illustrates. As with the Institute for Berber affairs, these are all measures that do 
not change the essential nature of the state's power, but aim at comforting certain 
key-groups. In Morocco, this has created an atmosphere and a discursive reality 
of change, where the centralisation of political power has not changed. 
From a scholarly viewpoint, the crux of the matter for a discursive 
establishment of the state's hegemony is located in the practice of newspaper 
journalists. As illustrated in this thesis, there is a certain defensive movement 
towards greater autonomy in the media, which is camouflaged by professional 
apoliticism and an interest in developing the profession. Nevertheless, the lack of 
liberal structures of information gathering and discussion leads to the copying of 
information and articles written elsewhere in the Moroccan press. According to a 
recent study, 70 percent of all journalists have difficulties in obtaining access to 
information.5~7 As the president of the journalists' union put it: '"In Morocco, 
information is sacred. If a train is late and you want to inquire the reason, you 
and Cohen: Civil Society and Political Theory (London and Cambridge, MA. The t-.IIT Press. 
1992),pp.523-532. 
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will be transferred from one responsible individual to the other, and nobody will 
ever tell you the reason. Even if it is only a train."548 The lack of editorial boards, 
in which decisions and editorials are discussed openly among journalists, has 
degraded the intellectual level of the profession. Especially in segments of the 
media that are still state-controlled, journalists have the status of bureaucrats. In 
a communication model, all this means that due to the lack of information , 
power-relations, which have already been established in those state-controlled 
media with special access to information, are constantly replicated. Nevertheless, 
the efforts that had been undertaken by the press and notably the SNPM, despite 
the setbacks explained with regard to the fate of Le Journal, point towards an 
increased autonomisation. It can be assumed that the disentanglement of press 
and political parties will continue as long as the so-called 'democratic' parties 
hold government positions. In the meantime, the power relations that structure 
the media are crucial for the hegemonic presence of the state in Morocco's 
public sphere. 
7.2.5 Civil Society and Political Change 
Morocco has achieved the re-establishment of the state's, the monarchy's, 
and the makhzen 's hegemony through an engagement in the language of change. 
As I have illustrated in this thesis from the beginning, the language used by 
groups of civil society had been to a large extent 'self-limited.' It had been part 
of their raison d 'etre to claim independence from political organisations, and to 
concentrate on the particular issue that they were promoting. Consequently, even 
when the issue had a political character, the state reacted 'positively' and did not 
view them as threatening. To the contrary, it aimed at establishing partnerships, 
and adopted certain aspects of the discourses that were initiated by these new 
groups of civil society. This had the consequence of establishing a public sphere, 
which in tum, criticised the continuing existence of neo-patrimonial practices 
outside the central exercise of political power. This helped broaden the agenda of 
national discussion, to which the state had to respond. This initial process 
54\lohamed Said and Youness M'jahid: Le Metier de Joumaliste all \Iaroc. Etude Quantitatin? 
(Rabat: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2000). 
548Younes Moujahid, Interview with the Author, Rabat. 2 \Iarch .2002. 
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accounted for the appearance of political change in a sphere that was analytically 
different from the sphere where the monarchy discussed the country's political 
future with the so-called 'opposition' parties. Political change, therefore, seemed 
to be achieved, but not at the level that an 'opposition to the state' might have 
wanted to. All parts of the state had emerged strengthened and reinforced, and 
divisions within the public can be - willingly or unwillingly - discursively 
exploited. As I have illustrated, the use of the state's monopoly over the 
legitimate use of violence was marked by both its selectiveness and by part of 
the public's support for these measures. Therefore, even here, the state's policies 
are far from aloof from discourses that are initiated in Morocco's civil society. 
To the contrary, they reflect them and take them into account. At the same time, 
as explained in the previous sub-section, the structuring of Morocco's public 
sphere had reinforced the pre-eminence of the state, and had the effect of 
perpetuating the state's ability to change its discursive hegemony whenever the 
political situation commanded it. 
Therefore, all of this shows that "the mere existence of so much infonnal 
political and economic activity does not suggest, per se, the presence of the kind 
of vibrant civil society which could be used to challenge the very existence of 
current Middle Eastern regimes, as it is said to have done in Eastern Europe at 
the end of the communist era.,,549 The parameters, within which political change 
was possible, depended on the prior structuring of the public sphere. 
Nevertheless, the public sphere as a sphere where increasingly private citizens 
engage in public issues is constantly evolving. In the long run, this might have 
'positive' effects concerning 'democratic governance, ,550 despite the fact that the 
general political framework for liberal democracy seems as far away as ever. 
549Roger Owen: 'The Middle Eastern State: Repositioning not Retreat'?' in Hassan Hakimian and 
Ziba Moshawr: The State and Global Change (Richmond: Surrey, Curzon Press, 2001). p. 245. 
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7.3 Section Three: Further Research 
In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regIOn, the role and 
significance of public spheres have not been subject to research. This may be 
explained with reference to the relatively young history of many of these states 
as well as the dominance, in domestic affairs, of institutions such as political 
parties, monarchies and religion. In recent times, however, the increasing 
activities of 'new' organisations of civil society in many of these states point to 
the lack of a systematic discussion about the nature of these groups and their 
relations to the dominant institutions in particular countries. An assumed linear 
relationship between civil society and democracy, and a certain wish to see 
Eastern Europe's experience in democratising repeating itself in the MENA 
region, may be the reasons for this. 
As a consequence, further research should focus more on the role that 
particular forms of public spheres and civil societies have assumed under 
different historical circumstances. A global distinction, as used in this thesis, 
between 'new' and 'old' organisations of civil society, may be a useful one, in 
historical as well as in contemporary studies. In particular, the form that 
particular discourses took in particular public spheres, should be subject to more 
historical research, in order to increase our understanding concerning issues 
related to governance in these countries. In this respect, this thesis's use of 
secondary literature in Chapter Three can only be considered a beginning, and it 
would be both desirable and useful to increase our knowledge of how, 
historically, discourses were or were not embedded in particular power relations. 
Apart from this, a comparative analysis with other MENA states, although 
highly problematic for reasons related to methodology, would also enhance our 
understanding of how political decisions and political processes work in this 
region. Questions such as whether there are distinct features that allow speaking 
of similar mechanisms, could clarify whether there is anything specifically' Arab 
550Which is. as Foley and Edwards well put it, the 'Ci\i! Society I' argument in contrast to 'Civil 
Society 11.' See Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards: 'The Paradox of Civil Society' in Journal 
of Democracv \'01. 7, No.3, July 1996. 
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post-colonial,' 'Islamic' or regional MENA about how these polities work. 
Equipped with more knowledge about these public spheres, political scientists of 
the region would also be able to communicate with their fellow political 
scientists about the general theories and models to be applied in comparatiYe 
politics. New concepts of public spheres, based on state and ciyil society 
interaction, would further social scientists' comprehension of the region, as well 
as help develop the analytical tools that can be applied elsewhere in comparatiYe 
politics. 
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